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U.S. MARINE CORPS. 1ST. DIVISION.

FINAL REPORT ON GUADALCANAL OPERATION.

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U.S. Marine Corps. 1st Division 767.351

ADQUARTERS, FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,

eet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif. A. b. No. 01720

l July, 1943.

From: To:

The Commanding General, First Marine Division.

The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

Subject:

Final report on Guadaleanal Operation. 2 v.5 7

Enclosure:

(A) Copy of Phase V of Subject Report.

l. In submitting the concluding portion of the reports on the Guadalcanal operation the undersigned desires to emphasize certain aspects of the operation and conclusions drawn by restating them in more concise and convenient form than was possible in the basic report.

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The Tulagi-Guadalcanal operation was an enterprise launched in the South Pacific at a critical time in the summer of 1942. Repulsed in the Coral Sea and again at Midway the enemy seemed prepared for a third attempt to sever sea communications between Australasia and the American continent. This fresh effort, less dramatic than its forerunners, was apparently to take the form of a steady, step by step, progression down the islands of the Solomons chain to reach and destroy our bases in the New Hebrides and New Caledonia. The decision of the United Nations to attach was based upon larger reasons unknown to this headquarters, reasons of the most compelling nature, it must be presumed, for seldom has an operation been begun under more disadvantageous circumstances.

## Time Element

The most important circumstance which militated against the probability of a successful outcome of the venture was the limited time available. This element affected the operation adversely in many ways.

There was not sufficient time for the necessary reconnaissance, study and inter-theatre liaison necessary for sound planning.

There was not sufficient time to plan, organize and conduct a methodical combat loading of the ships making up the transport pup. The loading operation at Wellington would have been a fantic and complicated task under the best of conditions; its accessful completion under the conditions actually existing was remarkable feat. Seemingly insuperable, its accomplishment is

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attributable largely to the extensive embarkation experience gained by the Marine Corps in the preceding twenty years of fleet maneu-

vers, expeditions and small operations,

There was not sufficient time for the necessary related planning by the commanders and staffs of the forces involved. Commander Task Force 62, in immediate charge of operations, did not reach New Zealand until 15 July. Commander Landing Force had no opportunity to confer with commanders of supporting naval task forces until the attack force was assembled off Koro on the eve of sortie. As a result the landing force plan of operations was formulated without detailed knowledge of the plans of higher and supporting commanders. This was most undesirable from the point of view of all concerned. But it was unavoidable, for the embarkation of a landing force involves the making of decisions irrevocable in character and, to be completed at all, this particular embarkation had, of necessity, to be begun forthwith.

The direct consequence of this unilateral form of planning was the absence of a complete meeting of the minds of the commanders concerned. For example, from the landing force point of view, the undertaking was planned and executed as a normal amphibious operation premised upon a firm control of sea and air by our naval forces. The latter however regarded the enterprise more in the nature of a large scale raid or hit and run operation as in fact it proved to be. Had this same conception been entertained from the outset by all of the forces involved it would have afforded us an opportunity to modify normal planning by adjusting it to the special circumstances. This in turn would have served to alleviate many of the misunderstandings which later arose with

respect to supply and general logistics.

There was not sufficient time to train for and rehearse the operation. The fact that the landing force elements had not reached a particularly high state of training made it desirable to hold a thorough training and rehearsal period before undertaking the actual attack. This was recognized, but the area (Koro Island) was most unsuitable for actual landings due to the obstacle presented by the unbroken expanse of fringing coral. From the point of view of the landing force the Koro rehearsal provided nothing beyond a valuable period of debarkation training and, in view of the rapid increase of enemy activity in the Solomons, the wisdom of devoting priceless time to such limited advantage apbeared dubious. This in no way detracts from the fact that rehearsals are of prime importance but they must be proper renearsals made under conditions closely approximating the actual operation and permitting the landing of troops and the enactment of the scheme of maneuver. With more time available a more suitable rehearsal area could have been selected,

The foregoing is submitted solely to reemphasize the importance of the time element in the planning of amphibious operations and is in no sense a criticism of others. It is well understood



that in this operation the time factor was paramount and that to insure success it had to be carried out at the earliest possible moment regardless of the disadvantages incident to haste and improvision.

## Organization and Training of an Amphibious Force

A vast amount of doctrinal and procedural material relating to amphibious operations has recently appeared from various Some of it is valuable; some of it is so impractical as to be utterly meretricious; nearly all of it is unnecessary. Its origin springs from the effort to correlate on paper the functions of two forces which belong together in fact. Until this fundamental fact is appreciated there will be little actual progress in this branch of warfare. An amphibious force must be organized and trained as a permanent unit rather than a provisional grouping of forces for a specific task. Landing force units should be definitely assigned to specified ships of the transport group and should be embarked for extended periodic training. Only by this close and continued association between corresponding naval and marine commanders can there be the full development of the striking power of the sea-borne landing force. The transport group and the landing force should find a common superior in a force commander provided with a combined staff capable of finalizing the many problems of amphibious warfare which still await solution.

In themselves these problems are not difficult but they are of a joint nature and cannot be solved independently. At the present time attack transports and cargo carriers are employed on administrative troop and supply movements. Meanwhile Marine Corps elements are engaged in training ashore with infrequent opportunity to perfect themselves in their major combat function. It is therefore recommended that attack transports and cargo carriers be withdrawn from administrative service and be assembled for training with the several harine divisions in order that both may devote themselves to the solution of common problems in preparation for operations which must inevitably come.

## Common Problems

Cooperation.— Essential teamwork between transport and landing team commanders can be obtained only by operational practice. Each ship presents an individual problem due to variations in structure and boats but, given opportunity, the landing team will adapt itself readily to the ship. For example at Wellington it was possible to emark 2nd Bn, 5th Marines in USS Neville which had embarked the same battalion for training on the Atlantic Coast on previous oceasions. Embarkation, shake down and subsequent operations proceed with the utmost order and despatch. Other battalions assigned to strange ships required twice the Neville's period for embarkation and loading and throughout the operation never acquired the Neville's smoothmass and teamwork.

The only difference was familiarity with the ship.

Transport Training. Transports as well as Marines require training and practice in the actual functions of embarkation, snip to shore movement and the landing of supplies. This cannot be gained in administrative carrying operations. For example, in the Melbourne area, HMAS Manoora was assigned this division as a training transport. She repeated a series of elementary landing exercises seven times in ten weeks each time embarking a different landing team of the division. Strange to her work, she required 21 hours to put ashore the landing team supplies on the first exercise. The time was reduced steadily with each successive attempt until ontthe final exercise she landed the same quantity of supply in 6 hours. Improvement in embarkation and boat operations was equally remarkable.

#### Supply

The supply problem requires training and planning by the landing force, the transport force and the amphibious force commander. Independent efforts will lead only to misunderstanding. The matter is of vital importance and it is unfortunate that there has arisen such a confusion of thought with respect to it on the part of those who have had only limited connection with the actual conduct of training and operations. The great problem is of course the quantity of supply to be taken; this cannot be fixed and absolute but must be determined by a careful balance of factors entering into each specific operation.

Supply Training. - The quantity of supply which can be landed and dispersed within a given period of time and employing a given amount of labor can be doubled or trebled if transport crews and shore parties are trained in their duties.

This division embarked for the Guadalcanal operation only those supplies utterly necessary to live and to fight. Baggage, bedding, seabags, extra clothing, tentage and camp equipment were entirely eliminated. Post exchange supplies were limited to soap, digarettes and razor blades. Ammunition was reduced from 20 units to ten, rations from 90 to 60 days. No sacrifice was spared which would increase the initial combat efficiency and landing rate of the division yeth solely by reason of the shortage of shipping space much valuable equipment had to be left behind.

In future operations the division will continue this policy of reduction and carry it still farther as experience teaches us to distinguish between the essential and non-essential. But it must be pointed out that troops cannot be espected to exist indefinitely on short rations and utterly devoid of the necessities of life and some provision for the minimum comfort and standards of decency.

In planning future operations we must decide at the outset:

Shall the landing force be self sustaining as initially embarked or shall it carry only a bare minimum to be supplemented later? This is a basic decision for the amphibious force, but one in which the landing force is also vitally concerned. If the force is to be self sustaining for a considerable period of time the naval forces must be prepared to remain on the scene for the length of time necessary to complete unloading. If only a minimum of supply is to be landed initially there must be an orderly plan for supplementary shipment.

In the Guadalcanal operation this division embarked supplies in quantity sufficient to insure independence of action for a considerable period with the expectation that the transports would not depart prior to D plus 4 day. However, unloading operations ceased for all practical purposes on D plus 1 day. Supplementary shipments were not begun for a considerable period of time and until October were most irregular. As this method of supply had not been foreseen the division had made no provision for a rear echelon adequate to procure, classify and embark stores in accordance with planned requirements. An improvised organization was created in New Caledonia but it was not under division control nor responsive to divisional needs.

If this method of supply is to be used in future operations it must enter into the supply calculation of the operation as a whole. The following would then be the essential features of the plan of supply:

1. Amounts of equipment and supply to be embarked initially as affected by:

Probable rate of unloading.

Maximum period transports will remain in area.

2. Tonnage and frequency of subsequent shipments.

3. Priorities to be assigned in embarking equipment, materials and supplies for supplementary purposes.

4. Provisions of a landing force rear echelon or supply service sufficient to forward supplies in accordance with plan.

This method of supply has many advantages and may be superior to any other. However, it implies continuous control of the line of sea communications and likewise has the effect of delaying the development of the full striking power of the landing force pending arrival of successive supply increments.

## Lessons and Conclusions

Battalions should be practiced in landing operations at every opportunity without regard to state of training.

Reinforced regimental landings are necessary to provide training in shore party operations and as a test of the sufficiency of standing procedure with respect to supply debarkation. Battalion landings do not provide adequate training in supply and shore party operations.

The regimental combat team should be embarked in a transport division of 4 APA's and one AKA. If a large APA is available for

the regimental headquarters group it may be possible to disperse with the AKA.

The division requires a support group of 2 APA's and 3 AKA's to embark supporting units.

A division headquarters ship is likewise required to embark command elements of the landing force and amphibious force. Ample communication facilities for this ship are most essential.

A minimum planning period of six weeks should precede embarkation for combat. A much larger period would be desirable.

It is essential to employ amphibious patrols to secure information of enemy forces and to verify information obtained from photographic reconnaissance. This division now has a force of amphibious scouts trained for this purpose.

Use of persons possessing a detailed familiarity with the area of operations as guides and terrain advisers is of the utmost importance. The services of those who participated in this operation in such capacities were of great value..

Maps and photographs must be provided and reproduced in quantity sufficient for wide distribution.

Upon embarkation the attack force should conduct a series of complete and thorough rehearsals of the intended landing.

Before entering combat all officers who do not appear to possess the requisite ability should be relieved of command. It is better to enter combat with a limited shortage of officers than to be faced with the necessity of relieving the incapable in the presence of the enemy.

A comparison of the several landings leads to the inescapable conclusion that landings should not be attempted in the face of organized resistance if, by any combination of march or maneuver, it is possible to land unopposed and undetected at a point within striking distance of the objective.

The organization for landing, the technique of ship-to-shore movement, landing craft and special landing equipment developed in the ten years prior to the war were found satisfactory to a degree beyond expectation.

The operation did not involve a real test of methods of controlling ship's gunfire by shore based fire control parties. However, nothing developed during the operation to indicate the need for any fundamental changes in doctrine.

On every occasion our troops proved themselves superior to the Japanese in actual combat. Their great deficiency was inadequate physical training and hardening prior to combat. An important secondary deficiency was the failure of small patrols to operate effectively. This was corrected in late phases, but precombat training proved definitely inadequate.

While the division as a whole was made up largely of green troops with inexperienced company officers, it should be observed that battalion commanders and higher ranks consisted of thoroughly experienced and capable officers on whose shoulders rested the major burden of planning, organizing and directing operations,

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Operations in general pointed to the fact that insufficient training had been conducted in close and difficult country approximating jungle terrain. Large sections of the divisional training area in New River were ideally suited for this purpose but were generally neglected in favor of open terrain.

Troops in training must be made to live hard and to march long distances by day and night through unfavorable terrain. Ease and comfort in training periods will lead to excessive losses in combat.

Care of the feet, including daily foot inspection by junior officers, is particularly essential in jungle warfare. In one instance during this period one battalion had 159 ineffectives due to minor and entirely avoidable foot ailments.

Troops must be trained to preserve their clothing and equipment. This is an important disciplinary problem and its only solution is constant inspection followed by disciplinary action.

Tanks were employed with some success on two occasions. An analysis of these actions includes:

- (a) That the jungle is generally unfavorable for tank action.
- (b) That tanks in small numbers can operate effectively in areas occupied by coconut plantations.
- (c) That the tanks must operate at slow speed and with extremely close infantry support.
- (d) That wherever possible medium tanks should be employed due to the extreme vulnerability of the light models.

It was necessary to employ pioneers and engineers on infantry missions. The results clearly vindicated the Marine Corps policy of thorough training of such units in weapons and tactics.

There appeared a distinct need for regularly organized air support parties to accompany ground forces for liaison and control purposes in connection with the use of supporting aircraft.

The lack of adequate maps and photographs was a distinct handicap which continued throughout the entire period of our occupation of Guadalcanal. A recommended future procedure:

- (a) Designation of an aerial photography unit to take photographs in accordance with exact landing force requirements.
- (b) Direct liaison between landing force and designated photographic unit.
- (c) Photography unit to supply negatives and six prints of every photograph taken and to furnish mosaics, including copying camera negatives, of all mosaics so provided.
- (d) Landing force photolitho unit to reproduce photographs and mosaics in quantity for unit distribution.

The presence of a limited number of qualified interpreters to translate enemy documents and examine prisoners of war was of great value in ascertaining enemy intentions and in studying his habits of combat.

The landing reemphasized the vital nature of the logistical problem presented by the ship-to-shore movement of supplies. As had been foreseen, the Pioneer Battalion proved inadequate in size LIBRARY

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to cope with the tremendous burden placed upon it. Adequate supplementary labor must be provided. It is considered that there must be available to the shore party on the landing beach additional personnel in the proportion of at least 100 men for each vessel discharging cargo across the beach.

For this operation 60 days' supply and 10 units of fire were embarked. While these amounts represented reductions of 33% of supplies and 50% of ammunition as compared to the normal levels of 90 days and 20 units they nevertheless proved somewhat excessive from the point of view of immediate requirements. Only a fraction of these supplies were actually landed; that this fraction proved inadequate in no way detracts from the conclusion that amounts actually embarked were somewhat excessive.

In view of the foregoing the following recommendations are submitted:

- (a) That not to exceed thirty days' supply, 10 units of fire, and 50 days' rations be embarked.
- (b) That only half this material be landed initially and that the transports clear the area on D plus 1 day.
- (c) That AKA's carrying the remainder of the supplies be withheld from the danger area initially and that, beginning on D plus 2 day, they be committed singly or in pairs at regular intervals to permit orderly unloading and to reduce the target offered to hostile aircraft.

A determined low level or dive bombing attack on the landing beach may prove ruinous unless supplies are promptly cleared to dispersed dump areas. Likewise great attention must be paid to the rapid establishment of a strong anti-aircraft defense of the landing beach.

No supplies should be packed in pasteboard containers.

Security for supply dumps is to be found in wide dispersion rather than overhead cover. Second only to the foregoing is the necessity for limiting the height of stacks of inflammables to a maximum of two feet instead of the normal six feet as the maximum density of fragments of the enemy personnel bomb appears in a sheaf extending horizontally and about three feet above ground impact level. These fragments have an incendiary effect. As rapidly as possible dumps should be placed below ground level.

To the greatest extent possible ammunition should be loaded on vehicles and amphibious tractors prior to embarkation. This will permit a large proportion of the initial ammunition supply to be landed with maximum speed and minimum exposure.

To reduce waste and wanton destruction, orders should be issued prior to the landing covering the disposition of captured materiel.

The absence of sufficient defensive material was a severe handicap. None was landed initially and only small amounts were received in subsequent shipments of supplies. It is recommended that a higher landing priority be assigned to a small portion of

such materiel. As a result of this experience the present standing operating procedure of this division prescribes that ten (10) per cent of such supplies shall be assigned landing priority "X"-Variable" (i.e. so embarked as to be accessible for landing on call at any time during the ship to shore movement).

A proportion of the defensive wire carried by the division should be of the prepared concertina type. It will often be necessary to pass to the defensive on such short notice as to preclude erection of double apron fence prior to attack. Wired in defenses are highly desirable particularly in the event of night attack. This division contemplates carrying sixty (60) per cent concertina in all future operations.

The failure to land engineer equipment and machinery severely handicapped our efforts to complete the airfield and its defenses. Construction equipment and personnel are not a luxury but an absolute necessity in modern warfare. Bridging equipment is particularly necessary.

Since it is obvious that the enemy will always resort to night attack there is an urgent need for night illumination material in defensive operations. This should take the form of parachute flares for illuminating beaches and a hand thrown flare for illuminating the immediate foreground of jungle positions.

While equipment employed in the landing proved generally satisfactory, the amphibian tractor demonstrated a usefulness exceeding all expectations. Some of the initial missions assigned were transporting bridging material from ship to erection site direct, ammunition carrier, prime mover for 105mm guns, bridge pontoons and ambulance. These missions were executed early in the operation under conditions of terrain which preculded the use of tracks. The amphibian thus made a vital contribution to the operation by its performance of diverse missions beyond the capacity of conventional vehicles. It proved proof against the fire of enemy .25 calibre weapons in one instance where a tractor was employed to attack a cave on Gavutu. It is to be observed that this was an emergency undertaking only as it is not considered that the tractor is a tactical combat vehicle.

Reproduction equipment will always be needed. It should be brought in with the second echelon. Little reliance can be placed on obtaining cartographic assistance from rear areas.

All types of Marine Corps combat transportation proved highly satisfactory. The superiority of our 4-wheel drive equipment over the 2-wheel drive type of Japanese truck was most apparent.

Arms and equipment, while satisfactory for landing operations, are in general too heavy for jungle operations. Troops must be taught to strip down to bare essentials and travel on light rations; patrols must be specially armed and equipped in accordance with the terrain and type of resistance to be encountered. Specific recommendations are:



- (a) Carry only 40-60 rounds per rifleman with proportionate reductions for the BAR and light machine gun.
- (b) A limited system of selective or optional armament permitting the following substitutions for special occasions:

Light machine guns for heavy machine guns. 60mm mortars for 81mm mortars.

Increased number of submachine guns and carbines. required by close terrain.

Sufficient machetes to issue one per man when required.

- (c) The "C" ration is too bulky and the "D" ration unsatisfactory for extended patrols. Proops must be trained to live for considerable periods on individually prepared rations of rice, bacon, raisins and coffee.
- (d) This ration should be varied and supplemented by airplane drops of canned fruit and "C" ration at intervals of four or five days.

(e) Two canteens are necessary.

- (f) Blankets are not required in tropics; men should carry only the shelter half or poncho.
- (g) Make preparations in advance for airplane drops of ammunition and medical supplies in the event of a serious action.
- (h) Organize natives as carrying parties as soon as possible after landing.

Prior to the Solomons operation some doubt was entertained as to the practicability of employing 105mm artillery in jungle warfare in view of its lack of mobility. It is now considered that this weapon has a definite place in future operations in the Pacific. Since large scale operations will almost invariably center around the seizure or defense of installations on or near the sea, ramp boats and amphibian tractors can be employed to move artillery. In this same connection it should also be noted that the coastal terrain of the Pacific islands often includes areas of flat ground permitting free movement of guns and normal prime movers. superior effectiveness of this weapon and its desirable ballistic characteristics were clearly demonstrated on the night of 13 Sep-It is considered highly desirable that these advantages be retained by continuing to include this type of artillery in all large operations.

A major landing operation such as the Guadalcanal-Tulagi attack will be followed by a period of minor operations for purposes of defense, mopping up, and seizure of small outlying bases. To accomplish these tasks successfully landing equipment must remain available to the landing force for tactical purposes. During the entire Guadalcanal operation the use of attached landing craft for tactical purposes was, of necessity, subordinated to their administrative employment in the unloading of supply vessels. Likewise the few APD's available were usually assigned to escort duty for which they were ill adapted. Three were lost

While on such duty during the period covered by this report. These factors had an extremely adverse effect on the conduct of the entire operation. Only limited operations involving the use of small numbers of craft could be planned. In repeated instances it was necessary to cancel planned operations due to the unexpected arrival of supply vessels or non-availability of APD's. To execute the Tasimboko landing, for example, it was necessary to shuttle the raiding force from Lunga in two echelons, a procedure which exposed the advance force to the danger of defeat in detail. Future operations should make provision for a force of landing craft and APD's to remain with the landing force at all times for purely tactical missions.

The enemy demonstrated a high state of training with respect to night operations. Movement and control were excellent. However, he underestimates the disadvantages occurring in this type of attack, particularly with respect to the effectiveness of the prearranged night fires of the defense. To preserve direction he followed the conventional practice of moving dense columns of infantry along terrain lines leading to the objective. These were interdicted as a matter of course by the deep supporting fires of our artillery and mortars. In consequence severe losses were inflicted upon many enemy columns during the approach march.

The enemy revealed certain specific weaknesses which were repeated again and again. These were:

(a) Lack of perception.

(b) Careless disregard of security measures.

(c) Fondness for the tactically dramatic "Bushido."

- (d) Lack of intelligence and initiative—as individuals, or in groups without formal leadership the Japanese soldier displayed tenacity and a willingness to die on the spot but no capacity to take independent action to redeem his situation.
- (e) Lack of combat discipline as demonstrated by their general habit of keeping and carrying diaries together with operation orders and other documents into action. This weakness provided a valuable and never failing source of information.

(f) Faulty reconnaissance.

A. A. VANDEGRIFT.

# DIVISION COMMANDER'S FINAL REPORT ON GUADALCANAL OPERATION

PHASE V

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First Marine Division,
Fleet Marine Force,
C/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California.

DIVISION COMMANDER'S FINAL REPORT ON THE GUADALCANAL OPERATION

PHASE V (18 September - 5 December)

## Situation at Beginning of Period

The period begins with the arrival of the 7th Marines (reinforced) from Samoa on 18 September. The return of this fine and highly trained regiment marked the first occasion that the division had ever been concentrated at full strength.

This accretion in force required us to reexamine and readjust our plans in accordance with improved circumstances and in the light of lessons learned from the bitter fighting of mid-September. Ten infantry battalions and one raider battalion were now available on Guadalcanal, these were supported by four battalions of artillery, a nearly complete defense battalion, a small provisional tank battalion and a growing air force.

In re-disposing forces the enemy capabilities were carefully analyzed. Whereas initially the hostile course of action most dangerous to us appeared to lie in his ability to attempt a forced lodgment against our beach defenses employing armored landing craft supported by overwhelming naval gunfire it now appeared that his opportunity to pursue this course was greatly reduced. There were still large concentrations of troops and shipping at Rabaul but the strength and demonstrated proficiency of our small air force henceforth would make it difficult to approach Guadalcanal with slow moving transports and landing craft carriers without exposure to devastating losses from the air. It likewise seemed probable that the enemy would continue to follow his established doctrine of unopposed landings followed by overland assaults.

The fact that air power now confined him to small infiltration landings by night added weight to the conclusion that beach defense had now become a matter of secondary importance by night and of negligible importance by day and that, defensively, our major effort should be directed toward an improvement of our inland defenses. The revised plan of defense was as follows:



To continue the defense primarily by aircraft action and secondarily by the establishment of a perimeter defense of Lunga Point.

To employ only special units on beach defense, reserving the infantry of the division for inland positions.

To establish strong reserves to permit rotation of units on front line duty and to provide a striking force for offensive operations and counterattack.

## Establishment of the Lunga Point Perimeter

Division Operation Order No. 11-42 of 19 September (Annex A) directed the organization of a complete perimeter defense subdivided into 10 sectors. Three were beach defense sectors manned by the Pioneer Battalion, Amphibian Tractor Battalion and Engineer Battalion. The inland portion of the perimeter was divided into 7 infantry battalion sectors. of the latter were assigned to each infantry regiment while the remaining one was retained immediately under division in order to effect certain economies in supply and to facilitate communication and control. This method of subdivision enabled each infantry regiment to hold a battalion in reserve under regimental control but available to division for the support of an engaged flank. One infantry battalion (3rd Bn. 2nd Marines taken from the Tulagi garrison on 14 September) and the Raider Battalion (with attached elements of 1st Parachute Battalion) were held in division reserve at all times although one battalion had initially to be assigned to the battalion sector retained under division control. While this represented a small division reserve it could be quickly augmented by employing the reserves of regiments occupying quiet sectors.

There was likewise a great administrative advantage in this regrouping of forces. By placing the Pioneer, Engineer and Amphibian Tractor Battalion on beach defense assignments they would be conveniently located with respect to their usual areas of employment and, since daylight beach defense was no longer a factor, they could be employed administratively by day and tactically by night when necessary. This arrangement proved a highly practical solution of the beach defense problem.

The perimeter was regarded as a final defensive position only, as it was expected that, by passing to the active defense the enemy could be denied the crossings of the Matanikau on the west and the Ilu on the east. To the west it was anticipated that by eventually establishing an advanced battle position on the Matanikau an approaching force could be contained there for a period sufficient to move a larger maneuver element overland to strike at the enemy's exposed

inland flank or, by a shore-to-shore movement, to offect a landing in his rear. To the east the wide grassy plains beyond the Ilu permitted the employment of tanks and facilitated the rapid movement of infantry and artillery. In an engagement in this area the enemy would be forced to meet us by day in open country, an opportunity we greatly desired.

There was, however, no real solution to the problem of active operations to the south. The broken terrain and heavy jungle of the upper Lunga impeded movement and development of the attack. The only practical scheme for an active defense in this area appeared to be a movement of lightly equipped forces south along the Tenaru to Kiarokiki thence west to strike the right flank of a hostile column moving down the Lunga. (See Annex B Trail Map). One advantage occured to us. To reach the upper Lunga the enemy would be forced to make a circuitous approach from the west over terrain so bewildering as to beggar description. He would thus be presented at the outset with almost insurmountable supply problems and faced with the necessity of attacking with forces fatigued and shaken by their long trek.

This decision to maintain a continuous perimeter defense entailed acceptance of the disadvantages resulting from dispersal of forces over a long and thinly held front. The only alternative consisted of the establishment of a series of horse shoe defensive positions east, south and west of Lunga Point. This offered the advantage of economy of force but its success would depend entirely upon the accuracy and sufficiency of our information of the enemy. The abundance of cover, however, reduced the effectiveness of aerial and ground reconnaissance and with respect to the latter we were still laboring under the handicap of inexperience. In consequence the hazards of being taken at a disadvantage were considered so great as to necessitate rejection of the horse shoe defense despite its manifest advantages. Somewhat the same effect resulted, however, from our practice of holding inactive sectors with light forces while strongly reinforcing threatened points elsowhere on the perimeter and by the construction of switch positions to permit temporary contractions on our front. (Operation Overlay to Annex A). There was never any occasion to regret the decision to employ the perimeter type of defense and on one occasion at least it saved us from a disastrous surprise.

## The Defensive Establishment

The type of fixed defenses to be established along the inland perimeter was the cause of great concern. It was naturally desired to organize in depth but the dense vegetation limited the mutual support of weapons to a few yards and the improvement of interior fields of fire would entail a tremendous and prohibitive labor. A continuous main line of



resistance was established. Its trace followed the hills and ridges west of the Lunga. It included all commanding ground and wherever possible it was sited to take advantage of the fields of fire afforded by a number of open, grassy, ridges. East of the Lunga the line dascended and crossed Edson's Ridge which parallels the river then dropped abruptly to a dense jungle flat extending to the Tenaru, a natural line of defense to the east.

Along the ridges organization in depth was possible but in the jungle flats the position was little more than a line laboriously scratched through the maze of tropical vegetation. Fields of fire were the first consideration but in the dense growth they were necessarily limited. Field fortification took the form of individual fox-holes and splinter proof emplacements for automatic arms. In these latter the line was particularly strong as many additional weapons were emplaced in order to compensate for the lack of infantry strength. The front was completely wired in, eventually with two bands of double apron fence supplemented by low trip wires between the bands. Large stocks of ammunition and rations were placed on positions and steps were taken to make them self-sustaining in the event of a breakthrough resulting in a disruption of supply routes. In covered areas great reliance was also placed on small local reserves held mobile for reinforcement or counterattack.

Admittedly this was a cordon defense of the worst type except in the comparatively few open areas where organization in depth was practicable. However, the cordon defense afforded certain advantages which it was highly desirable to obtain. These were as follows:

- (a) It permitted assignment of unusually long unit frontages.
- (b) It enabled us to place a tremendous fire power in support of the main line of resistance.
- (c) Continuity of the defenses denied the enemy the use of small operational gaps for the employment of his favorite infiltration tactics.

On the other hand the great disadvantage of the cordon defense, namely its vulnerability to and intensive concentration of artillery as a preliminary to breakthrough, did not apply in this area. This for the reason that the Japanese artillery had conclusively demonstrated a lack of efficiency and a low order of professional technique. This reduced but did not eliminate the danger of a rupture of our lines. There still remained the possibility of a rupture by the surprise night attack of overwhelming infantry forces operating on a narrow front. However, our experience at the Tenaru and in mid—September lead us to believe that the Japanese entertained a faulty conception as to the effectiveness of modern fire



power, that our troops were steady and reliable with growing confidence in their ability to throw back the enemy's fanatical assaults and that such tactics would fail completely against positions which were thoroughly organized and wired in.

## Second Action Along the Matanikau

The construction of the perimeter defenses involved a long period of labor by large number of troops. Until completed there would be no large forces available for offensive operations: Minor operations pursuant to the mid-September defeat of the enemy indicated that he was still present in considerable force in the area to the west of. Lunga Point and that detachments of survivors and stragglers were drifting slowly to the west. Lacking the force to hold it permanently it was decided to dominate the area to the west by a series of small operations designed to clear the area of small forces and to prevent larger forces from consolidating within striking distance of our positions. The first such operation was to be undertaken by the 1st Bn 7th Marines (Puller) and was to consist of an advance to the west along the northern slopes of Mambula thence west of the Matanikau to investigate the territory between that river and Kokumbona. This operations was to begin on 23 September and was to be completed by 26 September. On the latter date a second operation was to commence. It was to consist of an advance to the west by the Raider Battalion (Griffith) to establish a temporary patrol base at the village of Koku-bona which is situated at the point where several important inland trails intersect the main Government Track along the coast.

LtCol. Puller's battalion encountered its first serious resistance shortly before sunset on 24 September when a strong enemy force was surprised at its rice fires in a bivouac on the northwest slopes of Mambula. An attack was driven home without delay and the enemy force was defeated. Darkness enforced a cessation of the attack and the enemy withdrew after burying many of his dead and recovering his wounded. The enemy losses were consequently indeterminate but from a count of graves and unburied dead they greatly exceeded our own casualties of 7 dead and 25 wounded.

To assist in the evacuation of these wounded a strong column from 2nd Bn, 5th Marines (McDougal) joined Col. Puller on the following day and the operation was continued with a mixed force. Two companies of the 1st Bn, 7th Marines returned with the wounded. Progress was slow due to the broken terrain but on 26 September the column reached the Matanikau and turned north following the route along the east bank of the river. Before reaching the government track along the coast the battalion was subjected to heavy mortar fire from the vicinity of Matanikau Village and it was obvious that the



high ground on the west bank of the river was held in some strength. Artillery fire based on concentrations previously plotted and registered for defensive purposes and aircraft were employed to support an attack of the infantry but all attempts to cross the river were unsuccessful. Meanwhile the Raider Battalion which had reached the vicinity enroute to Kokumbona was directed to join forces in preparation for a renewal of the attack the next day in accordance with the following plan:

Raider Battalion to move up the east bank of the river to crossings in the vicinity of the first stream junction, then to cross the river and move on Matanikau Village from the south.

Second Bn, 5th Marines to hold the line of the river and to launch an attack across the bar at the mouth to assist the attack of the Raider Battalion.

Both attacks to be supported by aircraft and artillery.

CO, 5th Marines (Edson) to direct the operation.

The operation began the following day with the flank movement of the raider battalion along the east bank of the river. As the battalion neared the vicinity of the river crossing near the first stream junction it encountered resistance from an enemy force which had crossed to the east bank of the river in an apparent attempt at a counterenvelopment. The force was strong and was well posted on commanding ground. As the leading elements of the battalion advanced to the attack they were met with heavy fire from the front and flanks and pinned down along the crest of an open ridge. The battalion commander (Griffith) was severly wounded and his executive (Bailey) was killed. Attempts to advance succeeded only in the pinning down of additional companies and the accumulation of additional casualties. Unfortunately due to imperfect communications and the ambiguous wording of a message it was believed both by this headquarters and by Colonel Edson as well, that the raiders had crossed the river and had encountered resistance along the west bank while in the execution of their attack in the direction of Matanikau Village. Under this misapprehension the decision was to resume the attack at 1330 as follows:

Second Bn, 5th Marines to assist the advance of the raiders by launching an attack across the mouth of the river.

First Bn, 7th Marines (less Co C) to move by boat from Lunga Point to the beach west of Point Cruz landing in the rear of the hostile positions and attacking to the east in the direction of Matanikau Village.

Raiders to renew the attack toward the village.

To support the 2nd Bn 5th Marines with an intensive preliminary bombardment by aircraft and artillery directed against the enemy positions near the mouth of the river.

To support the raiders with aircraft and artillery "on call" as requested.

To support the landing attack of 1st Bn, 7th Marines by naval gunfire from the destroyer, Ballard.

All attacks to be launched simultaneously.

The attack of the 2nd Bn, 5th Marines was launched on schedule. However, the artillery fire could not reach enemy positions closest to the river and these were not neutralized. As a result the infantry attack, while pushed with vigor, failed to gain a permanent foothold on the opposite bank.

The raiders were manifestly unable to carry out their portion of the attack as their orders were based on a mistake of fact which was not discovered until after 1330.

The 1st Bn, 7th Marines landed near Point Cruz on schedule and without casulaties. Shortly after the advance inland was begun the acting battalion commander (Rogers) was killed. Note l The battalion carried its first objective, the ridge inland from the beach, but was immediately attacked by strong forces which succeeded in cutting it off from the landing beach. Additional enemy columns were also seen approaching from the east. In view of the failure to advance elsewhere it was obvious that this battalion was in a dangerous position. Steps were immediately begun to undertake its withdrawal but before arrangements could be completed the division command post was subjected to a heavy aerial attack by a formation of 26 heavy bombers. Resultant damage included the complete disruption of all communication facilities at the division headquarters at a time when reliable communication was imperative. It become necessary to complete local arrangements for withdrawal by the use of officer messengers while contact with the Matanikau was reestablished over the forward observer line of the artillery.

The Ballard fortunately was in visual contact with the battalion and Colonel Puller was taken aboard to direct the withdrawal. He ordered the battalion to cut its way to the beach at all costs and arranged for naval gunfire support.

Note 1: LtCol. Puller the regular commander had been directed to assist Col. Edson east of the river the day before and consequently was unable to rejoin his battalion for landing.



The boat group was dispatched from Lunga Point to reembark the troops which, meanwhile, had fought their way through to the shore line at a point considerably east of the landing beach. The boats first attempted to make the original landing beach but were met with heavy fire and withdrew to seaward in an effort to establish contact with the troops ashore. A friendly aircraft, perceiving the difficulty, directed the boats to the correct spot and the troops reembarked and returned to Lunga Point by nightfall. Their losses were 18 killed and 25 wounded. All the wounded were brought out and the battalion lost no arms or equipment to the enemy.

Meanwhile the Raider Battalion was ordered to withdraw to Lunga Point while 2nd Bn, 5th Marines was ordered to hold present positions to cover the retirement of the raiders and to await developments with respect to the situation of the 1st Bn, 7th Marines. When it was established that the withdrawal of the latter battalion had been accomplished successfully the 2nd Bn, 5th Marines executed a night withdrawal to Lunga Point and the operation came to a close.

#### Analysis of Operation

The operations of the 26th and 27th of September were definitely unsuccessful due to a combination of circumstances from which we were to derive some valuable lessons. the intention of all concerned that LtCol. Puller's column should cross the Matanikau and come down the west side if time permitted. This, as it developed, would have placed him on the flank or in the rear of the hostile position. But at the time in question there was no knowledge of this enemy force and his decision to descend to the coast by the east bank was a proper one in view of his instructions to return to Lunga on 26 September. Unfortunately this placed his force in a disadventageous position initially as he was obliged to cross the river to come to grips with the enemy. The action should have been broken off at this point as the division was not in a position to provide additional forces sufficient to make a strong attack. The decision to resume the attack the following day was made by the division in the belief that the Raider Battalion was a sufficient reinforcement to justify a continuation of the action. The inability of this battalion to progress in its attack is largely attributable to misfortune of Major Bailey's death and the wounding of LtCol. Griffith at first contact. In the short time available the plans for communication, artillery and aircraft support which had previously been worked out on the basis of supporting a moving patrol operation could not be adequately shifted to meet the demands of a coordinated attack. The decision to land a battalion in rear of the enemy represented a continuation of the same fundamental error, piecemeal commitment and sketchy arrangements for support. It was executed according to plan but could accomplish nothing when the other attacks miscarried.

The successful withdrawal of this battalion in the face of the enemy was due to its fighting qualities, brilliant improvisation on the part of those responsible for the movement and to the great good fortune which attended it. This compensated in large part for the numerous misfortunes of the day. Enemy losses were heavy but indeterminate. The total enemy force engaged consisted of approximately 1800. Our forces were somewhat less, our losses (60 killed 100 wounded) somewhat greater. But for the good judgment of senior commanders present our losses might will have been much more severe.

In fairness to the enemy it must be stated that his forces were well handled, this occasion being the only one in which he ever demonstrated a capacity for maneuver. The great lesson however is to be found embodied in the passage in Field Service Regulations which warns against "drifting aimlessly into action" for in last analysis it is to be observed that this battle was unpremeditated and was fought without a definite purpose other than the natural one of closing with the enemy at once and upon every occasion. In apologia however it should be pointed out that these reflections are entirely retrospective in character, made from the comfortable vantage point of hindsight and free from the stress and strain, misapprehensions and uncertainties which accompanied the actual events. Annex C shows the disposition and movements of units during this operation.

## Third Action on the Matanikau

In the days immediately following the action on 27 September the perimeter defenses were substantially completed thus releasing troops in sufficient numbers to warrant a resumption of the offensive. Indications were that the enemy was present in growing force in the area between the Matanikau and Bonegi rivers and was preparing to attack. He was also active east of the Matanikau. There was daily bickering between opposing patrols and it required increasingly large forces to reconnoiter the line of the river. As troops became available it was planned to launch an attack across the Matanikau seizing Kokumbona and driving the enemy beyond the Poha River. If the operation succeeded a permanent garrison would be left at Kokumbona to deny the enemy access to the several trails emanating from the village by which he could reach the upper Lunga to attack us from the south.

The plan involved an attack as follows:

Fifth Marines (less 1st Bn) to advance to and hold the line of the river prepared to cross on division order.

The Whaling Group (Whaling) consisting of 3d Bn 2d Marines

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and the Division Scout-Sniper Detachment to follow 5th Marines initially then turning inland to cross the river near the first stream junction (Nippon Bridge) an attack to the north along the first ridge west of the river.

Seventh Marines (less 3d Bn) to follow across the river and attack to the north with battalions abreast simultaneously with and on the left of the Whaling Group.

Aircraft and artillery support to be carefully planned and coordinated.

The operation to be conducted under division control. (See Annex D Operation Plan No. 2-42).

If the initial envelopment succeeded it was expected to pass 5th Marines through the assault force to continue the attack toward Kokumbona.

It was also anticipated that if the attack moved rapidly a considerable hostile force would be trapped between the village and the river and that in any event the hostile preparations for attack would be upset.

Artillery fires were carefully planned and air control parties were improvised and trained to accompany the ground forces to take over the function of air — ground liaison. Meanwhile, in preparation for the attack, troops were withdrawn from defensive sectors and assembled for movement. To maintain the defense 7th Marines left one battalion to cover its normal regimental sector while to the west of the Lunga the line was withdrawn to the main switch position thus releasing 3d Bn lst Marines and two battalions of the 5th Marines for offensive action. All preparations for the attack were completed by nightfall 6 October by which time the supporting artillery was reported in position.

On 7 October at 0700 the attack force moved out along the coast astride the Government Track. Shortly after 10 o'clock the advance guard, 3d Bn 5th Marines (Bowen) made contact with an enemy force several hundred yards east of the Matanikau River. The advance guard developed its attack and began to push the enemy force slowly to the west. Some of the enemy fell back across the mouth of the river but a part of the force was trapped with its back to the river and could not be dislodged by nightfall.

Meanwhile 2d Bn, 5th Marines moved to the left of the 3d Bn and advanced to the line of the river without opposition. The Whaling Group and 7th Marines also turned to the south and moved to bivouac areas after disposing of some slight resistance.

There was little activity during the night except that

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some concern was felt over the fact that the enemy was stubbornly clinging to a small bridgehead east of the river and about 400 yards from its mouth. They were surrounded by elements of 3d Bn 5th Marines which held the right of the regimental line but their presence was a source of danger and it was decided to reinforce the 5th Marines with a raider company from the division reserve. Throughout the night the 5th Marines pretended to be preparing crossings of the river by manifesting unusual activity during the night. From time to time amphibian tractors were used to indicate movement of tanks to attack positions at the eastern end of the bar across the mouth of the river. It was hoped by these deceptions to divert the enemy's attention from the movements of the enveloping force.

Unfortunately for us the following day, October 2, was a day of torrential and continuous downpour. Mud in the valleys and the wet slippery grass on the steep coral ridges reduced the progress of the enveloping force to a snail's pace. This was to have been D-day but it was obvious that all troops would not reach their jump off positions before late afternoon. The attack had of necessity to be postponed until daylight 9 October. This unavoidable delay would enable the enemy to pull back and escape the envelopment or redispose his force to meet it.

Meanwhile in the 5th Marines area along the river little progress had been made in clearing up the group of enemy still holding out with their backs to the river. At 1800 as positions were being consolidated for the night this force attempted to break out and escape across the river over the sandspit. The breakthrough was delivered against a lightly held portion of the line in an area of thick jungle. In the gathering darkness there was a short hand to hand fight between a small group of raiders who held this point and overwhelming numbers of Japanese. Most of the raiders were killed but only after inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. The surviving Japanese broke through but only to find themselves trapped on the inside of the wire barricade which we had erected across the sandspit. Here they were disposed of in a fight which continued into the night. Some escaped but 67 dead were found in the wire the next morning. Elsewhere the night was quiet except for intermittent sniping and machine gun fire.

The same day was also marked by the receipt of disturbing news from other quarters. It appeared that the enemy was on the point of executing an all-out attempt to recover Guadalcanal by a combined land, sea and air operation. There was great activity in Rabaul attended by large concentrations of transports and combatant vessels. We were warned to expect the worst and soon. The attack might take



the form of an assault on Lunga Point, a fresh landing to the east, or a reinforcement of forces already engaged on the west. There was likewise the possibility of a landing between the Matanikau and Lunga Point to cut off our forces engaged in the river operation.

It was plainly necessary to assemble a strong reserve and keep it in hand to meet any contingency. Hence, in accordance with these changes in circumstances, the plan for the attack on the next day was modified as follows:

To continue the attack as planned until the envelopment was complete but to undertake no further movement to the west.

The maneuvering force to withdraw on order in successive echelons along the coast after the envelopment was completed.

To hold the 5th Marines in position along the river to cover this withdrawal instead of passing it through in a continuation of the attack to the west as originally planned.

The attack on the morning of the 9th was launched under favorable circumstances. The weather had cleared; the troops had enjoyed a full nights! rest and supporting fires were well coordinated. The advance was rapid and what little resistance was encountered was quickly swept aside by the flanking direction of the attack. On the right the Whaling Group advanced to the northeast along the ridge west of the river and secured the western end of the crossing. only scattered resistance and it was evident that the enemy had pulled back. In the center 2d Bn 7th Marines (Hanneken) encountered resistance in the vicinity of Matanikau Village but his attack carried through to the vicinity of Point Cruz. On the left 1st Bn 7th Marines (Puller) also encountered resistance and when it had gained the high ground everlooking the coast found itself confronted with a strong force, occupying assembly positions in the wooded ravines on his left and to his front. Puller placed intensive concentrations of mortar fire in the ravine to his left while he called for artillery fire to cover his front. The enemy were unable to launch their counterattack and broke formation running up the open slopes of the ridge forming the opposite side of the ravina. While ascending the slopes they were taken under heavy machine gun fire and driven back to the cover of the ravine leaving many dead and wounded behind them. This process was repeated until the supply of mortar ammunition was exhausted and the bettalion began its withdrawal in accordance with orders received during the morning. LtGol. Puller could only estimate enemy losses but a diary taken from the body of a Japanese field officer killed in a later battle stated that his regiment (4th Infantry) lost 690 men killed in this engagement.

The withdrawal was accomplished smoothly and according to plan, 5th Marines covering the movement of Whaling Group, 2d Bn 7th Marines and 1st Bn 7th Marines, in the order named. The entire enveloping force was east of the river and enroute to Lunga Point by 1400. Fifth Marines remained in position covering the river.

## Analysis of Action

In this operation our losses over the entire three day period were 65 killed in action and 125 wounded. A conservatively revised estimate enemy losses would place them at approximately 900 men killed. As actually carried out the operation partook more of the nature of a raid on a large scale than a conventional attack. Its final purpose also resembled that of a raid i.e. to inflict losses and dislocate enemy plans.

The enemy had obviously been planning an offensive enterprise of some description as evidenced by his increased activity since 27 September. Exactly what was in preparation was not known until immediately after tha battle when a copy of an operation order was taken from the body of a Japanese officer. (Annex E). From a study of this order it appears that the enemy were preparing an attack which, by a strange coincidence, was scheduled for 8 October, the day originally set for our own attack and using a similar scheme of maneuver. One battalion of the 4th Infantry was to secure the Nippon Bridge near the first stream junction and advance to Mount Austin (Mambula). A second battalion was to force the crossing at the rivermouth while the remaining battalion in reserve covered the coast line to prevent a landing. The Oka detachment, equivalent to a lightly reinforced regiment, was to operate in an undetermined area, probably on the right of the 4th. The entire operation was under the direction of the 2d Division and had as its purpose the seizure of the island. The mission of the 4th Regiment was to seize positions east of the river permitting employment of the divisional artillery to neutralize the air field as the first step in the reconquest of Guadalcanal. There was apparently a general reserve available for exploitation. It probably consisted of the 29th Infantry and may have been posted to the west of Kokumbona along the Bonegi and Balesuna Rivers. In any event the fortuitous event of our being beforehand in our attack was to have a profound effect upon subsequent operations.

# Establishment of the Forward Battle Position

The establishment of a strong defensive position along the Matanikau had long been planned and our experiences in the fighting of 27 September and 9 October again emphasized the

importance of occupying and holding this river line as a means of securing the airfield from effective artillery fire. The captured order indicated plainly that it was the enemy's intention to adopt the course we feared most - interdiction of air operations by artillery fire. By holding the enemy west of the river we could deny him the effective use of all except the heavier calibers of artillery and it was consequently decided to hold the river line at all times and at any cost. The anticipated arrival of reinforcements in the form of the 164th Infantry Regiment, U.S. Army, now permitted us to proceed with our plans.

The 5th Marines (less 1st Battalion) had occupied the river since 7 October. It was not withdrawn on 9 October upon completion of the last operation but remained in place after covering the withdrawal of the enveloping force. Over the period of the next few days it was relieved by the McKelvey Group consisting of 3d Bn, 1st Marines (McKelvey), and 3d Bn, 7th Marines (Williams) and elements of the Special Weapons Battalion.

To hold the line of the river with two battalions was a difficult problem. The Government Track along the coast which crosses the river at the mouth was the only feasible route of movement for hostile tanks and heavy guns; other routes would not permit the passage of wheeled equipment. In consequence the bar at the river mouth thus became the key terrain feature of the entire campaign for as long as we held it we held the river, protected the airfield, and, in the last analysis, held the island. Three to five battalions could have been employed to advantage but were not available as it is to be remembered that we were simultaneously engaged in preparations to meet a large scale attack from Rabaul and were required to keep a large reserve in hand for this emergency.

With only two battalions available a compromise scheme of defense was inevitable. If we built up a strong center of resistance at the river mouth capable of all around defense it would be comparatively simple for a force crossing upstream to surround and reduce it. On the other hand an attenuated front along the entire river line would be subject to penetration and defeat in detail as the terrain inland was so precipitous and broken as to prevent the rapid movement of reserves. Such a line would also be exposed at its most vital point if a landing were made in the rear of those engaged in the defense of the river mouth. The decision reached was to construct a horseshoe position with its front covering the line of the river from the mouth to the Nippon Bridge, its right flank refused along the beach and its left flank slightly refused and resting on high ground overlooking the first stream junction. This barred the two most important points of crossing, but did not prevent the possibility of an outflanking operation as there were known to be other



crossings above the Nippon Bridge. Note 2.

The forward position was energetically developed. of fire were cleared on the opposite bank to make difficult the approach to a crossing or the movement of bridging materials. The vicinity of the Nippon Bridge and the high ground on the opposite shore near the mouth were planted with booby traps and an ingeniously contrived system of electrically controlled anti-personnel mines. Two barriers of anti-tank mines were placed across the sandbar, which was also covered with the fire of emplaced 37mm anti-tank guns with a 75mm half-track concealed in readiness nearby. At night the bar was illuminated with headlights taken from abandoned amphibian tractors and arranged in banks protected by sandbag screens. The beach was wired in and defended for a distance of several hundred yards. The interval between the termination of the beach defenses and the defenses at Lunga Point was covered at night by patrols. (Annex F is an overlay showing the details of organization of this position). Note 3.

#### Revision of the Lunga Point Perimeter

Simultaneously with the construction of the Matanikau position every effort was made to improve and strengthen the perimeter defenses particularly in the area west of the Lunga. The arrival of the 164th Infantry on 13 October was the occasion for a complete revision of the defensive plan. Division Operation Order No. 12-42 of 13 October (Annex G) divided the readjusted perimeter into 5 regimental sectors. The remainder were inland sectors, two on each side of the Lunga. This had the effect of increasing strength west of the Lunga by one regiment. All beach defense activities were consolidated under 3d Defense Battalion (Pepper) although there was no change in the occupation of subsectors. This grouping of the variegated beach defense elements under one experienced command was logical in view of the interlocking and closely related functions of beach defense installations, coastal defense batteries and anti-aircraft establishments. A motorized division reserve of one battalion was maintained at In addition each infantry regiment was required to hold in reserve one battalion available for division employment. Note 4.

Note 2: It would however, delay such a movement as the route to be followed would be circuitous and difficult and expessed in part to our observation and fire.

Note 3: The Nippon Bridge was the Japanese name for the first crossing above the mouth. The "Bridge" consisted of two palm logs laid across the river at a narrow point where the steep banks recoded sufficiently to permit a descent to stream level.

Note 4: During this period 1st Marine Raider Battalion was evacuated from Guadalcanal after its long period of outstanding service.

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# Enemy Activity

Following his defeat on 9 October the enemy withdrew to positions west of Matanikau Village and our patrols roamed unchallenged over the ridges west of the river. Elsewhere, however, he was increasingly active. Air raids increased in duration and intensity. Our air forces engaged in daily attacks on the "Cactus Express" taking a heavy toll of ships and planes but with oriental singleness of purpose the enemy persisted in his course without regard to losses.

On the night of 11-12 October a friendly naval task force (Admiral Scott) surprised the "express" and inflicted heavy losses in a night engagement which lit up the skies to the west. This was the first move to contest Japanese naval supremacy in the Solomons and the fact and outcome of the battle were most heartening. On 12 October there was a two hour air attack as four waves of bombers escorted by zeros attacked our positions.

At sunset 13 October long range enemy artillery of heavy calibre opened fire on the airfield from positions near Kokumbona. Use of the main field was interdicted for the time being and it became necessary to conduct operations from the new fighter strip recently constructed to the east.

During the same night the Lunga Point area was subjected to a punishing ships' gunfire and artillery bombardment. The combined Japanese fleet consisted of four to six battleships, several cruisers and numerous destroyers which pounded our positions with intensive concentrations for one hour and twenty minutes. The accuracy and volume of fire were remarkable. Cruiser planes hung overhead illuminating the target area with flares and doubtlessly spotting for the larger vessels. Fighter and bomber strips, dispersal areas, dumps and the vicinity of division headquarters appeared to be the special target of attack. Our losses were 41 killed with considerable damage to planes particularly bombardment types.

On the following day a heavily escorted convoy of seven large transports was sighted enroute to Guadalcanal. Our few available planes were able to make one attack before sunset sinking one large transport and damaging another.

At daylight the following morning, 15 October, five enemy transports were observed unloading troops and supplies in the vicinity of Tassafaronga — Doma Reef ten miles west of Lunga Point. Our small force of fighters and dive bombers made repeated attacks on the enemy transports diving through the canopy of anti-aircraft fire put up by shore batteries and escort vessels despite the attacks of zero fighters which arrived in relays to cover the transport area. By 1100 one transport was sunk and two were beached and buring fiercely. The remaining two broke off the action and stood out to sea with their escort. As they



proceeded toward Savo a formation of B-17's attacked and scored a direct hit on one of the transports which began to burn. This action which resulted in a partial although considerable reinforcement of the enemy on Guadalcanal demonstrated the need for additional aircraft for patrol and baombardment and more effective methods of dispersal and protection. A sufficient number of planes would have enabled us to destroy or turn back the approaching forces in a single attack. However, on 14 October we had available no patrol planes and the available striking force of dive-bombers was greatly reduced by the necessity of employing them on patrol missions.

Enemy activity continued unabated during the days following 15 October. There were repeated naval bombardments and daily attacks by aircraft. Hostile artillery fire increased in volume and in accuracy. We could do little in the way of ground activity. The old troops were exhausted, the new arrivals not yet ready to undertake active operations. Malaria was becoming critical and there were frequent cases of battle neuroses arising from the constant pounding at our positions from land, sea and air. The enemy was in great force and it was necessary to await developments.

In addition to the action on the 12th of October naval forces gave considerable support during this trying period. Small task forces bombarded the Japanese held coast line from Kokumbona to Cape Esperance burning large quantities of hostile supplies brought ashore on the 15th. Motor torpedo boats although few in numbers, made repeated and gallant attempts to break up the "Cactus express" and inflicted considerable damage in their nightly attacks on hostile surface vessles.

# Operations from Tulagi

After the initial assault on the islands of the Tulagi area and the cleaning out of the stubborn resistance encountered there, activities based on Tulagi were confined entirely to amphibious patrols. There were no air attacks, no enemy landing attempts and only spasmodic shelling from light enemy surface craft. The facilities for berthing seaplanes at Gavutu were utilized frequently by Naval PBYs and after 12 October Tulagi was used as a base for Naval patrol torpedo boats.

Two of the amphibious patrols from Tulagi stand out as noteworth, the patrol to Koilatumaria (Gurabusa) of 9 October, and the patrol to Cape Astrolabe on Malaita of 2 November.

Native reports indicated that there was a Japanese concentration at Gurabusa at the mouth of the Gurabusa River (between twenty and thirty miles from Lunga Point) and another at the village of Koilatumaria, some five miles west along the

north coast of Guadalcanal. Accordingly a combat unit of four officers and 430 men from the First Battalion, Second Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Hill was detailed to seek and destroy the enemy force. In eight Higgins boats towed by two YP boats Colonel Hill's unit departed from Tulagi for Guadalcanal at 1540 on 9 October.

The plan was to land at dawn at Aola, then divide the command into two groups which were to proceed through the hills inland and strike simultaneously at Koilatumaria and Gurabusa. One YP boat with its tow landed on schedule at dawn. The other had one of the Higgins boats in its tow founder with a loss of one officer (Lieutenant F.S. Parks), fourteen marines and three naval personnel. Searching for survivors, it was delayed in its arrival until about twelve noon.

Leaving "C" Company (Captain R.Y. Stafford) to make the short march to Gurabusa the next day, Colonel Hill took the remainder of his force into the hills inland and started our for Koilatumaria. The terrain was unexpectedly rough and the force did not arrive at the village until about 1600 the next day. One enemy officer was killed, installations and earthworks for a force of perhaps two hundred were found in and around the village, but except for the single officer no other Japanese were found. Colone Hill lost one enlisted man killed and one officer wounded.

Meantime, Captain Stafford, having bivouacked at Aola, had started out at dawn for Guarbusa, arriving and attacking it at about 1200. Thirty Japanese were killed, and a large amount of arms, equipment, documents, and radio material captured. The only Marine casulaties were Captain Stafford killed, and one man slightly wounded.

Colonel Hill's unit returned to Tulagi on the twelfth, leaving a combat patrol of four officers and 87 enlisted men under the command of Lieutenant Thomas M. Lienweber to proceed from Aola to Lunga Point via the Government trail along the shore. This patrol returned to Tulagi from Guadalcanal on 19 October.

Native reports having indicated the presence of a Japanese coast watcher station at Cape Astrolabe on Malaita Island, a patrol of men under First Lieutenant J.W. Crain from Company I, Second Marines, set out from Tulagi on 2 November in two native schooners. The patrol landed a nights march from the reported Japanese camp, and, guided by friendly natives arrived in positions for attack before daylight. The Japanese were taken by surprise and their coastwatcher detachment wiped out, twenty being killed and one captured. The patrol returned to Tulagi on 6 November with large amounts of captured equipment, arms, radio materila and documents.

Aside from these two operations, patrols from Tulagi were routine combat and reconnaissance sorties with no large hostile concentrations encountered. Florida Island was the area in which most of this patrolling took place, for the dense jungles of the larger island had afforded a refuge to the scattered Japanese who escaped from Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo at the beginning of the operation. The natives of Florida Island were completely sympathetic to the allied nations cause and it was through native guides that most of the Japanese were rounded up.

For the men of the Second Marines who were stationed on Tulagi throughout most of the occupation the Florida patrols afforded excellent training in jungle warfare. Such operations were in progress on Florida Island constantly.

An outline of contacts by patrols from Tulagi follows:

- 16 August; Mopping up operations conducted at Halavo, Port Purvis and Bungana. No armed enemy encountered. Natives delivered three prisoners to Port Purvis patrol. Large dump of aviation gasoline captured at Halavo. Patrols to Harora rescued one Marine from USS Quincy.
- 17 August; Patrol to Vlua Point found a dummy two inch gun emplacement. Killed four Japanese, and six escaped. Three hundred and fifty-six arms with ammunition destroyed.
- 18 August; Tanavola Point (Sandfly Passage) raided successfully. Complete surprise. Killed four Japanese. Captured radio set and two boats. Camp and stores destroyed. Raider company on Florida pursuing about fifty Japanese. One platoon on way to East Point. (later) Patrol to East Point reports enemy camp evacuated.
- 20 August; Raider patrol returned from Florida Island. Enemy contact negligible. Hostile force believed to be scattered and poorly equipped.
- 24 August; Florida Island patrols continuing. No contacts.
- 26 August; Florida Island patrols relieved. Encountered a few poorly equipped disorganized Japanese.
- 27 August; Observation detachment established at Manaluva Point.

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17 September; Six Japanese aviation personnel captured on Nagatanois Island.

19 September; Patrol made contact at Gumuarea with armed enemy detachment. Seven Japanese killed, thirty-three escaped. One native policemen of our patrol killed.

23 September; Patrol made contact with small enemy detachment near East Point: on Florida Island. Killed four Japanese. Suffered no casualties.

28 September; Patrol killed five Japanese at Hararo. Suffered no casualties.

6 October; Outpost detachment detailed to Siota Mission to observe North shore of Florida Island.

17 October; Three Japanese aviation personnel captured from rubber raft.

These operations did much to consolidate our hold on the southern Solomons at a time when the larger forces were precupied by the necessity of prevailing in the long struggle for possession of Guadalcanal. They represented a contribution far exceeding that which would be indicated by the small numbers engaged.

## Improvement in Patrolling

At the beginning of this period our patrols were still far from satisfactory. In general their actions were clumsy and their inexperienced leaders were either overcautious or bold to the point of rashness. Missions were not always carefully regarded; some leaders always looked for, and usually found, a fight, others avoided action. In either event little useful information was obtained. It appeared that the priceless experience of continuous years of bush warfare in Haiti, Santo Domingo and Nicaragua had been entirely lost due to the influx of young officers and men during mobilization.

At about this time Colonel W. J. Whaling an experienced jungle fighter, hunter and woodsman came due for reassignment by reason of promotion to full Colonel's rank. As no regiment was immediately available for him he volunteered to create a scout-sniper detachment as the first step in bringing about the needed improvement. He personally selected a few volunteers from each battation and assisted by a few junior officers and veteran NCO's established and schooled his detachment and lead it on patrol. Physically tireless, his leadership and enthusiasm attracted a rine type of man capable of training others. As they became experienced these men were returned to their units

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where they quickly spread the gospel of long marches, light equipment and scant rations. The result was an immediate and noticeable improvement in patrols and a desire for patrol duty despite its hazards and hardships. The men soon became confident of their superiority to the enemy in jungle operations and demonstrated it upon every occasion. Never again were we to lose a patrol by ambush and before the end of our oddupation the Japanese were to acquire on their own part a morbid fear of meeting us in the jungle.

## The Night Battles of October

After the landing on 15 October it was a foregone conclusion that the enemy would attack soon and in great strength. A captured map, for example, indicated a three pronged drive by a force of three divisions. One to attack from the east, one from the west, and one from the south down the Lunga. However, the evidence was equivodal and subject to varying interpretations. There were no signs of fresh forces to the east. Since Koilotumaria the area had been clear and the natives had returned to their gardens. The native police covered the area and reported frequently from their headquarters at Aola. There were large forces to the west but to the south constant patrols, air and ground, reported no troops along the Lunga except the usual bands of dispirited, half starved, poorly armed stragglers and deserters, the killing of such groups being of daily occurrence. Beyond these small parties of "vagabonds" as they were commonly termed there were none of the unmistakable signs of fresh Japs on the Lunga.

As late as 23 October all signs pointed to a strong and concerted attack from the west. Enemy ground activity increased at a rapid rate. Artillery fire was increasing although counterbattery by two batteries of recently arrived 155mm guns was effective in pushing back his largest gun (mobile 150mm), causing him to make frequent shifts of position and destroying some guns outright. The forward battle position on the Matanikau was a particular target and following a barrage at the rivermouth, at sunset on 21 October an attack was launched by nine tanks supported by infantry. This attack was broken up at the outset, the enemy losing one tank. On the next day the bombardment continued with losses to us of six killed and twenty-five wounded. The following day, 23 October, was quiet until 1800 when the heaviest concentration yet experienced was placed on our positions at the mouth of the river, along the Government Track and on rear area installations of the forward battle position

After dark when the barrage lifted eighteen ton medium tanks supported by infantry attempted to force their way across the sand spit as the first step in what appeared to be a form of the well known Japanese "filleting" type of attack i.e. an attack by armored forces followed by masses of infantry delivered on a narrow front astride the defenders only route of communication

This contingency had been anticipated and provided for. Antitank guns swept the sand spit and truned back repeated attacks. To break up the following infantry formation a prearranged barrage of ten batteries of artillery was placed along the Track from the river to a point beyond Point Cruz. It was maintained almost continuously throughout the attack and was repeated at intervals during the night. By ten o'clock the attack had been definitely checked. The sand spit was littered with the wreckage of nine hostile tanks. Only one tank succeeded in breaking through our wire. As it passed over a fox-hole occupied by a young Marine the latter placed a hand grenade beneath the track and damaged it. A 75mm half-track coming up out of the darkness then engaged the tank driving it into the water and destroying it by close range fire. Nothing more was seen of the hostile infantry and the battle came to a close by midnight except for an attempt by a small force to cross the river at a point several hundred yards inland which was easily broken up.

Japanese losses during this night cannot be accurately assessed. There were nine burned out tanks and a number of enemy dead on the sand bar next morning. The effectiveness of our artillery fire could not be estimated for several days when it became possible to patrol to Point Cruz. The first patrol sent out reported several hundred dead still lying along the road where they had been caught by our barrage. It also found three additional tanks destroyed by artillery.

All of the night's action had taken place in front of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines: On the left in the sector held by the adjacent battalion (3d Battalion, 7th Marines) the night passed quietly with no attempt being made to force the Nippon Bridge. At first daylight, however, a long enemy column was observed moving across a bare ridge to the left rear of the battalion position and disappearing into a heavily wooded ravine. As was to have been expected the enemy had crossed during the night by one of the crossings above the Nippon Bridge.

Aircraft and artillery were employed to attack this force but the extent of cover available was such as to make the results doubtful. It was a strong force and would obviously be able to make an attack after nightfall against the rear of the forward battle position.

It happened that on the previous day the 7th Marines (Sims) (less 3d Battalion) had singled up its lines by turning their entire regimental defensive sector east of the Lunga over to the 1st Battalion and had started for the Matanikau for the purpose of relieving 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. This routine

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relief had been planned in order to regain organic unity and provide more adequate command facilities by holding the forward battle position with 7th Marines (less one battalion). This fortuitous circumstance enabled us to revise our plans without delay. Colonel Sims was informed of the new situation and directed to employ his 2d Battalion (Hanneken) to cover the flank and rear of the forward battle positionby taking up a defensive position along the high ridge which faces to the south and forms a natural and continuous left flank extension of the forward battle position sharply refused in the direction of the main perimeter defenses.

This ridge constituted a strong natural position. escarpment on the side toward the enemy facing was precipitous and formidable. There was little time for construction of defenses and the battalion took up a linear defense facing south. On the right it established a tenuous connection with the 3d Battalion. 7th Marines. On the left a gap existed between the battalion and the perimeter sector held by 5th Mainres. This was closed the following day by a readjustment of front on the part of 5th Marines. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines remained in their previous positions. All operations in the area were placed under command of CO, 7th Marines. (For an overlay showing these dispositions and the subsequent action see Annex H). Action on the 24th October was confined largely to artillery and aricraft. night passed quietly along the Matanikau but the battle flared up anew elsewhere.

The decision to leave only one battalion in place in the 7th Marines sector of the perimeter defenses had been carefully considered. This sector was a dangerous one due to its proximity to the airfield and was singled up only after all reports indicated that no enemy forces were on the upper Lunga. Reconnaissance had been extremely thorough. In addition to local patrols by 7th Marines two detachments of native scouts were sent far up the river. A three day divisional patrol composed of Scout-Snipers and an independent patrol by the 5th Marines had also scoured the area. Except for the killing of a few "vagabonds" these patrols submitted negative reports and the native scouts sent back no message as to any contacts. It was accordingly believed that the upper Lunga was clear.

By nightfall on 24 October there were two significant developments. A man who had strayed from a 7th Marines patrol reported that he had observed a Japanese officer studying our positions along Edson's ridge through field glasses. A scout sniper returning from the upper Lunga reported sighting the smoke of many rice fires arising from the jungle in the vicinity of the "Big Bend" a local descriptive term for a point several miles upstream where the course of the Lunga forms an exaggerated horse-shoe.

At about 2130 there was a brief outburst of firing coming from the direction of an advanced post south east of Edson's Ridge. This was followed by a strong attack at 0030 delivered on a narrow front against the left center of the sector itself. At this point the perimeter cuts through a dense jungle flat extending from Edson's Ridge eastward to the line of the Tenaru which was held by the 164th Infantry. It was manifest that a strong attack was in progress against this thinly held sector.

Artillery concentrations were at once placed in front of the threatened area and were maintained in considerable depth throughout the night. The reserve battalion of the adjacent regiment, 164th Infantry, was directed to reinforce the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines immediately with instructions to commit it by detachments in support of the threatened point. This involved a difficult night movement in a heavy rainstorm and it was Q330 before the battalion reached the 7th Marines sector.

Meanwhile the garrison made every effort to strengthen the defense with every means at its disposal. Small local reserves were used as reinforcements and mortar fire was used to supplement the automatic weapons in support of the main line of resistance. As units of the reinforcing battalion reached the scene they were guided into position and entered into the fire fight.

The action continued until 0700, 25 October at which time the situation was stabilized. There had been minor penetrations by small groups but it was not believed that any organized force had broken through. The wire was piled high with enemy dead.

The daylight hours were spent in reorganizing the front and mopping up behind our lines. The left battalion sector was assigned to the reinforcing Army battalion while the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines contracted its front to the right battalion sector. As there had been considerable inter-mingling of units during the attack it was almost nightfall before both positions were consolidated. During the day Marine patrols \*illed 67 enemy snipers and members of small bands which had broken through during the night.

The heavy rain which accompanied this attack had the effect of grounding all aricraft the following morning due to the condition of the fighter strip. This field had no natural drainage and unlike the temporarily abandoned bomber strip, was not yet matted. In consequence take-off was impossible. The enemy had apparently anticipated the effect of the weather on our air defenses for he was quick to take advantage of his opening. It was "Condition Red" all day with zeros and bombers arriving in relays to attack the field. One dive bombing attack was particularly effective in destroying a number of planes parked in regular formation along the edge of the bomber strip.

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Fortunately this target was the "bone yard" of the airdrome and the planes "destroyed" consisted merely of a series of wrecks and crashes arranged as dummies to deceive the enemy. Operational planes suffered little losses the lessons of dispersal and camouflage had been well learned. At 1000 three large enemy destroyers entered Lunga Sound and attacked two of our destroyers. The latter were old world war flush deckers entirely outranged and outgunned. They escaped through Sea Lark Channel in a running gun duel. The enemy destroyers then sank two small auxiliaries including the "Seminole" and engaged our shore batteries. The latter scored three hits on the leading destroyer. Meanwhile three of our fighters which had managed to take-off attacked the destroyers with machine gun fire. The destroyers retired to the west.

Thereafter there was a continuous series of dog fights overhead interspersed with strafing attacks on the field. The condition of the field improved rapidly and as additional planes took the air our forces soon gained the upper hand. although the fight continued until late afternoon. Antiaircraft fire destroyed 5 enemy planes while our fighters accounted for 22. Dive bombers, P-39's and P-400's carried out four bombardment missions against approaching enemy naval forces sinking one heavy cruiser and seriously damaging another. The day, which began so badly for us ended in success due to the skill and audacity of our air force. This was the last of a continuous series of daily air attacks; thereafter the enemy approached the field only rarely and with obvious caution frequently jettisoning his bombs in the sea upon the approach of our fighters.

During the night 25-26 October the enemy attacked in strength at two points. He renewed the attack of the previous night south of the airfield and 3d Battalion 164th Infantry and 1st Battalion 7th Marines were engaged in heavy fighting throughout the night. This attack was even stronger than on the preceding night but it was thrown back with terrific loss. On the Matanikau front the enemy force which had crossed the river during the night 23-24 October attacked the positions held by 3d Battalion 7th Marines and 2d Battalion 7th Marines (Annex H). principal attack took the form of an attempt to drive the latter battalion from the ridge. At one point a breakthrough was made and the enemy attempted to consolidate a position along the ridge. The only elements of the regiment available for counterattack comprised the headquarters group, the band and weapons company personnel. These diverse elements were hastily organized by a staff officer (Conley) who lead a counterattack along the crest of the ridge. After a hand to hand struggle in the dark the enemy was driven off the ridge and the position restored.

Additional attacks were made on succeeding nights but these became progressively weaker and died away. By 28 October it was evident that the enemy had been finally defeated in every point of contact.

#### Analysis of Enemy Action

The final enemy plan was to force the perimeter by a major attack on the south preceded by a secondary attack on the west. The failure of the western (Matanikau) attack was in part due to our own action on 8-9 October which dislocated his plan to attack on the same date and secure the bank of the river. primary source of failure here however rested in our own decision to organize and hold the Matanikau. The main attack on the south came as a surprise. How the enemy reached the upper Lunga unobserved was revealed by the maps and diaries taken from the dead after the battle. To avoid using the regular trails the enemy had laboriously cut a new track through the jungle well to the south of existing trails. This route began at Mamara, a village west of Kokumbona, and lead to the head: of the Lunga. It traversed thick jungle, and rugged mountains. At points ropes were necessary to climb and descend the precipitous slopes. The journey of some 35 miles required fourteen days to complete and the troops were exhausted and short of rations before they reached the point of attack.

This force consisted of the Japanese 2nd Division reinforced with the Kawaguchi Detachment and was spearheaded by the 29th Infantry. This latter was one of the most celebrated regiments of the Imperial Army and noted for its physical hardihood (Note) yet it failed utterly in its first encounter with modern firepower. The regiment was wiped out. The regimental Commander with a small party broke through our lines during the initial attack. Cut off from his regiment he wandered behind our lines for several days. He eventually destroyed the regimental colors and committed suicide. On his body was found a diary pertinent extracts of which are reprinted here (Annex I). best analysis of the enemy plan from the enemy point of view however is to be found in Annex J (Translation of Diary of an officer of the 4th Infantry Regiment. It also contains interesting disclosures as to enemy operations and shows indications of the progressive decline of enemy combat morale.

<u>Note:</u> Service with this regiment was the basis for many articles written by Colonel Warren J. Clear, U.S. Army on the subject of the Japanese army. They have recently been widely reprinted to stress the physical perfection and endurance of the Japanese soldier.

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It is difficult to estimate the enemy losses. On the Matanikau he appears to have lost about five hundred killed by artillery fire in addition to a total of thirteen tanks. Fighting during succeeding nights resulted in heavy additional losses. Colonel Hanneken counted two hundred twenty-seven dead in front of his position on the ridge. This figure does not include hundreds of additional bodies lying in the close cover of the revine. These were neither counted nor buried. Total enemy losses on the Matanikau during this period can be conservatively estimated at 1200 killed. Most of these were from the 4th Infantry and the Oka Unit.

On the other front 1200 bodies were buried after the battle. A partial count of additional bodies lying in the woods indicate total losses of 2200 killed. Hundreds of wounded also died along the trails during the subsequent retreat. The 29th and, 16th Infactry regiments and the Kawaguchi detachment had been annihilated.

#### Resumption of Offensive Operations

Following the successful termination of the defensive night battles the division returned promptly to the attack again with the mission of driving the enemy west of the Poha and with a view of further operations based on Kokumbona designed to intercept the retreat of survivors from the upper Lunga. 7th Marines and 3d Battalion, 1st Marines required rest and relief, the 164th Infantry was holding a long frontage on the eastern flank where fresh landings were expected. The 5th Marines alone were rested and available but were at too reduced strength to attempt the operation unassisted. To secure the necessary additional troops the 2nd Marines (Arthur) (less 3d Battalion, already on Guadalcanal) was brought from Fulagi. The 3d Battalion, 2nd Marines was returned to Tulagi for garrison duty and a well deserved rest. For six weeks as mobile division reserve it had been kept continually in motion, seldom spending two nights in the same bivouac and its services had been invaluable. The plan for the new attack appears in Division Operation Order No. 13-42 (Annex K) and was as follows:

To attack to the west at 0630, I November in column of regiments seizing Kokumbona and driving the enemy west of the Poha River.

To have 3d Battalion, 1st Marines outpost the high ground west of the Matanikau River on the night of D-1 day.

To have the engineers construct four bridges across the river during the night.

To have 5th Marines cross at daybreak and attack to the west.

To have 2nd Marines (less 3d Battalion) follow column in reserve.

To have Whaling Group (Scout-Snipers and 3d Battalion, 7th Marines) cross the Nippon Bridge and advance by inland routes protecting the left flank and prepared to assist the advance of 5th Marines.

The attack was executed on schedule preceded by heavy artillery, air and naval bombardment. 5th Marines attacked with 1st and 2nd Battalions in assault 1st Battalion on the right. The 2nd Battalion met little opposition and advanced rapidly. On the right the 1st Battalion soon came under heavy fire and became locked in a stubborn struggle with a strong enemy force. By nightfall 2nd Battalion was considerably in advance of its neighboring battalion with the Whaling Group in position on its left flank. The attack was resumed the next morning by a maneuver as follows:

1st and 3d Battalions 5th Marines to continue attack within 1st Battalion zone.

2nd Battalion, 5th Marines to attack to the north enveloping the resistance in the 1st Battalion zone.

The maneuver was successful and the enemy was forced to withdraw leaving a large pocket of resistance cut off in the vicinity of Point Cruz. This was mopped up the following day by 5th Marines who executed three bayonet assaults in the course of the afternoon. It is believed that these were the only three successful bayonet assaults of the campaign, the much vaunted charges of the enemy having invariably come to disaster. Enemy losses in this pocket were heavy, the 2nd Battalion alone killed 187 enemy including 17 officers, one a Colonel. Twelve 37mm guns, one field piece and 34 machine guns were captured. (Annex L).

Beginning the next day 5th Marines and Whaling Group were progressively replaced in line by 2nd Marines reinforced by 1st Battalian, 164th Infantry. The advance continued to make good progress on 4 November and there was every prospect of capturing Kokumbona when other events enforced a temporary cessation of the attack.

#### Operation in the East

It had long been expected that the Japanese 36th Division from Rabaul would attempt a landing to the east of Lunga Point.



On 1 November it was definitely established that a small covering force would land east of Koli Point during the night 3-4 November. To counter this enemy move orders were issued for 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Hanneken) to proceed by forced march along the coast to the threatened locality. This battalion although tired by the fighting of the previous week at once took up the exhausting march to the east and was in position by nightfall 3 November. It was a night of rain and low visibility but the silhouette of enemy ships, one cruiser, one transport and three destroyers appeared in the darkness at about 2200 and a troop landing began. Unfortunately the point of landing was somewhat to the east of Colonel Hanneken's position and he was forced to wait for daylight to engage the landing force. From the number of ships present it was obvious that the force was larger than expected. The action began at daybreak as the enemy moved to the west. Colonel Hanneken inflicted severe losses upon the enemy but soon found himself heavily outnumbered and subjected to enemy artillery fire. In addition a smaller enemy force appeared in his rear, apparently landed from one of the destroyers during the night. In a dogged rear guard action which continued throughout the day, the battalion fell back across the Metapona to a strong position along the west bank of the Malimbiu to await reinforcement.

Unfortunately information of this encounter did not reach Division Headquarters until mid-afternoon on 4 November (See Journal Annex I). Air support was sent out at once and reinforcements were dispatched to the east by boat during the remainder of the day and throughout the night. By morning the entire 7th Marines (less 3d Battalion) was in position along the Malimbiu, 1st Battalion on the right, 2d Battalion on the left. Orders were also issued for the 164th Infantry to march to the west by inland routes at daylight, crossing the Malimbiu and attacking to the north to outflank the enemy force which was now estimated at 2000 men. In addition to these detachments the 2d Raider Battalion (Carlson) which had recently been landed as a covering force for other units at Aola was directed to move to the west to assist in the attack by intercepting any enemy detachments moving eastward. The operation was placed under command of the Assistant Division Commander (Brigadier General Rupertus). The action during the next few days was indecisive and somewhat confusing. Enemy detachments west of the Malimbiu were mopped up or driven back across the river. Our own forces effected a crossing with difficulty as the river was now in flood. The enveloping action continued slowly due to the thick jungle and the enemy was able to withdraw to the east across the Metapona. Here the enveloping process was repeated and the enemy finally fixed in position in the vicinity of Tetere Village in an engagement on the morning of 8 November. In this action Lieutenant Colonel Puller commanding the Ed Battalion, 7th Marines received



seven wounds from shell fragments but continued in command of his battalion.

The enemy occupied a strong position slightly inland from the beach and partially protected by a deep lagoon. This position was encircled but during the night a large part of the hostile force escaped through a gap and moved inland to the southeast in the direction of the upper Tenaru.

The remainder of the force was entirely posketed and the 7th Marines assisted by 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry was assigned the task of clearing out the hostile center of resistance. This was accomplished in two days of mopping up operations supported by artillery. Four hundred fifty dead were found in the pocket. Large supplies of ammunition, fifty collapsible landing boats, field pieces, rations etc. were destroyed. Our losses were approximately forty dead and one hundred twenty wounded.

#### Raider Patrol

Coincident with these operations the 2d Marine Raider Battalion (Carlson) moved to the west from Aola to contact the Japanese force. Following inland trails it reached Biniu on 10 November. On the following day his advance elements made contact on the upper Metapona with the enemy force which had escaped from the trap at Tetere and was proceeding inland, This force consisted of two large detachments and several smaller ones which were engaged by the raiders in a series of guerilla actions extending over several days. By 18 November the area was clear of the enemy and the raiders started in pursuit up the Tenaru thence to the Lunga where they cleared the uppervalley of remaining enemy forces and destroying his main base. Following this they crossed the river and ascended the precipitous eastern slopes of Mambulo to hunt down the remnants of the enemy force. Two small but successful actions were fought in traversing the mountain and on 4 December the battalion descended to the headwaters of the Matanikau and returned to Lunga Point. In exactly thirty days the raiders had executed a long and arduous transit of mountains and forbidding country. They had fought no less than twelve successful actions and had counted enemy dead in excess of 400. Their losses, 17 dead, were surprisingly small.

This was a remarkable performance even for fresh, well trained troops and the methods used are worthy of study. Typical guerilla tactics were employed. The process of advance, repeated many times was as follows: first patrols were sent out along all routes leading in the direction of the advance.



If contact was made the patrols were quickly followed by light forces which harassed and hamstrung the enemy into a floundering retreat with small parties exposed to interception and destruction. On the otherhand if no enemy was found by the patrols the main body followed on the next day over the previously reconnoitered routes and thereafter the base would be shifted forward and the process would then be repeated. This base of operations was always located eccentrically with respect to the apparent line of operations thus always enabling the raiders to strike from the flank or rear. This eccentric disposition proved particularly baffling to the Japanese whose orthodox tactics habitually found them with their forces ill disposed to meet an attack moving along the real rather than the apparent line of operations. raiders were splendidly trained and accustomed to long marches. on a continued diet of rice, bacon and tea. Any troops operating in jungle warfare would be well advised to adopt many of the practices and methods employed by this battalion.

#### Western Flank

When these operations were begun it was necessary to suspend, temporarily the advance toward Kokumbona. However, when it became apparent that the threat on the east had been definitely checked our attention was once more turned to the Matanikau and on 10 November the attack was resumed from the same lines reached on 4 November. The 2d Marines lead the attack with 8th Marines (a recently arrived reinforcement) following in column. Resistance was strong and the Japanese positions were greatly improved in organization and extended in depth. The advance was continued day by day but progress was slow as only the tactics of frontal attack were attempted by these less experienced regiments.

On 11 November there were again strong indications of an empending attack from Rabaul - this time on a scale far exceeding previous attempts. It would possibly be a renewal of the attempt on the eastern flank but in any event it was necessary to prepare for eventualities. Accordingly, on the afternoon of 11 November the attack on the west was halted and the troops were withdrawn to the forward battle position along the Matanikau. The enemy did not pursue but employed his artillery to harass the withdrawal which was completed by noon 12 November but not rithout the loss of some arms and ammunition. In these operations enemy losses were estimated at several hundred, principally incurred through a number of unsuccessful counterattacks. Three 75mm guns, five 40mm guns, three 37mm guns, thirty-two tachine guns and twenty-eight mortars were captured. Our own cosses were 61 killed, 193 wounded and 10 missing including 0 killed and 19 wounded of the 1st Battalion, 164th Infantry ttached to 2d Marines.

#### Mid-November Air - Naval Battles

As anticipated, the enemy made a strong attack from Rabaul. On the night of 12-13 November a large Japanese task force of battleships, cruisers and destroyers approached Guadalcanal apparently for the purpose of bombarding the airfield. A friendly task force intercepted and a violent night battle ensued off Savo Island. Our forces were greatly outnumbered and outgunned but in a gallant and memorable engagement defeated the enemy with heavy losses. Our own losses too, were severe, and included Admirals Callahan and Scott whose gallantry on other occasions as well had contributed so much to the defense of the island.

The following morning our aircraft pursued and inflicted additional losses particularly on crippled vessels. Throughout the day a burning enemy battleship (Konga or Haruna) was plainly visible in the vicinity of Savo Island. It was attacked repeatedly and finally sank during the night.

In the early hours of 14 November and enemy naval force bombarded the air field but damage was light. The action of the previous night had obviously been effective in reducing the effectiveness of the enemy fleet. An attack by our motor torpedo boats broke up the attack. At daybreak our planes again returned to the attack damaging or sinking two cruisers in the early morning. Before noon however contact was made with a heavily escorted force of eleven large transports with strong air coverage proceeding toward Guadalcanal and 150 miles distant. Our planes, Army, Navy and Marine Corps, strongly reinforced by carrier squadrons from the Enterprise attacked this force repeatedly throughout the day. The enemy naval escort turned away leaving the transports to their fate. By nightfall when the action was suspended nine of the eleven transports had been hit. Two had been sunk. Five were burning and dead in the water. Four were still underway but, of these, two were damaged.

During the night enemy surface ships again attempted to cover the approach of the remaining transports by a bombard-ment designed to destroy our aircraft. However a stron friendly task force of battleships and destroyers under Admiral Lee passed Lunga Point at midnight and surprised the enemy during his approach. A spectacular long range gun battle ensued with our heavy units driving the enemy to the northwest with heavy losses indicated by blazing and exploding ships.

At daylight 15 November four enemy transports, one burning, were seen along the coast west of Kokumbona. Three were already beached and unloading while one was standing slowly in



toward Doma Reef. Our western shore battery destroyed the closest vessel which had beached within range of our 5" guns. Aircraft accounted for the others and by noon all were abandoned and ablaze. Repeated attacks were also made along the landing beaches and tremendous fires, one 1000 yards long, were started among the freshly landed supplies. The lesson of Rod Beach had not been overlooked. More distant attacks were delivered against the five transports left burning the night before. Three were sunk outright; the remaining two were obviously already burned out and abandoned.

This concluded the last and greatest enemy effort to retake Guadalcanal. The cost in human life, aircraft and ships, was staggering. The loss of life on the transports alone may have exceeded 18,000. In return for this tremendous sacrifice little was accomplished. Few supplies were unloaded and of these a great part was destroyed. Hundreds of troops were killed before they could get clear of the beached transports and those who escaped represented a band of survivors rather than a military force.

The failure of the enemy air arm to participate in this attack is sunewhat puzzling. Aside from fighter coverage for the transport force enemy aircraft took little part in the action. His carriers did not appear and there were none of the devasting raids on Henderson Field which heretofore had been the invariable prelude and accompaniment of large scale attacks. Instead he attempted neutralization of the airfield by heavy artillery and by naval bombardment. The former proved ineffective while the latter was frustrated by the timely intervention of our naval task forces. During this same period the use of our carrier groups as temporary land based reinforcements proved as sound in practice as it had appeared in theory.

#### Fianl Period

By November it had become obvious to all that relief of the division was becoming urgently necessary. The cumulative effect of long periods of fatigue and strain, endless labor by day and vigilance by night were aggravated to an alarming degree by the growing malarial rate. The malaria was accompanied by a form of secondary anemia which caused the endurance and resistance of the troops to decline rapidly. Marches and movements were becoming increasingly difficult due to the high percentage of march casualties and the duty strength of regiments was markedly reduced by the number of evacuees and ineffectives. The infantry regiments were no longer capable of offensive operations.

Meanwhile fresh troops were arriving in increasing numbers. The 8th Marines and the Americal Division were already on the island and additional units were enroute. Accordingly, arrangements were effected for a progressive relief of the division by the Americal Division commanded by Major General Patch. Command of the forward battle position which henceforth would be the base of operations was turned over to the U.S. Army in mid-November and elements of the First Marine Division were assigned to defensive missions on the Lunga Point perimeter. In effecting this relief large quantities of weapons, heavy equipment, tentage and supplies were turned over to the Army to be replaced during the reorganization and refit of the division subsequent to its withdrawal. Withdrawal began on 7 December and was accomplished in the following order: 5th Marines (reinforced), 1st Marines (reinforced), 7th Marines (reinforced). Command was turned over to Major General Patch on 9 December.

As a final act in turning over the command the division commander addressed the following letter of appreciation to all those of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps who had contributed so wholeheartedly to the success of an enterprise which from its very inception had been a common cause of all arms and services:

"In relinquishing command in the Cactus Area I hope that in some small measure I can convey to you my feeling of pride in your magnificent accomplishments and my thanks for the unbound loyalty, limitless self sacrifice and high courage which have made those accomplishments possible. To the soldiers and marines who have faced the enemy in the fierceness of night combat; to the Cactus Pilots, Army, Navy and Marine, whose unbelievable achievements have made the name "Guadaicanal" a synonym for death and disaster in the language of our enemy; to those who have labored and sweated within the lines at all manner of prodigious and vital tasks; to the men of the torpedo boat command slashing at the enemy in night sortie; to our small band of devoted allies who have contributed so vastly in proportion to their numbers; to the surface forces of the Navy associated with us in signal triumphs of their own, I say that at all times you have faced without flinching the wrost that the enemy could do to us and have thrown back the best that he could send against us. It may well be that this modest operation, begun four months ago today has, through your efforts, been successful in thwarting the larger aims of our enemy in the Pacific. The fight for the Solomons is not yet won but "tide what may", I know that you, as brave men and men of good will, will hold your heads high and prevail in the future as you have in the past."

### LIST OF ANNEXES PHASE V

- A OPERATION ORDER No. 11-42
- B \*GUADALCANAL TRAIL MAP
- C \*MOVEMENT OVERLAY 26-27 Sept
- D OPERATION PLAN No. 2-42
- E TRANSLATION OF ATTACK ORDER OF 4th IMPERIAL JAPANESE IN-FANTRY REGIMENT
- F \*OVERLAY SHOWING FORWARD BATTLE POSITIONS ALONG THE MATANIKAU
- G OPERATION ORDER No. 12-42
- H MOVERLAY SHOWING SITUATION ALONG THE MATANIKAU NIGHTFALL 24 Oct.
- I TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM THE PERSONAL NOTEBOOK OF COLONEL FURMUMIYA, CO 29th IMPERIAL INFANTRY REGIMENT
- J EXTRACTS FROM THE DIARY OF AN UNKNOWN ENEMY OFFICER
- K OPERATION ORDER No. 13-42
- L SKETCH OF DISPOSITION AND MOVEMENTS ON 1 3 Nov.
- M DIAGROMMATIC SKETCH OF OPERATION ON THE METAPONA
- N INTELLIGENCE ANNEX
- O FIRST MARINES ANNEX
- P FIFTH MARINES ANNEX
- Q AVIATION ANNEX,
- R ARTILLERY ANNEX
- S COMMUNICATIONS ANNEX
- T MEDICAL ANNEX DENTAL APPENDIX ATTACHED
- U EXTRACTS FROM D-3 DAILY JOURNAL
- V SECOND MARINES ANNEX
- W PERSONNEL
- X CASUALTIES
- Y ENEMY STRENGTH AND LOSSES
- Z LOGISTICS
- \* Enclosed in envelope with 104 Map at end of annexes.

NOTE: In many cases annexes are appended merely to present a fresh and more detailed point of view. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed therein do not necessarily bear the approval of this headquarters.

#### ANNEX A

222 0042)

First Marine Division Fleet Marine Force % Postmaster, San Francisco, California


19 SEPT 42, 1200.

### OPERATION ORDER No. 11-42

- 1. a. Present indications are that the enemy will continue infiltration landings on GUADALCANAL with a view of building up a force sufficient to launch an overland attack on our position.
  - b. First Marine Air Wing will continue to provide air defense of the area including distant reconnaissance and bombardment missions.
- 2. First Marine Division (reinforced) will establish a perimeter defense of the LUNGA POINT Area in order to provide all around protection for the airfield and divisional installations. (Op Overlay Annex A)
- 3. a. First Marines defend Sectors 8 and 9. Reinforce Engineer Battalion with heavy weapons detachment to support defense of Sector 10.
  - b. Fifth Marines defend Sector 3 holding hill on left flank in strength at all times. Organize and defend Sector 4. Reinforce Pioneer Battalion with heavy weapons detachment to support defense of Sector 2.
  - c. Seventh Marines organize and defend Sectors 6 and 7. Hold ridge line in Sector 6 in strength at all times.
  - d. Third Battalion 2d Marines (division reserve) organize Sector 5. Occupy and defend on order.
  - e. First Pioneer Battalion continue pioneer functions. Occupy and defend Sector 2.
  - f. First Engineer Battalion continue engineer functions. Occupy and defend Sector 10.
  - g. First Amphibian Tractor Battalion occupy and defend Sector 1.



- h. Eleventh Marines continue to support defense. Make any adjustments of position areas necessary to provide effective support for all sectors.
- i. Companies A and B 1st Tank Battalion (division reserve) continue present mission. Conduct intensive route and employment reconnaissance of areas in and adjacent to the position which lend themselves to tank action.
- j. Third Defense Battalion continue present mission. Be prepared to provide machine gun anti-aircraft defense of beach areas when so directed.
- k. First Raider Battalion (division reserve) be prepared to execute special offensive operations in areas outside the defensive positions.
- 1. First Special Weapons Battalion provide anti-boat defense of beach areas from present position.
- (x)(1) Utmost use will be made of natural and artificial obstacles.
- (8) The exact trace of the main line of resistance will be established by sector commanders; differences with respect to siting of sector boundaries will be reconciled by the next common superior.
- (3) Positions will be organized in depth but at night or in close terrain the main line of resistance will be occupied in strength sufficient to prevent infiltration.
- (4) Priorities
  Clearing fields of fire.
  Protective wire continuous barrier double apron
  fence across front of positions.
  Fox holes and emplacements.
  Connecting trenches.
- (5) Infantry regiments be prepared to occupy and defend adjacent sectors on order.
- (6) Sector commanders will submit sketch or overlay showing complete plan of fires. Copy to this head-quarters and to 11th Marines.



#### SECOEM

#### ANNEX A (CONT)

(7) Infantry regiments will conduct intensive daily patrols as follows:

1st Marines to the east 5th Marines to the southwest 7th Marines to the south

Report of patrols sent out will be submitted to this headquarters prior to 0800 daily. Report of patrol activities will be submitted prior to 2000.

- (8) When Sector 5 is occupied troops in Sector 4 will hold forward line of that sector; at other times they will occupy the switch position.
- (9) When Sector 5 is not occupied security detachments will be posted along the east bank LUNGA RIVER by 7th . Marines.
- 4. No change.
- 5. No change.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:

W. C. JAMES
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### Annex:

A - Operation Overlay

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

G. C. THOMAS, LtCol., USMC, D-3.

#### ANNEX D

108/222 (AE-0049)

First Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, Guadalcanal, B.S.I. 6 October, 1942. 1200

(Simms)

OPERATION PLAN

Maps:

Map No. 104 Guadalcanal Island 1;20,750. Operation Overlay Annex A

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) 5th Marines (Edson)
5th Marines (less one Bn)

(b) 7th Marines (less one Bn)

(c) Whaling Group (Whaling)
3d Bn, 2d Marines
Sniper detachment

(d) Artillery Group (del Valle)

(e) Air Group (Geiger lst Marine Air Wing

(f) Boat Group. (Dexter)

(g) Reserve (McKelvy)
3d Bn, 1st Marines

- 1. (a) The enemy holds an outpost line of resistance along left (west) bank of MATANIKAU RIVER. Additional enemy forces are dispersed in the coastal area MATANIKAU (VILLAGE) KOKUMBONA.
  - (b) 1st Marine Air Wing will support operations of this division.
- 2. In addition to maintaining its present position this division will detach forces to drive the enemy from the area, MATANIKAU KOKUMBONA.
- 3. (a) 5th Marines. On morning of D-1 day occupy positions along the right (east) bank of the MATANIKAU RIVER on a



front of 1800 yards with right flank resting at the mouth of the river. Cover movement of other units. Prevent hostile crossing of the stream. Support other elements by fire. Be prepared to attack to the west on order when stream crossings have been seized by other troops on D day. Operation Overlay.



- (b) 7th Marines. Move out on D-l day. Follow route of Whaling Group. On D day support attack of Whaling Group initially. When advance of Whaling Group permits pass in rear of this group and attack on its left seizing high ground 1500 yards southwest of POINT CRUZ. Intercept and destroy withdrawing hostile detachments. Operation Overlay.
- (c) Whaling Group. Move cut on D-l day via covered routes to bivouac area on left flank of 5th Marines. On D day secure crossing of MATANIKAU RIVER at daylight. Cover crossing of 7th Marines. Attack to the northeast enveloping right (south) flank of hostile outpost line of resistance.
- (d) Artillery Group. Support attack by fire placing mass of fires initially in area west of MATANIKAU RIVER in support of Whaling Group. Cover movements of infantry groups on D-1 day. Artillery Plan Annex B.
- by front line units. Beginning D-1 day break up observed hostile troop movements in area, MATANIKAU TASSAFARONGA. Attack targets of opportunity in area west of 7th Marines zone or advance. Air Support Plan Annex C.
- (f) Boat Group. Beginning D-day maintain maximum number of boats in readiness for troop movements directed by this headquarters.
  - (g) Reserve. Be prepared to move out on thirty minutes notice.
- (x)(1) Every effort will be made to conceal movement and disposition of 7th Marines and Whaling Group on D-1 day.
- (2) All front line units conduct intensive patrolling operations beginning D-2 day.
  - (3) An outpost will be left in place to cover defensive sectors where garrisons have been withdrawn.

#### ANNEX D (CONT)

- (4) Every effort will be made to reduce casualties through full and coordinated use of air and artillery support.
- 4. Carry rations for three days.
- 5. (a) See Annex D Signal Communication.
  - (b) To be reported when established.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:

G. G. THOMAS,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

#### Annexes:

A - Operation Overlay

B - Artillery

C - Air Support Plan .

D - Signal Communication

### Distribution: Special

M. B. TWINING Ltcol., USMC, D-3.



### ANNEX "B" TO OP PLAN 2-42 - 1st MAR DIV

11th Marines 6 October, 1942.

#### ARTILLERY

Map: Map No. 4, Guadalcanal Island, 1:20,750

- 1. See Op Plan 2-42 1st MarDiv
- 2. In addition to maintaining present artillery support, llth Marines will support the attack of units of this division on the MATANIKAU area.
- 3. (a) 1st Battalion direct support attack of 7th Marines. (Colonel Sims). Furnish two forward observers, one liaison officer, and one TBX (6 man team). Positions-forward.

(b) 2nd Battalion direct support attack of 5th Marines. (Colonel Edson). Furnish two forward observers, one liaison officer and one TBX (6 man team). Positions—switch.

(c) 3rd Battalion maintain present assignment to east with one battery, one to north with one battery, and take over missions of 1-11 to south with one battery.

- (d) 5th Battalion direct support of 3 2. (Colonel Whaling). General support of other units. Neutralize roads, trails, ridges. Furnish one forward observer, one liaison officer and one TBX (6 man team). Provide and net control air spot. Positions-forward.
- (x) (1) See Appendix 1 (Overlay of fires).
- (2) Keep all firing data corrected for weather.
- 4. Ammunition-Not limited but do not waste, Pack Hows use same type shell (M41Al or M48) within Battalion. Either M48 or M54 fuse may be used.
- 5. See Annex "C" (Communications.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL del Valle.

DIST: Same as Op Plan 2-42. Plus (1) each for 1-11 2-11, 3-11, 5-11.

J. A. BEMIS, LtCol., US Marine Corps, Executive Officer

O F'F I C I A L:

T. B. HUGHES
LtCol., USMC
R-3

Ve .

ANNEX D (4)

#### ANNEX D. (CONT)

#### ANNEX "C" TO DIVISION OPERATION PLAN NUMBER 2-42.

#### AIRCRAFT SUPPORT PLAN

- detail one officer with suitable radio personnel and communication equipment as air forward observers. These officers report to LtCol. Cooley MarAirWing not later than D-2 day for instructions in communication and method target designation.
- (b) Have Bombing Group in readiness to support attack beginning D-1 day for bombing and strafing as required. Bomb targets of opportunity as indicated on overlay at any time beginning D-2 day.
- (c) Maintain artillery spotting plane in air as required by Artillery Support Group.
- (d) See Annex D Signal Communication to Operation Plan 2-42.
- (e) D-2 Map No. 104 will be used for all map designation.
- (f) Liaison Plane to be available beginning D-1 day for 7th Marines and Whaling Group and D day for 5th Marines on call.
- (g) All planes be prepared to use 1st MarDiv Simplified Panel Code and message drops.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:

G. C. THOMAS, Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

Distribution:

(Same as Operation Plan 2-42)

#### OFFICIAL:

M. B. TWINING LtCol., USMC D-3.

## ANNEX "D" TO DIVISION OPERATION PLAN NUMBER 2-42 SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

Map: Map No. 104 Guadalcanal Island 1:20,750.

- 1. (a) See Operation Plan.
- (b) CP locations to be reported on and following D-day, using prearranged message code.
  - 2. Primarily by radio. Use voice when practicable. .
  - 3. (a) RAD COM

•		
	: :P S: 'P S:TBY: EMERG :	
	: 3 4: 3 : 4 3: :	
ORGANIZATION	:CALL: 2 3; 1 :5 3: <u>P \$</u> :	
•	: 3 5: 5 :1 7: 1:	
	: :5 5: 5 :0 5:4 6: :	
CG 1ST MAR DIV	: CGD: X : X : : X :	
5TH MARINES.	: LGP: X : X :	
7TH MARINES	: OLG: X ; X : X : E :	
WHALING GROUP	: RGO: X : X : E :	
ARTILLERY GROUP	: ART: X : L : X : : E :	
AIR GROUP	: ASG: L : X : : E ;	
P-400s	: PFO: : X : : E :	
SBDs	: SBD: : X : : E :	
TBF	: TBF: : X : : E :	
ARTY SPOT PLANE	: APL: ; : X : : E :	
LIAISON PLANE	: LIP: X : : : E :	
BOAT GROUP	: BGP: X : : : X : E :	
NOB CACTUS	; NOB: X : : X : E :	
RES	: RES: X : Y : E :	
	: XYZ: : : : :	

Units use calls and frequencies assigned in SOI for comwithin unit.

- X Continuous watch during operation.
- Y When committed to action.
- L Listening watch only.
  - E Div maintains continuous watch this frequency. May be used by any unit for emergency com with Div.

FREQUENCY SHIFTS - Signal to snift from P to S is series of dots followed by Operator's Authenticator, repeated several times and VA. Signal to shift from S to P is same except substituting dashes for dots.

arrang ANNEX D (6)

#### ANNEX D (CONT)

(b) PYROTECHNICS - Following Ground Troop pyrotechnic signal meanings assigned, superseding those in Pyrotechnic and Lamp Code No. 5-42 for this opn only:

Assistance required Send Boats Attacked by strong enemy force Amber star cluster Lift gunfire No assistance needed For local use of units

Green star parachute: Green star cluster Amber star parachute White star cluster White star parachute and White or Red Very star

(x)(1) Make maximum use PREARRANGED MESSAGE CODE. Following additional meanings assigned:

Prep Afirm Afirm Aircraft Prep Fox Afirm (time/time) Friendly planes will be in air (from to ) Prep Roger Queen Request

- (2) Countersign for opn LULA BELLE.
- (3) Use CSP 1249(A) for encrypted dispatches.
- (4) Pay particular attention to GROUND AIR BOAT Emergency Challenge and Recognition Signals.
- (5) Be prepared to use 1st MarDiv Simplified Panel Code No. 1 and message drops.
- (6) Task groups check into Div 3235 rad not between 1600 and 2000 D-2 day. Thereafter rad silence, except for emergencies, until D-day.
- 4. Units provide own supplies during operation.
- 5. (a) Index No. 4-42 to SOI applies except as modified above.
  - (b) Use local zone (LOVE) time.
  - (c) Task Groups synchronize watches with DivSigOff.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:

G. C. THOMAS Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

Distribution:

Same as Opn Plan plus 2 DSO.

OFFICIAL: M. BARTWING. LtCol., USMC, D-2.

ANNEX D (7)

#### ANNEX D (CONT)

(x)(7) 5th Marines establish wire communication with 7th Marines in bivouac area.

7the Marines establish wire communication from bivouac area to 3d Bn 2nd Marines bivouac area.

ANNEX D (E)

#### ANNEX E

TRAFSLATION OF ATTACK ORDER OF 4th IMPERIAL JAPANESE INFANTRY REGIMENT (Taken by 5th Marines on 10 Oct from the Body of a Fallen Japanese Officer)

OPERATION ORDER
No. 50

1600, Oct. 5, In the South West section of Mamara.

Order of the 4th Infantry Regiment.

1. The troops in the Guadalcanal (?) --- enter under the command of the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Division and press forward to capture Guadalcanal Island.

Prepare for afternoon operations there (?) --- occuring, being an alteration in the Divisions dispositions.

The units mentioned above becoming the NASU unit in order to aid the deployment (?) of the artillery troops firing on the airport. Prepare to attack the important line of the right bank of the NATANIKAO River, while it is expected that the attack will commence on the 8th but according to conditions the set time may be (?) hastened.

Brigade headquarters 4th Regiment Infantry. 1 of the 10th Medical and one of the 3rd Bn. mertars.

- 2. At the same time that the Regiment speedily gathers together its strength with the goal of attacking the right bank of the MATANIKAO River the OKA Unit will change its dispositions and will search out the enemy and the topography on the (?) --- front.
- 3. For the changing of each unit the departure from its present position will be tomorrow the 6th at dusk and the change will take place during the night. For this purpose the 2nd and 3rd battalions Chiefs of Section (staff) will be gathered at the headquarters of the CKA unit today the 5th at 1900.
- 4. The 1st Battalion (the artillery train less one-half being independent) will assemble its strength on the South side of Pt. Cruz and with one part will secure the area on the right bank of the MATANIKAO and will search out the enemy's positions and topography of HYO (?).

#### ANNEX E (CONT)

- 5. The 3rd Battalion (less the 11th Company and the 5th Company) (the one half artillery train independent) will assemble in the area West of the Nippon bridge and with about a company for each seize and hold the area of the AUSTEN range and the area West of the Nippon bridge. The 2nd Battalion, less the 5th Co. will assemble in the area to the South West of Pt. Cruz and while guarding the coast line will be prepared to support (maneuver) the 1st Battalion.
- 6. Again the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion will until dawn on the 7th have one Company under the command of the 3rd Battalion Commander at the present position of the 2nd Battalion Command Post.
- 7. The Regimental Infantry Artillery will occupy the position in the rear of the 1st Battalion and with its main force support the fight of the 1st Battalion.
- 8. The Regimental CP and the Infantry communications unit will be in a position to the South of Pt. Cruz.
- 9. It is the duty of the Infantry communication unit to maintain communication between the Brigade headquarters and the 1st and second Battalions.
- 10. The second Battalion commander will send one platoon to the Regimental CP at 1600 on the 6th as a (?) --- unit.
- 11. Today the 5th at the OKA unit headquarters the Commander of the 4th Infantry Regiment NAKAGUMA.

#### SECON

#### ANNEX G

108/222 (AE-0058)

First Marine Rivision Fleet Marine Force %Postmaster, San Francisco California 13 October, 1942, 1500

### OPERATION ORDER

Maps:

Map No. 104 Guadalcanal, Lunga Area, 1:20,750; Operation Overlay Annex A.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) 164th Infantry

164th Infantry

Designated elements 1st Spl Wpns Bn.

(b) 7th Marines 7th Marines

Col. Sims

(c) <u>lst Marines</u> lst Marines

Col. Cates

(d) 5th Marines 5th Marines

Col: Edson

(e) <u>llth Marines</u> (Arty) <u>llth Marines</u>

BrigGen. del Valle

(f) 3d Defense Battalion
3d Defense Battalion
1st Spl Wpns Bn

Col. Pepper

(g) <u>lst Marine Air Wing</u> lst Marine Air Wing MajGen. Geiger

(h) Cos A & B lst Tank Bn
Cos A & B lst Tank Bn

Maj. Walseth

(1) 3d Bn 2d Marines
3d Bn 2d Marines

LtCol. Hunt

(j) <u>lst Engineer Bn</u>

lst Engineer Bn

Maj. Frazer

(k) <u>lst Pioneer Bn</u> lst Pioneer Bn

Maj. Ballance

(1) <u>lst Amphibian Tractor Bn</u>
lst Amphibian Tráctor Bn

- LtCol. Barr
- 1. (a) Annex B Intelligence.
  - (b) First Marine Air Wing will continue to provide air defense of the area including distant reconnaissance and bombardment missions.
- 2. First Marine Division (reinforced) will continue the defense of the LUNGA POINT perimeter in order to secure the airfield and divisional installations. (Op Overlay Annex A).
- 3. (a) 164th Infantry. Occupy and defend Sector 2.
  - (b) 7th Marines. Continue defense Sector 3. Hold EDSON'S RIDGE in strength at all times. Establish night combat group covering PIONEER BRIDGE. Prevent hostile infiltration down LUNGA RIVER.
    - (c) 1st Marines. Occupy and defend Sector 4.
    - (d) 5th Marines. Continue defense Sector 5. Hold KING COMPANY RIDGE in strength at all times.
    - (e) 11th Marines. Continue to support defense. Be prepared to mass fires in support of Sectors 4 and 5. At least one battalion pack howitzers to be in position at all times to support forward positions covering MATANIKAU RIVER. Annex C Artillery.
    - (f) 3d Defense Battalion. Continue to provide anti-air-craft and seacoast defense. Assume tactical command of Sector 1. Coordinate all matters within the division respecting beach illumination, anti-aircraft, anti-boat and seacoast fires.
    - (g) <u>lst Marine Air Wing</u>. Continue distant search and bombardment missions. Support defense by executing close reconnaissance and attack missions. (Air Support Plan Annex D)
    - (h) Tanks (Division Reserve). Conduct intensive route and employment reconnaissance of areas in and adjacent to the position which lend themselves to tank action. Submit detailed plans for tank employment based on reconnaissance.

#### ANNEX G (CONT)

- (i) 3d Bn 2d Marines (Division Reserve). Conduct necessary reconnaissance to enable battalion to move at night to the support of any defensive sector. Conduct training night operations.
- (j) <u>lst Engineer Bn.</u> Continue present missions. Occupy o defensive subsector as prescribed by CO 3d Defense Bn.
  - (k) <u>lst Pioneer Bn.</u> Continue present missions. Occupy defensive subsector as prescribed by CO 3d Defense Bn.
  - (1) 1st Amphibian Tractor Bn. Continue present missions. Occupy defensive subsector as prescribed by CO 3d Defense Battalion.
  - (x) (1) Sectors 2 to 5 will be subdivided into two battalion subsectors. Subsector 1 will be subdivided into 3 subsectors.
  - (2) Sector commanders will prepare plans for use in the even it becomes necessary to employ an additional battalion on the sector front line. Similar plans will be prepared for use in the event it becomes necessary to reduce the number of front line battalions within the sector.
- (3) The exact trace of the main line of resistance will be established by sector commanders. Differences with respect to siting of sector boundaries will be reconciled by this headquarters.
  - (4) Positions will be organized in depth but at night or in close terrain the main line of resistance will be held in strength in order to prevent infiltration.
  - (5) Utmost use will be made of natural and artificial obstacles.
  - (6) Existing fox holes and communication trenches will be improved to afford greater protection from artillery fire.
  - (7) Machine guns will be sited to deliver enfilade fire. Frontal protection for machine gun positions to be provided by riflemen.
  - (8) Fires of artillery, mortars and machine guns will be carefully coordinated.

- and the state of the second
  - (9) Sector Commanders will submit sketches showing dispositions and complete plan of fires. Scale 1:5000. One copy to this headquarters: one copy to lith Marines.
  - (10) Daily patrols will be sent out as far to the front as practicable returning prior to darkness. Patrols will observe hostile movement and amough trails. Night patrols may be sent out when state of training permits. The size of patrols will be as prescribed by sector commanders. Report of patrols sent out will be submitted to this headquarters prior to 0800 daily. Report of patrol activities will be submitted prior to 1900.
  - (11) Sector Reserve battalions conduct training in night movements and night operations over sector terrain.
  - 4. See Administrative Annex, Annex E.
  - 5. See Annex F Signal Communication.

    BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:

G. C. THOMAS, Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,. Chief of Staff.

#### Annexes:

A- Operation Overlay

B - Intelligence (To be issued)

C - Artillery (To be issued)

D - Air Support Plan (To be issued)

E - Administrative (To be issued)

F - Signal Communication (To be issed)

#### Distribution:

Special

#### OFFICIAL:

M. B. TWINING LTCCL., USMC D-3.

#### ANNEX I

# TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM THE PERSONAL NOTEBOOK OF COLONEL FURMUMIYA, CO 29th IMPERIAL INFANTRY REGIMENT.

26 October

Those who followed me in the charge together with 2d Lt ONO are the eight persons under 2d Lt CNO. whose names are written on the back of this page. Later I met Capt SUZUKI.

First I called out to the escort company which was advancing to the right in order to avoid the enemy line, and tried to control it, but it was impossible to do so. Subsequently it seemed to me that the company charged in the direction of the 2d Bn, so I moved to the right and thereafter things became quiet. There was an enemy signal station in this area. I considered attacking it, but we did not because I thought I would escape from here with my subordinates in case the main force did not arrive, I am ashamed of my lack of training.

(NOTE: Following is the list of names)

Capt. SUZUKI
2d Lt. ONO
WO KOBAYASHI
Sgt OGAWA
Corp SATO
Corp WAKISAWA
Lance Corp TAKAHARA
Superior Pvt KONDO
Superior Pvt SAKAMOTO

Will you please look after the future of those nine men.

Around 05:30 we decided to lie hidden and made final arrangements for official and personal matters. As INUZUKA and the guard soldiers had been killed, their possessions were divided and each man carried one article.

Following this I clearly indicated our location to my subordinate and we lay hidden individually, watching for the enemy. Frequently there was fierce firing until 08:30, and I thought our troops were making a charge but this was not the case. However, I heard yelling a few times, which was probably either a charge by our brave soldiers or a hand-to-hand fight against an enemy counter-attack.

At 09:30 a friandly plane carried out a low-flight reconnaissance in the face of enemy machine-gun fire. As I thought the plane was sent out by special arrangement of the division commander to hunt for us, we immediately signaled but the plane did not discover our position. The plane was trailing smoke behind. I sincerely appreciated the thoughtfulness of the Div Comdr. Around 10:30 enemy planes came to reconnoiter. The enemy position is only one line with covered machine gun emplacements. Penetration of the enemy line can be easily accomplished by ordinary flanking neutralization fire. There is notneed to be afraid. Mopping up of the enemy is also easy. A problem is whether to put this into practice or not. There are no wire-entanglements. Spirit has overcome material things; and this has become the decisive battle between Japan the the USA. Careful preparation is necessary accordingly, in regard to date, operations, material (map information) ammunition, provisions, equipment etc., however there are times when the situation does not permit making these preparations. We carried out our plans regardless of success or failure. The determination of the commanders from the beginning was to die in GUADALCANAL if this was unsuccessful. I, also have this determination and have tried to carry it out. sorry that I lost many troops uselessly and for this result which has come unexpectedly. We must not overlook fire power: When there is fire power the troops become full of spirit but when fire power ceases they become inactive. Spirit exists eternally,

To division commander MARUYAMA To group commander NASU

I express my sincere apologies.

I wish you success in the occupation of GUADALCANAL.

After all, there is not better attack than a night attack. However, the jungle is not a suitable place for a night attack although it can be utilized to conceal a planned maneuver very effectively.

With the condition of the division as it is at present, it is best to attack LIZARD PLATEAU at dusk.

The enemy position is weak. Infantry equipment alone is sufficient to attack it. Tonight I am attempting to escape from here with my subordinates. Success or failure cannot be known in advance. If I do not succeed, please forgive me for not being able to apologize to you any more than by death. (Div Comdr)

From this day anti-aircraft machine guns started firing. Are battalion commanders WATANABE and YOSHII in good health? How is the combat of lat Brecoming along?

ANNEX I (2)

#### ANNEX I (CONT)

I suppose you had a hard time with two companies. How is the attack of the division developing?

Considering the present situation, it is best to capture LIZARD PLATEAU and then extend the battle.

Determination is all we need.

At 12:00 and 12:45, our planes made a low flight (probably for the purpose of reconnaissance). They underwent fierce anti-aircraft fire. I suggest that you stop excessively low flights, for it reveals the object of reconnaissance.

I don't know how to apologize for spoiling the reputation of the army by losing troops and hindering the execution of the attack against the U.S.A.

Even though it may be possible for the army's honor (Note:-this probably refers to the regimental color) to fall into the enemy's hands, I am trying to return safely by taking every possible step. This may be the last opportunity to burn the army's honor, but I cannot see fit to do so in the present situation.

25 Oct 1942

To division commander MARUYAMA

I do not know what excuse to give. I apologize for what I have done.

Commanding ISAMU No. 1303

25 Oct 1942

To Unit Commander NASU

I do not know what excuse to give. I apologize for what I have done.

Commander of ISAMU No. 1303

To the officers and men of my command:

I do not know what excuse to give for speciling the reputation of the regiment because of my ignorance. I appreciate that you have endured long hardships and performed your duties honestly and conscientiously.

Unit commander,



and the second

Plan of Escape

However, we will not necessarily escape even in sase our troops carry out a dusk attack.

- 1. Date, time. From 04:40 to 05:30 on 25th.
- 2. Direction. 20 meters east, where we had penetrated.
- 3. Command and movement of troops.

  Presumably the same as before.

  2d Lt Ono

  If Ono dies

  Regt commander will be
  in the order of
  Capt SUZUKI

  WO KOBAYASHI
  Sgt YAMAKAWA

Be especially careful not to lose the articles given in your care.

4. Advance secretly and quietly until the enemy's front line is reached and then break through the enemy line by rushing. After reaching the jungle area of our forces, return by the path along which we originally advanced.

I am afraid that the enemy may fire mortars etc. at our present location.

We lost liaison with the group that escaped first. (2d Lt ONO and two soldiers). We searched but were not able to find them. Warrant Officer KOBAYASHI was sent to find them, but he has not come back yet (according to a report, they accomplished their purpose safely). Conditions are not favorable for an escape at the moment because of the moonlight. At 23:00 clouds rose and I thought it was the best time to carry out the attempt, but we hesitated to do so because of ONO and KOBAYASHI. Later I decided to carry it out tonight. We departed at 02:00. The enemy disposition has been strengthened since yesterday. The enemy situation was so different from yesterday that finally it became impossible to carry out our escape.

At daybreak we gave up hope of escaping and began to make last preparations. We finished the preparations at 03:50 (of-ficial and private matters). At 04:00 the enemy's front line began firing guns and automatic rifles. We heard the sound of automatic rifle fire by our forces. It was probably a daybreak attack by our forces. We slowly awaited the result. My, mind is as calm as though it were an ordinary day. If our force does not

ANNEXAI (4)

#### ANNEX I (CONT)

succeed in its attack this time, Japan will have to reconsider the matter of military equipment. At 04:00 the sound of firing from both forces became slower. It is strange that the enemy fire is slow. I asked Capt SUZUKI about his final preparations and his answer was "Well." Around 04:30, the sound of firing from our forces became slower for a time.

I am going to return my borrowed life today with short interest.

I feel sleepy because of exhaustion for several days.

At 04:30, the enemy front line fire reached its maximum.

Enemy planes appeared.

An attack is unsuccessful if a penetration is not made when the enemy fire net is neutralized.

The mission of a Japanese warrior is to serve his Emperor and his parents with fidelity.

I sincerely apologize to my superiors and to the officers connected with 29th Inf. Regt. I have never heard American sold-iers talking except when they are communicating. I admire them for keeping silent. The enemy's rear unit is also quiet.

It is hard to understand the purpose of the covered light machine guns in the enemy's position which fire one or two shots at a certain interval. It may be for the purpose of disturbing our sound plotting, or perhaps the machine guns are operated by electricity and no soldiers stand by.

Once before I determined that escape was impossible, and made all final preparations, but as I thought this determination should not be made lightly, I am going to try to escape ence more (26th 13:00).

Difficulty of Escaping.

- 1. (Illegible)
- 2. Swift movement is impossible in the jungle except on the roads. However, the jungle is suitable for concealment.
  - 3. On the 26th we are completely enveloped by the enemy.

I made Capt SUZUKI my assistant and formed two-men group. The NCO's and men also formed two-men groups.

It was sultry and rained in the afternoon. How lucky we are!



It seemed to me that there is an orientation locater in the enemy gun position, and that the enemy fire on this area is directed by sound from the center. If my supposition is correct, the movements we made last night were foolish. This will probably make the division's method of attack clearer.

After making a thorough study, we decided to escape by moving a short distance to the east, and we began moving. Movement in the jungle on a dark night, is truly impossible. When the moon rose we started to escape. Although we often met enemy positions, we avoided them without any trouble. Our escape did not progress as we wished because of hunger and thirst. At 02:00 we could not decide whether to cross the enemy's main position, and so we passed the night at the following place:

We were in great danger because our presence was suspected by an enemy trench mortar unit, and two men came out scouting.

The canteen I filled on the 24th was empty. I ate one of three NASHIGORENES (could not ranslate) which were the only rations remaining, and left two. (illegible)

Merely to escape would be easy but a conditional (i.e. with equipment etc.) escape is really difficult. The enemy's sound locater and a fire not have not yet been completed in this area, so we should make our escape tonight (night of 25th).

Although, I was planning to escape separately, I finally joined the men and went along with them. This group movement is bad for both of us. We must move separately tonight. At 11:30 the enemy completed the disposition in this area sending vehicles and approximately 10 more men. A simple preliminary drill was also carried out. I could not observe clearly the disposition from the jungle. The interval between posts is 50 meters and each post has two machine guns. The rear post was equipped with trench mortars and machine guns.

I felt refreshed after lying on the ground face upward and sleeping, but was awakened by someone snoring. Conditions were not favorable for making the final arrangements (i.e. burning the color, etc.), and so we once more made up our mind to carry out

### ANNEX I (CONT)

the escape (in a group). We again entered a strong enemy envelopment (we were cleverly detected by the enemy and were fired upon from the left and right). A complete escape (of all persons) has become hopeless. I cannot guarrantee positively that (probably the regt color) will not fall into the enemy's hands.

- 1. We must elude the enemy's observation and penetrate this fire net (?)
- 2. As we are in the jungle, we can not move swiftly (It took us 5 to 6 hours to go 200-300 meters and keep our movement concealed). On the other hand, officers and men have lost their vigor and strength owing to the lack of water and food, and it has become impossible to accomplish the important mission of escaping and making a report. At the present time we are receiving reconnaissance fire from the enemy's enveloping line. The situation will be worse if the enemy finds us before dark and fires at us. This is the reason why I took the final determination. Will you please excuse me.

The thing which should be burnt is the regimental color. However, soldiers of the color guard have been dispersed and so the color is not here. As we have enveloped by the enemy, it has become impossible to burn the thing. Therefore, I hope you will understand that I will tear the thing in pieces and scatter the pieces. `

#### ANNEX J

# EXTRACTS FROM THE DIARY OF AN UNKNOWN ENEMY OFFICER

1 Oct 42 The 3d Bn made preparation for advancement. The 2d Bn is moving its position to KOKUMBONA and the 5th and 7th Cos. are in the vicinity of POINT CRUZ.

2 Oct. There was sound of guns in the direction of the MAT-ANIKAU RIVER around 2:00. I presume they are attacking gun fire by the ONUMA platoon which has a mission to cross the MATANIKAU RIVER to facilitate the advance of the OKA Unit.

Joct I heard that Gen. MASU landed yesterday. The advance personnel of a regiment arrived. In the future, the regt. is expected to relieve the OKA Unit. From now on, the landing point is expected to be the sand beach beyond the BONEGI RIVER so it will be very convenient in supplying provisions and forage.

It is said that there are about 40 ships in TULAGI and furthermore, the powerful fleet of our friendly army is in the vicinity of NEW ZEALAND and is cutting off the advancing enemy route.


4 Oct Enemy planes flew all night last night. TK (tanks) landed at KAMIMBO BAY and the remaining troops of the OKA Unit landed at the new landing point. It seemed that the Div, Comm. also landed.

The division commander came. We entered under the command of the AOBA division commander and will press on to-occupy GUADALCANAL ISLAND. It seems that the 4i (4th Inf. Regt.) will relieve the KAWAGUCHI UNIT and will occupy the right bank sector of the MATANIKAU RIVER and will cover the deployment of artillery. The cannonade is expected on the 8th and thereafter, it seems that 29i (29th Inf.) and 16i (16th Inf Regt.) will land in the area of the TAIVU POINT. The KAWAGUCHI UNIT was assigned; to secure the landing point, the protection of liaison route to the rear, and the supplying of materials, provisions and forage.

6 Oct For the deployment of the artillery, III (3d Bn) occupied the left bank from the mouth of the MATANIKAU RIVER and with a part of the Bn. occupied the right bank. The 4i (4th Inf. Regt.) and SA (Heavy Fd. Art.) are indeed the sacrifice of entire troops.

7 Oct. We woke up at 02:00 and dug trenches. We received an enemy air attack as usual.

#### ANNEX J (CONT)



9 Oct We received a division order which ordered the 4th Inf. Regt. to carry out the night attack against the former 1st Co. Position and occupy this position and also occupy the right bank position. However, it was 02:30 when the order came and it was only one hour before day break. It was obvious that the enemy would give us a concentration of gun fire. We thought it would be only loss of our strength even though we did succeed in the night attack, so we did not carry out the attack and bivouacked at the former 3d Bn. Hq. The casualty of the 4th Inf. Regt was heavy; 567 persons in the 2d Bn. about a rate of 70 persons per Co. and in the 1st Bn. about 30 persons. In the 2d and 3d Co. about 100 persons in the rest of the 1st Bn. In the En Hq. 3 sergeants were seriously wounded.

10 Oct There was Jun fire from our friendly warships last night and this morning. The 15 howitzers are located in jungle near the Regt. Hq. and it is pre-arranged to deploy today. The 20th Ind. Mt. Art. with 6 cannons arrived near our position. Preparation for attack is progressing steadily. There were no attacks from the enemy artillery and airplanes. I presume that the reason for this is that the enemy has a great damage or has a shortage of ammunition.

ll Oct The enemy artillery fire had completely ceased last night. In the evening 35 enemy combat planes, 5 Boeing bombers and a few other bombers which are either reinforcements or the planes which had escaped to another airfield, landed at the airdrome.

12 Oct Most of the enemy planes took off toward TULAGI early in the morning. Due to the delay of a division landing plan, the general attack was postponed until two days later. The 15cm, howitzers (96 year type) were unloaded from the sea-plane tenders NISSIN and TITOSE. I heard that we are contracting with the combined fleet for the execution of gun fire from the warships.

13 Oct It seems that two enemy transport ships, two light cruisers and one destroyer entered the harbor and are engaging in unloading operations. Around 09:00 about 29 of our operation. planes came to bomb them. For the purpose of covering the landing of remaining troops of the division and the unloading of provisions and forage by the convoy of 6 transport ships, 2 cruisers and other tomorrow hight (TASSAFARONIA, KOKUMBONA), the 15cm Howitzer will carry out firing from 19:00 until 23:00. From 23:00 the fleet whose cadre ships are KONGO and HARUNA (and maybe MUTSO and NAGATO)

ANNEX J (2)

#### ANNEX J (CONT)

will fire about 2000 shells tonight. It is also said that a navy anti-aircraft unit at TASSAFARONGA and a part of the 45th and the 47th anti-aircraft Bn. at KOKUMBONA and the M.G. at our present area will begin firings tomorrow morning. I heard that there are two 15cm, howitzers (96 type) in the front jungle and will begin firing against the airdrome at 19:00. In regard to the 15cm. howitzer it is unknown. The two field artillery guns will fire against the mortar at MATANIKAU.

14 Oct After the firing from the 15cm. howitzer, the warships shelled the airdrome and the airdrome was set afire. There were three explosions in THE AIRDROME in the morning but I do not know whether they were explosions of powder or gasoline.

The result of the war is unknown but we could not see any of 10 enemy warships and 2 transports ships which were in the narbor. I sighted only 11 combat planes and 1 bomber that took off from the airdrome this morning. I did not hear much sound of guns only rifle shots, and I presume they are short of ammunition. Enemy artillery fired once in a while, as soon as our 15cm. howitzers begin firing, the 15cm, enemy howitzers begin to counterfire continuously.

15 Oct The gun fire from our warships started at 11:00 as prearranged, In the morning, I saw 6 of our friendly transport ships in the harbor. It was expected that main strength, 16I, 2031 (probably a mistake as the 203i is already identified (main strength of 16th Inf. Regt 203d Inf. Regt. 1 Sqdn. of 10th Cavalry, 1 Co. of 15th Howitzer, 1 Co. of 1st Tank Unit, 1 Co. of 1st Ind. Rapid firing gun and anti-aircraft gun Bn. would land and supply would be unloaded. Enemy coast artillery guns were firing fiercely on us. Enemy planes attacked our transportation ships and set fires on two of them.

16 Oct The division with the NASU Det. (291) will maneuver toward the upper stream of the LUNGA RIVER on the left bank.

4i (4th Inf. Regt) will occupy the position on the right bank of the MATANIKAU RIVER two days prior to the general attack (under the command of Maj. Gen. SUMIVOSHI). The artillery will go in the position in the vicinity of the former Navy HQ and will start firing from 19th, especially if the agreement with the Navy is made, one Bh will land in the vicinity of the LUNGA RIVER or at the pier. 16i (16th Inf. Regt) will be the reserve unit and will advance in the direction of either the NASU or the KANAGUCHI Detach. Whichever the result of battle is greater or pre-arranged. According to the report, the enemy fleet is advancing toward the north. If we can annihilate it, we would give the enemy a damaging

blow, materially and mentally, and we will be able to put one Bn in a very advantageous position. The concealment of the plane of the operating units is very important. The Regt will divert the enemy from the direction of the shore road.

17 Oct Last night I heard that our submarine had sunk 1 enemy transport ship and 1 destroyer. South of LUNGA POINT and this morning our bombers bombed 3 destroyers. The activity of our Navy is great. The rate of fire of our artillery is slow compared to that of the enemy, because we spend more time in observation so as to save ammunition. However, the calibers of the guns on warships are big and muzzle velocity is great. Moreover, the guns which have been firing against the airdrome are from warships above cruisers so guns are bigger than 30 cm. I suppose the blow which it gave is great. In the evening 3 Boeing bombers appeared but immediately flew back. I presume they came from Port Moresby.

18 Oct According to an artillery officer, our warship shelled the airdrome and only three planes are able to fly. The combined fleet which is operating in this vicinity consists of 15 to 16 ships and they are expected to attack enemy warships. I heard that an advance party of the maneuvering unit arrived at the upperstream of the LUNGA RIVER passing through Austen Mt. About 1200 sacks of rice, and about 500 boxes of hard tack and canned goods were burnt by the bombs from airplanes and gun fires from the warships which occured yesterday.

19 Oct It seemed that the Div. will send SHOJI Detach, who has many experiences in battle and who has succeeded in occupying the airdrome twice at HONGKONG and KARIJIYATE (?) to the area on the right bank of LUNGA RIVER.

29i (29th Inf. Regt) will advance along the left bank area of LUNGA RIVER and will attack the enemy from rear right flank. 3d Bn. of OKA Unit will occupy the positions of Mt. Austen and NEKO (cat) and OKA Unit will occupy the enemy position on the right bank of MATANIKAU RIVER and advance to SHISHI (lion) and TORA (tiger) by making a right detour. 4i (4th Inf. Regt.) will engage in the covering of the artillery on the left bank of the MATANIKAU RIVER and the defences of the coast, but according to the situation the 4th Inf. Regt. might advance by leapfrogging OKA Unit in the right bank area of MATANIKAU RIVER. I heard that yesterday a part of NASU Detach. received machine gun fire from the enemy. 4i (4th Inf. Regt.) will advance for the purpose to divert the enemy. When night came enemy planes started flying for observation, but there were no gun fires from the enemy, probably they were afraid to be shelled by the warships.

· 35.0

ANNEX J (4)

## ANNEX J (CONT)

25 Oct The regt has made the preparation for attack but there is no sign of move. I heard that we occupied a part of the airdrome. According to Sgt SASAKI the attack by the division main strength will be carried out tonight. At night the enemy artillery opened fires and our artillery counterfired. Enemy shells dropped near our position in the jungle. It was very difficult to discover the enemy position.

26 Oct Last night the night attack of the 3d Bn did not progress as we wished. They say that OKA Unit did not attack the enemy upon the order, and he(OKA) left his unit and stayed at the point 2 kilometers east of the narrow bridge. It seems that the regt condr. does not know what to do with him.

We heard the slow gun fires in the vicinity of the division main strength. It seems that the attack in the area of the army main strength also did not progress smoothly. The 38th Division (less 203i) is concentrated in the vicinity of Rabaul so as to be used either at Port Moresby or GUADALCANAL: It is said that the 38th Div will be used in this island and it will make the force landing probably at KASHI (?) which is one day walk from TAIVU POINT.

The KAWAGUCHI Detach. will cover its landing and the division will wait an opportunity at the upperstream of the LUNGA RIVER. I heard that there are one regt of 15 H (15cm Howitzer) one Bn of lok (10th Cav Regt) and one regt of TK (Tank) in Rabaul.

27 Oct Enemy planes flew above us to reconnoiter our plan and fired the machine gun into the vicinity of AA (Anti-aircraft) position. They say that our combined fleet sunk 2 battleships, 9 destroyers and cruisers altogether, and 4 aircraft carriers on the Solomon Sea. I suppose the reason the navy did not cooperate with the division in the general attack is that they were engaged in the sea battle with the enemy fleet. The main strength of the division will retreat 8 kilometers from the airdrome. And the KAWAGUCHI Unit will retreat to KASH (?) to cover the landing of the 38th Div. There is a rumor that the 38th Div. will make landing tomorrow.

28 Oct The landing of 38th division today was only the rumor. At the present time we are still pursuing remaining enemies, it is perhaps impossible to make the landing. For some time there will be no hope of attacking enemy which is expected on 3 Nov, the anniversary of the Emperor Meiji.

#### ANNEX J (CONT)

20 Oct In the morning friendly bombers bombed the enemy position and enemy anti-aircraft guns counter-fired. The division is advancing steadily to the attack preparation position. The consideration, which the division commander has at the present time is whether the main strength of the enemy is on the left bank of the LUNGA RIVER, or in the vicinity of the airdrome we might postpone it a few days so that the 16i (16th Inf. Regt.) can penetrate some more. My estimation is that the main strength is probably on the left bank area. And, it seems that the enemy is extremely sensitive of the beach area. The enemy again bombed the vicinity of the road. It seemed that night bombing and sea battle were held!

As soon as our field artillery began firing at the right 21 oct bank of the MATANIKAU RIVER the enemy artillery counterfired at the area which presumed to be the narrow bridge and the Ist Co. dummy position. Two enemy planes are flying above us. I heard that OKA Unit will earry out the night attack against the enemy position on the right bank of the MATANIKAU RIVER tonight. It appears that the Div. has entered the attack preparation position successfully. The general attack will be carried out tomorrow. For the purpose of covering the night attack of CKA Unit, our field Artillery, with the main strength will fire against the enemy mortars on the right bank of the MATANIKAU RIVER and with a part of it will engage in the anti-artillery combat at 1430. It is impossible to fire on the enemy mortar with our artillery on the right bank of the MATAMIKAU RIVER. It has been said that the mortar is the best to fire against the mortar. According to the estimation made by MAKINO, the enemy strength of the MATANIKAU RIVER is about one battalion with about 8 mortars. The night attack in the moonlight night is very difficult and we have to consider the damages by enemy mortar. Moreover, we must expect the attack by enemy planes and enemy artillery after occupying the right bank position of the MATANIKAU RIVER. The mission of OKA Unit is the diversion of the enemy but this will be the desperate diversion. The regt. has decided to cross the MATANIKAU RIVER at the mouth of the river, cooperating with OKA Unit to devert the enemy prior to the division general attack: 1 TKs (one indept. tank unit) was attached to the 2d Bn and they were placed as the front line unit. We departed at 1430 advancing along the shore line. We met fierce enemy fires in the vicinity of the river mouth, The general attack was postponed until tomorrow.

24 Oct The general attack of the division has started. The enemy gun fires are very accurate and most of them dropped on the road. When our tank began retreating enemy gun fires concentrated on them.

Cartain of the Committee of the

#### ANNEX K

108/222 (AE-0059)

First Marine Division Fleet Marine Force %Postmaster, San Francisco California

30 October, 1942. 1200

OPERATION ORDER No. 13-42

Maps: Map 104 Lunga Area 1:20,750

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) 5th Marines

5th Marines

Detachment lst Spl Wpns Bn

Detachment lst Engr Bn

Col Edson

(b) 2d Marines (less 3d Bn)

Col Arthur

(c) Whaling Group

3d Bn 7th Marines
Sniper Detachment

Col Whaling

(d) <u>llth Marines</u> <u>llth Marines</u>

BrigGen del Valle

(e) <u>lst Marine Air Wing</u>

Designated elements

lst Marine Air Wing

MajGen Geiger

(f) <u>lst Engineer Bn</u>

Designated elements

lst Engineer Bn

Maj Frazer

(g) Advanced Naval Base
Boat detachment

Capt Greenman

- 1. (a) The Japanese 2d Division which holds the area POINT CRUZ TASSAFARONGA has been defeated with great loss in the recent fighting along the MATANIKAU and LUNGA RIVERS.
  - (b) First Marine Division (reinforced) will be supported by 1st Marine Air Wing and (tentatively) by a naval task force.

2. A task group from this division will attack to the west on 1 November seize the village of KOKUMBONA and drive the enemy beyond the POHA RIVER in order to secure the airfield from long range artillery:

Time of attack! Line of departure: Formation: O630 l November
MATANIKAU RIVER
Column of regiments, 5th Marines
in assault.

- 3. (a) 5th Marines Attack to the west on a front of approximately 1500 yards with right flank on the coast. Main effort along the high ground in center of zone.
  - (b) 2d Marines (Reserve) Follow attack moving in right of 5th Marines zone. Be prepared to attack on the left of the 5th Marines or to effect a relief for the continuation of the attack on order.
  - (c) Whaling Group Move out along the high ground south of 5th Marines zone of advance. Assist the advance of 5th Marines. Protect left (south) flank.
  - (d) <u>llth Marines</u> Support the attack placing mass of fire initially in the zone of advance of 5th Marines. Displace to the west as necessary to insure continuous support of the attack by at least two battalions up to the line of the POHA RIVER.
  - (e) First Marine Air Wing Support the attack by bombing and strafing hostile positions with particular reference to troop concentrations and field batteries. Conduct battle reconnaissance. Provide artillery spotting plane on call 11th Marines.
    - (f) <u>lst Engineer Battalion</u> On night D-1 day throw four assault bridges across MATANIKAU RIVER at points designated by CO 5th Marines. On D-day construct temporary vehicular bridge to accomodate division loads near mouth of river. Attach demolition detachment to 5th Marines.
    - (g) Advance Naval Base Be prepared to provide on call maximum number of landing craft available for use in supply and evacuation and movement of troops by water.
- (x) (1) Maximum use will be made of air and artillery support. Artillery and mortar fire will be placed upon each objective prior to its assault and upon each wooded ravine or streamline suspected of hostile occupation prior to its passage by the infantry.

CENTEUT.

- (2) Anti-mechanized defense in depth will be provided along the coastal road in the right of the 5th Marines zone.
- (3) Contact with the beach will be maintained at all times.
- 4. Administrative details later.
- 5. Signal Communication Annex A.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:

G. C. THOMAS, Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff.

Annexes:

A - Signal Communication

Distribution: Special

OFFICIAL:

M. B. TWINING, LtCol., USMC, D-3.

108/222

First Marine Division,
Fleet Marine Force,
C/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California.

30 October, 1942.

#### MEMORANDUM FOR: All Units.

- 1. In preparation for the attack scheduled 1 November the following changes in dispositions will be effected:
- (a) Beginning morning 31 October 5th Marines move to line of departure. Regimental Headquarters and 2d Bn 7th Marines and 3d Bn 1st Marines withdraw to LUNGA POINT and take over 5th Marines Sector.
- (b) Beginning afternoon 31 October 2d Marines (less 3d Bn) move to bivouac area vicinity 74.0 200.5.
- (c) In order to protect crossings of the MATANIKAU RIVER 3d Bn 7th Marines and 3d Bn 1st Marines will each leave in place a covering detachment of the battalion heavy weapons company.
- (d) During hours of darkness 164th Infantry will maintain two companies as mobile reserve for support of sectors east of LUNGA RIVER.
- (e) During hours of darkness CO, 3d Defense Battalion will direct 1st Pioneer Battalion to maintain two companies as mobile reserve for support of sectors west of LUNGA RIVER.

M. B. TWINING, LTCOL., USMC, D-3.



First Marine Division Fleet Marine Force %Postmaster, San Francisco California

30 October, 1942;

# ANNEX "A" TO DIV OPN ORDER 13-42 SIG COM

Map; Map 104 Lunga Area 1:20,750

- 1. (a) See Opn Order.
- (b) CP locations to be reported when initially established and after each displacement.
- 2. Use all practicable agencies sig com. See SOPCOM 4. Complete installations by 1800, 31 October.
- 3. (a) Sig Co establish Div Adv Cen vicinity present 3d Bn lst Marines CP.

### (b) WIRE COM

- (1) Sig Co install and maintain 2 wire lines direct from Div CP to Div Adv Msg Cen. Install tp sbd with code name TEXAS FORWARD. Establish wire com with 3d Bn 7th Marines (Whaling Group) CP and with 7th Marines CP. Lay two wire lines to initial CP of 5th Marines, and one wire line to initial CP of 2d Marines. Assist in maintenance wire lines from TEXAS FORWARD to CP regt in assault.
- (2) 5th Marines extend and maintain two wire lines received from TEXAS FORWARD from initial CP. Sig Co will assist in maintenance.
- (3) 2d Marines extend and maintain one wire line received from TEXAS FORWARD from initial CP.
- (4) Whaling Group extend and maintain one wire line received from TEXAS FORWARD from initial CP. as far as practicable. Thereafter establish wire com with left assault bn of assault regt when situation permits.
- (5) 1st Engr Bn establish and maintain wire com with TEXAS FORWARD.

# (c) RAD COM (1) In accordance with following chart:

ORGANIZATION	:(	CALL	372	:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::	3 1 5	:	4 5 1	:	rby P:S	:	EMERG 2 3 8	
	:	•	5	:	5	:	Ø	:4	1:6	:	5	
CG 1ST MAR DIV	;	MDI:	X	:	X	:		:	<u> </u>	:	X	
DIV ADV MSG CEN	:	AMC:	W	:		:		:	:	:		
5TH MARINES	:	MAE:	X	;	X	:		:	X	;	E	
2D MARINES	:	ART:	X	:	Y	:		:	X	;	E	
WHALING GROUP	:	WGR:	X	:	Z	:		:	X	:	E	
11TH MARINES	:	DEV:	X	:	L	:	X	:		:	E	
1ST MARAIRWING	:	MAR:	L	:	X	;		;		:	E	
SUPPORT PLANE COMDR	:	SPL:		:	X	;		:		:		
RCN PLANE		RPL:		:	X	:		:		;		
ARTY SPOT PLANE		*ASP:		:		;	X	:		;		
AIR LN PTY (if provided)	: 4	APY:		:	X	•		:		:	E	
1ST ENGR BN	:	NGR:	W	:		:		;		:	E	
ADVANCED NAVAL BASE	:	ANB:	W	:		•		;		:	E	
BOATS	:	BTS:	Y	;		:		:	Y	:		

Units use calls and frequencies assigned in SOI for com within unit.

- \*If more than one plane add 1, 2, 3, etc. to assigned call. W Establish continuous watch whenever wire com not available.
- X Continuous watch during opn.
- Y When committed to action.
- Z When working with aircraft.
- L Listening watch only.
- E Emergency net. Any unit may shift to work DIV in this net in an emergency.

(2) Maintain RAD SILENCE (continuous listening watch) except for operational check, par x(5), or in emergency, until hour of atk. Thereafter no restrictions.

## (d) VIS COM

Sig Co establish vis sig station vicinity KUKUM by 0630 l Nov for com with unit vis stas along beach west of MATANIKAU.

# (e) PANEL COM

Use 1st Mar Div Simplified Air-Ground Panel Code No. 1.

(f) PYROTECHNICS - Following special Pyrotechnic Code assigned for this Opn only:

3661 E

By Ground Units

By Aircraft

RED VERY LIGHT.

WHITE VERY LIGHT

Display Front Line Company
Headquarters marking panels.
Signal Understood (or if no signal has been made) Display Identification Panels.

(x)(1) Following map reference point designations assigned for use of all units:

POINT	COORDINATES	POINT	COORDINATES
A-firm	(71.6-200.4)		(65.1-202.3)
B-aker	(70.64201.2)	E-asy	(70.8-199.8)
C-aat	(63.9-202.8)		

- (2) Password for opn Current daily password.
- (3) Make maximum use PREARRANGED MSG CODE. Following additional meanings assigned:

- (4) Use CSP 488 (M-94), CSP 1369/1370(2) or CSP 1249(A) with Div for encrypted msgs.
- (5) Task groups check into Div 2385 and 3725 kes nets prior 1600, 31 Oct.
- (6) Special Flag Signal Unit with right (north) flank resting on beach be prepared to display large RED with WHITE center signal flag to mark limit of advance for boats, or to naval gunfire support ships if naval gunfire support provided.



- (7) Pay particular attention to GROUND-AIR-BOAT Emergency Challenge and Recognition Signals.
- 4. Units responsible for own supply during opn.
- 5. (a) Index No. 4-42 to SOI applies except as modified above.
  - (b) Use local (LOVE) zone time.
  - (c) Task Groups synchronize watches with Div (TEXAS) telephone operator.

## BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:


G. C. THOMAS, Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps, Chief of Staff

Distribution:
Same as Opn Ord


## OFFICIAL:

M. B. TWINING, LtCol., USMC, D-3.





DISPOSITIONS AND MOVEMENTS 1-3 NOVEMBER



# ANNEX NINTELLIGENCE

#### Introduction

The fifth and final phase of the Guadalcanal Operation of the First Marine Division Reinforced, embracing all activities in the area following the arrival of the Seventh Marines until the withdrawal of the Fifth Marines, in point of time covers the longest period to be designated in a distinct phase. While a busy term in all aspects of the campaign, in the intelligence field it was a period of development and exploitation of already existing instrumentalities, rather than one of establishing new agencies for information gathering. The following paragraphs will briefly outline the course of events and show their bearing on intelligence activities, likewise how intelligence material affected the conduct of the Division's mission. A recapitulation of the sources of enemy information and intelligence tasks of Divisional, attached, allied and subordinate units as they functioned in the final phase will summarize this report, concluding with comments on the mistakes and shortcomings of the intelligence set up, along with suggestions for improvements in future operations.

### ORDER OF EVENTS

The night of 20 September, just two days after the 7th Marines had landed, the Japs attacked northward along a ridge held by the 3rd battalion of the newly arrived regiment. Two companies were cut off from each other and communications knocked out. All the usual cunning and wiles used by the enemy in earlier battles were again displayed. In reporting this action to D-2, the Battalion Intelligence Officer of this unit noted that most of his fellow officers were impressed with the fact that the Japs did not take advantage of chances for damage. Targets that were available were ignored, and there was a lot of firing with apparently little damage. In commenting, the Bn-2 stated that there seemed to be no purpose to the raid other than to harass or possibly to feel out new troops just put on the line.

On Oct. 2 a reconnaissance mission under the direction of Major John V. Mather, AIF, who had come ashore with the 7th Marines and was attached to D-2 immediately because of his previous expecience in the Solomons, set out for Malaita, to investigate the possibility of and to arrange with the filendly natives for the elimination of a Japanese coast watching station of 22 men with a radio transmitter. This was reported at Cape Astrolabe on that island. The party



completed their reconnaissance by October 7, having contacted the native headman and reliable members of the local constabulary. The sequel to this mission was written on November 5 when a Marine patrol operating out of Tulagi against Cape Astrolabe completely wiped out the post at 0800, having killed 19 Japs, taken one wounded prisoner and wounded the remaining two escapees whom the natives were rounding up in the bush. The radio equipment and documents were taken intact and all rifles, machine guns, and ammunition were captured. By careful planning, reconnaissance, and correct periodic reporting from the natives through the coast watcher station on Melaita, no casualties were sustained on this operation.

By October 2 it had become apparent that the Catholic priests and nuns in hiding at Tangarare would have to be evacuated from Guadalcanal for their own safety. Many. communications from the coast watcher at Lavoro Pass station and also from the watcher in the central mountain fastness of the island had been received asking aid for the clerics and the Bishop who was reported ill. Consequently, the first of the coastal sailing schooners to be placed at the disposal of the CG, 1st MarDiv., and to be administered by the D-2, was dispatched on the afternoon of October from the Naval Operating Base at Lunga Point to Tangarare for the purpose of evacuating 7 nuns, 5 priests, and the Bishop. Returning to Lunga the afternoon of 4 October, the priests and nuns were transferred to the USS Fomalhaut, unloading cargo at the time, for transportation to Noumea. The Bishop and some native nuns were transported to Malatia per their request. At this time the Messrs. Rhoades and Schröder closed their coast watching station at Lavoro and came in to the DSIO station at Lunga, because Japanese patrolling from Visale had made the situation untenable.

With this pioneer voyage of the auxiliary vessel Ramada, a word must be said about the employment of the four small boats which came under the aegis of the D-2. To the long account of yeoman's service in which the Ramada was used, carrying supplies of various coast watchers, rescuing stranded and wounded pilots from remote havens where friendly natives had cared for them after crashes and forced landings, and reconnaissance missions to other islands, including a trip around to the south side of Guadalcanal island, must be added to the many coastwise trips of the A.V. Mendana, the A.V. Nanui, and the A.V. Rob Roy. All of these were rescued from disuse, after their owners in the Solomon Islands were forced to hide them from the Japs, and upon being rehabilitated by the Allied forces at Guadalcanal, were individually pressed into service as they became available.

#### SECPET

From October 6 to October 9 the enemy was engaged in an operation along the east bank of the Matanikau River which was of particular significance to the Intelligence Section of the Division in that enemy documents of inestimable value were captured, turned in to the Division Japanese Interpreter, and translated. While a detachment of 1st Marine Raider Battalion and 3d Battalion, 5th Marines added to their list of commendable accomplishments in practically annihilating an enemy force estimated at one company, firmly entrenched in well prepared positions and protected from all sides by their machine gun fire, the real value of this engagement was in the captured enemy operation order which revealed that the Japs were sending reinforcements and supplies to their troops on Guadalcanal every night. This information, belated as it was, nevertheless enabled the U.S. Naval forces in the South Pacific, to whom it was immediately; communicated, to intercept the large Japanese task force which they blasted and destroyed behind Savo Island the night of October 11-12.

Patrolling activities by members of the D-2 Section, which had been discontinued after the disastrous patrol led by Colonel Goettge, were resumed at the end of September, when Pfc. Wendling and Private Massaro of Division Intelligence accompanied three members of the 1st Raider Bn on a reconnaissance mission in the Aola - Koilotumaria region east of Lunga. The party was under the command of Pl. Sgt. Pettus of the Raiders and was guided by two of Capt. Clemens native police boys, Andrew and Daniel, the chief scout. Landing from a Higgins boat near the Government Station at Aola the party went inland and westward to Gurabusu, where they split in two groups, with Raiders, a D-2 man, and a native scout in each unit. The purpose of the mission was to discover the strength of an enemy encampment believed to be in the vicinity of Kollotumaria. The enemy was not to be engaged and the party's presence was necessarily to be kept secret. One group moving on to the village of Gegende was aided by the addition of two native scouts who were more familiar with the territory to be patrolled than either Daniel or Andrew.

\* Cpl. Andrew Langabaea (Malaita) and Cpl. Daniel Pule (Roviana) remained at Acla in September and October directing scouts in W. sector under the direction of Captain Clemens. They provided guides and carriers from the Gurabusa clean-up, secured beaches fro preliminary reconnaissance patrols, watched over Government property, etc. Daniel returned to Lunga in Nevember became Q.M. Sergeant of cannibal battalion. Accrew remained at Acla. Both were awarded B.E.M. by Resident Commissioner. Andrew, the military man, is believed promoted to Sgt. Major of augmented police. Daniel is the chief clerk and scholar of the group, typist, recorder, historian, linguist.



Pvt. Massaro states that in reconnoitering the Jap camp at Koilotumaria village the party was at times within 200 yards of the enemy. They were thus able to not only locate him but to estimate his strength. The units joined up at Aola and returned to camp by boat, which came to pick them up at an appointed time. The success of this mission without casualties was in a large measure due to the splendid cooperation of the native constabulary acting as guides and their ability to recruit other boys on the spot for local scouting.

Based on the findings of this patrol a mission to wipe out the enemy encamped at Koilotumaria was planned and undertaken on October 7 by Captain Clemens plus a force of native police boys and Marines, including Pfc. Wendling as a representative from D-2. The force arrived at Aola by boat late that night, where Captain Clemens' native agent, Eroni, later to become a coast watcher and scout at Marau Sound, informed them of the unchanged enemy situation. Eroni and Pfc. H. M. Adams of the Marines had proceeded to Aola on October 2 to await the first Gurabusu patrol.

Through the use of Captain Clemens radio transmitter at Aola, hidden from the Japs, the Division Command Post was kept informed of the progress of the patrol. A message on October 11th to Colonel Buskley from Clemens dramatically tells the story of this combined intelligence and combat patrol: "1110 action Gurabusu completed X Captain Stafford USMC killed in action X one other slight casualty X Enemy taken completely by surprise X 2 transmitter receiver sets captured also maps and documents X one 8mm machine gun X all appear to be naval personnel X no contact with Hill since yesterday X

Using the designation ELT and later ZGJ 4 both at Aola and at Marau, this radio station carried on all the functions of a coast watcher including reports of observations, patrol reports, rescue of fliers, etc.

-4- ANNEX N

patrolling and defensive missions in the lower Solomons. Through their tireless efforts a great many of the enemy's attempts to reinforce his positions and weaken his opponents were thwarted. On call from Base Radio Gudalcanal the squadron received its orders from Radio Tulagi and made its reports to the Commanding General, Guadalcanal, through these channels.

The morning of Clemens' return to Lunga with the D-2 elements of this Gurabusu patrol, October 13th, witnessed the disembarkation of the U.S. Army's first troops participating in the Solomons' campaign. The 164th Infantry Regiment, U.S.A., was sent as the forward echelon of the Americal Division, located in Noumea under the command of Major General A. W. Patch. This was the Division which would eventually replace the First Marine Division and would be the dominating element of Army Forces at Guadalcanal under the command of Major General M. F. Harmon,

It was a day of great excet ment for all hands on the island, and gave the army regiment its baptism of fire without delay. At two minutes past noon, Henderson Field and Lunga were subjected to a severe air raid by 22 bombers with fighter coverage. Cactus aviation, not having sufficient notification, wereunable to get planes up to intercept. The runway and taxi way were damaged, 5000 gallons of gasoline were destroyed, and twelve planes on the ground were damaged. At 1350 a second raid by 25 bombers damaged the runway. Continued enemy activity in increasing volume was indicated when the Radar picked up enemy planes at 0108 on the 14th. At 0138 enemy naval gunfire was poured into Guadalcanal from two or three ships off Savo Island, one of them probably a battleship. The destruction of grounded planes and the neutralizing of the airfield was all but completed. Fragments found for days after indicated that 14 inch shells had been fired at Lunga from 0138 to approximately 0315. Single enemy planes continued to drop bombs through the night until about 0500. The 14th brought more enemy air activity, bombing raids, plus enemy field artillery reported by artillery and infantry OPs to be firing from a position at the base of Point Cruz. Allied coast watchers in the Northern Solomons gave warning of a large convoy on the way south to Guadalcanal, as well as other warships in the vicinity. From 0105 to 0220, on the 15th shelling from enemy warships, probably cruisers and destroyers, was resumed. At dawn observers and air patrols reported five enemy transports unloading troops and cargo off Kokumbona to the west, protected by a force of destroyers. The limited local air force was able to launch two attacks against this shipping early in the morning, damaging and eventually destroying

three of the transports. It is noteworthy that the D-2 observers at the left O.P. were able to give the command post a complete report of the coastwise activities, and most important they determined the location of the unloading at a point west of Tassafaronga rather than at Yokum ona and ascertained the number of ships to be six! Correct information facilitated later strikes made by Cactus aircraft and the Army planes which were rushed up to assist. It also indicated the immediate danger to the western flank of the perimeter defense by locating the landing point, probably bivouac area, and distance of the enemy from our lines.

Besides the comforting observations that three and possibly four of the enemy ships were rendered a total loss by aircraft before the observers! eyes, was the evidence that they could have unloaded only in part. Based on the 8 hours available. between 0230 and 1030 for unloading and on the estimated. class and capacity of each of the six transports, a potential troop carrying capacity and maximum figure for troops.landed (100% disembarkation) was estimated. Though it was almost. certain that neither all the troops nor much of the cargo were landed, the outside limit on personnel landed was set at 6,200. From earlier estimates of enemy strength on Guadalcanal, taking into account the lesser landings which had been effected, it was estimated that from 12,000 to 13,000 fully equipped troops were there on October 15th. "In the 24 hours just completed at least 8 transports and as many warships were sunk or damaged by aerial attack around Guadalcanal and to the North.

Opposition to this mid-October landing continued the following day when a destroyer, the USS McFarland, was called upon to shell, the enemy positions and dumps in the area of the new landings. It arrived at Lunga about 0800 on the 16th. Captain W.F.M. Clemens and David Trench of the B.S.I.P. Defense Forces with an artillery liaison officer and a D-2 observer went aboard to direct the attack on strategic targets, They were qualified for the job by a good knowledge of the coastal area plus the possession of aerial photos with targets designated by Sgt. Stanely, the first D-2 photo interpreter. A similar mission was sent to shell enemy positions both to the east and west of Henderson Field in December. Cactus aviation continued attacks on enemy troop concentrations, supply dumps, gun emplacements, and on landing barges which had collected around the ravaged transports beached at Tassafaronga. Aerial photos were proving their worth in the number of targets they provided for naval gunfire and aviation attacks

Two more events occured in the middle of October wroth noting for their importance as intelligence activities.

SECTION

THE THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY STATES AND THE SECOND SET OF THE SECOND SECOND SET OF THE SECOND SECON Permission was granted at this time to a native police boy who had made some very valuable observations and proposals. to take a handful of men and wipe out the Japanese coast. watching post operating in his Locale. The deputation recruited from natives living in the cape Hunter district of Guadalcanal were armed with captured enemy weapons and in short order annihilated the 9 man watching and radio post 🕬 🕆 that had been set up on a headland at cape Hunter. There 🗀 were not more than a dezen police boys on this mission and a they operated without casualty under the supervision of the leading local constable. The belated report of this action received by radion from ZGJ4 on November 3rd, reads: 19 Japs at Veunu were killed by local people other side X 9th. escaped X captured 9 rifles, 9 pistols and 1 machine gun put u out of order X burned all munitions X no wireless found X 2 of the killers reported this X killed Wednesday last week (28 October) X ELT 1415/3".

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The other undertaking at this time was the patrol sent out to the Russell Islands under the command of Lt. D.C. Horton, RANVR, of the coast watching system, with Lt. A. Anderson, RANVR, also of the DSIO office, assisting. Setting out from Lunga with a small complement of men in a Higgins boat about October 12th, the mission was to obtain information regarding enemy activity on the Russells Group and at the same time establish a radio coast watching post in the islands.

The second part of their mission was defeated by an accident which occurred upon the landing in the Russell Islands. Due to insufficient care in wrapping and carelessness in handling, the radion receiver transmitter was dropped in the surf while being unloaded, a vital instrument of our war effort thereby being put out of commission. Since no word was received by radio from this party and supplies were limited a boat was sent to evacuate them on the 18th.

By contacting the natives who were friendly, much valuable information was obtained regarding enemy movements in the Solomons. Among other things it was learned that groups of from 200 to 400 Japs arrived by small boats and barges from New Georgia at night. These groups were re-embarked from the Russell Islands, sometimes the same night they arrived, going to the west end of Guadalcanal. Available gas and oil stores hidden by loyal natives, and excellent anchorages were noted by the patrolling party, who reported back on 19 October.

A later intelligence mission conducted by Lt. Horton was undertaken on November 1 reporting much enemy activity and locating many strategic positions on Isabel Island where they landed on November 2. The following day the party went over to the Russell Islands for additional enemy information and returned to Lunga Point on the 4th.

The arrival of Colonel E. F. Carlson, CO of the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, at Guadalcanal on October 22 for a consultation with the Division Command, portended the employment of that raider group in the Solomons operation. The original plan to use the Raiders as a giant combat patrol which would land at Beaufort Bay on the west coast of the island and push its way north through the coastal settlements and then eastward, destroying the enemy, pushing him back toward the Marines' western flank, and distracting his concentrated effort against the defense line on this flank, was worked out in detail. Maps and aerial photos and mostacs were furnsified the solonel for this mission, and arragements to use native scouts and ..... carriers were made. Two days later Carlson left for the New Hebrides base where his troops were camped, with Major Mather accompanying him to act as liaison with the natives throughout the undertaking and Pvt. Massaro as the D-2 observer.

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The abandonment of these plans and the use of the Raiders on an entirely different mission was dictated by a necessity which arose with new developments in the Guadalcanal situation.

A smaller reconnaissance patrol of this area, however, was substituted and executed between November 19 and the 30th, when the men reported back at Lunga from their operational base at Beaufort Bay. 1st Lieutenant F. T. Flo of the 164th Infantry, U.S. Army was despatched with 17 men and a force of native scouts and carriers aboard the schooner Ramada on the earlier date, equipped with rations, maps, aerial photos, etc. In addition to their experiences and successful contacts with two small forces of the enemy, the patrol made a very thorough and valuable reconnaissance of the coast from Tambugu in Tiavo Bay to Aruligo Point on the north coast. Following is Lie Flo's intelligence summary of his job:

"From the information collected it is my contention that there are approximately 2500 - 3000 Japs in the area from ... Maravovo to Aruligo. These however are doing nothing in the way of fighting, but are doing some building in the bush They are made up of strong points along the way and don't seem to have too much contact with each other. Some are Marines and others are soldiers. Most of the Japs I believe are concentrated in the Visale - Aruligo area. They stay away from the beaches, at least as far back as the bush begins, and are never more than 11 miles back into the bush Aerial machine gun fire any farther back from the beach than 2 miles would certainly hit natives instead of Japs. They are in good condition and seem to have plenty of ammunition to waste. The natives in back of Visale are starving due to the Japs raiding their gardens and should be given food. The natives cannot be recommended too highly for their scouting abilities and should be given every consideration by the American soldiers. Activities on the 24th - 25th were limited for the most part to aerial strafing and bombing by SBD's on designated targets, located by patrols and observers, to artillery and mortar duels on the western front, and much patrolling activity by both sides. There was one enemy bayonet charge toward morning which was stopped with slight casualty to the defending force. It then appeared that the enemy was drawing back his forward lines after 2 days of unsuccessful fighting.

Sunday October 25, known in the Division Command Post as "dug-out Sunday" was one of continuous enemy aerial activity over the intire area. With one bombing mission in midmorning, Jap fighting planes were over the airfield at irregular intervals during daylight hours. Their diverbombers and reconnaissance planes also had missions over Guadalcanal, and in the clash with the defending air and AA forces, the enemy lost 17 fighters and 5 heavy bombers.

Japanese naval forces approaching Guadalcanal from various quarters that day were successfully held off by fighter and bomber planes. Much damage was inflicted on the ships, forcing them to withdraw without having fulfilled their mission. The D-2 journal for October 25 records a continous stream of enemy aircraft and ship warnings, beginning at 0715 and ending about 1900, from the coast watchers located along the Cactus Express Route all the way from BTU at Buka Passage to ZGJ-4 at Marau Sound. Together with the Cactus bombing and fighter plane reports relayed to D-2 from Air Wing Intelligence at Honderson Field and the radio intercept warnings belatedly received from ComSoPac, a complete picture of enemy activity around and over Guadalcanal was available throughout the day.

American Naval forces and carrier based aircraft carried on a running battle with these off-Guadalcanal enemy forces on October 26th in the major engagement subsequently known as the Battle of Santa Cruz. It definitely thwarted the Japaims to soften up the Guadalcanal fortress for a final overthrow.

Late on the night of October 25-26, in a surprise shift of emphasis, the enemy troops launches a new drive of considerable size on the southern front where Henderson Field was closest to the lines and where an attack was least expected. A regiment of Army troops and battalion of the 7th Marines defending this sector successfully withstead all efforts to crack the defense perimeter for three successive nights. The diminishing force with which these attacks we proceed indicated that enemy strength was waning and supply problems were becoming insuperable in the Japs position. An army survey in front of the lines on the 29th made a final estimate of 1500 enemy dead on a front defended by

The native trails are narrow but offer good concealment. Streams and rivers are easily fordable and potable. There is a good automobile road from Naro to Visale, which probably extends even as far as the Matanikau River. The best landing for American troops would be at Bahi as it affords a good base for operations. Maravovo can be reached from there in two hours. Potable water is plentiful and concealment is good.

Valuable information regarding the terrain, villages, good landings and anchorages was recorded by small patrols sent out from the Beaufort Bay base. A further service was rendered in pringing to headquarters Father Emery De Klerk, S.M., of the Catholic Mission who had been hiding and observing in the hills west of Lunga. Instead of being evacuated with the rest of the missionaries, Father De Klerk chose to remain and offer his services as watcher in the hills and later as a recruiter of native labor for the Allied forces on Guadalcanal. His knowledge of the natives and terrain to the west of Lunga also contributed to the intelligence picture and to the eventual clean up of Japs by the U.S. Army.

Jap landings to the west during the first half of Oct. were preparatory to the grand scale push against the Lunga :: Point defense perimeter with Henderson Air Field as the ultimate goal, undertaken by the enemy between Oct. 23 and Oct. 26. Though small skirmishes between Marines and the enemy occurred almost continuously throughout the month along the Matanikau, engagements in which enemy tanks or armored vehicles were glimpsed as early as October 19th when one was knocked out, the actual drive against Lunga began the night of the 23rd. Heavy mortar and machine gun fire from the enemy commenced about 1830. An artillery bombardment beginning shortly before this time was reported by phone to be falling short of Lt. Col. McKelvey's lines where the 3rd Bn., 1st Marines were defending the river bank. Artillery fire from at least three big guns was coming over the Command Post and falling on Henderson Field all this while, a repetition of the bombardment delivered the might before when the Japs failed to follow up with any kind of an attack.

Throughout the night of Oct. 23-24, the Marines held the Matanikau against every enemy attempt to cross. Tanks trying to break through were repulsed by 37mm anti-tank guns amd the 75mm half tracks. On the following afternoon Special Weapons Bn. reported 9 large Jap tanks knocked out. But a patrol of the battle area made three days later by members of the defending 3rd Bn., 1st Marines counted a total of 12. Two were identified (by careful noting of details and cataloguing in Army Training Manual 30-480) as Tankettes Ishikawajima, model 25/8 (1938). The remainder were Jap medium tanks - 15 to 18 tons, comparable to U.S. light tanks, and most closely identifiable as the model 97 (1937) cruiser.



two battalions.

Among the reports of prisoners captured and questioned during the late October campaign most interesting was that of a corporal granadier, whose statements were coroborated for the most part by those of other prisoners taken at this time, but who gave a more complete picture of the operation and answered some of the questions that arose regarding the plan and reasons for its failure. This man stated that the Japanese 2nd Division (complete) was on Guadalcanal, consisting of more than 10,000 troops. When asked how he knew this, he said it was the talk of his outfit. He told how these regiments were landed at hight on October 9th at Kamimbo Bay and Visale from destroyers. The Oka regitent landed a month before. They landed field guns of about 53mm and other artillery of about 5 or 6 inch, using fixed ammunition. Their mission was to attack and capture the airfield. They were to come around behind and meet the Oka unit, but the plan didn't work because they were one day late.

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In this way, the presumption that the attack on the airfield was intended to coincide with that on the Matanikau two days earlier was confirmed. Failure to coordinate these phases of the operation was explained by the prisoner's description of the 10 day gruelling journey undertaken by his regiment over mountain ranges and through impenetrable jungle, with full combat equipment! Some mountains resembling canyons were climbed by means of ropes. Artillery came a little later and was carried up or pulled up by man-power until it had to be abandoned because of its bulk and weight. Weapons carried to within 300 meters of the airfield included light and heavy machine guns. There were also 4 or 5 anti-tank guns in the regiment to be used against American tanks. All this was accomplished by troops eating less than a ration per man per day! They couldn't eat the rice they carried as they had... no water. They couldn't cook the food they are for fear of revealing their fosition and progress. Though men and officers aggreed mutually to withstand the hardships, they couldn't fight so well because they were weak from climbing mountains and lack of food.

The night of the attack on the SE flank, when gunfire and mortar fire held the advance; the Division consisting of the OKA, the AOBA, and the FUROKOWA Regiments participated. This man stated that these were the most famous regiments in Japan; their renown was owed to their never having been defeated. This man was in the Furokowa Regiment (1st Bn) and landed on Guadalcanal, October 9th.

Other prisoners in the OKA unit explained that the unit was composed of both experienced and inexperienced troops, particularly after one battalion had been defeated in the Battle of the Ridge, on September 13-14. One stated that in this October battle the OKA Unit did not have supply columns (there were not many trucks). He also stated that they had enough food but not nearly enough water. He was tired and hungry when they went into battle. He also admitted that much of their fuel and provisions had been destroyed by bombing missions in the west of Guadaleanal. Another revealed that at the Battle but due to emergency was called upon to fight. (This statement would indicate that part of the OKA Unit was with-held from Joining the rest of the unit in the SE sector on the 25th and 26th, because of the exigencies of the Matanikau battle, and thereby contributed to the general weakness of the later show); This man stated also that the OKA Unit was hit so hard that they were disorganized. Of interest also is the statement of a member of the AOBA unit that the killing of one third of a unit means annihilation from a military standpoint,

The Division Intelligence Section understaffed from the losses sustained in the Goettge Patrol, received additional personnel during the month of October. Early in the morning of the 15th, Lt. A. Claffy arrived by plane from Noumea for duty in the intelligence sub-section of the D-2. His duties consisted of map and photo classification and distribution, collecting of material and writing of reports, and general duties such as keeping up the daily work sheet and situation map as weel as day and night security watch.

The presence of another officer greatly relieved the pressure of work on LTs. Kidde and Whitehead and added another officer for the night watches which had been borne by four officers without relief.

Section by ship from Wellington via Noumea. As assistant D-2, Major Evans took over some of the administrative and executive duties which Colonel Buckley had been shouldering without assistance and which had been increasing in number as new intelligence office functions were handed to the section. He also stood the security watches by the telephone at night. On the same day the section received the valuable services of Pl. Sgt. L. H. Wolff, transferred from the 7th Marines, who became chief of section for the D-2 enlisted personnel. In addition Wolff began the organization of a productive actal photo interpretation unit. This work has been handeled by one man who had neither the equipment nor sufficient personnel for a subject so vital to the success of the

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whole campaign. Wolff had no staff to work with other than his predecessor, but with the increasing wolume of aerial photos being taken by the aviation photographic unit on Guadal-canal and those taken by the photographic squadron at Espiritu Santo, the two were able to find many targets for artillery, bombing, and naval gunfire missions.

The idea of recruiting native labor for work on the airfield was already in the minds of the Division Staff as early
as August. A first attempt to enlist some was made in September
with the assistance of Captain Clemens and Lt. MacFarlane,
coastwatcher at VOJ-8 in the Guadaleanal mountains. The
enemy situation, however, prevented the natives from joining
us. On September 20th MacFarlane had were than 50 native
volunteers with him from the south side, but they were
frightened and semanded armed Marine patrol escert, which could
not be furnished. MacFarlane had to feed them meanwhile. We
dropped supplies to him by plane, but eventually the boys were
forced to return home. Again in October a second effort to
enlist native labor was made. Once more the enemy situation
interfered and carriers ready to proceed to Lunga from the
East on the 25th were held up.

By November 1st a group of 200 had entered the Lunga defense area, and about 400 all told were encamped there by November 10th. D-2 was responsible for the recruiting, Lt. Col. Geraci of D-4 for the maintenance and operation of the "cannibal battalion". The first group which had been working on a volunteer basis desired to return home later in the month.

A permanent organization was then started, as the natives proved invaluable for unloading incoming transports. Squadron Leader Widdy had a hand in this, his interests being the preservation of the economic hold and the native exploitation of his company, Lever Brothers. Further recruiting was conducted with the aid of Father De Klerk of the Tangarare R. C. Mission. At the end of November Captain Trench, acting District Officer in Captain Clemens absence, managed the native labor camp along with the native constabularly. When the U.S. Army took over in December, the D-2 coastal "Navy" was stolen from G-2 by Widdy, who was still trying to run some 600 natives, all of whom entertained a secret, if not active, desire to shoot him. It was also his idea to enlist a further 400 or so from Malaita, playing both ends against the middle by the importation of a foreign element, but this had not yet been done when the rear echelon of the Division left. Payment of the native laborers was undertaken by the 1-2 office out of their Intelligence Fund. It was possible to pay out of this fund, intended for the costs of obtaining enemy information, inasmuch as keeping the natives friendly and cooperative was considered a counter intelligence activity.

November 1st marked the beginning of a new drive against the enemy on the western flank, a drive which took troops across the Matanikau as far as the base of Point Cruz but which never achieved the objective of taking Kokumbona and pushing the Joss back beyond the Poha River. So firmly entrenched were the enemy, that the Marines were held for 12 days, suffering notable losses. They finally had to be withdrawn to meet the new threat to the defense perimeter of the mid-November enemy naval blitz.

Communication lines with the front were intact throughout this period. The Division Command Post was kept informed of the situation at all times, though for D-2 much of the information was obtained by having a man in the D-3 office to pick up messages that never reached D-2 through the channels of organization. This was particularly necessary in order to keep the situation map up to date. Patrol reports and unit intelligence reports were sent to D-2 as required:

Staff from Tulagi to Guadalcanal on the 4th of November was effected for two reasons. Not only had affairs on Tulagi quieted down to a passive defense requiring smaller forces, but the consolidation of 2nd Marine Regiment troops in one place and the gradual union of 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal could now be considered with a view toward the evacuation of complete units in the not too distant future. On the other hand it was decided to give the ADC command of the eastern sector at Lunga Point, while Briggen. E. B. Sebree, ADC acting CG of the Americal Division, U. S. Army, before General Patch's arrival, was given command of the western sector, Both reported to the Division Staff offices, which were acting in the capacity of a corps headquarters on a small scale under General Vandegrift.

Following an unfortunate accident which incapacitated Captain R. L. Rowell, the ADC-2 officer, Lt. Kidde was appointed to fill this vacancy and moved into the ADC Command Post where he acted as Intelligence Officer until this group was evacuated from Guadalcanal in January with the rear echelon, First Marine Division.

Almost simultaneous with the operation westward came warnings an information from ComSoPac that Jap destroyers would attempt to land troops at Koli Point at 2230 on November 2nd. Despatches received on November 1st and 2nd indicated that enemy plans had fallen into Allied hands by intercept. Though and American cruiser and destroyer force had been advised directly of the enemy's approach and Cactus aviation and torpedo boat force was put on the alert, neither naval nor aviation interception of the enemy succeeded. The 2nd Bn., 7th Marines was sent down past Koli Point on the 2nd to await

the Jap landing and prevent it, should the ships succeed in getting through. Colonel Hanneken after unsuccessful attempts to get messages through to the Division Command Post, finally established communications by TBX transmitter the following afternoon, at which time he described the Jap landing of troops from a cruiser, a destroyer, and a troopship 3000 yards east of the Metapona. His bettalion which had skillfully been placed in position 1000 yards west of the landing engaged the enemy in battle in the early hours of the morning. The enemy's field artillery made the Marines' position untenable so they retired west of the leapons, where food and boat transportation for casualties was requested.

Without particularly designated targets in the Koli Point " sector, aviation was not too optimistic about the results oftheir three bombing strafing missions which they delivered in / the general enemy area on the 3rd. Wing Intelligence reported "Saw no activity except one camp fire - - - " and again "Strafed Nalimbu River area, saw no enemy As contacts between the battalion of the 7th Marines and the enemy continued on the 4th and thereafter, reports were sent to Division Command Post from ADU-2. After delivering heavy naval gunfire on the morning of the 4th against Jap installations west of Point Cruz as, mentioned earlier, the USS Landsdowne, a destroyer; repeated the performance on probable Jap positions just east of Koli Point. A patrol from the 1st Bn., 7th contacted the enemy the night of Bovember 4-5. The Japs moving southward, however, were attempting to get in behind the 2nd Bh. 7th position to the west. As they moved north to cut off this force, the 1st Bn. 7th marched Infrom the west on November 8th encountering the enemy in The ofternoon. Aviation support was requested and supplied when heavy enemy artillery fire was ecnountered. On the following day the 2nd Bn. 164th Infantry U.S.A., in taking up a position Fil mile east of the Metapona and 1000 yards south of the coastline, joining with 1st Bn. 7th Marines on the left (west) and 2nd Bn. 7th Marines on the right (exst), completed the encirclement around the Japs which was to close in and force them to the coast for ultimate surrender or destruction. Their number was estimated from 300 (164th estimate) to 800 (7th Marines estimate). From the 9th to 11th they attempted with extensive mortar fire and hand grenades to break free of their trap. During the early morning hours of November 11th a breach on the eastern flank of the army battalion was made through which an estimated 500 escaped and fled to the southeast. The supplies of the entire force, namely ammunition and food, were captured. Mopping up operations in the encircled area continued during the 11th and 12th. Although several hundred of the enemy were killed, the greater force is known to have got ten away in the jungle in a completely disorganized rout. The cleanup of these was baccomplished in the long campaign undertaken by Col. Carla n's Raider Battalion in November.

In order to assist in the secret landing of the Second Marine Raider Bn. at Aola, Captain Clemens with a group of Marines and natives proceeded by schooner to Aola on the 1st of the month where beacon lights were set to guide the ships in. The Raiders were disembarked from the APD's Manley and McKean on November Six larger trasnports and cargo ships landed a Defense Battalion, a Naval Construction Unit, and an Army Infantry Regiment at the same time. While the Raiders! task had been secretly assigned them in the New Hebrides, the other forces were intended to remain at Aola for the development and protection of an airfield there. Expert aviation enginmers who had made surveys and studies of the feasible sites and others familiar with Guadalcanal terrain had advised in favor of the grassy plain at Volinavua, but it was Admiral Turner's decision to locate the new landing field at Aola, where coconut palms had to be cleared away and stumps pulled before the ground could even be levelled. As more and more difficulaties were encountered in the work on the Aola field and in landing supplies the impracticability of the project was admitted and the whole operation was moved a month later, again by transport and cargo ship, to the extensive grassy plains inland from Volinavua, the original choice for an airfield.

The plan of the Raider Battalion in November was to advance inland and travel westward from Aola until the Matanikau River was reached and then to turn northward and come into the Lunga Defense area. Their mission was three fold: (1) to determine the existence of any enemy concentrations south of the defense perimeter (were forces again gathering for another push at their favorite point of attack?; (2) to discover the main Jap trail south of Mambulo (Mt. Austen) and report the presence of any Japs found there; and (3) to search for and destroy an enemy. field piece believed to be located on the north slope of "Bere Knob". To these was added the search for a reported easy trail south to the top of Mambulo following the ridge contours. Thus it would appear that they were to function as an immense reconnaissance patrol. Clashes with scattered groups of the enemy were inevitable on a trek of these proportions, and when called upon on the 11th by communication with their portable radio receiver-transmitters from Lunga to contact and destroy the enemy escaping southward from the trap near Koli Point, their operation took on the aspect of a stalk and mop-up. With a great staff of native carriers, the battalion was guided by Tabasui, a Malaita scout, and advised by Major Mather, the intelligence liaison officer. When the town of Binu on the Balesuna River was reached, Sgt. Major Vouza of the Guadalcanal Constabulary and a native of the region, led them to within striking distance of the fugitive groups. Three groups of Radio managed to contact and wipe out an equal number of enemy concentrations, at least one of which was chased out of the village of Asimana on the Metapona. It is important to note

that none of the maps in use at the time showed this village, but it was readily accessible with the sure guidance of the police boys. Between 200 and 300 were killed by the Raiders and by the artillery fire which was called for.

The original undertaking was accomplished with the following results: No concentrations of the enemy were found south
of the defence perimeter. The main Jap east west trail south
of Mambulo was discovered and the enemy gun position was
found on the northern slopes of "Bare Knob", Later the gun
itself was found by the Raiders at the juncture of the Lunga River
and the newly-discovered east west trail. Finally, because of
the resolution of Major Mather and the native guides, the accessible
trail from the top of Mambulo to the coast was traced by the
party though it had been nearly obliterated by disuse. An additional service of the Raiders was their report of an unprotected
and vulnerable left flank on the Matanikau defense line. The
Raiders came into Lunga on December 4th.

On the 12th of November, because of the complete exhaustion of photographic and lithographic print paper at Guadalcanal, Lt. Claffy was sent by plane to Noumea to obtain these supplies from the Americal Division still based there but preparing to embark for Guadalcanal. As a secondary responsibility the lieutenant acted as confidential courier between General Sebree at Cactus and General Patch at White Poppy. He returned to the intelligence section on the morning of November 16th with the required supplies.

A day or two later the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 182nd Infantry, U. S. Army, second regiment from the Americal Division arrived at Cactus, disembarked at Lunga and were shortly sent into the Matanikau offensive.

Reports from our coast watcher LQK in the Buin-Faisi area around November 10 indicated that an enemy task force of greater proportions than any previously encountered in the Solomons were being assembled there. The message from LCK that day reported 61 ships in sight, comprising 6 cruisers, 33 destroyers, 17 AKs, 2 sloops, 2 tankers and one liner of 8000 tons. Next morning two enemy air attacks came over Cactus, the first aerial attack in strength for many weeks. Though coast watchers and the Radar gave adequate warning to both troops and aviation, the enemy succeeded in reaching Guadalcanal. At 0930 nine Jap dive bombers supported by 12 zeros attacked friendly ships in area. Shot down were five zeros definitely, 2 probables, and one dive bomber definitely with one probable. Local losses, heavier than usual due to the inexperience of new pilots, were sex F4Fs from which two pilots were recovered. Twenty-five enemy twin-engine bombers supported by five zeros attacked. Henderson Field and Lunga area at 1135, at which time they lost

SPA

were four F4Fs. On the 12th a large force of enemy torpedo planes and zeros attacked U.S. shipping, inflicting slight damage and subjecting themselves to nearly complete annihilation. Thirty out of thirty one enemy planes were definitely shot down. No enemy air attacks were launched against Guadalcanal the following two days on which the enemy staged their grand scale Naval blitz, but on the 15th an, interception of Jap dive bombers and fighters approaching Cactus was made by F4Fs in which eight enemy planes were shot down or damaged. Cactus losses were one crash landing, pilot recovered. Thereafter there were no air raids in force over Guadalcanal during the remainder of the Marines! stay on the island.

Preparatory message explaining the plans formulated by the American Navy to catch the indicated Jap naval blitz began to arrive at Cactus by radio dispatch from ComSoPac and his subordinate commanders. Although the arrival of the enemy attackers was expected the night of November 12-13, a friendly task group was to be sent into the area the night of November 11-12. Results of all friendly air searches were to be forwarded immediately to the Navy for their information. The use of Cactus aircraft throughout the battle was carefully planned. Signal lights for friendly task forces were established and used on the Sealark Channel entrance to the Guadalcanal area. PT boats were used on a picket line for observation and patrolling out of Tulagi, reporting all contacts with the enemy in plain language, and were withdrawn from action when the naval battle began in earnest. The Naval Air Station Tulagi had planes in use during this operation. TBFs and SBDs were also sent on missions from the carrier Enterprise returning later to a doing South Pacific base. A small boat with radio was requested east of Koli Point to give information regarding enemy ships present there. Ground forces at Lunga Point were prepared to repulse any landing attempt by the enemy.

A brief of some of the results of this three-day engagement, which began with large enemy warships and ended with cargo ships and transports sent to retake Guadaloanal on the 14th and 15th, was dispatched to ComSoPac on the 16th. It stated in part that Cactus-based planes destroyed one damaged battleship, two light cruisers, and eleven transports or cargo ships, damaging another light cruiser. Unloading operations were believed to be unsuccessful and attended by heavy losses in personnel. Japanese beach dumps were heavily bombed. Gasoline and ammunition fires extended along the beach for 1000 yards. From Tulagi despatches came the Information that the PT boats scored at least one hit on an enemy battleship or heavy cruiser.

The Comairsopac Intelligence Bulletin for 19 November gives a preliminary recapitulation of the results of the battle as undertaken by U.S. Naval Forces the night of November 12-13. These helped in forming an estimate of the damage inflicted. while D-2 was still located on Guadalcanal.

Ships sunk or damaged included:

i Kongo Class 33 damaged and later sunk by aircraft.

1 Kongo Class BB seriously damaged.

37 W1 (A blew up and sanks a first section)

2 0L heavily hit and buring when engagement broke off. 1 DD sunk.

2 or 5 DD presumed sunk, several others set afire.

Thus through the coordinated preparation and execution of an attack plan the navy, aviation and land forces broke up the greatest threat to the Allied Guadalcanal base which the Japs ever undertook.

Enemy submarines operating in the lower Solomons with greater intensity and boldness presented a new threat to shipping. Their presence was reported to all ships and bases by dispatches from high naval authority and efforts to protect ships and sink the subs were undertaken by scheduled sub patrols. The cargo ship Alchiba torpedoed while unloading off Lunga on the morning of the 28th., but was beached to save cargo and for possible salvage. The same day, an anti-sub air patrol reported dropping three bombs on one large enemy submarine southwest of Cape Esperance at Veralui Cove. OS2Us and B-17s continued thereafter to harass submarine activities of the enemy by dropping depth charges and bombs on these targets. One was sunk by an OS2U on 7 December 10 miles north of Lunga Point.

A final Jap effort to land troops and supplies the night of November 30 - December 1 was anticipated with warnings to Guadalcanal the afternoon of the 29th. Cruisers and destroyers were ordered to intercept the expected destroyers and transports. This friendly task force engaged with the enemy near Savo Island about 2300 on the 30th. The Jap landing was prevented at heavy cost on both sides. Enemy transports and destroyers were destroyed, but the friendly force sustained heavy damage from torpedoes. Japosurvivors picked up after this battle revealed that at least two enemy DDs were sunk. One prisoner stated that he heard the BBs Kiel and Kirishima had been sunk in the mid-November engagement, but that the Haruna and Kongo had reached Truk safely. Any Jap warships reported around Guadalcanal after December 1st were sent for the purpose of

evacuating the officers and wounded from the much-mauled and seriously crippled western sector.

About November 25th Sgt. Stanley of the D-2 section was sent with Killimandi, a Fijian radio operator, to augment the coast watching personnel at Marau Sound. After four days of working together, Adams and Eroni were relieved and sent back to Lunga. In the five weeks that Stanley remained on watch at ZGL-4 enemy activity observed was limited to a few flights of Japanese flying boats on patrol.

Patrolling activity continued in the latter half of November.

A patrol was sent from Colonel Whaling's scout group to contact Mr. Hay, the observer in the Gold Fields, regarding the evacuation of a nun recovering from mistreatment at the hands of the enemy. Supplies were delivered and reconnaissance of trails and enemy territory was made. A three weeks native patrol arriving back at Lunga on the 26th reported on the trails, enemy situation, and supplies along their itinerary that had cut; inland to Kiarokiki across an unmapped trail to Tapinanja, up the main trail to Patonoli and Tangarare Mission. Thence around the coast they noted the main Jap concentrations between Marovovo Mission and Kokumbona. The last important patrol sent out by D-2 was the Odysseyof the schooner Ramada undertaken by Father DeKlerk's native boys. The trail covered the period November 29th to December 10, and they touched Cape Hunter, Wandererd Bay, Fox Bay, Beaufort Bay and many other points on the coast south and west of Lunga. In addition to providing a guard and communication force for Father DeKlerk while he recruited native labor for service with the armed forces, the Marines from D-2 made observations and notes on the terrain and suitable landing beaches.

The arrival of two Naval Air Photo Interpreters, Ensign R. H. Delancie and Ensign A. V. Sommar, for temporary duty with the Division Intelligence Section on November 24th greatly aided the operation of this department of intelligence activities. With additional equipment and enthusiass for their job the ensigns pitched in immediately, finding many targets for bombing and strafing missions. These interpreters were detached from the D-2 and assigned to G-2 when the Army took over from the First Marine Division.

Two Marine efficers, Lt. L. T. Burcham and Lt. J. J. Foley, reported to the section on November 29th for duty as aerial photo interpreters. Three enlisted interpreters reported on December 3. They made first phase interpretations of two sorties of photographs covering the area along the coast from



Cape Esperance to the front lines in the vicinity of the Matanikau. Information regarding troop dispositions along the enemy front lines and in areas immediately to the rear was obtained from these interpretations. A number of target areas in the vicinity of Kokumbona, AA postions and supply dumps, pointed out on these photos were exploited by artillery on December 7th, resulting in at least two fires; they were also strafed by aircraft. Targets on the Bonegi River were exploited by aircraft on a strafing mission.

Effective the 27th of November the Assistant Division Commander assumed tactical command of all U.S.M.C. ground units located within the Lunga Point perimeter. With his staff, General Rupertus commanded the defense of this area for the remainder of the Marines' stay on Guadalcanal.

Before December 1st Colonel Long, G-2 of the American Division, had moved into the D-2 Section in order to observe activities and methods. When his own personnel arrived shortly thereafter the G-2; section began gradually to assume some of the duties of an intelligence section, maintaining the situation map, working on an Order of Battle of enemy forces on Guadalcanal and keeping the journal and telephone watch.

On December 9th General Vandegrift officially handed over command of the forces based on Guadalcanal and the lesser islands to General Patch. That day marked the embarkation and evacuation of the first section of troops, First Marine Division, from the Solomons.

# Full Development of Information Sources and Intelligence Supparies

From the above it is evident that the information gathering functions of the D-2 Section were exercised to the fullest extent in the Phase V of the operation. Not only were the instrumentalities for this work improved, expanded and molded to meet the peculiar demands of the Guadalcanal situation, but with the addition of new agencies, such as the Tropedo Boat Squadron patrols, the schooner patrols and a complete aerial photo interpretation unit, there was a natural increase in the volume of enemy information received, evaluated, and passed on for executive action or for general security.

Sources and volume of information, which have been described in the foregoing narratives of this entire campaign seemed to meet the demands made by the increase of enemy activity, pressure and contacts. These sources comprise in toto: (1) O.P. observations and reports; (2) lower echelon patrols and reports; (3) attached units patrols, searches and reports — i.e. Air Wing and Torpedo Boat; (4) D-2 patrols, reconnaissances and reports; (5) Coast Watcher reports — both on and off Guadalcanal — including enemy troops and shipping concentrations

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as well as air raid warnings; (6) Summaries from higher echelons—i.e. ComAirSoPac Intelligence Bulletins and O.N.I. Weckly!
Bulletins; (7) Enemy docements such as captured letters,
diaries, operation orders "pep-talk" leaflets, addresses of
instruction, despatches and posted notices— all of them
found at Guadalcanal and each indicative of the enemy composition, fitness or intentions; (2) prisoners interviewed;
which revealed the same kind of information; (3) aerial
photos— for mapping or interpretation; and (10) despatches
from higher intelligence or from attached units.

The activities of the Division Intelligence Section promoted by the ever increasing quantity of enemy information consisted primarily of receiving; recording; evaluating and passing on to the proper authority all information received —— that is, everything reported from the above sources. It meant maintaining in the final phase (1) daily work sheets; (2) a D-2 journal; and (3) a situation map of enemy and friendly dispositions. It included publishing (1) daily summaries of intelligence data on Guadalcanal; (2) periodic reports of the enemy activity in the Solomon Islands (less Guadalcanal); and (3) periodic reports of the enemy situation on Guadalcanal. It included keeping an up-to-date record, as closely as possible, of the enemy order of battle. Lastly it meant dissemination of urgent warnings by telephone or dispatch when enemy contacts were imminent.

To augment the information gathering of other units, the D-2 Section maintained O.Ps of its own which were most proficient in observation; it supplied specialized personnel such as observers and spotters to the island coast watching system. Patrols were sent directly from D-2 on Division Intelligence missions. On many other scouting parties and reconnaissances representatives of the section were included as liaison or guides. In this way Intelligence had a report from its own trained personnel as well as from the patrol commander.

Other routine methods of obtaining intelligence information included examining enemy material and ordnance; the laborious segregation, translation and evaluation of captured documents, as well as the questioning of prisoners by Captains Moran and Boardman our overworked Japanese interpreters. This work contributed to the Situation and the Order of Battle Reports enumerated above. The receipt, classification and distribution of maps, serial photos and mosiacs was a D-2 Section job requiring the services of two menta great part of the time. Map-making from aerial photos was executed by D-2 photolitho group supplied the reproduction.

SECRET

From an uncontrolled aerial mosiac taken by the SoPac Photo Interpretation Unit, based at New Hebrides, - aerial photos of the North Coast of Guadalcanal made on 18 August, 1942 a 12 sheet map of the Lunga Area was traced by draftsmen in Regimental H&S Battery of the 11th Marines. Reproduced by the D-2 Lithographic Section early in October, this map, known as the D-2 #104 Map, was distributed to all units in great quantities and became the principle operations map and situation map for the area between Kokumbona and Koli Point throughout the remainder of the campaign. Its chief faults lay in the cloud covered areas back from the shore line and in some distortion (common to all uncontrolled mosiacs of large areas) which was not taken into account in tracing the map. No other photographic sortie of the area was made in order that a better map might be traced. A reconnaissance strip of aerial photos flown by the same photographic unit on 12 October, 1942 from Visale to Kokumbina provided the original from Which Sgt. Stanley of the D-2 section traced the seven-sheet map of the western coastal area. This job was limited in depth to a few hundred feet from the coast, but was carefully executed and was distributed in November as the D-2 #106 Map, for operations in the western sector.

Interpreation of aerial photos for enemy information got moving in full swing in the closing days of the operation. For local security and for the general safety of the area against air raids or naval bombardment at night, an officer and an enlisted man were kept on watch 24 hours a day.

Over and above purely "intelligence" functions D-2 was charged with (1) the recruiting, organizing, and paying of the native labor battalion; (2) the dispatching of our schooners on supply, rescue, recruiting, or good-will missions; (3) the custody and assignment to regiments of war-dogs and dog-handlers sent from Pacific Fleet Headquarters at Pearl Harbor; and finally the creation and protected distribution of pass-word lists for the island's defenders.

# CONCLUSIONS AND RECONNAISSANCE

To the shortcomings and expedients for improvement recommended in previous phase reports can be added the following faults and requirements of a divisional intelligence organization which made themselves felt in the closing phase of the operation.

The only facilities on the island for taking aerial hotographs were one fighter plane in which a camera had been mounted. As a lens of  $8\frac{1}{2}$  inches focal length was used

and since it was impracticable to fly lower than 9,500 feet, the photos at the resultant scale of 1:14,000 were at the minimum acale for general interpretation. For first phase interpretation of troop dispositions, front line emplacements, and similar military installations, aerial photographs should have a scale of not less than 1:10,000. It would have been possible to secure photographs at this scale since a camera lens of 20 inches focal length was available. Except for the small scale the photos were of excellent quality for interpretation. Photographs furnished by Marine Photographic Squadron one were satisfactory in all respects (having been provided at a scale of 1:7,500) but this squadron was based on Espirity Santo and liaison was not close enough to provide for distribution of its photographs quickly enought for first phase interpretations.

It was felt that some running record should have been maintained of all the events in which the D-2 section was even remotely concerned. This could best be kept in the form of a war diary, containing not only items of enemy information, but also the activities of the intelligence section -- the date, composition, and purpose of patrols sent out; the date and source of new photos or maps distributed; personnel changes; introduction of new activities; etc. It might also record the highlights and origins of purely operational events; since the interaction of D-2 and D-3 functions is maintained constantly. In this way the record will differ from already existing journals and work sheets, and will provide the D-2 with ready reference to material not hitherto available, but necessary in the assembling of reports and summaries. It is of prime importance that events be entered in the record as they take place, in order to keep it complete and accurate. The undertaking should be worthy of a permanent and responsible if not a full time assignment.

In conclusion, to the end that the D-2 Section might carry out its functions in a more capable manner, it is recommended that Standard Operating Procedures, written in detail on the chief activities of the Intelligence Section, be provided and followed by all D-2 personnel on future operations. The makeshift S.O.P. drawn up for reporting coast-watcher warnings and forwarding urgent message that was used at Guadalcanal points the way. However, the keeping of records uniformly, the systematic handling of aerial photos and their interpretations, and the expeditious reproduction and distribution of maps and mosaics are only a few of the activities that called for improvement. Already Procedures for D-2 Command Post Activities and for Handling and Filing of Classified Documents have been written for future operations of the First Marine Division.

#### ANTEX O

FIRST MARINES, FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE.

# "HISTORY OF THE FIRST MARINE REGIMENT".

Phase V (18 September--10 December) ::: `

From its position along the Tenara River this Regiment vigorously.. patrolled the area to the east of the Tenara as far as the Malimbia River.

24 September - A patrol from "I" Company, Third Battalion, fired at two enemy snipers and sighted two more in the vicinity of the Ilu River.

25-26 September - Two patrols; one from "L" Company, and one from "K" Company, made a reconnaissance of the native village at Koli Point.

The Third Buttalion held in Division Reserve was ordered to take up positions in the area of the Matanikau River and on 30 September, "K" Company, patrolling along the Matanikau River, found two dead Japanese soldiers.

3 October - The First Battalion was ordered to take up the Second Battalion's positions along the beach and the northern stretches of the Tenaru River. The Second Battalion was ordered to occupy the Third Battalion's positions along the upper regions of the Tenaru.

4 October - A patrol from "A" Company, First Battalion, under Captain Brush captured four 37mm enemy guns at Koli Point; destroyed three and brought one back intact. The patrol also captured 500 rounds of 37mm ammunition.

5 October - A patrol from "F" Company, Second Battalion, under Captain Howland, captured two enemy 75mm guns approximately 8000 yards east of the Second Battalion positions. The breech blocks were removed and brought back to our lines. There was extremely recent evidence of a gun crew bivouacked in the immediate vicinity of the guns. The pieces were in excellent condition, cleaned and freshly oiled.

Meanwhile in the Matanikau area, "I" Company, Third Battalion, under Captain Lichtman, reenforced by the 81mm mortar platoon, "M" Company and an LIG section of "L" Company, was sent out as a combat patrol to feel out the enemy positions along the eastern bank of the Matanikau River 300 yards from the beach. An undetermined number of the enemy were killed.

Our casualties: 7 killed; 4 wounded.

A patrol from "C" Company, First Battalion, under Captain Stevenson, landed by Higgins boat at Koli Point, dispersed a group of 12 Japanese and captured a radio and telephones.

ALNEX O (I)

7 October - A Second Battalion patrol under Captain Rockmore brought in one 75mm gun discovered on 5 October and destroyed the other.

8 October - The Third Battalion in conjunction with the Fifth marines attack to the west feinted a landing at Kokumbona, and received artillery fire from the enemy.

11 October - Second Battalion patrol from "G" Company under Captain Sherman captured two more 75mm guns near the spot where the first two guns were captured. The patrol also discovered a supply dump containing tools, spare parts, radio, radio telephones and 29 cases of ammunition (75mm). The guns were disassembled and scattered, the ammunition buried.

The next day another Second Battalion patrol under Lieutenant Theaton, Bn-2, captured two enemy range finders, a spotoscope and two cases of 75mm ammunition approximately 500 yards west of the location of the 75mm guns.

14-20 October - "I" Company. Third Battalion, which had taken up positions on the point on the east bank of the mouth of the Matanikau River, returned sporadic enemy mortar and artillery fire. Meanwhile the remainder of the Regiment moved, 13-15 October, to the ridges west of the Lunga River, forming the southwest defensive line on the entire defense perimeter. The First Battalion occupied Sector 4, the Second Battalion Sector 5.

# BATTLE OF THE MATANIKAU 20-24 October

20 October - An enemy combat patrol approached the west bank of the Matanikau River with two tanks. One tank was knocked out by our 37mm fire. Casualties were inflicted on the accompanying Japanese infantry. 21 and 22 October - Mortar and artillery duel. No information regarding casualties inflicted on the enemy.

23-23 October, 1800-0600 - Approximately a regiment of enemy infantry supported by tanks attacked "I" Company's position at the mouth of the Matanikau River. The attack was repulsed and nine 13 1/2 ton tanks were disabled by the Third Battalion supported by 37mm AT guns, artillery and a half-track which was very effective knocking out five tanks. A conservative estimate of enemy casualties was 600. Our losses: Killed. 25; Wounded, 14.

25 October - At 0630 our artillery and mortars fired at enemy troops sighted on the other side of the Matanikau River. At 0930 a seven man patrol from "L" Company under First Sergeant Bartholomew wiped out an enemy machine gun squad in rear of "M" Company mortar platoon, killing nine enemy and destroying a heavy machine gun.

The next day at 1430 the enemy took a ridge to our southeast from a company of the Second Battalion. Seventh Marines. First Platoon, Company "I", with Lieutenant Wright leading, counterattacked in conjunction with Seventh Marines reserves and retook the hill.

ANNEX 0 (2).

### ANNEX O (CONT.)

29 October - A Third Battalion patrol led by Lieutenant H. K. Taylor found and dismantled two 75mm enemy field pieces on a ridge south of Point Cruz while the enemy gun crews were sleeping in a gully some 50 yards away.

31 October - Two patrols, one under Lieutenant Taylor, the other under Lieutenant Whyte, Bn-2, struck out west of the Matanikau River. Taylor's patrol engaged 40-50 enemy in a bivouac area in a ravine just west of the river. Whyte's patrol contacted a group of enemy along the ridge south of Point Cruz. Outside of killing from 15 to 30 enemy, the two patrols captured and dismantled two 37mm guns and removed a cache of .303 ammunition. Lieutenant Taylor and one marine were killed.

The night of 31 October, "L\* Company, Third Battalion, took up positions on the ridge across the Matanikau River to secure a bridgehead for the Fifth Marines attack, and had occasional contact with the enemy during the night.

The First and Second Battalions were sending out one, two, and three day patrols to the south and southwest in the vicinity of Grassy Knoll. It was believed that the enemy had established an observation post on Grassy Knoll to observe our movements and to direct the fire of their artillery. The Lunga River for some seven miles to the south was carefully patrolled as it presented a natural route of approach into our positions. Colonel Cates wanted to be quite sure that the enemy were not moving around from the west in front of our positions in preparation for an attack:

The following patrols made contact with the enemy in the Grassy Knoll area:

At 1730, 20 November, a three day reconnaissance patrol from "G" Company, Second Battalion, under Lieutenant Jordan, was fired upon by 20 to 30 Japanese on the southwestern slope of Grassy Knoll. The enemy was equipped with two heavy machine guns, two light machine guns and two mortars. The enemy suffered 15 casualties of which four were known to be deaths. Lieutenant Jordan's patrol returned without any casualties.

23 November - "F" Company, Second Battalion, combat patrol of 55 men led by Lieutenant Maples surprised an estimated enemy force of 200 men at the spot where Lieutenant Jordan's patrol was fired upon. The Japanese were washing their mess gear.

25-26 November - "E" Company, Second Battalion reconnaissance patrol led by Lieutenant Bender made contact with an estimated 30 enemy on Grassy Knoll. Three to four Japs were killed.

29-30 November - "E" Company, Second Battalion, patrol under Lieutenant Stover surprised 15 Japs asleep on the crest of Grassy Knoll in the general vicinity of the spot where Lieutenant Maples' patrol was engaged. The patrol killed 12, wounded three, but killed the three who were wounded as they were trying to escape.

ANNEX O (3)

On orders from Brigadier General Rupertus the Regiment was making preparations to attack to the west in a flanking movement in conjunction with the Army. Photographs and maps were assembled and distributed; preliminary orders issued.

The First and Second Battalions were relieved on the front lines by the First and Second Battalions, Eighth Marines, and withdrew to Division Reserve.

The Third Battalion, moving into position in preparation for the attack to the west, relieved the Third Battalion. Eighth Marines, on the ridge east of the headwaters of the Matanikau River. However, the proposed attack was called off.

The Regiment moved to the beach in preparation for debarking from the island, beginning 10 December. The Third Battalion embarked 15 December, H&S Company, Weapons Company, the First and Second Battalions embarked on 22 December.

Patrol activities of this Regiment during the period included in Phase V revealed some instructive and revealing facts.

Small patrols of about 10 or 15 men armed with TSEG's proved more effective for reconnaissance than larger platoon or company patrols. These small patrols were able to seek out the enemy and if engaged and outnumbered, withdrew easily and quickly. The findings of these reconnaissance patrols were followed up by large combat patrols sent out to engage and destroy the enemy, whose bivouac areas were usually discovered by the reconnaissance patrols. Company patrols, burdened down with machine guns, mortars, TBX radios for periodic communication back to the lines and the problem of handling over 150 men in thick jungle, were slow moving, noisy and cumbersome to commit into action. Small patrols were able to go out for three or more days at a time, travelling for the most part unseen.

It proved unwise, though sometimes necessary to follow trails. The Japanese, when they layed an ambush, often fastened light machine guns in the trees aimed at a certain spot along a trail. Frequently they would let the point go through, then open fire on the main body.

From examination of Japanese trails it was noted that the Japs cut through the jungle with saws probably because they were quieter than machetes and axes, etc. Through stumpy, gnarled growth over swampland they burned their trails probably using flame throwers. As well as following definite magnetic azimuths the Japs evidently made an effort to follow ridge lines, river banks and gullies. Their trails never followed the topographical crest of a ridge, always skirted along the side of the slope under cover and in

# ANNEX Ò (CONT.)

defilade. They used laborers to precede the soldiers and cut out the trails. From the startlingly wide and squarely cut Japanese trails which we followed through the thickest kind of jungle, it became increasingly clear that no jungle is impenetrable.

In general the Japanese were found to be careless in establishing security. They never used outposts and very rarely carried their rifles in bivouac. Consequently, our patrols were able to effect the element of surprise which accounted for the success of our patrol activities and kept our casualties at a minimum.

The following is a compilation of Japanese casualties, 1st Regiment casualties, Japanese prisoners captured, and Japanese ordnance captured or destroyed in 1st Marine engagements on Guadalcanal:

1. Total Japanese casualties:	Killed,	21,02
2. Total casualties (our own);	Killed, Wounded,	109 197
3. Total prisoners captured:		20

# 4. Total ordnance captured:

HMG	Captured,	12	Destroyed,	1	
LMG	Captured,	21	Destroyed,	1	
Mortars and Grenade Dischargers	5		Captured,	21	
Rifles			Captured,	700	
Pistols			Captured,	20	
70mm Field Pieces			Captured,	3	
Flame Throwers			Captured,	12	
75mm			Destroyed,	Ş	
75mm ammunition			Captured,	29	
37mm AT		- ,	Captured,	6	
37mm ammunition			Captured,	500	
TSMG	•		Captured,	1	
Tanks (15 Tons)	•		Destroyed,	12	
Range Finders			Captured,	. 2	
Spotoscopes			Captured,	1 .	

Miscellaneous--Small arms ammunition, Sabers, Grenades, Bungalore Torpedoes, Clothing, Radios, Radio Telephones and Tools -- Undetermined Number.

#### ANNEX P

# FIFTH MARINES, FIRST MARINE DIVISION FLEET MARINE FORCE C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

RECORD OF EVENTS - Period from September 19, 1942, to December 9, 1942.

September 19, 1942

O200 - 5th Marines area shelled by Japanese cruiser and two destroyers. Shell fire killed 2 and wounded 4 men of 7th Marines bivouacked in 5th Marines area. O915 - L-3-5 left on patrol to South and West. 1015 - Patrols from 1-5 left to reconnoiter area in front of their lines. 1120 - L-3-5 returned. No contact. "A". "B", "C" Companies, 1st Bn; sent out patrols. No activity reported. 2nd Bn ordered to return from Edson Ridge after being relieved by the 7th Marines.

September 20, 1942

Continued consolidating positions. O410 - Colonel Leroy P. Hunt left by plane to return to the United States. Col. W. J. Whaling assumed command of the Regiment. L. Col. Reaves from the 1st Marines assumed command of the 2nd Bn, relieving Col. W. J. Whaling, who had temporary command. Air. raid alarm at 1012 but no planes were observed.

September 21, 1942

Col. Merritt A. Edson assumed command of the 5th Regiment on this date. Quiet in all sectors. A small amount of rifle and machine gun fire heard in hills beyond airfield but no enemy activity was reported.

September 22, 1942

Lines extended - 1st Bn to move forward to ridge in front of present position - 3-5 to extend lines about 500 yards to the West along beach and first ridge in from beach. 2nd Bn in Division Reserve.

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September 23, 1942

0700 a Two companies from 2-55 left on patrol of ridges to southwest of 1st Bh positions. On Grassy Knoll 9 enemy were sighted (one armed) but no contact was made:

September 24, 1942 His Time of a great record of the control of th

Advanced OF set up to observe area to front of 1st Bn. 1445 - Regimental OP reported a Japanese soldier observing from a hill about 1500 yards to the southwest. 1510 - Regimental OP reported Japanese soldier observed on ridge about 2500 yards to southwest moving north. September 25, 1942

0500 - 2nd Bn left to contact 1st Bn, 7th Marines, and to bring in 5 dead and 25 wounded from that battalion. 1450 - Part of the 1st Bn, 7th, returned through our lines with 26 wounded, mostly stretcher cases. All evacuated by way of 5th Marines Regimental Aid Station.

September 26, 1942

1625 - Raider Bn passed through our lines and joined forces with the 2nd Bn, 5th under command of Lt. Col. Puller of the 7th Marines. Firing increased on both sides and at 1714 Colonel Edson on order of the Division assumed command of the combined forces. 9 dead and 49 wounded evacuated by Regimental Surgeon. During the night Colonel Edson's forces occupied the east bank of the Matanikau River with considerable fire of all kinds being exchanged during the night. Remainder of Regiment moved defenses and were prepared to operate as situation required. An attempt to cross the Matanikau River proved unsuccessful by 2-5.

September 27, 1942

1400 - Bombed by 18 enemy bombers. 1640 - U. S. destroyer assisting the attack by fire on beach near Matanikau Village. Our forces continued attack on enemy along Matanikau River until about 1800 when all troops were withdrawn to their defensive area. 1st and 3rd Bns continued work during the night on defense positions along ridge lines.

September, 28, 1942

Hill. Returned at 1300. Some enemy activity in front of 3rd Bn area during the night. 1st and 3rd Bns alerted but enemy did not attack.

September 29, 1942

The day was spent in patrolling, improving our defenses and servicing equipment.

September 30, 1942

Contact with enemy in 3rd Bn area after dark 29 September. 2107 - 3rd Bn reported enemy activity along tactical wire near center of sector and requested permission to lay down mortar fire in that area. Request granted. Daylight patrols. There was no sign of the enemy having been in any of the areas for a period of at least ten days. Three dead Japs, laborers, were found. Apparently having died of malnutrition. One of them in the past two days, the other two having died at least ten days previous. One reinforced

ANNEX P (2)

#### ANNEX P (CONT)

company from 3rd Bn. 1st Marines, made a patrol toward Matanikau Village. Area defended during night. Forward area secured by daylight patrols which procured some information of the enemy. Defenses on MLR improved. the said with the first washing the property of the

October, 1, 1942. And and arrived to regress on the contract the

The day was spent in patrolling, putting in tactical wire, setting tank traps, cutting five paths through the jungle and in general improving our defenses.

October 2, 1942

A patrol of 4 men from 2-5 under-Corporal Stankus left at 1935; 1 October, 1942, for Matanikau River. They travelled slowly and largely through the brush, reaching the river before dawn. They had no contact with the enemy. nor was any activity seen beyond the river due perhaps to the earliness of the patrol. On the east side of the river Warines! packs were found; they had not been disturbed since being left there during the operation of 26-27 September. Some of our hand grenades were also found and brought back. The patrol returned at 0940. Two patrols were sent out by L-3-5 to locate and identify one of our planes which had been shot down in front of our lines.

October 3, 1942

Two four man patrols were sent out by 3-5. They found no evidence of recent activity on the part of the enemy. They returned at about 1400. The remainder of the regiment was occupied in continuing the improvement of our defences.

and the second of the second

October 4. 1942 - A Charles of Baryon and the Company of the Compa . New positions were prepared by 1-3-5 strengthening our defense of the point where our right flank turns on the beach. Trails were cut with the view of moving the right end of our First Battalion and the left and of our Third Battalion line forward. Additional trails were also cut behind our First Battalion. The road along our front lines was improved. A thorough reconnaissance was made of possible positions for a secondary defensive line. Two patrols were sent out. Evidence of enemy activity along the Matanikau was found. There was one contact resulting in three enemy killed, two wounded. No Marine casualties. One platoon of the Second attalion was sent to the mouth of the Matanikau River with trucks and a half-track to salvage abandoned equipment. They returned about 2015, 4 October: 17 10 10 10 The first the second of the se

The same the first in a simple of the same and the same in the same of the sam Work was continued non our new front line positions p. communication trails and fire lanes were cut; beach defenses were improved; a motorized patrol went to the east bank of the Matanikau River to recover abandoned Marine Action of the state of the stat

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residence de la compartación de la La compartación de la compartación Corps gear; and three small patrols were operating to the front of our lines. A motorized patrol from Second Battalion, Fifth, made up of one motorized weapons platoon, plus one half-track (75M), in command of Major McDougal, went out on October 4th to the east bank of the Matanikau River mouth to salvage equipment left there as a result of the Fifth Regiment and Seventh Regiment contact there on September 26-27.

October 6, 1942

stober 6, 1942 The day was spent in improving defenses, patrolling, and in preparing for the execution of Regimental Operation Order 4-42, which was given to Unit Commanders on this date. The mission of the Fifth Regiment less the 1st Bn and detachment of the Won Co was to drive the enemy from the east bank of the Matanikau and then to feint a crossing. Meanwhile, Col. Whaling with 3-2 plus a sniper detachment was to secure the crossing of the Matanikau River on the left flank of the 5th Marines and cover the crossing of the 7th Marines. The 5th parines are to cross from their position on order.

at some profit for the policy or contract of the

October.7, 1942. er. 7, 1942 m. And the state of the state of

Furnished beach defense guns to Sector 2 from Apris Co. Occupied defensive position Sector 4 with 1st Bn. Furnished outpost for Sector 3 from 3rd En. Rest (less 1-5 and detachments from 3-5 and Wpns Co) attacked toward Ratunikau Rivereto seize position along river and assist 3-2 in attack on 8 Oct 42 toward Matunikau Village, prepared to cross river on order. Details as follows: 0700 - Foint of 3-5 cleared wire in its sector moving west toward That nikau along beach pead. Column formation: 3-5 (less Co L), H&S (loss. detachments), 2-5, Med Sec, Whas Co (less detachments), Work (Regt 1 reserve). 10.855 - Simm Plat. Co H. 2-5 and H-2-7 ordered into position forward of CP at eastern edge of banana grove; 1005 - 3-5 point received small arms fire from east of Matanikau River, advanced attack: 1148 - 2-5 occupied position along latenikau River at junction with creek extending north and cast; 1216 -. CO requested assignment of Amph Trac unit to assist in diversion; 1500 (about) - Co L reserve reverted to 3-5; 1455 - Request to D-3 for assignment of one Co Rdr Bn as reserve, granted, Co A; Rdr Bn reported about 1700 to CP and wore ordered into positions as local security along beach and weeds; 1750 -"Two AT mines set off by Amph Tracein front of right of 3-5.

in a significant constraint the east of the specimens are in the second part of October 8, 1942

Furnished beach defense guns and crews from Vpn Co to Sector 2. Occupied defensive Sector with 1st Bn and furnished outpost for Sector 3 from 3rd Bn. Rogt'l less above units and with units of alst Raider Bn attached, occupied position slong Matanikau River and attempted to drive enemy from salient in right contor along river. Details as follows: 0906 - 2-5 (2 Cos) ordered to cross river south of creek junction, contact 3-2, and attack north on right

of 3-2; 0910 - Co A, Raider Bn reached river, Cos K and L held up by enemy fire; 1001 - Amph Tracs disposed for local security at CP; 1006 - Evacuation of casualties from 2-5 authorized via river trail; 1145 - L-3-5 withdrawn, relieved by Co C, Raider Bn; Raider Bn placed under command of Rajor Malt; 1212 - Cos E and G stopped by MG and rifle fire;

The same that we have the state of the

October 9, 1942

Furnished beach defense guns and crows from Wpns Co to Sector 2, occupied defensive sector 4 with 1st Bn. Furnished outpost to Sector 3 from 3-5. Regt'l, less above units and with 1st Raider Bn attached, occupied holding position along Matanikau River from mouth to crock junction about 1800 yards to south, dreve enemy from salient east of river in right center assisted by fire attack of 3-2 on Matanikau Village, Details as follows: 1800 - Co B. Raider Bn placed in position between A and C Co, 1st Rdr Bn, to trap enemy in their position; 1830 a Fierce enemy actack on A Co, 1st Rdr Bn, from enemy defensive position, enemy repelled throughout night with heavy losses to both sides, the enemy boing driven off and destroyed; 1900 - Cos L and I, pre-" viously reorganized as one company (146) and placed in reserve, released to 3-5; 2025 - Repelled enemy attack on the right flank (30 to 40 enemy); 2110 -One section 37mm and one half-track covering sand bar at river mouth, artillery directed to fire concentrations from river mouth to Point Cruz Peninsula then to fire scheduled fires interdicting road leading to west; 1155 - 2-5 alerted. prepared on order to withdraw and cover remainder of regiment from position at river mouth; 1750 - Raider Bn withdrew to Lunga Bivouac.

October 10, 1942

Furnished beach defense guns and crows from Upns Co to Sector 2. Occupied defensive Sector 4 with 1st Bn. Furnished outpost to Sector 3 from 3-5. Regiment, less above units and loss 3-5, with 3-1 and H-2-7 attached, occupied defensive position along Matanikau River from mouth south 1800 yards to creek junction. Details as follows: 1825 - 3-5 withdrew to Lunga bivouac relieved by 3-1; 1915 - Artillery to fire harassing fire twice hourly on road leading to Point Cruz; 2020 - Artillery interdiction ordered for night; 2400 - 3ecurity detachment stationed on beach; 1345 - 2-5 to hold position along past bank of river astride creek and East West Trail, 3-1 to hold position on east bank from mouth south to 100 yards from right flank of 2-5; 0630 - 3-2 units cleared to reconnoiter East West Trail and Grassy Knoll; 1530 - H&S and Upns Co returned to Lunga Bivouac; 1700 - 2-5 returned to Lunga Bivouac relieved by 3-7; COC3-1 in command of Matanikau defensive area.

October 11, 11942 7 ...

Furnished beach defense guns and crews to Sector 2, occupied defensive Sectors 3 and 4. 2nd and 3rd Bns reorganized and serviced equipment. Reconnoitered Grassy Knoll and East West Trail in that area--no new information.

### October 12, 1942

Furnished beach defense guns to Sector 2. Occupied defensive Sector 4 with 1st Bn. Furnished outpost to Sector 3 from 3rd Bn. 2nd and 3rd Bns. reorganized and serviced equipment. Details as follows: 0904.— pns Co alerted in beach defense guns; 1347 - 3-5 tested BARs: 0700 - 3-2 recommaissance patrol (reenforced company) cleared for Grassy Knoll, returned in the late afternoon with negative information.

October 13: 1942:

First unit of army Tanded at Mukum this morning. Worked on defensive installations, tactical roads and trails.

October 14. 1942

Af 0130 chear naval units with it least one battleship in it shelled for 2 hours. Airport received most of the fire. Intermittent bombing throughout the night-along with fire from enemy artillery. Furnished beach defense guns to Sector 2 from Whos Co. Occupied defensive Sectors 3 and 4 with 1st and 3rd Bns (Co F attached). 0645 - 1-5 ordered to send out daily squad patrol; 1730 - one half-track and 2-57mm guns withdrawn from emplacement covering AT, minos to defiladed position in rear of Co K as part of reserve. Enemy planes because at 1145 and at 1330. Results not known.

October 15, 1942

Proparation on defense lines continued throughout the day. 2nd and 3rd Bns occupied front line position which they had previously prepared. Enemy planes bombed at 1250 with results unknown. Enemy artillery fired spasmodically throughout the day and fire was returned by our batteries.

October 16, 1942

Furnished beach defense guns to Sector 2 tactically assigned to Pioneer Bn. Occupied defensive Sector 3 with 3-5 (Co C attached) and Sector 4 less. left half with 2-5. Continued work on forward defensive line.

October 17, 1942

Occupied defensive Sector 5 with 2nd and 3rd Bn (Co C attached). Furnished beach defense guns to Sector 1. Patrolled in front of left Bn (2nd) to southwest.

October 18, 1942

Cocupied defensive sector 5 with-2nd and 3rd (Co C attached) Bas. Furnished beach defense guns and crews to sector 1 from Wpns Co.

ANNEX P (6)

October 19, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 5 with 2nd and 3rd (Co C attached) Bns. Furmished beach defense guns and crews to sector 1 from Wons Co.

October 20, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 5 with 2nd and 3rd (Co C attached) Bns. nished beach defence guns and crews to defensive sector 1. Continued work on defensive installations. Patrol from 3-5 to draws south of coconut grove west of 3-5 mines. Had no contact with the enemy but discovered what appeared to have been an OP with a commanding view of the beach road. OP did not appear to have been used recently. At 1930 an onemy plane dropped fragmentation bombs. Results unknown.

October 21, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 5 with 2nd and 3rd (Co C attached) Bns. nished beach defense guns and crews to defensive sector 1. Continued work on defensive installations.

October 22, 1942.

Occupied defensive sector 5 with 2nd and 3rd (Co C attached) Bns. Furnished heach defense guns and crows to defensive sector 1. Continued work on defensive Installations.

October 23, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 5 with 2nd and 3rd (Co Cattached) Bns. Furnished beach defense guns and crews to defensive sector 1. Continued work on defensive minstallations. Reserve: Co A, 1st Tk Bn; pns Co - 5 (less dets); 1st Bn (less Co'C). Dotails: Two patrols from 2-5 patrolled to south in left of sector along East West Truil and Grassy Knoll. Information negative. Enemy tanks attempted to cross the Matanikau River. 10 were destroyed. Considerable onemy activity was observed near our OPLR along the Matanikau River. Heavy artillery fire was laid down.

October 24, 1942

evire or all

Occupied defensive sector 5; furnished beach defense guns to sector 1. One platoon Co Camanned listening post along beach to rear of 3-1 from dusk to dawn

October 25, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 5; furnished beach defense guns to sector 1. Reserves: Co B and Co D; Co A. 1st Tk Bn, Wpns Co (less dets). Details:

Patrolled in left of sector (three platedns) from 2-5 to East West Trail.

Patrolled right of sector, draws and ridges for 1500 yards, 1141 - 2-5 sent four man patrol to contact plateon patrol in its front. This patrol fired upon by small group of enemy, 1220 one half of one plateon patrol from 2-5 returned, having made contact with enemy; suffered ene killed, one missing, patrol separated. Others returned later in day.

October 26, 1942

Furnished beach defense guns and crows from Tpns Co to sector 1; occupied defensive sector 5. Furnished beach defense from 3-1's rear 37mm to front of tank barrier on Matanikau River road. 1615 Combat patrol G-2-5 returned, having patrolled the foot of Grassy Knoll, staying in ambush position during day.

October 27, 1942

Furnished beach defense MG's crews from Wpns Co to sector 1. occupied defense sector 5 with 3rd Bn. 1037 - Three squads reconnectored, patrols to E-W Trail left from 2.5. returned at 1610, 1125 - M Co MG crew killed one enemy in front of K Co which had been hit by mortar and few rounds.

October 28, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 5. Furnished beach defense guns and crews to sector 1. Reconnectered front with 4 man patrels merning and afternoon, information negative.

October 29, 1942

From 1800 to 0815 occupied defensive sector 5; furnished beach defense guns and crews to defensive sector 1. 1655 - L-3-1 received orders to cross the Matanikau on the night of the 31st and cover north bridging and crossing of 1-5 at 0630. At 1707, 2-5 ordered to cross Matanikau on the night of the 31st to cover south bridging and own crossing at 0630 with one platoon on west bank of Matanikau. 1700 - Artillery fired on request to west of river about 600 yards south of mouth.

October 30, 1942

Regiment made preparations for following days offensive. Four friendly destroyers and I truiser fired on enemy positions near the village of Kokumbona about 0700. One prisoner (workman) captured by Hq-2-5 on the East West Trail. Air raid alarm sounded at 1515 but no enemy planes appeared.

October 31, 1942

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Regiment moved up to east bank of Matanikau, bivouacked and prepared to

ANNEX P (8)

move out on offensive the following morning. Enemy artillery fire fell in whis Co - 5th bivouse area, which was about 500 yards east of mouth of Matanikau, throughout the night.

Novembor 1, 1942

At 0200, one platoon from 5-2-5, under L. Babashanian, reinforced with a section of machine guns crossed Matanikau River in rubber boats and covered crossing of 2-5 which took place at 0630. Crossing completed at 0700 with 2-5 on left and 1-5 on right. 3-5 crossed at 0800 following 2-5 advance. 2-5, on left; sector of regimental front advanced to 0-1 at approximately 1000 with very little opposition and was then ordered by regiment to take up assault from 0-1 at 1230. 2-5 lost contact with 1-5 at this time. They 1 then proceeded to 0-2 at 1440 without encountering any enemy opposition where they then outlined a defensive plan for the night. 1-5, however, ran into The heavy enemy opposition. At 0630, 1-5 crossed Matanikau in right half of regimental zone, by means of foot bridge constructed by engineers during preand ding right. No opposition encountered until about 0830, when within 800 yards of 0-1. Right company (A) succeeded in overcoming opposition and reaching 0-1-by-1000. Left company (C) met stiffer opposition, suffered heavy casualties, including three officers, and was stopped about 250 yards short of 0-1. Reserve company (B) committed about 1000 on right flank of C. The attack moved on, reaching Q-1 about 1130. When attack on 0-2 was commenced at 1230, 1-5 was unable to advance in loft of its zone. Right company advanced 800 yards beyond 0-1 but withdraw upon finding themselves isolated. Left companies continued to suffer heavy casualties and were unable to advance. Late in the afternoon, 1-5, with L-3-5 attached, took up defensive position along 0-1 for the night's halt.

November 2, 1942 - 000

Can be a second of the second Solzed, 0-2. Cleared area of ellemy group between 0-1 and 0-2. Placed battalions in defensive positions. 0603 - I and K Cos repulsed bayonet charge. All enomy killed; 4 darines wounded. 0640 - B-1-2 moving west through our troops along bouch road. Light interdictory fire on road. 0715 - D-1-2 halted. 2-5 attacking to north. -0830 - 2nd Marines authorized to pass through 5th to west. . 0845 - G25 captured 4 Jap 37 type guns and one prisoner. 0936 -Enemy group withdrawing toward left of 2-5, E-2-2 passing through to west. + 0938 - 2 more 37,s moving to positions to assist attack of 2-5 on enemy pocket. 0942 Enchy attempting to swim out from pocket. 0957 - Total of 9-37s and one field piece captured, 1034 - 2-5 hold up by 2 MG s in corol. 1042 -2-5 reached bouch. I-3-5 engaging enemy, in-water. 1107 - L-3-5 to move to: position, as local socurity at Rose 4 CP. 1115 -1-5 ordered to withdraw to derentive sector on Tenaru, 1123 - 2nd Jarines passed left of 2-5 moving to 0-2. 1153 . Cos I and K to withdraw to east bank of Matanikau. 1240 . 1-164 passed Wirough I-3-5 moving wast. 1241 - Captured heavy weapons demolished. 1305 - 2-5 to occupy defensive position south and west of Regt'l CP. 1500 -Wpns CP established south of road and west of base of Point Cruz. 1541 ... 3-5 to furnish socurity detachment Matanikau River bridges. May be willion in a contract of

ordered to 0-2. 2-5 to place reserve dompany in evacuated position. 1626 - 3-37mms ordered to 1-5 on Tenaru. 1745 - 3-5 to dispose one rifle company reinforced at G Btry; one covering river mouth and one covering river crossings. During day's operations Capt. Keith with G-2-5 and five enlisted men of 2-5 were fatally injured. Soven other evacuated. 3-5 suffered heavy casualties.

# November 3, 1942

Withdraw 2-5 and Wpns Co from west of Matanikau to defensive position along Tenaru River. Moved CP, forward and rear echelons, to sector 2. 3-5 remained in defense at Matanikau, passed to Division control. Details: 0547 - 2-5 moving to Tenaru defensive sector followed by Wpns and H&S. One half-track assigned to 1-5 left sub-sector. One plat 37mms assigned to 1-5 and one to 2-5. Before the 2nd Bn withdraw they had disposed of 187 of the enemy including 17 officers of which one was a colonel. 9-37mm guns were captured, 300 rounds of 4.5 ammunition and 34 M Guns.

# November 4. 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in defensive position on Matanikau. Continued moving CP to sector 2 from 5. Patrolled 1000 yards to east, southeast, and south. Information negative. Inspected and repaired wire in new positions.

#### November 5. 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division control. The area of patrol responsibility of the 5th and 7th Marines was agreed upon as the line running north and south through MIR limiting point. 3rd Bn patrolled along East West Trail east of the Matanikau to the high ridges on the west. Ammunition and equipment left in a bivouac area in this vicinity was found and a party was sent out to bring it in. Two patrols from 2-5 were sent to the East West Trail to their front. The information gained was negative.

# November 6, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn under Division control. 4-37mm and 8 cal 50 MGs assigned to each 1st and 2nd Bn, one half-track to 1st Bn, one half-track to 3-5 and one to 2nd Marines, 1-5 sent reconnaissance patrol 1500 yards to mag az 1000, negative. 0820 - 2-5 sent one rifle plat with one light MG section attached to reconneiter to Melambu River on mag az 1350. Negative report. Prescribed boundary between Bns for patrol responsibility. 2-5 had 2 patrols in front of their position to EW trail. Discovered 40 fresh Japanese tracks headed in westerly direction.

November 7, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn under Division control. 1-5 patrolled beach from Tenaru to Ilu River at night. 2-5 patrolled south to EW Trail and along Trail and 1-5 1500 yards in its right front. Information negative. Receiving orders to outpost site of bridge construction across Tenaru beginning morning of 9 Nov. Reserve First Plat, wpns Co. General alert at 2000 for naval gun fire as eleven enemy warships were reported 150 miles out heading this way; however, our aviation turned back this threat.

Novembor 8, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn under Division control. Half-track (organic) from Matanikau reverted to Regt 1 control and attached to 105, other half-tracks reverted to own organizations. 2-37mms from Wpns Co reverted to reserve from 1-5 sub-sector. Reserve 1st Plat Wpns Co (4-37mms and 4 cal-50 MGs). Patrolled beach during darkness from Tenaru to Ilu Rivers. Reconnectored to east, southeast and south of front-information negative.

November 9. 1942


Serve. Patrolled to south, southeast and east of defensive sector. Information negative. Patrolled during hours of darkness from the Tenaru to Ilu Rivers along beach. Information negative. Outposted site of bridge construction across Tenaru River. Installed tactical wire at outpost to include outpost in defensive sector.

November 10. 1942.

reserve, moved from defensive position at Matanikau River to bivouse position at Regt 1 CP. Outposted bridge site over Tenaru River in 1st Bn area. Reconnectered to south, southeast and east of position during hours of daylight. Patrolled from the Tenaru to Ilu Rivers along the beach during the hours of daylight. The troit of the beach during the hours of darkness. Information from all patrols negative except to southeast where two-day old tracks of about 8 men headed in a westerly direction on the E-waring were discovered. Today was the 167th birthday of the U.S. Marine Corps.

November 11, 1942

noar Regt'l CP and remained in Div Res. Reconnoitered to south, southeast and east during the hours of daylight. Information negative. Patrollod from the Tenaru River to the Ilu River along the beach during the hours of darkness. Information negative.





Novembor 12, 1942

· Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division The state of the s rosorve.

November 13, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division reserve bivouncked near R-CP. 1st Bn began organizing RRL facing west.

. November 14, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division reserve. 1st Bn continued organization of RRL facing east and 3rd continued organization of RRL facing north (beach), between Lunga and Tenaru Rivers. Reconnoitered to E, SE and S in front of right (2nd) Bn. Reconnaissance patrol, one officer, 20 men, and TBY from 2-5 authorized at 0600 to resume southerly move on second day of four day patrol from (82.0-194.5).

November: 15. 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division reserve. 3rd Bn continued preparing RRE facing north (beach) and 1st Bn continued preparing RRL facing east. Reconnectered S. SE and E of position. All patrols negative.

51 14 November 16, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division reserve. 3rd Bn continued preparing RRL facing north (beach) and 1st Bn continued preparing RRL facing east along Alligator Creek. "Reconneitored. to E. SE and S: enemy information mogative. 2-5 furnished security group. to 1-11 survey party at 0915, leaving OP 6 to trail SE as far as burned off ridge. Reserve: 1st Plat. Wpns Co (4-37mm; 4-50 cal MGs). 2-5 officers and senior NCO's witnessed bridge buildings demonstration by Pioneers.

and general transfer of the second November 17, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division . reservo. 3rd Bn continued preparing RRL facing north (boach) and 1st Bn. continued proparing RRL facing east along Alligator Creek. Reconnoitered to S. SE and E: negative information. The first of the second section of the second

Since the part of the state of the state of

November 18, 1942

A CONTRACTOR OF THE STATE OF TH Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division reserve. 3rd Bh continued preparing RRL facing north (beach) and 1st Bn : . continued preparing RRL facing cast along Alligator Creek.

ANNEX ?

November 19, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division reserve. 1st Bn continued proparing RRL facing east along Alligator Creek. Shifted boundary of patrol responsibility between Bns to north. Recommoitered to east 1000 yards past Red Beach, information negative. Other patrols recommoitered to SE and S; information negative.

Movember 20. 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division reserve. 1st Bn continued preparing RRL facing east along Alligator Creek. Shifted right boundary to enable 1-7 to take position on MLR. Reconnoitered to E. SE and S; information negative. Patrolled beach during the hours of darkness from Tenaru to Ilu River; information negative.

November 21, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division reserve. Reconnoitered to E. SE and S; reports negative. Patrolled along the beach from the Tenaru to Ilu Rivers during the hours of darkness; report negative. Outposted bridge site in 1-5 area during daylight hours.

November 22, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 11st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division reserve. 1st Bn continued preparing RRL facing east along Alligator Creek. Outposted bridge site in 1-5 area during the hours of daylight. Reconnoitered to S, SE and E; reports negative.

November 23, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division reserve (less K-3-5). 1st Bn continued preparing RRL facing east along Alligator Creek. Outposted bridge site in 1-5 area during the hours of daylight. 1600 - K-3-5 attached to 2-5. 2-5 ordered to outpost fighter strip No. 3.

November 24, 1942

Occupied defensive sector 2 with 1st and 2nd Bns. 3rd Bn in Division reserve. 1st Bn continued preparing RRL facing east in Alligator Creek. Reconnoitered to E, SE and S; reports negative. Patrolled along the beach from the Tenaru to Ilu Rivers during the hours of darkness; reports negative. Outposted bridge site in 1-5 area during the hours of daylight. 1915 - K-3-5 reverted to 3-5. Order to outpost fighter strip revoked. 1435 - Received porder to relieve 2-5 with 2-7 tomorrow.



November 25, 1942

Occupied left subsector of defensive sector 2 with 1st Bn; 5th: 2nd Bn relieved by 2-7 and completed move at 1600 to bivouac area. Reconnected to E and SE; reports negative. Patrolled along the beach from the Tenaru to Ilu River during the hours of darkness; report negative.

November 26, 1942

Bivouacked in Division Reserve. Furnished working parties. 1600 - Division Reserve ordered to maintain one Bn alcrted for tactical employment - 2-5 alcrted, 1630 - 1-5 (less 3rd Plat, Co D) relieved by 1-8 in north subsector of defensive sector 2. 1-5 outposted Tenaru bridge site until relieved by 1-8; Patrolled from Tenaru to Ilu Rivers during darkness; reports negative. Maintained OP on beach at mouth of Alligator Croek. Air raid at 0330. Report no damage.

November 27, 1942

Bivouncked in Division Reservo (less 3rd Plat, D Co). Furnished working details. 2-5 maintained alert for tactical employment from 1800 to 0600 and 3-5 from 0600 to 1800. Air raid at 0330. Report no damage.

November 28, 1942.

Bivouncked in Division Roserve. 3rd Plat, Co D relieved at 1600, 28 Nov 42, and reverted to 3rd Bn. Working details. 3-5 alorted for tactical employment from 1800 to 0500; 2-5 alorted from 0500 to 1800. Air raid at 0330. Report no damage.

November 29, 1942.

Bivouacked in Division Reserve. Furnished working details. 2-5 alorted for tactical employment from 1800 to 0500. 1-5 alorted from 0500 to 1800. 3-5 alorted for tactical employment, motorized, from 1800 this date to 0600, 1 Dec 42. Air raid at 0330. Report no damage.

Novembor 30, 1942

Bivouacked in Division Reserve. Furnished working details. 3-5 alerted for tactical employment from 1800 to 1800 (motorized from 1800 to 0600). 1650 - 1-5 ordered alerted from 1800 this date to 1800 2 Dec 42. Air raid at 0330. Report no damage.

Docombor 1, 1942

Fightwouncked in Division Reserve. Furnished working details. 1-5 elected



#### ANNEX P (CONT)

for tactical employment from 1800 to 1800 (motorized from 1800 to 0600). 1710 - 2-5 ordered alerted for tactical employment from 1800 this date to 1800 3 Dec 42. Shortly past midnight there was a naval engagement in the harbor and shells fell in the 2-5 area. At 0400 had an air raid alarm but no bombs were dropped.

December 2, 1942

Bivouacked in Division Reserve. Furnished working details. 2-5 alerted for tactical employment from 1800 to 1800 (motorized from 1800 to 0600).

1640 - 3-5 ordered alert from 1800 this date to 1800 4 Dec 42,

December 3, 1942

Pivouacked in Division Reservo. Furnished working details. 3-5 alerted for tactical employment from 1800 to 1800 (motorized from 1800 to 0600). 1-5 ordered alerted from 1800 this date to 1800 5 Dec 42.

December 4, 1942

Bivouacked in Division Reserve. Furnished working details. 1-5 alorted for tactical employment from 1800 to 1800 (meterized from 1800 to 0600). 1730 - 2-5 ordered alorted from 1800 this date to 1800 6 Dec 42. 0130 - Air raid alarm sounded but no signs of enemy aviation.

December 5. 1942

Bivouacked in Division Reserve: Furnished working details: 2-5 alerted from 1800 to 1800. 1730 - 1-5 ordered alerted from 1800 this date to 1800. 7 Dec 42. (Motorized from approximately 2130 to daylight.)

December 6, 1942

Bivouacked in Division Reserve. Furnished working details. 1-5 alerted from 1800 to 1800 (motorized from 2130 to 0600). 1640 - 3-5 alerted from 1800 this date to 1800 8 Dec 42. 12-81mm mortars returned by 1st Marines to this regiment.

December 7, 1942

Bivouacked in Division Reserve. 3-5 alerted for tactical employment from 1800 to 1800 (motorized from 2130 to daylight). Organization equipment moved to assigned embarkation beaches at E Lunga Lagoon area. At 1045 air raid alarm but no enemy planes.

TENTON OF BUILDING

December 38, 1942

Convoy in the harbor at dawn. By 1300 practically all equipment was

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ANNEX P (15)

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put on beaches designated to units. Regiment with attached units expects to move out tomorrow morning.

December 9, 1942

Reveille at 0300 and chow at 0400. At daybreak all units started working on the beach, Gear was loaded on board ships and all troops were embarked at 1200. Air raid warning received at 1430. Left Cactus at 1430 for an undisclosed port. Another air raid warning at 1530 but no enemy aviation appeared. Malaria treatment commonced.

December 10, 1942

Navy chineumeed to proops that our destination was Brisband, Australia.

Major, U.S.M.C.

# ANNEX Q (CONT)


# AVIATION PHASE V

Listed below is a summary of air activities during Phase V.

- 19 Sept. 1942 Strafing enemy position northwest Guadalcanal by 3 P-400s.
- 20 Sept. 1942 Attack by 10 SBDs on enemy cruiser. Damage un-known.
- 21 Sept. 1942 P-400s bombed and strafed Koilotumaria. Rekata
  Bay installations bombed and strafed by 2 SBDs.
  Gi o Bay ap eared abandoned. Three SBDs on night
  patrol bombed destroyers off Esperance, no hits,
  flares used.
- 22 Sept. 1942 Visale area bombed and strafed throughout day. Effective planes 30 F4F4s, 22SBDs, 7 TBFs, 5 P-400s.
- 23 Sept. 1942 Continued strafing from Tassafaronga to Sapuru.
- 24 Sept. 1942 One biplane shot down by B-17 at Rekata Bay.
- 25 Sept. 1942 Visale and Esperance bombed.
- 26 Sept. 1942 Buin area raided by B-17s l cruiser, 1 AP hit,
  3 float plane zeros and 2 biplanes shot down.
  Visale bombed. Effective planes 41 F4F4s, 21 SBDs,
  8 TBFs 5 P-400s.
- 27 Sept. 1942 Five B-17s attacked Buin. Enemy losses 2 zeros.
  Our losses 1 B-17. Enemy losses 6 bombers 5 zeros.
  Our losses 1 SBD on ground: Effective planes 28
  F4F4s, 2 TBFs, 5 P-400s, 20 SBDs.
- 28 Sept. 1942 Enemy losses 23 bembers out of 25 and 1 zero.
  Our losses none.
- 29 Sept. 1942 Effective planes AM 33 F4F4s, 20 SBDs, 6 TBFs, 5 P-400s. Rekata Bay 2 float planes destroyed. Enemy losses 4 zeros our losses 1 F4F4.

  Visale bombed and boats strafed. Trucks near Kokumbona strafed by P-400s; Effective planes end of day 34 F4F4s, 20 SBDs, 5 TBFs, 6 P-400s.

# ANNEX Q (CONT)



- 1 Oct. 1942 Five P-400s strafed and bombed from Cape Esperance to Point Cruz. Effective planes 37 F4F4s, 19 SBDs, 1 TBF, 4 P-400s.
- 2 Oct. 1942 Enemy losses 4 zeros. Our losses 6 F4F4s (2 pilots recovered) Three SBDs, 3 TBFs lost. P-400s attacked enemy in area Maravovo, Tenaru and Kokumbona area.
- Enemy losses 11 zeros (2 by AA). Our losses 1 F4F4 (pilot recovered). Night attack on enemy surface force one bomb Lit on heavy cruiser. Planes available AM 26 F4F4s, 16 SBDs, 3 TBFs and 4 P-400s.
- 4 Oct. 1942 Planes effective 27 F4F4s, 20 SBDs, 5 TBFs, 6 p-400s. Attack on enemy surface force 2 torpedo hits on heavy cruiser.
- 5 Oct. 1942 Attack on Rekata Bay 3 enemy float planes destroyed. Tassafaronga to Maravovo P-400s attacked installations and boats. Six enemy DDs attacked 1 DD sunk, 1 damaged. Our losses 2 TBFs.
- 6 Oct. 1942 Effective planes 29 F4F4s, 16 SBDs, 3 TBFs, 8 P-400s. Air supported ground attacks.
- 8 Octob1942 SBD contacts with enemy surface force covered with zeros with belly tanks and float biplanes. One biplane shot down no losses to SBDs, three pilots wounded. Seven SBDs, 4 TBFs, 11 F4F4s attacked surface force, 1 torpedo hit on heavy cruiser, 3 float biplanes shot down, 1 SBD and 1 F4F4 lost.
- 9 Oct. 1942 Effective planes 25 F4F4s, 17 SBDs, 3 TBF, 6 P-400s, 8 P-39s Striking force attacked surface force. One CA damaged 1 destroyer damaged. Attack on Rekata Bay.
- Two CL and 4 DDs attacked damage unknown, 3 float zeros and 7 float biplanes shot down. Point Cruz to Esperance bombed and strafed by P-400s. Planes effective AM 45 F4F4s; 16 SBDs, 8 P-39s, 2 P-400s.

# ANNEX Q (COMT)

- 11 Oct. 1942 Thirty three zeros and forty four bombers over no contact.
- 12 Oct. 1942 SBDs bombed 5 DDs and badly damaged, 1 probably sunk, TBFs and SBDs attacked enemy CA one torpedo hit. Repeated attack found in company with another CA and 2 DDs direct bomb hits on both CAs and 1 DD. DD sinking and 1 CA abandoned. P-400s strafed ground installations and boats to west.
- 13 Oct. 1942 Effective planes 39 SBDs, 41 F4F4s, 4 P-400s, 6 P-39s. Enemy losses 1 zero. Ours 1 F4F4 (pilot wounded).
- 14 Oct. 1942 Heavy bembardment during night, Effective planes 29 F4F4s, 7 SBDs, 4 P-400s, 2 P-39s. Enemy convoy 8 DDs and 6 APs attacked by SBDs. One AP sunk another hit.
- 15 Oct. 1942 Two APs sunk by planes, third burning badly others damaged. Enemy losses 12 bombers (3 by AA), 5 zeros, 1 biplane. Our losses in air 3 SBDs, 3 F4F4s, 1 P-39.
- 16 Oct. 1942 Effective planes 9 F4F4s, 11 SBDs, 7 P-400s 7 P-39s. Bombing and strafing Cape Esperance to Kokumbona. Twenty F4F4s and 12 SBDs arrived.
- 17 Oct. 1942 Enemy losses 14 dive bombers (8 including 2 heavy bombers by AA) and 2 zeros. Our losses 1 F4F4, 1 SBD.
- 18 Oct. 1942 Enemy losses 8 heavy bembers 11 zeros. Ours 2 F4F4.
- 19 Oct. 1942 Enemy losses 2 zeros. Ours 1 F4F4.
- 20 Oct. 1942 Enemy losses 1 single float biplane, 2 bombers and 7 zeros. Our losses 2 F4F4s one pilot rescued.
- 21 Oct. 1942 Enemy losses 4 bombers (1 by AA) and 7 zeros.

  Our losses 2 F4F4s one pilot rescued.
- 22 Oct. 1942 Enemy losses 5 dive bombers. Ours none.
- 23 Oct. 1942 Enemy losses 1 bomber and 20 zeros. Ours none

24 Oct. 1942 - Our losses 2 SBDs, crews rescued..

# ANNEX Q (cond)

- 25 Oct. 1942 Enemy lesses 5 bembers, 17 zeros. Ours 2 F4F4s, 1 TBF all our pilots and TBF mechanic saved.
- 30 Oct. 1942 Seven F4F4s attacked Rekata Bay. Enemy losses this attack 3 zeros and 5 float piplanes, 369 planes destroyed October.
- 1 Nov. 1942 \ Seven F4F4s attacked Rekata Bay destroyed 5 float planes. Our losses 1 F4F4.

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- 4 Nov. 1942 \- Lost 4 SBDs.
- 5 Nov. 1942 Enemy losses 5 bombers and 1 zero all by AA. Our fighters did not make contact.
- 7 Nov. 1942 Attack on 1 cruiser and 10 DDs CL hit with 2 torpedos 1 1000 1b. bomb and one torpedo hit on 1
  DD. Enemy losses 8 float biplanes and 8 float
  zeros. Our losses 4 F4F4s one pilot rescued.
- 15 Nov. 1942 Twelve transports and cargo vessel destroyed.
- 16 Nov. 1942 Enemy losses 6 zeros. Ours none.
- 18 Nov. 1942 Three zeros shot down. Carried out 8 strafing and bombing missions. Buin attack 12 zeros and two float biplanes destroyed.
- 20 Nov. 1942 Five OS2U-re on wheels armived Cactus.
- 23 Nov. 1942 Six Hudsons arrived.

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- 25 Nov. 1942 Two zeros shot down on patrol.
- 26 Nov. 1942 Effective planes 32 F4F4s, 18 SBDs, 9 TBFs, 6
  PBOs, 4 OS2Us, 1 F4F7, 5 B-17s, 1 J2F, 12 P-38s, 20 P-39s, 1 P-400.
- 27 Nov. 1942 Effective planes 35 F4F4s, 18 SBDs, 9 TBFs, 18 SBDs, 18 SBDs, 9 TBFs, 18 SBDs, 18 SBDs
- 28 Nov. 1942 Search planes shot down one float biplane.
- 29 Nov. 1942 Striking force hit one AK and shot down 3 zeros.
- 1 Dec. 1942 Shot down 2 zeros on search missions.

# ANNEX Q (CONT)

- 4 Dec. 1942 Two 1000 lb, hits on cruiser 1 on another 2 torpedo hits on DD. Shot down 10 Float biplanes, lost 1 TBF, 1 F4F4.
- 7 Dec. 1942 Destroyed 2 zeros at Munda.
- 8 Dec. 1942 Striking force hit four DDs. Lost 1 SBD.

#### ANNEX R

#### Artillery

#### Phase V

On 18 September, 1942; the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, landed on Guadal-canal and reverted to control of 11th Marines.

On 20 September, 1942, the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, fired in support of patrols from 1st Raider Battalion and 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. Ammunition expended, 418 rounds, 105mm. Nothing unusual from artillery standpoint.

On 26 September, 1942, the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, fired in support of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, attacking Japanese positions in Matanikau Village.

On 27 September, 1942, the 2nd Battalion, reenforced by "N" Battery, 5th Battalion, took over support of the attack. Ammunition expended, 27 September: 941 rounds, 75mm. pack howitzer; 341 rounds, 105mm. Nothing of particular importance from artillery viewpoint in this engagement.

During the period 28 September-7 October, 1942, artillery fired harassing fires daily on Matanikau area. Included in this was the use of 105mm. WP shells for incendiary effect. This was successful, and several large grass fires were started.

On 7 October, 1942, the 2nd and 5th Battalions, 11th Marines, fired preliminary harassing fires in preparation for attack on Matanikau.

Cn 8 October, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines joined the above units. Units supported were 5th Marines, 7th Marines, and 1st Raider Battalion. Artillery setup was normal and the only matter worth mentioning is the difficulty of maintaining communications with forward observers. As has been reported before, the TBY radio is not satisfactory, and the TBY radio is too heavy to be manhandled by the three-man crew. Double crews were used in this operation. Ammunition expended was 2188 rounds, 75mm. pack howitzer; 1063 rounds, 105mm.

From 10 October to 23 October, 1942, interdiction and harassing fires were executed on Japanese positions in the Matanikau-Kokumbona area. Counterbattery fires were executed with moderate success, but the limited visibility and lack of sound-ranging equipment, together with the lack of suitable counterbattery artillery, precluded really effective fire.

On 23 October, 1942, the 2nd and 5th Battalions, 11th Marines, were supporting the defense of the Matanikau sector. It being evident that a Japanese attack was imminent, two batteries from the 1st and 3rd Battalions were emplaced to reenforce the fires in this sector. Japanese forces tried to force a crossing of the Matanikau at its mouth, and were repulsed with heavy losses. Ten batteries of artillery fired almost continuously during the early part of the night in the area just across the river and contributed materially to the repulse of the Japanese. Fire control was normal. Observation was very limited, and most of the firing was on map data. Communications were by telephone and were satisfactory throughout. Some observation was obtained through infantry officers, and was of great help. Ammunition expended in this action was 6164 rounds, 75mm. pack howitzer; 2719 rounds, 105mm.

On 24 October, the following night, an attack was made on the southwest flank of our position, and was repulsed. 1st and 5th Battalions, 1lth Marines, fired in support of the 7th Marines in that area. On the second night, an attack was made against our southeast sector, in the area of the 164th infantry and a battalion of the 7th Marines, and was repulsed. The 3rd Battalion, 1lth Marines, fired in support of this sector.

On 25 October, 1942, "I" Battery, 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines, joined from Tulagi, and was attached to 1st Battalion, 11th Marines.

On 26 and 27 October, 1942, artillery continued to fire in support of infantry units in their sectors in mopping-up operations. Artillery supporting the Matanikau sector continued harassing and counterbattery fires on Japanese positions. Artillery units were rotated for rest and experience.

On 31 October, 1942, additional artillery was moved to support the Matanikau sector and on 1 November, 1942, the 11th Marines, less two batteries, was in support of the 5th Marines in that sector. At 1500, 1 November, "G" Battery 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, crossed the Matanikau River and took position on western side.

On 2 November, 1942, Battery "F", 244th Coast Artillery, U. S. Army, and Battery "A", 5th Defense Battalion, U. S. Marine Corps, landed and were emplaced to fire on Kokumbona. This was the first effective counterbattery artillery available in this campaign.

On 3 November, 1942, the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, was withdrawn to regular positions, and the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, was ordered east of the Ilu River to support the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines, on Koli Point. Two guns of Battery "A" 5th Defense Battalion, were sited to fire on Koli Point. Japanese landed east of Koli Point during night of 2 November and were fired on on night of 3 November by Battery "A", 5th Defense Battalion.

ANNEX R (2)



On 4 November, 1942, the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines; disembarked and was attached to 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, in support of forces on Koli Point.

From 5 November to 7 November, 1942, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and Battery "A", 5th Defense Battalion, continued firing in support of 7th Marines, and 164th Infantry, U. S. Army, on Koli Point, and 3rd and 5th Battalions, 11th Marines, and Battery "F", 244th Coast Artillery, U. S. Army, continued firing in support of 2nd Marines, west of Matanikau River.

On 8.November, 1942, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, returned to regular positions. 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, remained attached to combined forces on Metapona (General Rupertus) until completion of mopping up in that area.

On 10 November, 1942, the 1st, 3rd and 5th Battalions, 11th Marines, supported the attack of the 2nd and 8th Marines toward Kokumbona. Ammunition expended in this attack: 4570 rounds, 75mm. pack howitzer; 549 rounds, 105mm. howitzer; and 212 rounds, 155mm. guns.

On 12 November, the 245th FA Battalion, U. S. Army (105mm. howitzers) and Battery "L", 4th Battalion, 11th Marines (155mm. howitzers) landed and passed to control of 11th Marines.

On 13 November, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, replaced 3rd Battalion in support of 8th Marines. 245th FA assigned to support this area, reenforcing 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines.


From 13 November to 22 November, 1942, 2nd and 5th Battalions, 11th Marines, and 245th FA, U. S. Army, continued in support of units on Matanikau River; units included 2nd and 8th Marines, 164th and 182nd Infantry, U. S. Army.

On 22 November, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, displaced to vicinity of Matanikau River to reenforce fires of 245th FA.

On 23 November, 1st and 2nd Battalions, 11th Marines, "L" Battery 11th Marines, and 245th FA Battalion, U. S. Army, supported the attack of the 8th Marines and 182nd Infantry, U. S. Army, toward Kokumbona. Ammunition expended: 1546 rounds, 75mm. pack howitzer; 655 rounds, 105mm. howitzer; 293 rounds, 155mm. howitzer; and 134 rounds, 155mm. gun.

On 24 November, 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, replaced the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines.

On 27 November, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, replaced 1st Battalion, 11th Marines.



On 28 November, 246th FA Battalion, U. S. Army, passed to control of llth Marines, and on 29 November replaced 5th Battalion, 11th Marines in support of forces in Matanikau-Kokumbona area.

On 29 November, Battery "A", 5th Defense Battalion, assigned to tactical control of 3rd Defense Battalion for coast defense.

The 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, and 245th and 246th Fa Battalions, U. S. army, continued in support of the units west of Matanikau until after 10 December, 1942.

Battery "F" 244th C. A. Battalion, U. S. Army, fired counterbattery, deep harassing, and interdiction fires in the Kokumbona area throughout the period 3 November-10 December, 1942, using both terrestrial observation and air spot. It may be interesting to add that the 244th C. A. were employed firing counterbattery within four hours after the ships started unloading at Guadalcanal. This Battery also fired on and seriously damaged ememy transports beached at Tassafaronga.

#### GENERAL COMMENTS

- 1. Fire control methods and artillery methods as basically taught at Fort Sill are correct.
- 2. Battalion fire direction centers as at present organized are capable of handling up to five batteries of artillery without any serious time lag. Decentralization and augmentation of battalions worked efficiently.
- 3. With the regimental staff as organized on Guadalcanal the regimental commander was able to control seven complete battalions, and three attached batteries of 155mm. howitzers and guns. Thus the regiment can be augmented from other organizations without involving staff difficulties.
- 4. Amphibian tractors were used in the initial landing, and later when the Lunga River bridge was washed out, as ammunition carriers and prime movers. These were of great assistance under the circumstances, but would not be suitable for normal duties as prime movers or ammunition carriers.
- 5. 155mmf. rguns, although trained as coast artillery, were used as field artillery for counterbattery with but slight modifications of method.
- 6. All officers of combat units should receive elementary instruction in artillery spotting methods, and battalion commanders should be instructed in the use of artillery. Several instances occurred of misuse of artillery through ignorance of unit commanders. Also other instances where the presence of mind and initiative of non-artillery officers enabled effective fire to be brought on enemy positions in the absence of artillery observers. Artillery infantry liaison needs improving on the part of both parties.

ANNEX R (4)

# ANNEX R (CONT.)

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- 7. Corps artillery 155mm. howitzers and guns should be landed as soon after the Division artillery as possible to provide suitable counterbattery and reenforcing artillery. These will also serve to fire against surface craft.
  - 8. The regiment should be augmented by addition of the following:
- (a) Regimental ammunition section. Division dumps were too far from artillery positions. It was necessary for the artillery to handle its own ammunition from the time it reached the beach.
- (b) Regimental ordnance section with necessary equipment to handle all minor and intermediate repairs, and to carry sufficient spare parts.
  - (c) Small sound and flash ranging section for counterbattery.

T. B. HUGHES, LtCol., U. S. Marine Corps.

#### ANNEX S

### COMMUNICATION PHASE V

Phase V was similar to Phase IV. Equipment and supply shortages remained critical. Expansion of the defensive perimeter with the resulting increase in number and length of tactical wire circuits severely taxed wire and tape supplies and placed additional burdeneon our already overworked personnel. Radio communication was satisfactory, both within the division and the Base Radio Circuit. Coding difficulties were relieved by use of ECM which was brought in during Phase V. Radio communication was maintained with the 2d Raider Bn during its operation from 6 November to 4 December 1942. TBX radio was used with CSP 488 (M-94) as the cryptographic aid. During Phase IV and this phase airground communications were as shown in enclosure (g).

### Recommendations.

- l. Adoption of uniform communication doctrine for all aircraft.
- 2. Adequate air-ground training, both for ground troops and aviation personnel.
- 3. Coordination between Army Navy Marine Corps as to frequency range of aircraft radio equipment.

# ANNEX TO (MEDICAL)

This phase which covers nearly three months, was one of reinforcement, organization, and active defense of the Lunga Point Perimeter. The chronological order followed in previous phases will be abandoned in this discussion and each subject treated as an entity in itself, to avoid confusion. For this reason individual engagements will not be discussed. These will be found in other portions of this report.

The arrival of the Seventh Marine's Reinforced on September 19, 1943 was to give the Division an additional regiment of troops, and the Division medical section a completely equipped medical company. In spite of an initiation by naval gunfire on their first night ashore and repeated bombardment from the air during the process of setting up a hospital, "C" Company, of the First Medical Battalion, was operating as a tent hospital in an area adjacent to "A" Company, First Medical Battalion, just west of the Lunga River within forty-eight hours. "A" Company was continuing to function as a complete tent hospital but with only one-half of its personnel and equipment (the second platoon did not land.)

During this phase the personnel on the island was to increase from the original 18, 134 plus Cub One, less evacuated casualties, to over 45,000. With few exceptions it become the problem of the Division Medical Supply Officer to obtain and distribute medical supplies to this entire group.

the portable unit for filtration and chlorination originally set up on the west bank of the Lunga River was replaced on September 1, 1942 by a mobile unit with a capacity of 24,000 to 30,000 gallons daily. The Third Defense Battalion set up a portable unit (capacity 6,000 to 12,000 gallons) on the east bank of the Lunga and Aviation units installed a second mobile unit upstream from both units. Early in November a portable unit was set up on the east bank of the Matanakau supplemented very shortly by a second on the west bank of the Matanakau supplemented very shortly by a second on the west bank of the Matanakau (operated by the U.S. Army). In late November a mobile unit was established on the Ilu River and for three weeks a portable unit was operated at Koli Point. Headquarters of the Second Marines set up a distillation plant for water on Tulagi. With these points of distribution and amounts, the water supply was more than adequate for all areas.

Although the responsibility for securing rations is a Quartermaster function rather than a medical one, no report would be
complete without noting the effect of adequate or insufficient
rations in the early phases of and throughout the operation.
Captured enemy supplies were the difference between a starvation
diet and one well above that point in caloric value during the
early phases. Food actually spoiled was condemned, but hunger

tempered the judgement of medical officers and food that would have been thrown out at other times was cooked, fed, and eaten without ill effects. At no time was there any evidence of disability caused by food during the entire operation. As supplies arrived on friendly ships the diet became adequate in every way and there were no cases of frank deficiency diseases reported within the Division. Equipment for proper preparation of food was lacking in many groups. Company messess were set up in bivouac areas. Field and mess cooks showed marked ingenuity in making workable equipment from captured material. Had the enemy taken the time to destroy these ration dumps and their equipment, the outcome of this operation might have been a tragic one.

During this period, six weeks after the initial attack, rations were adequate, and three full meals were served daily. frigeration was established in increasing amounts. Meat's were available, delivered to the island in a frozen condition. amounts of eggs, fruits, and fresh green vegetables, were obtainable and by Thanksgiving Day, 1942, roast turkey and all the "fixings" were served to the troops.

Medical supplies continued to-be adequate with the exception of a few items. These were requisitioned from the First Base Depot at Noumea and delivered by plane after the second month of occupation. In spite of the increased personnel on the island, some units arriving with their own supplies, others with only a few days supplies, the Division medical supply section continued to fill requisitions for all units without any serious shortages.

The Seventh Marines, First Defense Battalion, and the Second Replacement Battalion arrived with sufficient supplies and equipment for a three months campaign. The army was supplied from the First Marine Division reserves for the first four weeks period of their action. After this first month, the army supply section arrived on the island and handled all army medical supply requisitions. Navy construction units were provided with their own medical sections and the Division Medical Supply Officer was required to issue only supplementary supplies. Aviation units were in the same category as the construction units. The Fourth Replacement Battalion, however, was landed without any reserve These had been removed by the Corps Surgeon at Noumea. supplies. The Eighth Regiment arrived with field units only.

It is the feeling in this Division that it is just as important for all replacement and reinforcing units, arriving in combat areas, to be fully equipped with medical supplies and equipment, as to arrive with complete combat equipment.

During the six months period prior to leaving the United States a careful study was made to determine the reserve medical supplies necessary for one year in the field. This was based on the theory that we would probably have two landing operations during this

ANNEX I

period and be under actual combat condition about one-half of the time. These supplies were assembled at the Base Depot at Norfolk and shipped to Wellington. All supplies were divided into four equal parts and loaded aboard different ships. In preparation for this operation, field units not considered essential for this operation, plus additional reserve medical supplies, were left with the rear echelon in Wellington. Sometime during the first month, these supplies, plus those which had previously been requisitioned but had not arrived at the time of departure, were commandeered by the Fleet Surgeon, South Pacific Area and moved to the First Base Depot at Noumea. It is believed that these supplies were used to establish the medical section of the First Base Depot, with the idea of supplying all Marine activities in the South Pacific Area.

All additional supplies received on the island came from this First Base Depot with the exception of anti-matarial drugs which were forwarded by the Malaria Control Unit, South Pacific Area.

On being withdrawn from the island during December 1942, all supplies in the hands of the First Marine Division were left with those units remaining on the island. All equipment actually needed was also left.

Although the plans for supply of this Division were made prior to leaving the United States, and were in theory only, it is believed that they were adequate except for a few items.

During the evacuation process, eight hundred stretchers and three thousand blankets were lost to the Division by lack of replacement. It should be the duty of the supply base to return one stretcher and two blankets for each stretcher case evacuated. This is particularly important in the case of air evacuation. It should also be noted that the army type wooden stretcher will not fit in transport planes as we saw them on Guadalcanal. Metal stretchers such as are used in the First Marine Division do fit these transports. It is also suggested that compound medications put up in capsules be changed to tablet form for tropical use. Capsules degenerate and the drug is lost for all practical purposes. Cough syrups should be furnished for field use. One unit of brandy per ten men should be furnished for field use. Bismuth, paregoric, and the sulfonamides should be quadrupled in amount. Priority of combat loading must be maintained and in this regard it is suggested that a medical department loading officer be assigned to act with the Division loading officer.

It was during this phase that most of the surgery was done. Contributing factors to this increased surgical activity were the increased personnel under the direction of the Division, active defense of the area, increased naval and air bombardment, patrolling, raiding and offensive action. The situation was unique in that

patients operated on had to be evacuated hundreds of miles before reaching the nearest base hospitals. These tent and field hospitals were within range of enemy artillery at all times and particularly liable to bombing from the air by their very position. The operating was done in tents (except at the Division Field Hospital which had wooden buildings), always above ground and the recovery and surgical wards were also under canvas or wooden buildings. Surgical supplies were sterilized in portable autoclaves. Ether, spinal, and pentothal sodium were the anesthetics use. No untoward effects were noted when anesthetics were administered to men having received large doscs of sulfonamides.

The treatment of shock has always been a prerequisite to successful surgery. This was begun in the advance aid stations by liberal use of morphia, splinting of fractures, and blood plasman when indicated. Plasma and intravenous fluids were used extensively on the admission of prospective surgical patients. As noted in Phase IV, use of sulfonamides locally and orally was routine in the advance aid stations and repeated with each dressing locally and every four hours by mouth. Gas gangrene was seen only twice and there were no cases of tetanus reported in the Division. It is believed that with this very early use sufonamides, infection of war wounds and resulting deaths were the lowest in military—medical experience. This fact cannot be absolutely established at present because of lack of complete data but is an opinion based on partial reports.

General surgical procedure did not change from those mentioned in Phase IV. Abdominal wounds were explored, chest wounds which survived to reach the hospital were treated conservatively as were head wounds which did not require decompression. Simple fractures were reduced, if compound they were debrided by some, not debrided by others, reduced and fixed in plaster casts or splints. Incomplete reports indicate that better than fifty-five percent of penetrating abdominal wounds recovered after surgery. Medical diseases, particularly in the form of malaria, reached alarming proportions in the latter part of this phase. Hospital admissions from all causes rose sharply in October, held in November, and for the first ten days in December. This is strikingly shown in the following figures:

Personnel of the First Marine Division only admitted to the sick list while in the Solomon Islands.

Total August 900
September 1 to September 18 907
Septem er 18 to October 1 817

4- ANNEX T

Total September	1724
Total October	2630
Total November	2413
December 1 to December 10	913
Grand total for entire operation	8580.

There were occassional cases of an infectious type of hepatitis with jaundice which is now believed to be of a virus type identical with the jaundice which occured with certain lots of yellow fever vaccine. This jaundice is, however, separate and distinct from that couse. It occured well after the incubation period of the yellow fever type which is three to five months. At this writing its mode of transmission has not yet been determined.

A few of the troops which joined the Division from Samoa were infected with filariasis and had beginning oedema. Later the organisms were isolated from involved lymph nodes.

The psychoneuroses and war neuroses were evacuated at once if severe. The relative small number of these, when compared to other groups, is an indication of excellent mental stability among the officers and men of the First Marine Division. Two groups of this type of case were treated on the island by a few lays rest in the sick bay area until acute symptoms had subsided and then they were transferred to the Quartermaster and used as a lobor unit. A few very severe cases from these groups were evacuated. It is the feeling of the medical officers who were in charge of these groups, that the results were excellent. Approximately seventy-five men were so treated and made available for useful and necessary labor, which in turn released an equal number of men for front line combat duty.

A moderate number of admissions were for the treatment of ropical ulcers. Various medications were used at different imes with indifferent results. Local use of sulfanilamide powder was of little value. Treatment with fresh saturated solutions of azochloramide in alcohol became the method of choice. Improvement with this type of treatment was evident within fortypight hours and recovery a matter of days.

On August 7, 1942 the First Marine Division and supporting troops, landed in an area with "the highest malarial infected mosquito rate in the world". (Statement made by the Commanding )fficer, Malaria Control Unit, in November 1942). Within two weeks the first few cases were to appear. By the end of September 1945, 239 cases had been admitted to hospitals. The following is a report of admissions and is self explanatroy. It must be remembered that these admissions are for the First Marine

Division only. Unfortunately the records for the last week in November and the first two weeks in December are incomplete. Actually the number of admissions continued to increase throughout that period. Many of these were recurrent or relapsed cases.

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	MALARIA REPORT FOR TH	E MONTH	OF	AUGUST	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	7
ş.	Second Week Third Week Fourth Week			None 4 18		•
	Total	•		22		
•	MALARIA REPORT FOR TH	E MONTH	OF	SEPTEM	BER	
	First Week Second Week Third Week Fourth Week			31 48 52 108		
	Total  MALARIA REPORT FOR TH	E MONTH	OF	239 OCTOBE	R	
, - 7	First Week Second Week Third Week Fourth Week			173 273 655 840		. ,
•	Total	EL NAONYEUTT		1941	min.	<i>:</i> -
	MALARIA REPORT FOR TH	E MONTH	OF	NOVEMB	<u>En</u>	
:	First Week Second Week Third Week Fourth Week		•	843 765 912 693 (	<u>N</u> ot f week	
• :.	Total	·		3213	MACN	- /

# MALARIA REPORT FOR THE MONTH OF DECEMBER

First Week Second Week 155 (Incomplete 29 reports only).

Total

184

GRAND TOTAL FOR PERIOD COVERED. . . 5599

There were many hinderances to the prevention of malaria on the island. Early in the operation oiling of breeding areas within the camp proper was one by individual medical officers, none of whom had had any specialized training in preventive work. Later the Malaria Control Unit consisting of one medical officer, an entomologist, an engineer. laboratory technicians, and trained enlisted personnel were to arrive and take over this and related works. There were many areas which could not be reached for oiling. The lack of protective nets during the early phases was a contributing In spite of each man possessing both head and bed nets on embarking at Wellington, a tremendous number were lost during the landing operation. Large nets captured in the early phases were used in the hospitals to screen patients. and operating rooms. Insect repellants were not used and were not available.

Suppressive treatment began by order September 10, 1942 was continued throughout the operation. Although every effort was made by the medical department to make this suppressive treatment available to every man on the island, it was very unsatisfactory. Men would not take their medication when it was made available, line officers did not see that their men took their tablets, and they never fully accepted the responsibility for the actual dispensing of this medication when it was made available to them.

Atabrine, I tablet twice daily (0.1 gm.), twice a week was the original dosage. This was later increased to every third day. It was felt that less than ten percent of toxic results followed this mass usage of Atabrine. Those cases in which toxic reactions did occur, were given ten grains of quinine daily.

The proportions of benign tertain and malignant tertain for the complete operation were about equal. Only three deaths from malaria occured on the island. Many cases had to be evacuated but the majority were returned to duty. In noting the total figures for malaria admissions to hospitals we must keep in mind that an additional small percent were treated in organizational sick bays.



The original plan of ten days hospitalization for malaria had to be abandoned in many cases. Beds were not always available. Emergency admissions from ships and combat areas took precedence, and hundreds of cases were treated in their organization areas or in the one convalescent hospital. Most cases were hospitalized during the acute phase, however, and discharged only for follow-up treatment.

The introduction of native labor into the area was strongly opposed by the Division Surgeon. The Commanding General recognized the soundness of this advice but the gravity of the tactical situation, required all the troops available on the firing line and the native labor was necessary to unload food, ammunition and gasoline from the ships. It is a well known fact that the native is the reservoir of infection. This combined with the proper mosquito, and non-infected residents, completes the cycle.

Anti-malarial drugs were adequate in amounts and always available, but at times were used as conservatively as possible due to the low reserves. These drugs were obtained from the Malaria Control Unit, South Pacific Area to replace our original supplies. Intravenous quinine was used only in the hospitals and was not carried by the front line medical officers. A larger supply should be made available in any subsequent operation.

The evacuation of all casulaties in the area was arranged and carried out by the medical department of the First Marine Divigion. This was accomplished by sea and air. Occasionally the transfer of patients from hospital to plane was done while the airfield was actually under artillery fire. spite of this and many other attendant dangers, up to December 1, 1942 2879 patients were evacuated by air without any additional casualties. This evacuation by air reached its peak in November when 1582 patients were sent out during the seven day period November 21 to 27, 485 patients were taken off the island by plane.

# EVACUATION BY PLANE

August

Total August

September 3 to September 18

September 19 to September 30

Total September

321

October 1 to October 30	974
Total October	974
November 1 to November 20	985
November 21 to November 27	485
November 28 to November 30	112
Total November .	1582
GRAND TOTAL OF ALL EVACUATIONS	3919
GRAND TOTAL TO DECEMBER L BY PLANE	2879
GRAND TOTAL BY SEA	1040

TOTALS DO NOT INCLUDE PRISONERS OF WAR.

	**** *****	/ had and gires a		1 0 10 10 11	
August 7 - 9	: •			166	
August 10 - 20	:	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	•	35	• •
August 21 - September	18	• 1		502	
September 19 - December	er 10			3206	
TOTAL	; 			3919	

TOTAL EVACUATIONS BY ATR AND SEA BY PHASES FOLLOW BELOW:

As previously mentioned transport planes would carry eighteen stretcher or thirty-six sitting cases. The average load was about twenty patients. They usually arrived and left in the early morning dawn. During the week of November 21, two separate groups were evacuated in a single day, one in the morning and one in the evening.

After the establishment of more or less regular evacuation by air, there were no real difficulties except for the failure to return equipment evacuated with patients (stretchers and blankets).

Evacuation by sea necessitated much handling of cases and was more difficult. This method necessitated and ambulance ride, transfer to some form of ship to shore transportation (sually ramp or Higgins boat), and transfer to the ship by hoist. The type of hoist varied with the ship and was often



improvised. The need for a workable type of litter hoist with practice in its use was clearly demonstrated. Evacuation from the Tulagi Area continued in the same manner as noted in Phase IV.

During this last phase the personnel of the Division medical departments was brought up to strength as much as possible. Officers and enlisted men were brought in from outside areas, and most of the personnel of "A" Company, Second Medical Battalion were transferred from the Tulagi Area to fill vacancies in the First Marine Division. By December 10, 1942 the Division had lost three medical officers and eleven medical enlisted personnel, killed in action.

The order to evacuate the First Marine Division from the island set in motion the plans to evacuate all sick personnel in hospitals. As far as possible all walking cases were discharged to their organizations. The remainder were grouped according to their organizations and placed aboard the ship carrying that organization. This was coordinated by the senior medical officer of the combat aroup which was to leave first.

One regiment taken as a specimen group, was studied by their medical officers to determine the number of effectives on December 7 and 8, 1942. Each man was interviewed separately. The conclusion reached was that 34% of the entire regiment were unfit for any duty which might involve combat activity. This percentage of non-effectives would have been greater but for the inclusion of 400 recent replacements.

The following is presented for continued improvement in the medical section of the Division:

- 1. Full use of air trasnportation in the evacuation of casualties and securing of supplies.
- 2. Continuation of the policy of treating war wounds locally and generally with the sulfonamides.
- 3. Jeeps for evacuation of front line casualties, under medical department control.
  - 4. A Medical Department Loading Officer.
  - 5. Marine personnel to be used as litter bearers.
- 6. Increased ant-malarial instructions to officers and men.
- 7. Chemicals for sterilization of water to be carried by the individual, preferably in tablet form. (Tropical packed).
- 8. Screening material for screening of operating rooms, galleys and lattines.
  - 9. Increased supply of intravenous quinine.



- Development of new units 1, 2, 3 and 4 for tropical use.
- 11. System for rapid replacement of equipment lost through evacuation of patients.

Medically equipped replacement units. 12.

- Completely equipped medical replacement personnel. Standardization of litters to fit traesport planes. 13.
- 14.

### APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX T

The dental problems encountered during the Solomon Island Campaign were mainly the inability to set up offices in the various regimental headquarters are to the restricted area and constant enemy activity.

During the first few weeks, much equipment was lacking; however, this proved no handicap since more units could not have been used at this time.

During the first week one outfit belonging to "A" Company, Second Medical Battalion, Second Marine Division, who landed on Tulagi, was salvaged from the beach on Guadalcanal and put into use at the Division Field Hospital. Fortunately, although wet, this unit was found in time so that after careful drying and oiling, most of the supplies and equipment including the electric motor could be put in use. This was used when necessary with current supplied by a field generator, also salvaged, and in later weeks on current from the captured Japanese power-house. However, since air and ship bombardment disrupted the wiring with monotonous regularity, this latter source of power was sporadic. A foot engine was finally located, repaired, and put into use. The center rod was missing and had to be replaced with a wooden pole.

The most gratifying of all pieces of equipment is the field "castle" light. This light is considered absolutely essential if field oral surgery is to be attempted. One of these was located and with this addition the office was more or less complete, and, although repeatedly riddled with bomb fragments and shell splinters, continued to function. Replacement of vital parts was made from other units that arrived later.

During the first ten days another dental unit was located in the First Regiment supply dump. This was in fair shape despite some of the cases beign smashed, and was put into operation in the "E" Medical Company hospital area. This company had lost all of its original dental equipment. The scattered cases of a third unit were finally assembled and another office opened in the "A" Medical Company hospital area. These three offices continued to function throughout the campaign.

Some weeks later, upon the arrival of the Seventh Regiment and "C" Company, First Medical Battalion, a fourth office was opened. Still later in the campaign a fifth office was opened. However, throughout the campaign, it remained inadvisable if not impossible, for regimental dental officers to function as such. They did, however, perform invaluable work as assistant medical officers and in many other military duties.



- Care

Regimental dental officers in this particular action were not necessarily essential in the field, since with the constricted area of operations, casualties were evacuated directly to field hospitals and little or no dental repair or surgery was done in the regimental areas. Thus dental officers were attached to units where they could not function in their professional capacity and there was a shortage in areas where it was possible to set up offices. It is felt that the addition of one or perhaps two more dental officers to the medical companies would correct this and aid immeasureably in taking care of the overwhelming amount of accumulated dental work that has to be taken care of in the short periods of non-combatant status. This would work out nicely, since the medical companies operate in the areas of the regiments to which they are assigned. It is felt that any addition of dental officers to the regiments is definitely neither desireable nor practical since their professional services in the field would be completely lost.

The keeping of an accurate record of all operations and treatments during this period was practically impossible, consequently forms "K" Dental, were only the best that could be compiled under the circumstances.

The incidence of Vincent's stomatitis for the Division was low enough to be disregarded. Facial wounds were infrequent, however, it was found that where they were serious enough to involve the neck, fixation of fragments in many cases could not be accomplished as it increased the inability of the patient to swallow or clear the throat of saliva or blood. It was necessary in some cases to cut the fixing wires or rubber bands, liquids being given by use of a bulb from a syringe attached to a long bent glass tube. The bulb was filled and tube placed back of the tongue. These cases although extremely bad, seldom approached shock and all were in remarkably good condition when evacuated.

Referring to equipment again, the value of the field operating light cannot be overstressed. The novocaine carpule is definitely the answer to local anesthesia in the field and more carpules and needles should be included in the original unit.

Most of the dental officers would prefer brass orthodontic ligature wire in 18 inch eighteen inch stands to supplement the fracture arch bands.

It is also felt that one complete field prosthetic outfit (army chests 61 and 62) could be used to advantage in making prosthetic repairs in the field. This could be carried



er de el

in the medical company conducting the Division Field Hospital and could be set up when and if conditions permitted.

Additional generators whould be provided for the burners of the field sterilizer as these fouled rapidly and thereby rendered the sterilizing unit useless.

The unit #4 was altered to suit the individual dental officer's particular needs. Most preferred the larger hospital pouch which allowed for supplementing with bandages, sulfa-powder, and morphine syrettes; since all functioned a great deal of the time as assistant medical officers.

#### ANNEX U

# 19 September

From Asst Div Comdr to CG - YP with aviation material departs 0615 X Mopping up operations today made contact Gumuarea armed enemy detachment X Seven enemy killed thirty three escaped including one wounded X Our only casualty Col. E.T.E. Malaita police killed X Detailed report and captured material later

### 20 September

- 1700 Command Post closed at 60.6 -114.7 and opened at old location M220360
- 2145 From Asst Div Comdr to CG YP with Amphibian Tank
  Platoon and aviation material will depart daylight tomorrow X Request you send 5 inch star shell if can spare
- From CG to Asst Div Comdr Friendly planes in air from 0030 to 0200

## 22 September

Unit report from Unit #365 from Sept 21
Unit report from 3rd Bn Second Marines from Sept 20 to 21

#### 23 September

- O730 From Asst Div Comdr to CG YP departed daylight with flares aviation material sandbags X Small boats with remainder aviation material departs tomorrow morning details later
- 1200 From CG to All Units For purpose of operational control sector number two is hereby placed under tactical command of CO 5th Marines X Div Op Ord 11-42 is modified accordingly
- From Asst Div Comdr to Cd Patrol encountered small Jap detachment near east point Florida Island X Killed four Japs no casualties X Request permission issue ration fresh beef from YP 239

# ANNEX (CONT) 24 September

- O930 From 1st Bn 7th Marines Attach two 75mm guns with crews to Amph Tractor Bn for beach defense
- From CG to Asst Div Comdr Ballard arrive Lengo Channel daylight twenty six September proceed Gavutu unload
  one hundred fifty drums Avgas moorings and two special
  fueling buoys departing prior sixteen hundred same day X
  Request you arrange working party with boats to land
  drums expeditiously X Have working detail report to
  Ensign Polk X Instruct Polk remain Ringbolt until further
  orders Cub One X Responsible petty officer will be sent
  Ringbolt tomorrow to assume charge subsequent operation
  fuel buoys X Plan stage Catalinas through Ringbolt
- 1500 From CG to Asst Div Comdr Select location for Tare
  Baker Roger radio equipment to be installed Tulagi as
  base naval radio station X Operating personnel five officers ten enlisted X Advise when location available
- 1630 From NOB to CG Request air search in Dispenable Straights each afternoon for substand report results to us before nightly retirement X CTF62 messages en route by hand X We will commence unloading at O600 (Phoned from NOB)
- 1815 From CG to Asst Div Comdr Four enemy destroyers spotted by air X Can possibly reach this area two two zero zero tonight
- 1925 From CG to Asst Div Comdr Planes overhead tonight
- 2030 From 7th Marines to CG Fought enemy in vicinity of our second plane contact this afternoon X Request plane bomb area and point out tomorrow morning X Will remain on scene X Our casualties 7 dead 25 wounded 18 of which are stretchers here X Enemy dead not known due to darkness X Send two cases of water X Puller
- From CG to 7th Marines Strong column with stretchers and water moving out before daylight X Prep four hundreds overhead at daylight to bomb and strafe as you direct X Indicate your position and target X Contact planes on 3725 kc if possible X Artillery spot plane overhead at daylight X Contact on 4510 kc for fire missions X Rein-

# ANNEX U (CONT)

forcements subject your orders X Continue attack or return as you decide accordance your situation in morning X Well done and good luck

# 25 September

- O830 From 1st Bn 7th to Infantry planes Enemy has pulled out during night X Secure planes immediately.
- 1815 From Puller to 1st Mar Div Am taking C and Hq Companies with 2nd Bn 5th and moving on will get back tomorrow by shore route. A&B Companies with casualties are returning to bivouac
- 1925 From 2-5 to Div Notify 2-11 to set up radio
- 2010 From 2-5 to Div Bivouac for tonight organized 210 on second ridge line 1500 yards from artillery concentrattion 261
- 1910 From 5th Marines to 2-5 Info CG What is your location.
  What route will you take tomorrow and when shall we expect you in
- 2200 From 2-5 to CG Passed through 3 enemy bivouac areas observed four small enemy groups moving westward captured one enemy corporal

# 26 September

- O737 From 2-5 to CG Info 5th Marines March direction Kokumbona returning late afternoon or early evening. (Answer to our 251910)
- O845 Ballard arrived Ringbolt 0700 This by phone to Col. Twining
- From D-3 to CO 1-7 Raiders moving out on patrol along coast. Will reach point Cruz today. Be on Lookout
- 1330 From 2-5 to CG Notify 2-11 to set up radio

# ANNEX U (CONT)

1420	From 2-5 to CG - Enemy occupying Matanikau with MGs and mortars. Am on this side. Have 6 wounded. Puller
1420	From D-3 to 2-5 - Clarify your position with respect Matanikau River. Where is enemy can you use air or artillery. Griffith on way
1510	From 2-5 to CG + Inform me if 2-11 radio set is set up on 2502 on listening watch
1501	From CG to 2-5 - Your 1430 (Msg No. 11) afirmative
1525	From 2-5 to CG - We are on east bank Matanikau River. Unable to cross. Request plane bombing or artillery fire on west bank up 200 yards
1535	From 2-5 to CG - Request Bn arty fire on west bank of mouth of Matanikau River up 200
1544	From 2-5 to CG - Request plane spot for artillery fire. Observation here poor
1550	From D-3 to 2-5 - Artillery fire requested will follow air attack
1555	From 2-5 to CG - Have over 25 casualties request ambulance by coast road. 100 battle dressings
1605	From 2-5 to CG - Planes strafing too close to river
1635	From 2-5 to CG - Raider Bn has reported here
1640	From D-3 to 2-5 - Your 1632 Edson will command combined forces in continuation attack
1730	From D-3 to 1st Raider Bn - Your communication memo dated 25 Sept in force for Edson group tonight. Furnish Edson copy
2200	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Ballard departed 1600. Should we send YP tomorrow for material personnel
2015	From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr - Please report all ship movements to and from ringbolt area to Cactus promptly giving time

ANNEX U (4)

# ANNEX U (CONT)

# 27 September

	ST Gob compor
1400	Condition Red
1,600	From 2-5 to CG - Need 20 litters and carriers at once
1656	From 1st Marines to CG - Are there any hits near Division Hq
1715	From DD to Asst Div Comdr - Tell shore battery to cease firing. Same Msg from DD to CG
	28 September
1345	Air Raid - Tojo lost 23 bombers and one zero
2100	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - YP departing daylight to- morrow. Patrol Hararo killed 5 Japs no casualties
	29 September
1250	From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr - How many and what types of boats can arrive here prior to dark thirty Sept prepared for nearby tactical mission
1330	Condition Red
1450	Condition Green
1900	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 291250 Dexter has ordered 3 WLS 6 TRS sent Cactus tomorrow. Plus these we can supply 4 TS 4 TRS 3 TPS etc
1910	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - ADC will make cactus 0815 tomorrow on YP
	2 October
0405	Undetermined number of enemy planes bombed position
1200	Unit Report No. 56 from 5th Marines
1200	Air Raid

GRADEM	ANNEX U (CONT)
1435	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Any damage done
<sub></sub> 1650	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Report of 2 canoes or rafts
1615	From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr - No damage by bombs. Four zeros bagged. Your 1430
1820	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Boat proceeding pick up Major Gayler will report rescue later
1930	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Gaylor now at Ringbolt. Will return by duck tomorrow A.M.
	3 October
1200	Air Raid
2000	From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr - Prep Fox Afirm beginning 2100. 9 DDs 1 CA headed ours
2220	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - YP departing daylight to- morrow with remainder E Btry 11th
	From D-3 to All Units - Msg re Jap night tactics
	4 October
1320	From Asst Div Comdr to Cd - Request Duck here pick up Hall and Conn rescue both good condition
1637	From 2-5 to CG - Lay off Arty
1628	From 2-5 to CG - Have reached Matanikau River. No opposition. Phone rings open
	7 October
1830	From 7th Marines to D-3 - Ny Jommand Post located at 372.45 LM/971.40-172.17 X 20.37 07/N
2030	Engal-D-3; to Asst Div Condr - Five enemy destroyers can applied here prior midnight.

ANNEX U (6)

#### 6: October

- O833 From 7th Marines to D-3 CP 7th Marines closed 0830.

  From 7th Marines to D-3 7th Marines less Weapons Company cleared regimental area (Telephone)

  O918 From LtCol Cooley to D-3 Report on Dive Bombers. (Telephone)
- 1030 From CO 5th Marines to D-3 Advance guard made contact 300 yards east of Matanikau at 1000 X Estimated 30 Japs with one heavy and one light machine gun X D-3 suggest use of artillery fire before being involved.
- 1100 From Air to D-3 Air reports 3 or 4 light machine guns on high ground by Mamara. (Telephone.
- 1130 From Air to D-3 Air reports in panel contact Fifth Marines X Air reports no enemy seen west of Matanikau River X Bombs will be dropped within next half hour and strafing has been carried out. (Telephone)
- 1130 From Col Edson to D-3 First Bn moving forward receiving only scattered fire X Second Bn at 71.3 199.0. (Telephone).
- 1145 From Air Ground Net to D-3 Have strafed area seen nothing of importance,
- 1148 Artillery concentration on mouth of Matanikau River.
- From Baker One Seven to 5th Marines Observe effect of fire 300 yards above Point Baker (Intercept).
- 1200 From 5th Marines to D-3 Second Bn 5th Marines have reached river X Coordinates will be furnished when available. (Telephone).
- From 5th Marines to D-3 Coordinates of Second Bn 5th left flank 70.7 199.0 Right Flank 71.35 199.65 Sending unit to contact "K" Co 3-5 X
- 1330 From Third Bn 7th Marines to D-3 Marine Sniper out 200 yards front of "I" Co 3-7 killed two Japs. (Telephone)
- 1400 From Col Edson to D-3 -At 1400 sent a squad from Second Bn to fork of river X Was not fired upon X 2d Bn met little opposition except mortar fire X Killed 4 Japs washing cloths in river X 3d Bn moving ahead slowly with orders to have east bank of river mopped up by 1500 (Telephone)
- 1450 From Col Edson to D-3 Third Bn still has not reached river line X One Co Raiders to regimental reserve 5th Marines

- 155 Fire on ridge west of Matanikau requested by Col Edson
- 1740 From Col Whaling to D-3 Going into bivouac on high ground south of forks of river (Telephone)
- 1745 From Col Edson to D-3 Col Edson called and give location of 7th Marines X Is in visual contact with Whaling group X Jap machine gun post driven up by 2-5 to facilitate advance of Whaling. (Telephone)
- From Col Whaling to D-3 via D-2 Col Hunt moving up to high ground between the Matanikau River forks position just south river junction on high grassy knoll X Appears as though not able to get beyond this position this evening X This my bivouac for tonight X Col Whalings CP under enemy probably sniper fire and moving same X Will give new position later X CP located between 71-72 and 198-199.
  - 1835 From D-3 to 7th Marines (Whaling Group) Give coordinates your Bn bivousc area.
  - 1830 From 7th Marines to D-3 My Command Post located at 71.45 lM 71.45-199.17 X 1800 OP/K.
  - 2030 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr. Five enemy destroyers can arrive here prior midnight.

### 7 October

- Ol55 From CO 7th Marines to D-3 Need 25 litter and 100 stretcher litter men at Regimental Casualty Station. (Believed to be fake message).
- 0800 From Air to D-3 Air Spot no activity beach trail vicinity Point Cruz (Telephone)
- OSOO From Col Whaling to D-3 Whaling Group tells artillery cease fire mass concentration effective standby (Telephone).
- 1015 From 11th Marines to D-3 11th Marines report K, L and Raider Co across river.
- From D-3 to 3d Bn 2nd Marines, 5th Marines and 7th Marines. Report situation as of Eleven Hundred X Make hourly reports thereafter.

4 ANNEX (8)

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- 1145 From D-3 to 3d Bn 2d Marines Ample air and artillery available suggest you blast all probable hostile areas before each advance.
- 1155 From 5th Marines to D-3 Situation report of 5th Marines as of 1100/8.
- 1200 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Request loan two TBX radios be used in operation on ninth X Send on yoke prep today if available X Also send 3 wash basins.
- 1200 From CG to Asst Div Comdr Your 1013 radios not available.
- 1450 From Col Hunt to D-3 Have occupied ridge abreast 5th Marines left flank X One company moving up river bottom X I Company Seventh Marines moving up to our left flank.
- 1450 From Col Hunt to D-3 Have enemy machine gun which is well dug in holding Right Company along riverX Believe machine gun is located at 70x35-199x25 X Cannot use artillery or air due to troops all around X Am trying to blow him out with hand grenades.
- 1450 From Col Hunt to D-3 Notify all artillery that we are in vicinity of concentration 38/39/40/.
- 1455 From Col Edson to D-3 Unconfirmed report from Col Edson advance elements of Whaling group entering Matanikau Village X Warning to air group not to bomb village until we can confirm. (Telephone)
- From Col Hunt to D-3 Two companies abreast on ridge extending 70x0-199x5 to 70-45-199-x5 X One company along river at 70x5-198-85 X Bn CP located in rear of above ridge X Casualties 2 dead X 2 wounded X Said station in rear of company an river.
- 2345 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Damaged yoke prer has made temporary hull repairs X Will use in operation tomorrow X Will be possible to complete movement in one night.

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- O615 From Whaling Group to D-3 To Tulsa Black 3 X Request Bn CN 51/52/53/54/55/commence firing O630 cease firing O645 X No fire thereafter except TN call.
- From Spot Plane to D-3 Front lines along concentration 61 and 52 X Hg Whaling at 39. (Telephone).

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### 8 October

- 1030 From 5th Marines to Whaling Group Firing on your right flank is directed by us against enemy salient east of river X 37 and 75 half track delivering this fire.

  1030 From Col Hunt to 5th Marines and D-3 Our assault units reached beach
- at 0955 X Number of enemy sighted heavy caliber gun firing at river mouth on our right must be from 5th Marines X Request they stop.
- 1100 From D-3 to 11th Marines. Movements (See message)
- 1155 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Construction Battalion and gear unloaded when message received X Consider advisable finish unloading here and tranship CBS later.
- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Request information of any enemy ships approaching.
- 2115 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Fuller with escort departed nineteen hundred Will return zero six thirty tomorrow.
- From Any or all U.S. Ships to CTF 62. CTF 62.4.4 sending X This unit arrived Ringbolt 0650 Love ninth.
- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Your fourteen thirty X Yoke preps towing boats expect arrive Aola 2330 X Have informed Hill on yoke prep.

#### 9 October

- O315 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Transfer of Rear Echelon of Second Marines.
- O415 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Fired Eight inch shell at suspected ship of Lunga X No contact.
- OSOO From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Yoke preps return from Aola during daylight today X Request air coverage.
- O830 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Your zero nine nineteen X Will send forty rolls yoke prep tomorrow.
- O830 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 One yoke prep with four boats in towing failed arrive Aola X Request air search X Advise.

 $(x_1, \dots, x_n) = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ 

1005 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 - My 100722 search vicinity of Hitchcock Shoal southeast end Florida Island.

CHORE

1215 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 - Missing YP located seven miles north Taivu Point has been directed to Aola X Hill will carry out assigned mission.

## 10 October

- O415 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Both yoke preps returned one nine zero zero with fourteen survivors all well X Missing 1st Lt. F. E. Parks fourteen enlisted Marines three enlisted Navy X Remaining troops landed one four zero zero X Operations will proceed as planned X Fullor completed unloading and departs two one zero zero.
- 0900 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Request fighter escort for four SOC cruiser planes reconnaissance north end Lunga Lagoon X Rendezvous Alligator Creek 1300.
- 1050 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Your 0920 X Four SOC planes Task Force 64 at Tetere X Ordered return ship 1600 X Do you consider advisable they make reconnaissance Cactus prior return.
- 1100 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr Your 1010 negative.
- 1230 From approximately 1230 to 1500 30 enemy bombers and 15 zeros were reported overhead X Bombs were dropped around Koli Point with no damage.
- 1500 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Four SOC planes departing fourteen fifteen,
- 1935 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr Do not illuminate tonight unless in case of actual hostile landing.

#### 11 October

- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Yoke prep departs zero six hundred with Col Linscott one hundred cast bakers and equipment X Return QM clerk Polakiewicz Second Marines X No information Keilotumavia.
- O610 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Two Mines Sweepers and four Torpedo boats arrived Ringbolt 0530.
- 1300 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Gardner request Amphibian at one five three zero. (Telephane)
- D890 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Southerd and Hovey arrived zero four five five X Departed zero seven zero seven.
- 1650 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 One Sail Option Cast landed Gavutu X Total here five.

1656 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 - Lt. Stern army here X Send someone in duck to identify X Lt. Neff here condition well.

- 1835 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr Have yoke prep boat search sea vicinity Savo Island daylight tomorrow for hoat carrying survivors X Air coverage will be provided.
- 1855 From CG to MTBRON 3 McCawley Zeilin arrive off Kukum zere five four five leve thirteenth.
- 2115 Frem D-3 to Asst Div Comdr If available request information regarding position and progress of McCalla.
- 2200 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Patrol at Boli killed 4 Japs none escaped Chief Warrant Officer Harper Rand reported today X Five SOC departs zero five thirty tomorrow X have only one unit seventy five gun ammunition X Can you spare any.
- 2240 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr For MTERON 3 X No friendly ships in area tonight X Friendly Task Group via Lengo Channel daylight.

#### 12 October

- OS15 Fram Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Yoke prop two three nine reparts heavy smoke vicinity Nugli.
- 1010 From Asst Div Camdr to D-3 Float planes departed sore six fifteen X My 122000.
- 1200 From 1200 to 1400 approximately 38 enemy bombers excerted by zeros were everhead X Bombed airfield and caused slight damage.
- 1810 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Test fixing AA.
- Enomy artillery opened fire for approximately twenty five minutes X No damage.
- 1955 From D-3 to MTBRON 3 + No friendly forces in area tonight X Turner now retiring through Lenge Channel.
- 2125 From MTHRON-3 to CG Advise at 1900 daily of friendly ships this area.
- 2250 From Asst Div Comdr to CG Yoke Prep departs 0700 tomorrow with remainder personnel and material and Jap float homber radio. C Co 2d Mar new vicinity BOLI NAVU. No centact. Should enter your line tomorrow.

3.7	12 October
2325	Enemy artillery again opened on positions around airport X No damage.
2340	From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr - Transfer Inter Battery and Afirm Tare Platoon third battalion to Cactus.
	13 October
0015	From Col Pollock to D-3 - Army not in condition to move tonight X First Bn First Marines can move within five minutes notice X Decision desired on patrol tomorrow October 14 due to new moving regiment. (Phoned)
0.40	Shelled by enemy naval gunfire from 0140 to 0300 X Probably by battle-ships and heavy cruisers X Slight damage and several personnel casualtic
0254	From CG to All Stations - Be alert for landing attack.
0315	From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 - Torpedo boats leaving Tulagi.
0315	From 1st Marines to D-3 - Everything secure light casualties X Alerted X Army battalion alerted at tent city X Other scattered detachments at my bivouac area X Their CP here. Cates.
0,100	From R-2 to D-2 and D-3 - Sound of landing boats reported off 3rd Bn area by left OP X No confirmed X Adams R-2.
0410	From R-2 to D-2 and D-3 - Flashes off to north and northeast X Appears to be naval engagement X Adams R-2.
0420	From 1st Eng Bn to D-3 - All our lines are out we can only reach you by radio/k.
0615	From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 - Second yoke prep departs zero eight hundred today with anti-tank.
0640	From 7th Marines to D-3 - Report of 7th Marines less third bn X No casualties X No known property damage X Regiment alerted X Sims.
0750	From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 - One prep tare aground probably Savo X Yoke prep making search to garble X Request air search Savo and report location.
0800	From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 - Prep tare boat on Tanavutu Point X Request

coverage.

- 1250 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Four prep tare sail made contact with one cruiser and three destroyers in channel X Inshore probably one cruiser firing X Fired four fish one probable hit on destroyer baker bridge put out searchlight on one destroyer X No casualties.
- 1625 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr From ComAirSoPac to Radio Guadalcanal 140226 X Prep Baker Yoke forty eight Victor thirty five may land Ringbolt prior sunset.
- 1820 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr Load drums aviation gas on Yoke Prep boats Send over tomorrow in case barge does not arrive.
- 1850 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Pass to ComTaskFor Six Two X Request one Tank Platoon Button to Ringbolt Fag Trans.
- 2155 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Lt. Dalgish here slight facial injuries also Pvt Mallone injured X Cast Company at Suagi for night X Prep Baker Yoke landed one eight twenty X One torpedo boat damaged.

From D-2 to MtBron 3 - Reference my 1640 bearing of one Baker Baker and three Cast Loves and four dog dogs is 335 from Cactus.

#### 14 October

- OOlO Received Naval gunfire for approximately two hours X Battleships and heavy cruisers fires salvos ranging fram 8 to 14 inch shells.
- O200 Flying boat overhead and dropped several bombs on our positions X No damage done and no casualties.
- O230 Japs succeeded in landing reinforcements above Matanikau.
- O254 From CG to All Stations Be alert for landing attack.
- 0315 From Asst Div Comdr to CG Torpedo boats leaving Tulagi.
- O315 From 1st Marines to D-3 Everything secure light casualties X
  Alerted X Army battalion alerted at tent city X Other scattered
  detachments at my bivouac area X Their CP here. Cates.
- O400 From R-2 to D-2 and D-3 Sound of landing boats reported off 3rd Bn area by left OP X Not confirmed X Adams



- O420 From 1st Eng Bn to D-3 All our lines are out we can only reach you by radio.
- O615 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Second yoke prep departed zero eight hundred today with Antitank.
- O640 From 7th Marines to D-3 Report of 7th Marines less third battalion X
  No casualties X No known property damaged X Regiment alerted X Sims
- 0750 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Enemy observation plane circling area.
- O755 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 One prep tare aground probable Savo X Yoke prep making search X Request air search Savo and report location.
- OSOO From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Prep Tare beat on Tanavutu Point X Request air coverage.
- 1850 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Four prop tare sail made contact with 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers in Channel X Inshore probably one cruiser firing Fired four fish one probable hit on destroyer X Baker bridge put out searchlight on one destroyer X No casualties.
- 1625 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr From ComAirSoPac to Radio Guadalcanal. 140226 X Prep Baker Yoke forty eight victor thirty five may land Ringbolt prior sunset.
- 1820 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr Load drums aviation gasoline on Yoke Prep boats X Send over tomorrew in case barge does not arrive.
- 1850 From Asst Div Comdr Pass to ComTaskFor Six Two X Request one tank platoon Button to Ringbolt Fag Trans.
- 2155 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Lt. Dalgish here slight facial injuries also Pvt. Mallone injured X Cast Company at Suagi for night X Prep Baker Yoke landed one eight twenty X One torpedo boat damaged.

From D-2 to D-3 - To ComMtBron 3 X Reference my 1640 bearing of one Baker Baker and three Cast Afirms and four Dog Dogs is 335 from Cactus.

#### 15 October

- O220 From CG to All Ships and Stations Receiving heavy Naval gunfire starting O150 Love X Com Gen Sends
- O645 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 PBY departed Tulagi.

- 0905 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr Pilot and Gunner of friendly plane on raft near Florida.
- 1030 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Cast Company Second Marines departed Suagi zero six thirty.
- 1055 From GG to Asst Div Comdr Division will stand continuous watch on two three eight five as emergency frequency.
- 1215 From CG to Asst Div Comdr Despatch Yoke Prep with avgas to arrive
  Lunga Lagoon repeat Lunga Lagoon at twenty thirty tonight X Tank
  Lighters and working party will be ready X Protect move with Prep tares.
- 1247 From Asst Div Comdr (2nd Bn Second Marines) to D-3 We are now at Bone Expect to reach Bugle late this afternoon X Request division have bivouses and chow ready for us.
- 1305 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Enemy ships retiring westward shall we send two Yoke Preps with gasoline.
- 1355 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 If practicable return Cast Company on Yoke Preps.
- 1407 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 We have picked up Pilot Rouse near Koli X Killed while coming in X Have patrol come up and meet us.
  - 1415 From 1st Bn Second Marines to D-3 Leaving now.
  - 1450 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Cast Company expect to reach Tenaru this afternoon X Request bivous area and afternoon meal for 92 men.
  - 1730 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Need our Tank lighters unload Yoke Preps.
  - 1900 From CG to Asst Div Comdr McFarland arrives Ringbolt or Cactus as conditions permit 0945 love tomorrow.
  - 1945 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr No friendly vessels these waters tonight except Yoke Preps.
  - 2006 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 My 1530 and 1630 not complied with X Awaiting.
- 2035 From CG to Asst Div Comdr Radio at NOB has secured. (Sent to Dexter)

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#### 15. October

2130 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr - Cast Company bivousced here until transportation available X One Yoke Prep on reef.

#### 16 October

- OO12 From CG to ComMtBron 3 Vireo with barge tow escort Meredith arrives morning sixteenth via Lengo Channel X May arrive night of fifteenth.
  - O600 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 One yoke prep abandoned off Lunga Lagoon Other with garble has safely returned.
  - 0655 From D-3 to ComMt Bron 3 Any sign of enemy transports last night.
  - 0705 From D-3 to ComMtBron 3 Earliest possible arrival Cactus Vireo and escort noon today.
  - 1043 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 One Yoke Prep abandoned off Lunga Lagoon Nother with Prep Tares safely returned (Correction to No. 3.
  - 1835 From CG to Asst Div Comdr Send Yoke Prep boats to assist McFarland.
  - 1850 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Yoko Prep arrived X No casualties X Slight damage to super structure by shell fire.
- 1855 From D-3 to ComMtBron 3 Frieldly surfact vessels may be in area toni
- 2200 From 2200 to 2330 enemy planes overhead X Probably four motored glying beat X Dropped eight bombs later returned and dropped eight more X No damage and no casualties.

#### 17 October

- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Do you desire Pfc Clark general court martial prisoner and witness tomorrow X Request six thousand Aspirin tablets X YP with 125 drums field wire remainder Cub personnel majority material departs 0700.
- O445 From CG to CTU 64.5.1 Liaison Officer will board on arrival Lunga Lagoon.
- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Zero gas X One boat out of commission engine trouble one eight zero zero gas X Gas capacity three zero zero X Will advise when last two boats are in operation.

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### 17 October

- From First Marines to D-3 One seriously wounded in First Marines X Large oil fire near Lunga bridge.
- Seventeen bombers were overhead escorted by zeros X Positions bombed with no damage.
- 1500 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 One boat out of commission no torpedos hull damaged no gas X One boat in commission no torpedos two three zero zero gas One boat temporarily out of commission salt water in gas four torpedos two zero zero.
- 1830 From Asst Div Comer to D-3 5,500 gals avgas in drums available to send you X Adrise Com Adv Nav Base X Send ? ? ? X One YP will be out of service tomorrow and next day.
- 1840 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Yoke Prep boat was directed by Dexter not to return except when ordered by Cactus X Have ordered ammunition X Instructions and Dgm?ovvgred to unload.
- 1850 From D-3 to ComMtBron 3 Friendly surface vessels may be in these waters tonight.
- 2355 Shelled for approximately fifteen minutes by enemy surface craft. Probably two destroyers:

#### 18 October

- O235 From D-3 to ComMtBron 3 Are detonaters available there X None here X Johnstown sends.
- O310 From ComMtBron 3 to D-3 Correction on my 1540 X ComTaskFor six two X Request two four torpedo impulse charges now on board Joseph Staton be shipped Ringbolt by air.
- 1055 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Pass to Jamestown X 20 depth charge detonators fifty four torpedo detonators are here.
- 1130 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 My one seven sixteen hundred X Lt. Polk request Button be notified amount of gas here.
- 1225 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Forty three hundred twenty five pound depth charges with hydro-static and instantaneous contact fuses available on McFarland. X Advise.

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- Sixteen bombers escotted by zeros were overhead and dropped bombs on our positions X Slight damage and several personnel casualties.
- 1810 From CG to Asst Div Comdr Eight torpedos on hand X Feasible to shift from one boat to another X Expect to have boats with torpedos in commission by tonight X Will advise X Jamestown does not repeat not have any torpedos.
- 1920 From CG to Asst Div Comdr Friendly forces may be in area tonight X Two friendly DDs Lengo Channel daylight.
- 2115 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Three MTB in commission one with four torpedos two with two with two torpedos each repeat X Repeat

### 19 October

- O215 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Prep Baker Yoke with LtComdr Painter civil engineer USMC flew in seventeen forty five X Three wounded Jap aviators picked up X Will send to you when physical condition permits.
- O800 From Asst Div\_Comdr to D-3 Yoke Prep departing zero seven zero X Request Cast Company be returned on same.
- 1840 From 3rd Bn First Marines to D-3 Enemy artillery fire interdicting road X All telephone communications to the rear are out.
- 1922 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 One PT has bent propeller will carry out mission with two Prep Tares X Request air support X Illumination not desired. Montgomery.
- 2340 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Yoke Prep departs for Cactus zero seven hundred twenty October with ammunition three Jap prisoners and rear echelon Third Bn Second Marines.
- 2340 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 My twenty hundred X Request air coverage for Yoke Prep tomorrow.

# 20 October

- O655 Enemy range increased X Everything all ready quiet now. McKelvey
- 735 From 5th Marines to D-3 Patrol of one platoon from Third Defense Bn searching slopes and ravines to south of Matanikau road forward of cocoanut grove and MLR that bn will be dispatched 0800

- To D-3 Am receiving light and heavy artillery fire to rear of my CP X 0838 Telephone line out X Everything else quiet. McKelvey.
- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Your 0721 X Barge will depart about 1050 X 1000 ComSoPac has ordered tug barge depart Cactus dark will cover with Prep Tare boats X Tug will radio Div Net for orders.
- From 1100 to 1145 several flights of enemy planes including one flight 1100 of bombers were overhead X Dropped bombs in water to east of our position with no damage.
- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Patrolling two Tare Prep boats departs for 1450 Mandolian Island thence east Point Siota investigate presence nightly float plane or sub reported by natives.
- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Barge departing noon. 1450
- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Two boats carrying out mission observed 1900 nothing X Friendly Prep Baker Yoke bombed Jap area machine gun fire observed on shore X Blinking light observed southeast tip Savo directed toward Cactus X At present no boats in commission.
- 1910 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 - Two Prep Tare boats available.
- From MtBron 3 to D-3 Two have bent propellors one has clogged fuel 1910 lines X Will advise when in commission.
- From CG to ComMtBron 3 Two friendly dog dogs may be in area tonight. 1920
- From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr - Prep Fox Afirm all night. 1925
- Several enemy planes overhead for approximately 30 minutes dropped about 2000 16 bombs with no damage.

- 21 October From Asst Div Comdr to D=3 - For ComAdvNavBase X Facilities for staging PBYs ready Ringfolt. 0120
- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Request Air Coverage zero six hundred for 0:300 shipment avgas.
- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 + Seminole departs daybreak for Cactus with 0900 250 drums avgas X YP with 110 drums 2 WLs with 80 drums and TR with jeep and equipment for 3rd Bn 2nd Marines departs 0630 X 21 cases malaria request atabrine X Request 100 batteries TA.

: ANNEX (20)



- Seven enemy bombers escorted by zeros attacked and bombed positions around airfield X No damage.
- 1922 From D-3 to ComMtBron 3 Nicholas Jamestown Copra arrive Cactus daylight tomorrow X No friendly surface vessels tonight.
- 2100 From CG to esst Div Comdr Come to Cactus tomorrow prepare to stay five days.
- 2100 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 My 2000 message of 503 drums avgas on Seminole K Request return WL and TR today.

### 22 October

- O340 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Patrol to garble still out no contactX Patrol to central Florida out on twenty one dash twenty two garble are boats available X One will garble two zero zero X YP already loaded with gas will depart on garble zero zero tomorrow ammunition twenty third.
- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Seminole departs for Cactus daylight with 500 drums avgas YP one hour later with 75 and 105 mm ammunition X One PT on nightly patrol.

# 23 October

- O930 From MtBron 3 to D-3 Prep Tare patrol returned nothing to report X
  At present two boats in commission one with four torpedoes one with two
  Both boats three thousand gas.
- At 1130 seventeen enemy bombers escorted by zeros were overhead and attacked and bombed positions with no damage.
- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Request air coverage for Seminole to Cactu zero six zero zero tomorrow.

# an a la la gradin et for**24 October**,

- OOLO From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr Embark one rifle company with five days rations two units fire in Trevor as guard for reconnaissance party Aola Bay.
- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Boats returned fromPatrol X First boat sighted SE are light in Savo Sound headed for it light disappeared no vessels sighted probably submarine X Sporadic machine gun fire from beach out of range X Second boat nothing to report X Six boats in commission two two zero zero gas each two one torpedoes.

#### 25 October

- From Cg to Asst Div Comdr Pass to Jamestown and ComMtBron 3 X Enemy sub expected to attack Ringbolt tonight.
- O440 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Request air coverage for Seminole and Yok Prep to Cactus 0600.
- 0945 From CG to Asst Div Comdr Two unidentified ships bearing three zero nine from Lunga Point.
- Bombers escorted by number of zeros bombed positions around airfield was slight personnel casualties.
- 1535 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Possible Sail Sail sighted in vicinity of hostile ships during morning engagement.
- 1912 From CG to Asst Div Comdr Summary X Two Jap tanks destroyed west flat
  Three Hundred Jap dead south flank X Yesterday twenty zeros two bomber
  Today nineteen zeros six bombers down X One Cast Afirm three hits one
  Cast Love one hit by Sail Baker Dogs X Friendly surface near to strike.
- 1700 Enemy flights of zeros and bombers overhead all day X Only bombing rat at 1400 X No damage no casualties.

#### 26 October

- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 All boats returned X Boat west of Cactus sighted three Dog Dogs at zero one five zero Love which approached from westward then retired X No other contacts X One boat now on Coral Reef at Ringbolt hull damaged X One boat has cracked cylinder center engine X Four boats in commission X Seventeen torpedoes X Refueling boats low on gas X Gas consumed on patrol four thousand gallons.
- From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Will send Capt. Boardman Army men barrels and belts on PT tonight X Will depart them at dark X Request meet them Now have a hundred drums avgas and two hundred 100 pound bombs X Can supply fifty thousand fifty caliber links if desired X My 251332 X Was Amberjack X She departed 0200 this date.
- O415 Two enemy bombers were overhead for approximately fifteen minutes dropped bombs with no damage.
- Jap artillery from Point Cruz believed three inch gun near miss X One boat returned from patrol at twenty four hundred engine grouble X. Three boats now in commission X Lt. Hugh Robinson.

ti ANNEX (22)

SMADEM

#### 27 October

### SECRET

- O415 Two enemy bombers were overhead for approximately fifteen minutes drapped bombs with no damage.
- OSOO From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 From boats on patrol X One boat fired on by Jap artillery from Point Cruz believed three inch gun near miss X One by returned from patrol attwenty four hundred engine trouble X Three boats now in commission. Lt Hugh Robinson.
- 2220 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Patrol to Tanabuci zero eight zero zero twenty eight October to pick up aviators X Prep Tares on nightly patrol. Yoke Prep to Aola with fifty men at one seven three zero X Patrol to we Florida going out on twenty eight October X Gen Rupertus.

#### 28 Octaber

- Olus From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 YP with 84 drums avgas and aviators picked up at Tanabuli Lt. King USMC comma Lt. Paren JG Paren Masters USN radio second class forward departs for Cactus 0600 X Forward wounded in legs PTs on nightly patrol X Lt. King reports one BB sunk 2100 25 October of Isabel from B-17 bombing.
- O430 Enemy bombers overhead for approximately thirty minutes drapped bombs with no damage.
- O715 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr Sent Arthur with sufficient Headquarters to operate tactically and battalion at once X We are sending fourteen Tare ramp and two Tares to assist X Situation improved and hop to hit them.

#### 29 October

- O400 Two enemy bombers overhead at 0400 to 0420 dropped several bombs with no damage
- O630 From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr Hunts Battalion needs rest X Will exchange him for remaining battalion soon as possible.
- O900 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Three boats on patrol X One boat fired on from Point Cruz by 3 inch near miss X Bright flare seen about four miles east of Lunga Point X 3000 gallons gas expended X Four boats now in commission.
- From D-3 to Asst Div Comdr Hunts Battalion leaves zero seven thirty to row X Send Hills Bn by return trip of boats X Send Yoke Prep with troops to arrive early as possible X Hill to leave all camp and galley equipment there.

## 30 October

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- O225 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Prep Tare patrolling off Russell Island reports a hit on Dog Dog now dead in water between Savo and Esperance.
- 1300 Six enemy dive bombers escorted by number of zeroes were intercepted la miles north of Lunga X Enemy jettisoned their bombs and fled.

### 31 October

- O400 Enemy plane overhead for approximately twenty minutes dropped several flares.over field.
- 1650 From Fifth Marines to D-3 Have planes strafe 500 yards further west to avoid friendly troops X Edson.
- 1930 From Aola Group to D-3 To Lt. Buckley X Ringbolts checked in X Twenty enemy killed by police were balance of Garwusa Party X Isimoto still at large X Police report four twelve seated Dingies seen five days ago five hundred yards up Nalimbiur tracks left west banks and joined old enemy trail also five man Jap Patrol seen Koli same day. Clemens.
- 2200 From Aola Group to D-3 Arrive Saugi X Killed two Japs one prisoner X (native wounded X Request transportation for prisoner and native X Please answer immediately.

- O535 From Aola Group to D-3 Give time and place arrival boats X Hurry.
- 1100 From Col Whaling to D-3 To all concerned X What objective is Edson now on X Whaling.
- 1100 From Col Whaling to D-3 To all concerned X Can see Edsons men about 1200 yards to north X This Group at 69.6 dash 199.0 X Whaling.
- 1100. From D-3 to Whaling Group Edson on Option one preparing to move to Option two.
- From D-3 to 5th Marines Whaling Group moving to Option two at eleven thirty:
- Both assait units on 0-1 X Casualties 1-5 undetermined X Estimated 10 per cent enemy group one hundred at artillery concentration nineteen X Expect jump off for 0-2 at 1230
- 1235 From 5th Marines to D-3 Request artillery concentration from 1220 to 1230 on 19, 18, 30, 32 X Lift at 1230 and interdict next concentration west.

- 1420 From Whaling Group to D-3 To all concerned X What is Edsons present position X Whaling.
- 1425 FromCG to Whaling Group Edsons position thirteen thirty line 68.0 199.5 69.2 201.0
  - 2020 From CG to Whaling Group Move north at daylight and take over so ne of action 2nd Bn 5th on option dash two X They are attacking toward Point Cruz.

#### 2 November

- O725 From D-3 to Whaling Group 2nd Bn Fifth Marines being used to mop up base of Point Cruz X This leaves nobody in the left battalion zone of Fifth Marines X Move your group into this zne and take it over X Begin advance to 0-3 when in position.
- 1215 From Whaling Group to D-3 At 1200 on option two X Have contact with Second Battalion Fifth X Staying in positionpending development of Point Cruz action X What is present situation X Whaling.
- 1222 From D-3 to Whaling Group Stay on option two for present X Second Marines passes through Fifth when Point Cruz cleared out X It will attack along coast in column battalion on front of four hundred yards X Protect its flank.
- 1307 From Whaling Group to D-3 Believe have located enemy artillery piece 500 yards west of Option two and 300 or 400 yards south of beach X Requestillery fire.
- 2150 From 2nd Bn 7th Marines to D-3 Am in position X Hanneken.

- 1245 From CG to Second Marines Whaling Group Third Bn Seventh Marines attached Second Marines X Col Whaling return Division Headquarters.
- From 2nd Bn 7th Marines to D-3 One cruiser one troop ship and one DD landed troops three thousand yards east from Metapona River X Battalion was in position one thousand yards west of landing in battle this AM X Enemy had several field pieces making my position untenable X Moved west of Metapona Hanneken.
- From 2nd Bn 7th Marines to D-3 Due to lack of communication with Divisi and enemy forces moving into position between Koli Point and Metapona Riv and tired condition of men no rations for evening meal am now west of Kol Point X Request boats be sent to Koli Point to pick up 24 casualties immediately and food sent to Bn X Notify departure of boats.



- 1510 From CG to 2nd Bn 7th Marines Air has been instructed to hit everythic east of Koli Point X Delay enemy to maximum extent X Boats are on way.
- 1520 From CG to 2nd Bn 7th Marines Sims and Puller will join you by boat X Watch for them X Keep us informed your position.
- 1720 From 5th Marines to D-3 Ground southeast Matenikau Bridge X 4th Infanon high ground southwest Point Cruz X 17th Artillery dispersed between second village and kokumbona X 38th Div east of Tenaru X Overlay being forwarded by runner.
- 1740 From 2nd Bn 7th Marines to D-3- Planes are bombing us stop them X Our positionwest of Malimba River.
- 1800 From 2nd Bn 7th Marines to D-3 Request all planes stop bombing until things can straighten out.
- 1810 From CG to 2nd Bn 7th Marines One five fives will fire east of Malimb River at twenty hundred X If possible report artillery spot.
- 1830 From 2nd Bn 7th Marines to D-3 My present position extends along Mali fromsouth for a distance of 400 yards south and then west 400 yards the to beach at Koli Point.
- 1900 From 2nd Bn 7th Marines to D-3- Planes dropped bombs too close to our position on the Malimbu also on our position on the south flank X Sever planes fired machine gun fire into our position X One man wounded.

- O820 From CG to Asst Div Comdr San Francisco Helena dog dog bombarding eas Koli Point X Have San Francisco plane spot.
- O835 From CG to 164th Infantry Seventh established position mouth Malimbu River to 94 16 dash 201.65 X Patrols to east and south X No contact.
- From 7th Marines to CG Have encountered enemy small number west of Malimbu River and south of position X Whaling has been informed.
- 1145 From2nd Marines to D-3 Our own planes strafing our man.
- 1640 From 7th Marines to D-3 To Division Surgeon request arrangements be a for one boat detailed to Seventh for evacuation service from Koli Point
- 1640 From 164th Infantry to D-3 To Commanding General Rupertus X Am at 91. dash 198 any information reference to direction of attack.

#### No messages

### 6 November

- 2105 From 164th Infantry to D-3 Third battalion at Koli village X No ration Communications with Marines only by 288 X Please try and contact us by 288 setup X Col Hall.
- 1040 From CG to CO 2nd Raider Bn We are pushing enemy back to line of Metapona but location his main body uncertain X You continue present measure to establish contact with enemy X Will send one battalion reinforce you for attack on enemy rear X You specify date and point of landing and provide coverage X Time of landing should be just after daybreak on date set by you.

#### 7 November

- O715 From CG to CO 2nd Marine Raider Bn Have been unable raise you by radio Our watch continuous on 3725 and 2325 Kcs X Current SOI calls and cipher device key used X Traffic will be broadcast to you at intervals during night X Answer by radio if you can.
- O857 From 7th Marines to Asst Div Comdr Frist and second battelions have crossed river and now occupy line on grid 77 between grids 116 and 117 X Continuing advance X No opposition reported to this point X Am moving command post forward.

- Ol55 From 7th Marines to Asst Div Comdr (Intercept) 2nd Bn reports small enemy tank near mouth of Metapona River X Request aviation drop flare to assist in destruction of same.
- O730 From 7th Marines to Asst Div Comdr (Intercept) Commenced advance O600 X Second Bn crossing River X Will be followed by first battalion X No evidence of tanks by daylight.
- 0800 From CG to CO 164th Infantry Inform General Sebre relieve General Rupertus at once in command forces operating east X General Rupertus returning due to illness.
- 1330 From 7th Marines to Asst Div Comdr 1st Bn encountered enemy force at 80.7 115.6 2nd Bn moving north to beach X Artillery fire delivered by enemy.
- 1535 From 7th Marines to Asst Div Comdr Reinforcements requested should be sent in by boat X Puller wounded.



- 1540 From 7th Marines to Asst Div Comdr Request aviation support beach vicinity 80.8 115.5 X Friendly troops vicinity 81.7 115.3.
- 1545 From CG to CO 2nd Raider Bn Japs hold position near beach two thousand yards southeast Metapona River X Hanneken attacking from east others from west.
- 1550 From 7th Marines to Asst Div Comdr Enemy gun is located on beach position between 81.0-80.9 along beach line.
- 1700 From 7th Marines to Asst Div Comdr Rush boats for casualties immediate 500 yards west of Metapona River.
- From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Patrol reports enemy in Suagi patrol destroy was at Merende and five new rubber boats with outboard motors mouth of Berande River X Request you try garble my rear echelon send boat with food.

#### 9 November

- 1230 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 Request additional boats be sent to Koli Point to assist in evacuation 164th Infantry.
- 1658 From 2nd Marines to D-3 Knock off all bombing and strafing.
- From CG to CO 2nd Marine Raider Bn Give geographical description your position X Lay out panels for plane in morning where shall be send boat with food X Seventh has nips surrounded two thousand yards east of Metapona.

#### 10 November

- O735 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Food arrived and I have moved to Biniu properto operate towards zero one nine from southeast on information native scouts unless otherwise directed.
- 1205 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Our location Biniu on west bank Balasuna (the Esouth hat of) Tetere D-two map one zero two X Have food to include 12. Send food boat that day to Suagi X Am sending strong patrol to reconnoise east from Tetere X Two more companies due today.
- From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Reference map No. one zero three four located eighty five point five dash one thirteen point five X Patrol contacted Hanneken today X Tomorrow will have patrol in area between garble 76.5-13 point and Second Bn and One Sixty Fourth X Four companies now with me

ANNEX (28)

- 1130 From Asst Div Comdr to D-3 One of my patrols now engaged with strong enemy patrols employing mortars machine guns 1000 yards west of burned plantation about 81 112 X Am concentrating.
- Enemy bombers escorted by zeros were overhead X Dropped bombs with no damage.
- 1630 From 7th Marines to D-3 Easy Co reports enemy column moving west from Asamana a point 78.12 109.109.
- 1800 From Second Raider Bn to D-3 Enemy force estimated one battalion located in bush vicinity 79.7 13.4 X Our lines located east and south of enemy X Request air support this point and strip four hundred yards north and south.
- 1815 From 7th Marines to D-3 Urgently in need of boats to bring troops to west side of Metapona X No other means of crossing.
- 1910 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Following to Rear echelon (See message)
- 2000 From 7th Marines to D-3 Coxswain YR P 10 20 refused my R 33 to assist in ferrying troops Metapona River and returned NOB X Need for boats urgent.
- From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Our base out guard killed Nip approaching of trail from zero four one papers show he was set from Fourth Division probably zero one eight contingent X Native police killed another at zero one eight pesterday.

- O825 From CG to 2nd Raider Bn Give coordinate map one zero three where boar desired.
- 0825 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Patrols vicinity of Asamana.
- O925 From 2nd Raider Bn to Asst Div Comdr Friendly troops now operating in vicinity of 79 113.
- 1230 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Boat desired 82.3 115.4.
- 1415 Enemy Torpedo planes attached ships in harbor with slight damage.
- 1610 From 7th Marines to D-3 To Division Field Hospital X Eight stretcher cases arriving beach Lunga Lagoon at approximately 1630.

- 1730 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Advance base now at seven eight point five d one one three point four X Killed three Nips on arrival X Evidence Easy killed seventy here yesterday.
- 2010 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Request artillery fire be kept south and eas of coordinates 79 113 for next hour X Have patrol approaching from nor east.
- 2025 From CG to 7th Marines Inform your artillery Raiders request fire be k south and east of coordinates 79 113 until 2100 to avoid hitting patro

- oolo From CG to CC 7th Marines Carlson reports as follows X Reference frien artillery fire X Large enemy force believed located in next draw on sout of woods X Seven nine point seven dash one one three and approximately thousand yards south of here X Smoke seen within draw bearing one six firm seven nine point five dash one one three point three and distance about three dash four miles.
- 0825 From CG to 2nd Raider Bn Instruct all units lay out panels X Air strike on way X Indicate direction target with panel.
- 0952 From CG to 7th Marines Friendly troops at 78.55 113.4 X Raiders.
- 1020 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Direct artillery to cease firing.
- 1025 From CG to CO 2nd Raider Bn and 7th Marines Enemy patrol actibility reported by Engineers vicinity new bridge 14.4 201.4.
- 1027 From CG to 7th Marines Cease artillery fire.
- From CG to CO 7th Marines Are there friendly troops your command vicini 78.5 113.4 X Raiders asking.
- 1032 From CG to 7th Marines Lift barrage one thousand yards X Raiders request.
- 1035 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Enemy force estimated one company in woods vicinity 78.6 114.4 X Request air support other groups on east and west
- From CG to CO 7th Marines Raiders report enemy force estimated one company vicinity 72.6 114.4 X Other groups on east and west.
- 1040 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Friendly troops at 78.55 113.4.

- 1040 From 2nd Reiders to D-3 Situation too critical where I am X Will report for conference as soon as practicable.
- 1055 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Enemy group believed in bush at 77.5 113.7 Artillery search recommended.
- From CG to CO 7th Marines Raiders request artillery search in bush at 77.5 113.7
- 1140 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Tell artillery to not repeat not shorten rang
- From CG to 7th Marines Tell artillery to not repeat not shorten range.
- From CG to CO 7th Marines Carlson reports four hundred Japs at 78.8 114.2 moving northwest.
- From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Body of enemy troops estimated to be about 400 moving on bearing 312 along west bank of Metapona River in vicinity of 78.8- 114.2 X Friendly troops in village other small groups moving against us from east and northeast.
- 1300 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3- Reference artillery fire X Map reference 77.3 114 X Excellent continue sweeping back neck of woods from north to south,
- 1305 From CG to CO 7th Marines Artillery excellent at 77.3 114 X Continue sweeping back neck of woods from north to south X Carlson sending.
- From CG to CO 2nd Raider Bn Sims says no friendly troops vicinity 72.5
- 1750 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 At 1515 attacked by enemy force estimated two companies which came out of woods off map about 77.7 112.8 X They retur to woods X Casualties unknown yet X These woods circled and strafed by aviation.
- From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Your 1110 X In last 24 hours have killed 15 N messengers and foragers and two officers X Appears we are sitting on JAR X Nip rendezvous this area X Believe presence here prevents union two force TBX batteries low men 3 days no sleep so will move back tomorrow and come for conference X Planes and artillery did good work.
- 1850 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Killed 30 Nips in afternoon engagement X Still killing (Strays).

14 November

No messages



No mossages.

#### 16 November

- O150 Patrol cleaned out Mip marauder base today at Voutea five miles south by west from Sinu killing five and capturing large quantity of ammunition Supplies and documents Cma relieving pressure on natives X All except Fourth Division.
- 7th Marines to 2nd Raider Bn Your one five two zero one five X Patrols negative X Am patroling south and west of Metapona today.
- 1430 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Movement to 78.7 113.2 completed X Two Mips stragglers killed enroute X No other sign of enemy at present.
- 1525 From 2nd Reider Bn to D-J Request boat be at Seventh Marines two sever at ten hundred temorrow one seven Nov for one wounded X Will come in for conference on same boat X Desire return same day if possible.
- 2130 From 2nd Raider Bn to 7th Marines Reference your 1828 coming for confience as indicated in my 1445 X Does your 1828 mean that you do not want me to send patrols out tomorrow.

### 17. November

- Ol35 From 7th Marines to 2nd Raider Bn Reference your two zero one zero X Send out patrols
- 1025 From 2nd Raiders to D-3 Request that BNCO at conference bring one TBX generator cable on return.

#### 18 November

- O830 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Our patrol moving Volinavua X Our patrol moving south on east bank of Metapona River X Patrols moved out at zero seven one five X Inform 7th Marines.
- 1755 From2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Patrols followed Nip trail three days from woods at 77.3 114.4 to Engineer bridge on Malimbu thence south along east bank X Dead bodies and abandoned equipment along trail.
- 2145 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Propose to move by bounds to upper Tenaru X Tomorrow will scout camp site in vicinity of seventy four point six dask one one three point zero X Plan move base there twentieth November

ANNEX (32)

CTACTOTTO

2327 (Interespt) Possible Sub off Bongana and am investigating.

20 November

#### No messages

#### 21 November

- 0930 From CG to 2nd Raider Bn Captain Enfield being sent 7th Marines CP by boat this morning X Natives report Jap battery half mile west Bare Knob.
- 1700 (Intercept) Investigate and attack enemy submarine 7 miles northwest of Point Cruz X There is friendly surface vessel in vicinity.
- From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 For Capt Plumley rear echelon Aola X Reference my one eight three nine November one nine X Three officers and sixty three men now at volinavua awaiting transportation to Aola arrange boat earlies practicable.
- 2145 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Request that natives who located battery west of Bare Knob be sent to me as guide.

## 22 November

- 1015 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Plan to move east tomorrow twenty three November to vicinity of eight three point three dash one nine six point zero X Request that two trucks report to meet tractor ferry today to assi in transfer of supplies.
- 1405 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Woods and Nimmer passed through Asamane at or two five zero on return trip.
- 1835 From CG to CO 2nd Raider Bn Your Afirm company disembarks Lunga Lagoon tomorrow X Advise present location your base.
- 2010 From CG to 2nd Bn 7th Marines 2nd Raider Bn Friendly patrol proceedir Volinavua by boat this morning to inspect airfield sites along Metapona River.

#### 23 November

1755 From CG to 2nd Raider Bn - First Marines will have three day patrol south along Lunga commencing tomorrow.

Stor Arton

2000 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 - Patrols operating today to 80.0 - 195.9 and to 80.3 - 192.0 X Large quantity of abandoned equipment found in vicinity of 80.5 - 196.2 X Tomorrow patrols will operate up the Lunga and in the direction of Bare Knob.

#### 25 November

- Diemy plane overhead for one hour dropped several bombs in the vicinity of the airfield.
- Special Intelligence report To Dog two location per map reference 1738 have planes quit strafing Maravovo to Vera Huex X May hit us X Drop us cigarettes X Tell planes to look before shooting any men.

### 26 November

- 1000 From CG to All Unites Effective this date the Assistant Division Commander will assume tactical command of all USMC ground unite located within the Lunga Point perimeter.
- 2130 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Patrol today destroyed following enemy munitions vicinity 80.4 196.0 X 36000 round 7.7 MG X 500 twenty MM shells X 54 rifles X 8 land mines X 31 rounds 75 MM and one 37 MM gun.

#### 27 November

- O330 At approximately O330 to O400 enemy plane was overhead X Dropped several bombs in vicinity of Lunga Point X No damage reported.
- 1732 From Beaufort Patrol to D-3 Send planes to bomb and strafe Maravovo immediately X Inside edge of coconuts X Maybe CP X Have seen use X Troops can land Baki X Get Japs in pincers X Planes not located yet X Any orders X Will you send plane to bomb.

## The state 28 November 40 to the same state of th

S Date

O855 From CG to CO Americal Division - Please accomplish necessary relief and direct Colonel Jeschke to move 8th Marines (less third bn) to Lunga Point X Necessary to completed by sunset 29 November.

To the second of the second of

- 1030 FromCG to Americal Division Preparatory to further operations in the direction of Kokumbona it is requested that 3rd Bn 8th Marines be directed to undertake active operations to the south and southwest of their present positions in order to clear this area of all enemy forces.
- 2030 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Gun position located 3000 yards east of right angle bend in Lunga River X Gun evacuated X Destroyed quantity of ammunition killed two japs.

' ANNEX (34)

- O400 At approximately zero four hundred an enemy plane was overhead X Dropped several bombs with no damage.
- 2000 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 CP located 74.0 190.6 X Also garble are to aerial photograph with grids from 104 super imposed north give instruction for food drop tomorrow.

#### 30 November

From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 - Located south bank vicinity 74.0 - 192.22 X Hit small group killed 25 X Captured one 75mm one 37 quantity small arms caliber supplies X Suggest air search bombing north of river vicinity 74.0 - 192.55 desire drop when practicable more follows.

#### 1 December

- O345 Enemy plane overhead but no bombs dropped made several runs over field before retiring.
- 0930 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 From first drop we recovered one and one half sacks of rice.
- 1004 From CG to 2nd Raider Bn Communicate with plane overhead on thirty thirty seven.
- 1832 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Mopped up this area today killing ten more X Captured material includes large quantity medical garble food munitions two swords many documents plus that previously reported X Wire fromgun position ends here X Tomorrow my patrols scout Nip trail to northwest Diaries say food arrived here twenty eight.
- 2130 . From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 CP now on Makknin trail which passes south so Kumbula for Matanikau X This bivouac held two dash three battalions X We surprised rear echelon of sixty killing thirty five X Others fled to bush and north across river X My men need rest before returning X Suggest we remain here two days and scout trail to north and west X Propose return via Kumbula.

#### 2 December

0910 From CC to 2nd Raider Pn - Commence return movement three December X Keer us informed as to routes and movements.

## 3 December

O735 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 - Hold native carriers for our arrival X Where do you wish us to rendezvous on arrival.

# STOCKET!

#### 3 December

O800 From CG to 2nd Raider Bn - Billeting area 1000 yards south Alligator Creek X Fifth Marines will mess you X If this not desired establish bivouac in palms between Tenaru and Block Four.

#### 4 December

- 0850 From CG to Americal Division Please direct 3d Bn 1st Marines to rejoin the regiment at Lunga Point in order to prepare for offensive operations
- 0950 From CG to 2nd Raider Bn Your zero eight hundred negative.
- 1100 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Encountered sniper ambush X Resistance over come X Pushing on X Five bastards less X We have casualties.
- 1200 From 147th Infantry to D-3 Request twenty four cases thirty seven mm cannister for Kali Point area when notified of approval X Captain Baker will pick up.

## 5 December

- 0800 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Request a truck be at bivouac south east of Second Bn Seventh Marines at 0800.
- O815 From 147th Infantry to D-3 CG Army forces requests 300 rolls barb wire 1000 loc X Pickets 2000 short pickets for Koli sector.
- O825 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 We are again in contact northwest of last nights bivouac X Have you any information regarding enemy forces this locality.
- 0855 From CG to CO 147th Infantry Craft reported is friendly.

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- 0830 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Dog dash three jeep is here X Got stuck in mud X Will return as soon as practicable.
- 1735 From Malaita Patrol to D-3 Dog two X Meeting rative carriers today X In buire if permissable we offer two shillings per day X Selecting more permanent wireless site X
- 1814 From 2nd Raider Bn to D-3 Only three trucks have arrived so far.

## 6 December

osog From Malaita Patrol to D-3 - Dog two X Succeeding well X Will work on south side far as Cape Hunter tomorrow X May need plane escort X You may expect us Wednesday.

1 ANNEX (36)





## 6 December

1815 From Malaita Patrol to D-3 - Dog two X We have six guides for Kokumbona and Matanikau area X About sixty carriers may get more X Send escerts planes to Cape Hunder eleven o'clock Monday.

7 December

No messages

#### ANNEX. V

#### RECORD OF EVENTS

## SECOND MARINES REINFORCED

## September 1 - September 30, 1942

- l SEPT. Continued work on defensive installations, coordinating defensive fires and sighting tactical wire. Dispatched .
  small combat patrol to FLORIDA ISLAND.
- 2 SEPT. Continued work on defensive installations and preparation of Battle C.P. Patrol returned from FLORIDA ISLAND, having killed one Jap; other Japs escaped in mangroves. Extended right flank of Second Battalion to fill gap left by Paratroops transferred to GUADALCANAL. BUR-ROUGHS free of reef at southeast end of TULAGI at 1830; grounded on Southern Cross reef during the night. Air raid alert at noon followed by bombling attack on GUADALCANAL airfield.
- 3 SEPT. Air alert at 0900. Continued reorganization of positions vacated by Paratroops. BURROUGHS off reef at dusk, proceeding to GUADALCAWAL. FOWALHAUT arrived. Received copy of order, dated August 29, establishing a "Raider Battalion" composed of units of Second Marines, Reinforced rear echelon.
- 4 SEPT. Continued coordinating machine gun fires. Work progressing on tactical wire. Commenced emplacement of underwater obstacles. Combat patrol of thirty men under command of Captain M. P. Ryan, Third Battalion, Second Marines, sent to FLORIDA ISLAND pursuant to information of a Japanese detachment on the north coast in the vicinity of TUMULIGONU.
- 5 SEPT. Five Japanese ships entered bay and attacked GUADALCANAL during night. Work continued on all defense installations. General Vandegrift flew to TULAGI to spend the night. Air attack on GUADALCANAL at noon.
- 6 SEPT. Captain Ryan and patrol returned from FLORIDA ISLAND.


  Negative results due to shifting of Jap detachment to
  another location. General vandegrift returned to GUADALCANAL by air: Work started on new dock in vicinity
  of CHINATOWN.
- 7 SEPT. Continued normal work routine. General Geiger over for short visit by air.

and ten destroyers were headed this way.

- 8 SEPT. FULLER, BELLATRIX and five DDs in harbor. These ships attacked with bombs at dusk by two small Japanese planes. No damage. Ships got under way and stood out after meeting Japanese attack with anti-aircraft fire. Manned battle C.P. at 2110 on report that one Japanese cruiser
- 9 SEPT. Night spent in battle C.P. Japanese attacked TULAGI, harbor by shellfire in conjuction with star shell and searchlight illumination, commencing at 0030. One of two YP boats returning from GUADALCANAL hit and set afire. This ship beached on southeast end of TULAGI. Japanese attack continued approximately 30 minutes.

Continued normal work on all defensive installations; interrupted by air raid alert and bombing of GUADALCANAL between 1040 and 1210. The FULLER and BELLATRIX returned at 1630 and unloaded until 1900 when they departed.

- 10 SEPT Four Japanese destroyers attacked TULAGI harbor at approximately 0030 by systematic shelling of harbor in conjunction with searchlight illumination. Again shelled YP beached on southeast end of TULAGI, destroying same. Overs inflicted hits on Second Battalion positions in rear that vessel. Thirteen casualties, two serious, eleven minor, suffered by personnel of Second Battalion as a result of this attack. Shrapnel landed on MAKAMBO. occupied by "L" Company. Third Battalion, with no casualties or serious damage. 5" battery opened fire, Air alert at 1145. Twenty-six Japanese bombers and eight fighters passed over TULAGI. This flight taken under . fire by the 90mm battery, 3dDefBn, which was credited : with destroying one bomber. Three bombs dropped in this. area without damage. Bombers continued to attack airfield at GUADALCANAL. Dispatched patrol of nine men in charge of Sergeant Fred J. Martin, "L" Company, Third. Battalion, to attack Japanese position at HOGALU on FLORIDA ISLAND.
- llSEPT. Normal work routine continued. Interrupted by air raid alert and bombing attack on GUADALCANAL at 1245. Sgt. Martin and patrol returned, having destroyed Japanese detachment. Killed four; no casualties to his own patrol.
- 12 SEPT. Moved Regimental C.P. to new location at "Bishop's House;" Continued normal development of positions. Air alert between 1130 and 1205.




- 13 SEPT. Heavy shelling of GUADALCANAL by Japanese surface force at 0005. 5-inch batteries here illuminated to seaward in attempt to locate ships off shore. No contact. Two airraid alerts between 1000 and 1230 and 1335 and 1430. Japanese surface force again shelled GUADALCANAL at 2300.
- 14 SEPT.- Japanese surface attack on GUADALCANAL continued until approximately 0100. Heavy land fighting on GUADALCANAL apparent from OP. Orders received to dispatch one battalion to GUADALCANAL as quickly as possible. Started movement of Third Battalion, Second Marines. Company "I" embarked aboard YP at 0730.

FULLER and BELLATRIX arrived at 0800 and commenced unloading. Airraid alert at 1000 at which time the FULLER and BELLATRIX got under way and stood out. Second airraid alert at 1330. The FULLER and BELLATRIX returned and continued unloading until 1745 when the third airraid warning was received. Both snips got under way taking 175 troops, members of working parties, with them. Manned battle C.P. at 1900 in expectation of another Japanese surface raid. FULLER and BELLATRIX and escorting destroyers attacked by hostile aircraft without damage.

- 15 SEPT. Secured from battle positions at 0630. Continued transfer of Third Battalion, Second Marines via YP. Air alert at 1035. Secured OP from TANAVULA POINT on FLORIDA ISLAND.
- 16 SEPT. One Jap prisoner brought in by native patrol from FLORIDA ISLAND. Continued coordination of machine gun fires and development of defensive installations. Air alert at noon. Transfer of Third Battalion, less two platoons, completed.
- 17 SEPT.- Continued normal development of defensive installations.
  Dispatched reconnaissance patrol from GAVUTU, under Second Lieutenant H. A. Hayes, Company "A", 2dPionBn, to examine the HALAVO PENNISULA and observe entrance to SIOTA PASSAGE for evidence of enemy activity during hours of darkness. Enemy suspected to be operating motor boat in this area.
- 16 SEPT.- HALAVO patrol returned with negative results. This patrol again stationed on tip of HALAVO PENNISULA with two 37mm guns and one .50 cal. machine gun to intercept suspected enemy motor boat. Dispatched combat patrol of twenty men under command of Lt. W.F. Sanford, "F" Company, Second Battalion, to VATILAVA ISLAND to secure seven Japanese aviators reported there. The patrol returned in late afternoon having captured six and killed one of the aviators. No Marine casualties.

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GUADALGANAL during hours of darkness.



and materiel. Enemy surface vessels again attacked

- 20 SEPT. Air raid alert at 1030. Amphibian Tractor Platoon under command of Gapt. J.T. O'Neill reported from ESPIRITU SANTO via GUADALCANAL for duty. Combat patrol of twenty three men under command of Lt. J.B.H. Wickersham, "E" Company, Second Battalion, dispatched to the TOA area to capture or destroy eleven Japanese reported concentrated there.
- 21 SEPT. The TOA patrol returned having killed nine (9) Japanese.

  No Marine casualties. Captured materiel, including 1
  LMG, 4 rifles, 2 swords, and ammunition.
- 22 SEPT. Reconnaissance patrol under command of Et. Leinweber, Bn-2, Second Battalion, sent to search HALETA PENNISULA. Results negative.
- 23 SEPT. LtCol Van Ness located 11 Japs at HALAVO. Japs retreated to jungle when party approached beach. Reconnaissance patrol under command of Lt. Kelly, Reg. Weapons Company, sent to search HALAVO-HELETA area. Results negative.
- 24 SEPT.- Combat patrol under command of Lt. W. Morris, "G" Company, Second Battalion, sent to Southeast side of FLORIDA ISLAND to contact reported Jap detachment and secure three Japs reported to have been captured by natives.
- 25 SEPT Patrol returned with three Jap prisoners. Reported that an inspection of TOA revealed nine dead Japs. Brought in arms, documents and miscellaneous gear from TOA.
- 27 SEPT. Our request for transfer of certain elements of rear echelon to TULAGI approved.
- 28 SEPT. Plans made for unloading and disposition of Rear Echelon.
  Air raid alert 1330.

Combat patrol under command of Capt. R.Y. Stafford, "D" Company, First Battalion, sent to village of HARORO, FLORIDA ISLAND, to capture five Japanese reported to be

in that vicinity. Patrol returned at 1830. Five Japs killed - no prisoners taken. No Marine casualties. Received notice of disbandment of the "Raider Battalion" of the Second Marines Reinforced.

- 29 SEPT. Air raid alert 1345-1420. Col. Arthur went to GUADAL-CANAL 0600 via YP.
- 30 SEPT. Combat patrol under command of Lt. D. Fultz, "H" Company, Second Battalion, dispatched to cover entire southern part of FLORIDA ISLAND.

## October 1-31, 1942

Supplementing the September Record of Events, the following events are hereby recorded:

- 15 SEPT: The 3dBn, 2d Marines, occupied security positions for Division CP on GUADALCANAL.
- 16-SEPT The Third Battalion occupied beach defense position from LUNGA LAGOON to ALLIGATOR CREEK.
- 32 SEPT: The 3dBn moved into new defensive line along LUNGA RIVER, south of the airport:
- 24 SEPT. New front line defensive area, along LUNGA RIVER developed by 3dBn.
- 1 QCT. -- Normal routine. The 3dBn occupied MIR along LUNGA RIVER -- one Jap prisoner captured.
- 2 OCT. Air raid alert at 1230. Jap planes over GUADALCANAL.

  Secured 1345. Reconnaissance patrol under command of
  Lt. D. Fultz, "H" Co, 2dBn, returned from patrol of EAST
  FLORIDA ISLAND. Did not contact enemy.
- 3 OCT. Reconnaissance Patrol of 39 men under command of Lt. R.V. Perkins, "D" Co, 1stBn, 1eft for central section of FLORIDA ISLAND at 0600. Air raid alert 1230. Enemy fighters over GUADALCANAL. Secured at 1350. Air raid alert 1900. secured at 2000.
- 4 OOT. Normal routine.



- 5 OCT. Reconnaissance Patrol from FLORIDA ISLAND returned. No enemy contacted. Information indicated 11 Japs are still at large in CENTRAL FLORIDA ISLAND.
- 6 OCT. Observation post established at STOTA MISSION, consisting of 14 menguirder command of Lt. D.W. Duchek, "H" Co, 2dBn. This outpost to be relieved in two weeks.
- 7 OCT. The 3dBn; less "M" Co, acted as assault unit in attack on positions along MATANIKAU RIVER: "K" Co had one killed and 14 wounded.
- 8: OCT. Three air raid alerts, the first at 2045 with final secure at 0230 the morning of 9 Oct.

  The 3dBn continued assault on Jap positions. l'officer wounded, three men killed from "I." Co.
- 9 OCT: FULLER arrived 0630 with the following units of rear echelon, total approximately 700 officers and men:
  - (a) Personnel from H&S Co.

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- (b) Regimental Weapons Co.
- (c) Battery "G", 3dBn, 10th Marines. To the
- (d) Remainder H&S Battery, 3dBn, 10th Marines.
- (e) One platcon "A" Co, 2dAmphTracBn.
  - (f) "A" Go, 2dPionBn, (less 15 men).
  - (g) Remaining personnel of 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions.
- Assault on Jap position on GUADALCANAL completed.
  The 3dBn retired to former position in Sector 5, along LUNGA RIVER. Total casualties for that operation, 4 killed, 22 wounded. Air raid alerts at 1230 and 1630.
  FULLER got under way each time but returned after the alarms and continued unloading. Ship got under way at 1930 and remained out of the harbor during the night.
  - Four (4) officers and 430 men of lstBn under command of LtCol Hill, left TULAGI for raid on known enemy concentration in vicinity of AOLA, GUADALCANAL. This combat unit included all of the lstBn except "D" Co and certain "Hq" Co personnel. During this movement one "T" boat being towed by a YP, capsized. Lt. F.S. Parks, 14 Marines and 3 Navy (boat crew) were lost.
- 10 OCT. At request of Division on GUADALCANAL, 5" Battery illuminated with star shells at OOlO and O2OO. FULLER returned at 0700 and resumed unloading; completed unloading at 2030 and got under way. Four float planes from nearby U.S. cruisers arrived. "IstBn moved into position for attack on GURABUSA and KOILOTUMARIA, GUADALCANAL.

ANNEX V (6)

- 11 OCT. Air raid alert at noon. Approximately 30 enemy bombers attacked GUADALCANAL.
  - lstBn Combat Unit, less "C" Co, attacked KOILOTUMARIA, GUADALCANAL killed one Jap officer, no other Japs contacted. 1 Marine killed, l officer wounded. "C" Company, meanwhile, attacked Jap positions at GURABUSA. 30 Japs killed and a large amount of arms, equipment, documents, and radio materiel captured. Capt. R.Y. Stafford killed and one man slightly wounded.
- 12 OCT. Major Kyle with 55 men and two dead from 1stBn returned to TULAGI at 1600. Also with this detachment was one injured Marine aviator whose plane had crashed in the vicinity of the 1stBn landing point. This detachment also returned the body of an army aviator, Lt. H.L. Stern, recovered from the wreckage of an army plane. LtCol Hill with remainder of unit, less combat patrol of 4 officers and 87 men, returned to TULAGI at 2300. Observation detachment under command of Lt. D.W. Duchek, "H" Co, 2dBn, at SIOTA MISSION, located and killed four armed Japs.
- 13 OCT. Four air raid alerts today two at noon and two in late afternoon. Manned Battle CP throughout the night. 1st
  Bn patrol of 4 officers and 87 enlisted men under command of Lt. Thomas M. Leinweber proceeding from AOLA to LUNGA RIVER on GUADALCANAL via government trail.
- 14 OCT, Six air raid alerts today beginning at 0930. Reports indicate large enemy task force headed for this area. Manned Battle CP throughout night.
- 15 OCT. Enemy ships began severe shelling of GUADALCANAL at 0130. Our 5" guns illuminated with star shells throughout the early morning hours. Manned Battle CP throughout the night.

A direct shell hit on a fox hole in the 3dBn area re-sulted in three corpsmen killed.

- 16 OCT. The 3dBn reverted to Division reserve and was moved into a new bivouac are in rear of 5th Marine sector of MLR.
- 17 OCT. Air raid alert 0715. Several Jap bombs fell in the 3dBn bivouac area, injuring 5 men.
- 18 OCT. Air raid alert 1230. Large number of enemy bombers and fighters over area. LtCol M.L. Curry ordered to GUADAL-CANAL for duty with 11th Marines left on YP at 0700.

- 19 OCT. Lt. Leinweber and patrol from lstBn returned to TULAGI from GUADALCANAL. Outpost at SIOTA MISSION, under command of Lt. D.W. Duchek, "H" CS, 2dBn, relieved by group under command of 2dLt Duane Fultz, "H" Co, 2dBn.
- 20 OCT. Reconnaissance patrol of 20 men under command of Lt.

  W.A. Tynes, "F" Co, 2dBn, Left for FLORIDA ISLAND. Rear
  echelon of 3d Bn sent to GUADALCANAL by YP. Two air raid
  alerts during morning.
- 21 OCT. The 3dBn, as Division reserve, moved into a new bivouac area north of Division CP. During noon air raid, 6 bombs fell in their area resulting in 11 killed and 42 wounded. Two air raid alerts during morning. Patrol of 20 men, under command of Lt. R.V. Perkins, "D" Co. 1stBn, departed for HAGALU area on FLORIDA ISLAND.
- 22 CCT. Jap artillery shelled 3dBn position. 1 man killed.

  Patrol under command of Lt. Perkins returned from FLORIDA

  ISLAND. Results negative. Air raid alert at noon.
  - 23 OCT. Reconnaissance Patrol commanded by Lt. Tynes returned from FLORIDA ISLAND. Results negative. Air raid alert at noon.
  - 24 OCT. Japanese patrol of 9 men captured in 3dBn area. Air raid alert at noon.
  - 25 OCT. Capt. M.A., Smith, Capt. J.T. Bradshaw of H&S Co, and Plsgt James Smith, "H" Co, 2dBn, embarked aboard the YP El DEAVOR and departed TULAGI 0730. Air raid alert at 0830. Air raid alerts throughout remainder of day. Battle positions manned throughout the night. The 3dBn ordered in position in rear of 7th Marines area.
  - 26 OCT. Single enemy aircraft flew over TULAGI, apparently on photographic mission.
  - 27 OCT. Capt. Smith, Capt. Bradshaw and PlSgt James Smith returned from GUADALCANAL at 1600. Air raid alert 1630 no action on TULAGI.
  - 28 OCT. Normal routine:
  - 29 OCT. Orders received to send 2dBn and Regimental operating staff to GUADALCANAL. The 2dBn commanded by LtCol C.K. Pressley and the Regimental Staff, composed of Col J.M. Arthur, LtCol C.P. Van Ness, Capt. John T. Bradshaw, Capt. M.R.

Williams, Capt. R.L. Stallings, Capt. R.I. Langston, Lt. J.L. Schwabe, Dr. Karl E. Johnson, Chaplain Francis W. Kelly, and 38 enlisted men, embarked aboard 22 Higgins boats and the YP. The last boat cleared TULAGI at 1515. The 1stBn shifted to cover defensive area occupied by the 2dBn. Orders received at 2000 to send the 1stBn with second platoon, Regimental Weapons Co, to GUADALCANAL, The 3dBn ordered to return to TULAGI, departing GUADALCANAL at 0730, October 30.

- 30 OCT. The 3dBn arrived TULAGI last detachment 1200, and assumed defensive positions of IstBn. The 1stBn departed TULAGI last detachment 1330.
- 31 OCT. Orders received for remainder of Regimental Staff report to CO at GUADALCANAL. Partial Regimental Staff with 1st and 2dBn ordered to begin advance on KOKUMBONA and to act as reserve for 5th Marines. Units moved out and bivouacked west of MATANIKAU RIVER along beach.

## November 1-30, 1942

Supplementing the October Record of Events, the following is added:

- 27 OCT. Patrol of 50 men under command of Lt. Stephen J. Seskowski, "G" Co, 2dBn, left TULAGI ISLAND for AOLA, GUADALCANAL ISLAND. This patrol acted as security for group of native police entoute to LUNGA, also as a combat and reconnaissance patrol.
- 28 OCT. "G" Co. patrol left AOLA, enroute to LUNGA.
- 29 OCT. "G" Co. patrol contacted Jap detachment. 3 enemy killed, l captured, unknown number wounded. Enemy arms and equipment captured, and supplies destroyed. No Marine casqualties.
- 1 NOV. Operation to West of MATANIKAU RIVER with POHA RIVER as ultimate objective continued. Regimental CP established on East bank of MATANIKAU RIVER, GUADALCANAL, with 2dBn in defensive position along East bank, providing security for the Regimental CP and bridges across river. 1stBn in defensive position on West bank of MATANIKAU RIVER and beach at mouth, in rear of 5th Marines. Intermittent

shelling received during this period. The 3dBn, plus attached units, manned defensive positions in TULAGI AREA. SIOTA MISSION detail on FLORIDA ISLAND relieved by detachment from "L" Co, 3rdBn.

- 2 NOV. - 1stBn moved across country into assault position on Phase Line 02, covering a front of 400 yards with right flank on beach. A number of casualties inflicted on enemy and considerable materiel captured in 1stBn area during afternoon and night. 2dBn moved across the MAT-ANIKAU RIVER into position as regimental reserve in rear of left flank of 1stBn. 1200 - CP moved, under enemy. machine gun and rifle fire, to temporary location 1000 yards west of mouth of MATANIKAU RIVER, TAt 1500, the CP was moved into area in vicinity of 5th Marines CP, about 500 yards forward and 300 yards inland. Mortar and sniper fire received in CP area during afternoon and night. Plans made and orders issued for attack the following morning. Combat patrol under command of lstLt. J.W. "I" Co, 3dBn, left TULAGI for MALAITA ISLAND to Crain. destroy reported Jap coast watcher station.
- Heavy artillery and mortar concentrations registered on 3 NOV. Jap positions at dawn: 1stBn, in conjunction with 3dBn, 7th Marines on left, attacked at 0630 from Phase Line 02 with Phase Line 03 as objective. Strong enemy nortar and MG fire, some of which came from a pocket of Japs in the rear, which had been passed by by the 5th Marines, was slowly ocercome. The 1stBn halted at 1600 and took up a defensive position for the night, about 400 yards in advance of Phase Line 03. 2dBn moved into position in rear of 1stBn on Phase Line 02 at 0830, and later relieved 3d Bn, 7th Marines on left of 1stBn. ADC group ordered to GUADALCANAL. LtCol Hunt, 3dBn, assigned command of TULAGI SECTOR. Col Artnur placed in command of operations in. the West Sector as 5th Marines withdrawn. 2d Marines, with 1stBn, 164th Infantry, U.S.A., attached, occupied assault positions. Received orders from DivComdr to establish a shallow beachhead and hold position until ordered to advance. Reg 'CP moved forward to a point 1200 yards west of POINT CRUZ and 200 yards inland from beach.
- 4 NOV. lstBn in defensive position 400 yards West of Phase Line 03 on a front of 400 yards with right flank on beach. Little enemy activity during day. 2dBn in defensive position on left of lstBn, operated combat and reconnaissance patrols to the front and flank results negative.



lstBn; l64thInf, in reserve, guarding rear. Large number friendly ships in harbor. CL and DD's shelled Jap positions in vicinity of KOKUMBONA. 1700 - 1 platoon from lstBn, l64thInf, moved into front line to reinforce left flank of lstBn.


- 5 NOV. - Enemy attacked along left flank of 1stBn at 0200. Accurate artillery, machine gun and rifle fire was placed on advancing Japs. Attack repulsed with heavy casualties to enemy; slight Marine casualties. The 1stBn relieved during morning by 1stBn, 164thInf, and withdrew to a defensive position approximately 500 yards to the left rear. Positions consolidated generally along Phase Line 03. Long range enemy artillery fire received in: . 2dBn and Reg CP areas. Heavy artillery fire directed at Jap positions throughout the night. All Bns operated combat patrols during day. One patrol from 2dBn contacted enemy light machine gun section, capturing machine gun, and killed 1 Jap. Enemy bombers overhead at 1130 - no bombs dropped in our combat area. Patrol under command of Capt Wade H. Hitt, artillery liaison officer, went forward to direct artillery fire against enemy gun positions and munition dumps. Results satisfactory. Patrol encountered Jap resistance - estimated 25 Japs killed; Capt Hitt slightly wounded. No other Marine casualties. General Vandegrift visited CP at: 1400. 11 💌 🗀 🗀
- 6 NOV. Positions nemained unchanged. All units patrolled to front and flanks. Results negative. Heavy enemy mortar and long range artillery fire received throughout the day and night in all Bn areas. Second Lieutenant William H. Swisher, USMCR, Artillery Liaison Officer, killed in Reg CP by shell fragment; three men wounded by artillery fire. Artillery and mortar fire again directed on Jap positions throughout night. Patrol from "I" Co, 3dBn, sent to MALAITA, returned to TULAGI. Completely wiped out Jap detachment, killing 20 Japs and captured 1 prisoner. Large amount of equipment, arms, radio and documents captured. No Marine casualties:
- 7 NOV. Positions unchanged, all defenses further developed and consolidated. Jap detachment spotted about 4000 yards west of Reg OP. Air concentration neutralized that point, inflicting numerous casualties on Japs. Combat patrols sent out from all units. One patrol from 2dBn made contact, killed 1 Jap. Jap patrol attacked right flank (beach road) of 1stBn, 164thInf, at 2000. Artiflery fire immediately placed along beach road in front of Army position attack repulsed, a number of Japs being killed. Enemy artilleny fire, which was counterbatteried,



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received along beach road between CP and front lines intermittently throughout the night, with no Marine or Army casualties resulting therefrom.

- 8 NOV. - Positions unchanged. A number of heavily laden Japs spotted withdrawing to the southeast. These effectively engaged with long-range artillery, many casualties resulting therefrom. Combat and reconnaissance patrols operated throughout the day - results negative, except in front where strong enemy machine gun and mortar resistance encountered. 1400 - Adm Halsey and Gen Vandegrift visited CP. 1700 - Weapons platoon located moving log with 4 Japs aboard about 2000 yards off beach. Opened fire, making 6 direct hits out of 12 shots, killing all Japs. Jap landing boats sighted on beach at mouth of the POHA RIVER - Air notified at 1730. Lt. K.E. Johnson, (MC), USNR, acting Regimental Surgeon, injured in Reg CP by falling tree which had been previously weakened by shell fire - evacuated.
- Colonel J.M. Arthur placed in command of provisional 9 NOV. Brigade, consisting of 2d Marines (less 3dBn), 1stBn, 164thInf, USA, and 8th Marines, with ten batteries of artillery and aviation in support. 1200 - 8th Marines, Colonel R.H. Jesohke, UUSMC, Commanding, moved into position east of the Reg CP in reserve. Col. Jeschke reported to Reg CP at 1430. 1500 - Orders received from Division Commander to resume the attack to the westward on the morning of the tenth. Plan of attack -- three Bns in assault, with lstBn. 164thInf, on the right, 2dBn, 2d Marines on left, and 1stBn. 2d Marines echeloned to left rear of 2dBn, with 8th Marines covering south flank and rear, in reserve. Phase Line 04 set as day's objective, 1st and 2dBns, 2d Marines, moved into position during late afternoon in preparation for attack, the 2dBn pushing its line forward to Phase Line 03 in prelongation of the Army line. 1730 - Column of Japs, heavily laden, spotted moving across hill 10, about 2500 yards southwest of our position -- battalion artillery concentration placed directly on column at 1733 with excellent results. Combat patrol of fourteen men under command of Marine Gunner Prentice W. Jones, Tenth Marines, dispatched from TULAGI to FLORIDA ISLAND to destroy Jap detachment reported near VURA. Security patrol of 20 men from 3dBn, dispatched from TULAGI to HALAVO and FLORIDA IS-LAND as a guard for CUB Unit construction crew.



- Preceded by a heavy artillery and mortar preparation on lo Nov. enemy positions from 0615 to 0700, assault units moved forward at 0704 meeting stubborn resistance from Jap MG and mortar fire all along the front. Air supported attack by strafing and bombing enemy positions. IstBn suffered heavy casualties from enemy MG and mortar fire from front and flanks, while other assault Bns received some casualties. LtCol R.E. Hill, commanding 1stBn, wounded by mortar fire in vicinity of his Bn CP and evacuated, Major Wood B. Kyle taking over command. Despite strong enemy resistance and the extreme heat from which all, units suffered, the day's objective -- Phase Line 04-- was occupied at 1700. Heavy casualties in personnel and materiel: were inflicted on the Japs. IstBn, 8th Marines, moved into line between the 1st and 2dBns, 2d Marines, at 1400; 2d and 3dBns, 8th Marines following in rear of two right assault Bns. 1500 - Advance party went forward to locate new CP at a point 1000 yards west and 150 yards inland from beach.
- 11 NOV. Preceded by heavy artillery concentrations, assault units consisting of the IstBn, 164thInf, on right, 2dBn, 2d Marines in center, and IstBn; 8th Marines, on left; with IstBn, 2d Marines, on south flank with mission of protecting flank and destroying enemy MG and mortar nests in that area, jumped off at 0745; with Phase Line 05 as day's objective. Attack proceeded throughout morning against stubborn machine gun, rifle and mortar resistance all along front. Reg CP moved to new forward location at 0830. General Vandegrift visited forward CP at 0930. 1200 - attack progressing slowly, but according to schedule, against heavy machine gun fire; a number of enemy MG nests were wiped out and resistance slowly overcome during forward movement. 1400 - Incident to the report of an imminent all-out Jap naval and land attack on GUADALCANAL (which materialized but was completely frustrated), orders were received from the Division Commander to halt the advance and withdraw to the east immediately, in order to cover the withdrawal of the 8th Marines across the MATANIKAU RIVER and insure the safe evacuation of all munitions and stores in forward area. 8th Marines began immediate withdrawal which was completed by 1800. Accelerated artillery and mortar fire on Jap positions continued throughout afternoon. IstBn, 2d Marines, on south flank, began movement to rear at 1600. The IstBn, 164thInf, and 2dBn, 2d Marines, maintained front line positions, in contact with the enemy, until

1715 when they were ordered to withdraw to a covering position in the vicinity of POINT CRUZ, about 1700 yards to the rear. Reg CP moved to a new location 400 yards east of POINT CRUZ and 300 yards inland at 1700. Defensive positions occupied at 2030. 2dBn, 2d Marines, covering front (West), 1stBn, 2d Marines on South flank, and 1stBn, 164thInf, in reserve, covering rear. Heavy artillery concentrations placed on enemy positions throughout the night. Coast road under usual intermittent enemy shell fire, during withdrawal, resulting in approximately 20 Marine casualties.

0.630.4 Strong combat patrols from 1st and 2dBns, 2d Marines sent forward to gain contact with enemy and cover evacuation of remaining stores. 0730 - 1stBn, 164thInf, began withdrawal across the MATANIKAU RIVER, with orders to rejoin its Regiment in the vicinity of LUNGA POINT, 0900 -Colonel Arthur with R-1, R-2, and R-3, met with Brigadier General Sebree, U.S.A., at 8th Marines CP on east bank of MATANIKAU RIVER, for purpose of selecting new position for 2dMarine's (less 3dBn) in Brigade reserve. 2dMarines assigned bivouse area in coconut grove along beach 1000 yards east of the mouth of the MATANIKAU RIVER. Between 0730 and 1130 all supplies and equipment belonging to 2dMarines, 8th Marines and IstBn, 164thInf, successfully evacuated to the east of the MATANIKAU RIVER. Combat patrols advanced to original front line positions before contacting enemy who had not exploited the withdrawal of our forces the preceeding afternoon. 1200 - The 1stBn, followed by the 2dBn, began its withdrawal east of the MATANIKAU RIVER, reaching the new bivouac area at 1430. 1600 - Orders received from Division Commander to move the 2dMarines, less 3dBn, into area east of TENARU RIVER on the morning of 13 November. Received 200 replacements which were distributed to lst and 2dBns and H&S Co. Large naval battle took place in vicinity of SAVO ISLAND during the night. BAR BARAMER BARAMER

13 NOV. - 1st and 2dBns occupied outpost positions east of TENARU RIVER. Reg CP established approximately 800 yards west of TENARU RIVER in Vicinity of Navy and Marine Cemetery. 1500 - Air raid alert -- no bombs dropped. Enemy warships shelled airport during night, with minor material damage resulting. A number of shells fell in 1st and 2dBn areas resulting in four killed and 14 wounded. SIOTA MISSION (3dBn) detachment on FLORIDA ISLAND killed one Jap near GOLE. Two Jap prisoners brought into TULAGI by natives.

ANNEX V (14)

NOTE: As a result of the foregoing operations west of the MATANIKAU RIVER, the Marine forces under Colonel Arthur's command captured the following enemy material, and suffered casualties as indicated below:

## CAPTURED MATERIAL

## SECOND MARINES REINFORCED

75mm field guns 40mm field guns 37mm guns l Artillery sighting piece ,50 cal. machine guns .30 cal. machine guns .20 cal. machine guns 20 light mortars heavy mortar 90mm mortar sights .25 cal. rifles 162 51 6 shell cases 21 6" projectiles 6" projecuites 4" shell cases 4" projectiles 3" shells 370 37mm shells 1000rds .50 cal. ammunition 39900rds .25 cal. ammunition 5.0 light MG clips 30. heavy MG clips 400 detonators lbox hand grenades ammunition carriers . 6 land mines 20 bayonets radios telephone dispatch cases containing large number of maps, overlays, notebooks and journals. gasoline engines (destroyed)

## EIGHTH MARINES

5 light machine guns

l light mortar unknown amount of ammunition

NOTE: It was not practical to obtain a record of captured material from the lstBn, 164thInf, as they were employed

in the front lines at the time this report was prepared.

While it is impossible to determine the number of Jap casualties, it is estimated that they totaled several hundred.

## MARINE AND ARMY CASUALTIES

SECOND MARINES REINFORCED

Killed - 45 . Wounded - 133

Missing - 7

Killed - 6 Wounded -Wounded - 41 Missing - 3

1st BN, 164th INFANTRY, U.S.A.

Killed - 10 Wounded - 19

Missing - 0

- 14 NOV. Outpost positions between BLOCK FOUR and TENARU RIVER developed by Bns.
- 15 NOV. Outpost positions further developed.
- 16 NOV. Co "A", IstBn, detailed as guard for planes on new fighter strip. Remainder of battalion in defensive positions East of TENARU RIVER. 2dBn in defensive positions along. ILU RIVER. Operated reconnaissance patrols to East. Results negative.
- 17 NOV. Reconnaissance patrols sent out from 1st and 2dBns covering area to East front. Negative results. Major T.A. Culhane reported to CO, Second Marines Reinf. from Rear Echelon, BUTTON, and assigned duty as R-3.
- 18' NOV. Co "F"; 2dBn, ordered into line to replace one company of 2dBn, 5th Marines, sent on combat patrol to the Southeast. Reconnaissance patrol from "G" Co. 2dBn, operated 5000 yards to East along coast. Results negative. Detail from "I" Co, 3dBn, established observation post on TANAVULA POINT.
- 19 NOV. 1st & 2dBns operated patrols covering entire front and extending to the East approximately 5000 yards. Results negative. Co "F" returned to 2dBn. Patrol of 15 men under command of 2dLt R.W. Garvin; 3dBn, 10thMarines, returned from reconnaissance of N.E. FLORIDA. Results negative. The same of which the result of the same of

ANNEX V (16)

- 20 NOV. Orders received from DivComdr to move one battalion (1st Bn) into reserve position along coast West of TENARU RIVER, and the other battalion (2dBn) into reserve position in vicinity of KUKUM (Coordinates 78.5-204.3 Map N. Coast of GUADALCANAL). Both battalions moved into position during day. Patrol of 16 men under command of Capt. F.R. Smith, RegwpnsCo. departed TULAGI for reconnaissance of coast of Eastern FLORIDA ISLAND. Native scout "David", attached to 3dBn. SIOTA MISSION detail killed one and wounded one Jap near GOLE, FLORIDA ISLAND.
- 21 NOV. Orders received from DivComdr to move regiment into line West of LUNGA RIVER replacing 2d and 3dBns, 1st Marines, 1stBn occupied defensive position 1500 yards along beach, thence 1000 yards inland, replacing 3dBn, 1st Marines.

  2dBn occupied defensive position on left of 1stBn, line extending generally Southeast along ridge line for 1500 yards, replacing 2dBn, 1st Marines. Reg CP established in ravine southeast of new fighter strip. Detail from SIOTA MISSION dispatched for reconnaissance between SIOTA and GOLE. Native scouts killed two Japs near KOLOVASA, FLORIDA ISLAND.
- 22 NOV. Batta Mons consolidated and developed defensive positions. Relocated many MG and 37mm guns. Improved lateral communications. Four man patrol from "M" Co, 3dBn, detailed to set ambush for 4 Japs reported near HAGALU, FLORIDA ISLAND. Patrol under command of Capt. F.R. Smith returned to TULAUI. Did not contact enemy but observed a large amount of wreckage, both Jap and friendly, along coast. This patrol located the bodies of W.F. Hank (name in wasteband of pants), and C.W.T. Pogue, USN (name in wallet found on body). These bodies were buried and graves marked. SICTA MISSION reconnaissance detail returned to SICTA. Results negative.
- 23 NOV. Defensive positions further developed. Defensive and tactical wire installed. MG and mortars test fired.
- 24 NOV. Reconnaissance patrols operated from each Bn in area to their respective fronts results negative. Defensive positions further developed with particular attention to MG positions and lanes of fire. MajGen Vogel and MajGen Vandegrift visited Reg CP. Detail of two squads from 3dBarBalloonSquad, relieved "L" Co, 3dBn, detachment at VURA, FLORIDA ISLAND. Ambush detail near HAGULA relieved. Results negative.

- 25 NOV. 1st and 2dBns continued organization and development of defensive position West of the LUNGA RIVER. Combat and reconnaissance patrols active 3000-4000 yards to the Southwest, results negative.
- 26 NOV. - 1st & 2dBns situations same as Nov. 25. Combat patrol from 2dBn found Japanese bivouse 3000 yards Southwest of lines, no enemy present, destroyed enemy bedding and equipment found there. Otherwise patrols negative. 0315 - Enemy aircraft overhead. Dropped bombs on adjacent area. Assistant DivComdr (Briggen Rupertus) assumed tactical command of all ground units located within the LUNGA POINT defensive sector. Briggen Rupertus visited Reg CP. 1200 - Enemy personnel with machine gun reported located about 2500 yards to the Southwest. Combat patrol organized to attack and destroy this detachment.
- 27 NOV. 1st & 2dBns situation same as Nov 25. 0410 Enemy alreraft everhead, dropped bombs on adjacent area on LUNGA POINT, All combat and reconnal sance patrols reported negative.
- 28 NOV. - 1st and 2dBns, situation the same. All combat and reconnalssance patrols reported negative. 0435 - Enemy airoraft everhead. No bombs dropped. 1600 - Major General Patch, US. Army, and his Chief of Staff; Colonel Woodward, U.S. Army, visited the Regimental C.P.
- 1st and 2dBns, situation the same. All combat and recon-naissance patrels results negative. 6400 Enemy airgraft overhead. Bombs dropped in adjacent area.
- 30 NOV. 1st and 2dBns; situation the same. Combat and recennaissance patrols results negative. Naval engagement, occurred between SAVO ISLAND and POINT ESPERANCE, duping night.

The state of the s

#### ANNEX W

#### PERSONNET.

The strength of the First Marine Division, (less 7th Marines reinforced), 684 officers and 12,404 men, was increased to a total of 19,360 effectives for the initial assault on the British Solomon Islands. Reinforcing elements comprised 5,046 Marines and 1,226 naval personnel. The Third Defense Battalion, in addition, consisting of 54 officers and 918 men, was present at the commencement of hostilities but took no part in the action for several days.

Our forces were grouped as follows when the first wave went in at Guadalcanal:

Combat Group "A": 4,308 officers and men of the 5th Marines (Reinforced); attached units of engineers, tanks, amphibious tractors and other auxiliary groups.

Combat Group "B": 4,531 officers and men of the First Marines (Reinforced); supporting units of special troops.

Support Group: 3,537 officers and men of the 11th Marines (Artillery); the 1st Parachute Battalion and attached units.

2d Marines (Reinforced): 4,840 officers and men of the 2d regiment.

1st Raider Battalion: 828 men.

By September 6, the 67th Fighter Squadron of the U. S. Army Air Forces was established in the Guadalcanal area with a strength of 41 men. CUB ONE (Advanced Naval Base), made up of 158 aviation technicians, 31 communications personnel, 391 SeaBees, bomb disposal and torpedo technicians, had been brought in. At the same time, 2 medical battalions and a Navy defense force of 173 men had moved into the assistance of the Marines on Tulagi.

On 19 September the 215 officers and 3,450 enlisted men of the Seventh Regiment, reinforced, arrived in Guadalcanal.

The numerical strength of the forces ashore had not been increased by August 20 and casualties to the number of 362 had

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been inflicted on the division. 525 additional casualties by the 18th of September again lowered our effective strength, but from that point on, as the campaign entered its fifth Phase, American strength steadily increased.

Three aviation groups, with their planes, pilots and ground crews, were using Henderson Field. They were Marine Air Group 23--917 men; the 67th Fighter Squadron of the U.S. Army Air Forces--33 men; and Fighter Squadron 5, U.S. N.--64 men.

By September 30, an advanced Naval Base had been established in the Kukum area with more than 1,000 Naval personnel on hand. This base force was composed as follows: a headquarters unit; an advanced base aviation unit; a communications unit; a medical unit; a supply unit; a torpedo unit; the 6th Naval Construction Battalion and a Port Birector's organization.

By this time, there were 19,251 men on Guadalcanal and 3,260 men on Tulagi. Tulagi was further strengthened by the arrival of Motor Torpedo Squadron, 3.

Biggest single reinforcement at this time was the arrival of Army's 164th Infantry Regiment, whose 2,837 officers and men had all been established on Guadalcanal by October 26. Two more Marine Air Groups, with a total personnel of 1,000, had also arrived by the latter part of the month.

The 1st Raider Battalion and the 1st Parachute Battalion, both of whom had suffered comparatively heavy losses in the earlier clashes with the Japanese, had been moved to the New Hebrides where there were 2,320 rear echelon troops. Losses and reinforcements had stabilized U. S. forces of all services in the Solomons to a new high of 27,727 men as the month ended.

Seven additional aviation units were operating in the islands by the middle of November. They were

	- 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1		***	the same of the same	1 (1 a - 1 a				. ,
-Marine	a Air. Gi	roup 14.			그녀를 되었습!	126	317 men	TERROR COUNTY	
Marane	Air Gi	roup 142				7."\ 20	94 (0)	Louis Sierry	
347th	Fighter	r Group	(Army)	A 4 8 6 7	មុខ ខុស្ស	$\tilde{1}$	1400m 41	Paragram Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation	
- 37tn F	Menter	Squadro	n (Arm	<b>y</b> )	I Her.	A	16 sum 6		
VT-10	(Navy)				alag. Dy		3815 m	and the field	· {
VS-10	(Navy)	ไม่เลาผันไรค่สร้าไก เ			19				
	(Navv)				Barriera de Barriera de Barriera de			,	

1,748

The Division special troops were also considerably strengthened by the arrival of additional tanks, transport and amphibious tractor elements and the 2d Raider Battalion. By November 18 there were 5,581 men in this group compared with its low-ebb force of only 2,386 in October.

The Eighth Marines (3,186 officers and men) and another Army Infantry Regiment, the 182d (2,146 officers and men), were established in the Solomons by early in December. In addition, the Army had brought in the following groups: units of the 57th Engineers-303 men; 715 Field and Coast Artillery personnel, and a detachment of the 101st Medical Regiment of 220 officers and men.

The Aola area was now garrisoned by 289 Marines, 981 Army Infantrymen, 86 Field Artillery troops and the officers and men of the Acorn (Red) One, U. S. N., 493 strong.

Our forces in the Solomons of all services now numbered 39,416.

By 10 December a large part of the 1st Division had departed, excepting the Seventh Marines. The Second, Eighth and Tenth Marines, along with the Americal Division of the U. S. Army undertook the garrisoning of the island.

In the last phase of the campaign, which ended December 10, our casualties were more heavy than in the other three phases totalled. We lost 320 officers and 3818 men in this period, but the stream of reenforcements, more especially towards the end, was more than enough to offset losses.

Our forces involved in the entire campaign were approximately 32,000 Marine and Naval personnel, approximately 18,000 Army personnel. Total Naval and Marine losses in the campaign were 426 officers and 4,860 men.



# NUMERICAL SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES IN UNITS OF FIRST MARINE DIVISION (reinforced)

PHASE II		KIA		IED		ALI	E	VAC	T	OTALS
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AUG 7th-9th:		Enl:	011	Enl	: <u>Oi i</u>	Enl:	-	Enl;	Off	Enl
lstMarDiv.	4	31	-	2 2	Τ.	ᆄ	:3	73	7 0	107
2nd Mar.	~	19	•••-	2		3	1	31	7	55
lst Raider Bn.	2	28	1	5	•	. •••	4	50		83
10th Mar.	-	ļ	•••					2		3
USN Cub 1, ANB	****		••	*** .		. <del>T</del>	•	Z	211	2
PHASE III	:	1417					:		$f^{\frac{1}{2}}$	
AUG 10th-20th:	•	1 · 4	- 1			•				
lstMarDiv.	1	21	-	ı	: 4	27	3	22	8	7 <u>1</u>
2nd Mar.		1	••	2	-	-	•	4	•••	7
lstRaider Bn.	-	ì	•	ı			•	5	<del>***</del>	7
10th Mar.		· 1		-	٠	•	<del>ب</del>		•	7 1 0
USN & USA AIR	-	•	-	-			1	<del></del>	ï	Ö
USN Cub 1, ANB		•	•			-		7.	-	9-18 ··
	. *				• . •	•				
PHASE IV					•					
AUG 21st-SEP 18th	:		V	1.4	•		* .*			
lstMarDiv.	7	140	1	11	3	1	24	373	35	525
2nd Mar.	_	•••		* +	••			2	. **	2
lst Raider Bn.	· 1	24		1	4	11	6	48	7.	8.4
10th Mar.	• 📅	2			4	1	Sec. 1	9	_	12
USN & USA AIR	2	***	-		د <del>حم</del>	•		-	2	***
MAG #14 & 23	4	· 1	. 🚗	-	16	7	16	13	36	21
USN Cub 1, ANB	2	$\sim \tilde{2}$		_		ĺ	-	9	2	12
· PHASE V					•	_		•		
SEP 19th-DEC 10th										
lstMarDiv.	17	406	1	. 7	•••	16		1654		2083
2nd Mar.	4	52	-	-	2	3	19	291	25	346
lst Raider Bn.	1,	11	-		-	•	3	44	4	55
10th Mar,		3	· · ·	•••	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	2	1.	9	1	14
USN & USA <u>AIR</u>	2		•	-	1		3		6	11
MAG #14 & 23	11	- 23	•	***	34	-30	38	8 <del>6</del>	83	, 139
USN Cub 1, ANB	2	41	<del></del>	3		13		261	28	315
U.S. ARMY	24	144	***	. 1	-		24	376	<b>4</b> 8	521
8th Mar	. 2	54	· '" ; 😝 '	جشه ۱	1	10	9	198	12	262
2dwar Raider Bn.	-	13	1	5 - <del>5</del>	- (	1		42	l	. 56
lst Av. Eng.	-	•••	्र <del>केंद्र</del> 					16	10 M	. 16
and the second of the second o	***		UNID	ENTI	LIED:					1/4
AUG 7th-AUG 9th:	2.12.7	***	(4)	· ://=	فينف		- <del>( )</del>	***	•••	***
Aud 10th-Aug 20th	•			• •	* ***	. •	7	0.1		70
AUG 21st-SEP 18th	. <del> </del>	8	***		er van de <del>171</del> 0.	•	ر بهند و	2	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	10
SEP 19th-Dec 10th	-	31	W.	: <b>2</b>		<del></del>	•	ara:	1230	40
						THIN A	ex x			
						STATAL	11. No. 1	(1)		

	ANNEX X	(CONT)	
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TOTAL FOR PERIOD: lst Mar Div. 2nd Mar. lst Raider Bn.	29 4 4		.0	21 8 7	8 2	45 9 11	124 20 13	2122 353 147	164 26 18	2786 452 229
TOTAL (for all Unlisted)	its 86	1020	.15 .15	34	62	132	275	3625	428	<b>4</b> 860

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ANNEX X (2)

. 1.

# ALPHABETICAL LIST OF DIAGNOSES WITH TOTAL NUMBER OF ADMISSIONS AND READMISSIONS FOR EACH

#### FIRST MARINE DIVISION ONLY

#### Diseases

					•	غ
DIAGNOSTIC TITLE AND NUMBER	AUG .	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.	TOTAL
		. •				100
Abscess, Peritonsillar #500	11	1	.7	4	0	13
Abscess, Unclassified #1300	Œ	9	14	15		36
Appendicitis, Acute #304	" <del>" '6</del> "	4	3	<u>ٿ</u>	1	17
Appendicitis, Chronic #378	6	4	3	` 3	Ø	16
Bronchitis, Acute #817	3	Ó	7	ű	1	1.2
Bursitis Acute #160h	ำ	5	, <b>,</b>	. 1	1	13
Bursitis, Acute #1604 Calculus, (Urinary System)#749	70	3	ร์		1	12
Catarrhal Fever. Acute #801	67	160	107	26	11	371
Cellulitis #1305	12	48	109	91	13	273
Cyst, Teratoma, Inflamed #2334	* 2 Z	. 4	10)	5	0	21
	**************************************	2	11	ر م	. O	10
Dengue #1001		12	21	17	. 4	55 55
Dermatitis Venenata #1916	<del>.</del>			5	Oi	17
Dermatitis #1917	, 2	11	7			
Diagnosis Undetermined #2122	.3	25	: 31 <u> </u>	1.8	: 4	
Dysentery, Bacillary #902	O	4	. , 5	2.	. 0	11
Enterocolitis, Acute #323.	0	5	. 9	•	, 🦫 🐧	14
Enteritis, Acute #322	0	, 6	, , ' <b>5</b>	6	€, <b>O</b>	: 1 <b>7</b>
Bpididymitis, Acute, Non-veneral		57	e de abligadores. Persona		1,	**************************************
#712	6	, <b>1</b>	11	2	jeg 🦻	10
Flat Foot #1614	• •	. 0	112	•	0 ت	12
Fungus Infection Skin #2212	. 3	. 4	· 20	17	· 2	46
Gastro-Enteritis, Acute #332	228	245	123	68	12	676
Gonococcus Infection, Urethra#120	)5 h	7	1	. 1	. · · O	13
Hemorrhoids #336	70.72772		3	6	Ō	20
Hernia, Inguinal, Indirect #2004	7	TÁ	12	7	0	34
Impetigo Contagiosa #1934	3	- 5	21	2	2	33
Ingrowing Nail #1937		2	5	<u> </u>	- 2	14
Lymphadenitis #1403	0	9	7	i h	2	22
Lymphangitis #1405	Ò	á	o <sub>x</sub>	7	3	19
Malaria #1004		1169	1960	3283	334	5749
Mumps #810	, III	3			, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	17
No Disease (Mental Observation)	***		3	,	- 10.	
	2		2	<b>o</b> )	1	10
#2143		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	16	ر د	1	30
Otitis Media, Acute #520	. 0	4		<b>)</b>	₩	, 3: <b>,0</b> 0

Pharyngitis, Acute #822 Psychoneurosis, Hysteria #1534 Psychoneurosis, Situational #1521 Psychoneurosis, War Neurosis #1537 Shock #2153 Syphilis #1207 Tonsillitis Acute #818 All Other Causes (Causes for which total admissions were less than 10)	2 2 5 33	4 32 11 7 8 4 26	3 23 3 110 0 2 86	2 t II II3 II 2 53	1 12 58 0 17 1 131 0 10 7 177 1 314
 Burn #250.8  Compression, (Chest).#2511  Contusion #2512  Diagnosis Undetermined #2518  Exhaustion from overexertion #2526  Fracture, Simple #2531  Heat Exhaustion #2535  Intracranial Injury #2543  Killed in action, Details Not  Known, #2545	504003 102 57	7 7 10 8 2 10 15 2	13 66 9 6 12 17 13 11	119 7 0 2 5 8 8	0 33 0 92 0 30 1 115 0 116 1 36 0 46 0 23
Sprain Joint #2550 Strain, Muscular #2552 Wound, Gunshot #2576 Wound, Incised #2562 Mound, Infected #2577 Wound, Lacerated #2563 Wound, Punctured #2565 All Other Causes	4 3 230 1 2 7 2 5 Pois	8 2 443 3 2 11 8 20 onings	20 5 502 3 6 26 7	4 293 2 0 6	2 46 0 14 4 1472 1 10 0 10 1 51 1 18 2 46
Poisoning Venom (Insect) #2506	3	l' ALL CAUSES	6 (1st Mar	2 Div Only	• 12 ) 10635

ANNEX X (4)

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ci.

#### AUGUST 7 TO DECEMBER 10, 1942

				•	
	Killed in Action		ed Other Wounded (Causes emy Acti		Missing in Action
AUGUST	: 103	. <u>1</u>	1 :	<b>:</b> 457	<b>2</b> 5
SEPTEMBER	<b>1</b> 65	5 :	5 .	<b>433</b>	) <b>.</b>
OCTOB ER	196	\$ O 5.8	2 •	* 744	9
november	1124	t 0 t	2 :	<b>t</b> 449	<b>t</b> · · · 4
DECEMBER	<b>8</b> 0)		2 .	1 - 36	
TOTAL	£ 588	6 •	12 1519	\$ ,211.8	39
TOTAL AD-	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER OC	TOBER NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	TOTAL
(Including	• 770	• 15 <b>9</b> 2 • 3	3732 \$ 4200	<b>;</b> 428	• 110722
TOT L BICK	i 1653	6492 110	0683 8946	, 912	<b>28686</b>

# SUMMARY KILLED IN ACTION OR DIED AS A RESULT OF WOUNDS, FIRST MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED) 7 AUGUST TO 10 DECEMBER, 1942.

Division Headquarters Company  First Signal Company  First Service Battalion  Company "A" (Transport)  Company "B" (Transport)  First Tank Battalion  First Special Weapons Battalion  First Medical Battalion  First Amphibian Tractor Battalion  H&S Company, First Marines  Weapons Company, First Marines  1  1st Battalion, First Marines  2nd Battalion, First Marines	1 6 1 12 8 13	
3rd Battalion, First Marines 25		
First Marines	107	
H&S Company, Fifth Marines	108	
H&S Company, Seventh Marines	190	
H&S Company, Eleventh Marines	<b>4</b> 5	•
First Pioneer Battalion	10	
Total for First Marine Division,		627
First Raider Battalion	73 6 2	
lstBattalion, Second Marines	95	المعتدد المعادد المعاد
lst Battalion, Eighth Marines	• 59	
Tenth Marines	ц 3 3	

SUMMARY - Killed in Action or Died as a Result of Wounds, First Marine Division (Reinforced), 7 August to 10 December, 1942.....Sheet Number Two

Second Raider Battalion	, 5		
Headquarters, 164th Infantry	131		
Headquarters, 182nd Infantry	प्री	·	٠.
U.S.C.G. (Staff Commander Task Force #62) B-17 - U.S. Army Aviation Group USA - 71 67th Fighter Squadron, U.S. Army 245th Field Artillery Battalion. Advance Naval Base. Cub One. USS Calhoun. USS Gregory. USS Laffey. USS Walke. USS Atlanta. USS Monssen.	1 1 2 1 2 2 2 7 6		
USS Barton. USS Aaron Ward. USS Preston. USS San Francisco. USS Cushing. USS Mc Farland. USS Pensacola. USS New Orleans. USS North Hampton. USS Navy - Miscellaneous.	1 1 1 10 10 55 65 7		
Unidentified	42		
Total Other than First Marine Division	• • • • •	691	1,318

Division Intelligence Section, Headquarters, First Marine Division, C/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

# ENEMY STRENGTH & CASUALTIES IN THE GUADALGANAL CAMPAIGN

August 7 to December 10, 1942

# (a rough estimate)

Enemy strength as of August 6:- Gavutu & Tanambogo: 900. Tulagi: 400. Florida 150. Guadalcanal 250 naval garrison, 1500 laborers 100 detachments and ors. TOTAL

ath English Walls Casualties: Gavutu & Tanambogo: 900. Tulagi 400. Florida 50. Guadaloanal

Enemy strength as of August 9: Florida: TOTAL 1400 100. Guadalcanal: 1800.

1900

PHASE III Add to enemy strength: - Iohiki Detachment: 1200. Casualties: - Florida: 50. Guadalcanal: 600 (incl. 300 prisoners). Total 650

Enemy strength as of August 20:-1900 minus 650 plus 1200.

2450

HASE IV. Add to enemy strength: Kawaguchi Brig-ade: 2500 (E Sector), plus forward el-ements of 2d Division (W Sector), i.e. 2500 plus. TOTAL 7000

Casualties: Tenaru: 1,000. Bloody Ridge: 1,000, Add, all causes, patrols, contacts, bombing and strafing, prisoners, privation; 1,000. Florida: 50. Total 3050.

Enemy strength as of september 18:-E Sector 1000; Wisector 2000 plus. TOTAL

3000

Add to enemy strength; - W Sector, 2d Division minus elements that never got there plus reinferding ..... elements and other units which did: 15000. Total 16500.

Casualties: - To October 10, including first push W: 500. To October 30 including big battle: 2000 in S Sector 1000 W Sector, add 1000 \* all causes, contacts & combat patrols, bombing and strafing by aviation, native guerilla activitles,. prisoners, starvation and disease. To November 15, incl 2d push W: 1000, add all causes: 1000, To Dec. 1, including 3d push w: 1000, add all causes 1000. To Dec. 10, W Sector and all causes: 1000. Add Astrolabe and Gurabusu sections 100, and E sector 700 (7th Marines and 2d Raiders) Total 10,300.

15400

Enemy strength as of December 10, almost all in W Sector, but not to be considered entirely effective: 8100; by process of subtracting total casualties from total strength.

8100

.These totals, 23,500 and 15,400, of enemy strength and casualties covering the whole period, represent those numbers accruing the total losses to the Japanese by activities on land. They do not include air personnel shot down, naval personnel lost by naval or air action, or military personnel similarily lost and who hever reached their destination.

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#### - DER COMPANY

#### LOGISTICS PHASE V

#### MOTOR TRANSPORT

After the unloading operations were shifted to Lunga Point, the transportation problem became one of clearing the beaches as quickly as possible, and delivering the incoming supplies to the dumps as secondary necessity. Certain of our limited transportation was essential to supplying food and water to the numerous. As water had to be hauled from the water points along the Lunga River to the various organization areas both by water trailer, of which there were no where near enough, and by 5 gallon cans, a lot of our transportation was busy doing this. To get sufficient trucks to clear beaches, it was necessary to call on all units to send a large part of the prime movers to haul with. This practice of using prime movers to haul supplies is one that should be avoided when possible, but, due to the lack of sufficient large trucks on the island it was necessary. One or two tractor trailers that were available proved extremely useful in the work of hauling gasoline drums and heavy ammunition.

Break downs did their part towards making transportation a problem. The repair section and their vital equipment and spare parts were not landed until more than two months after initial landing despite repeated requests to have them landed. This made it impossible to keep all the vehicles operating. Many requests were sent for more large trucks, but there were never more than 30% of the allowance of large trucks for a division available on the island. Our captured vehicles were used during all the dry weather, but with the slighest rain they were rendered inoperative.

As other units were landed on the island, the problem of transportation became more acute as none of them was allowed to bring up large trucks. The mistaken idea had reached certain of the rear supply authorities that we had no use of trucks of is ton or larger capacity. This idea was a grievous error.

During the months of October and November, one battalion was motorized each night to provide a mobile reserve. To accomplish this it was necessary each night to call in all trucks of it ton capacity and have them assemble in the reserve battalion area. Sufficient trucks could be assembled to motorize but one battalion at a time.

In concluding this summary of Motor transportation as employed in the Guadaloanal operation, certain facts should be set forth that will be of interest and instruction.



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- vehicle.
- (b) It is essential to have some repair facilities landed with their equipment in the earlier stages of the operation.
- (c) The full allowances of vehicles for the various units of the division are necessary for an efficient operation.
- (d) The allowance of water carts should be increased by 100%.
- (e) An adequate supply of spare parts must be maintained in the Base Depots and must be shipped regularly to the forward elements.
- ements.

  (f) Captured vehicles should not be taken over by the unit first seizing them, but should be taken over and serviced by trained motor transport personnel prior to placing them in operation.

# PIONEERS STORES

on 20 September, the Pioneers took over defense of the beach unloading area and moved there which proved to be very logical conception. With the arrival of equipment, principally a Le-Teurneau Crane and a Northwest Crane, ability to handle the unloading of heavy items of equipment was vastly increased and an AK with from 3000 to 3500 long tons of cargo could be completely unloaded in from 30 to 35 working hours. On 13 October, Jap artillery commerced intermittent shelling of the beach west of LUNGA POINT and this caused cessation of unloading activity in that area. This task consequently was turned over to the Naval Activities present under Cub One, and the beach between Lunga Lagoon and the Tenaru River was prepared to receive cargo. This condition continued with two exceptions: the unloading of the 182d Infantry which was brought ashore in the Kukum Beach Area, and the unloading of the 147th Infantry which was landed at Velinavua Village, both of which were handled by the Pioneer Battalion. The latter unloading was noteworthy in that it approximated an actual landing One Company of Pioneers arrived at the site with about two hours of daylight left in which to prepare it for a task to commence at daylight the following day. Elements of Acorn one were were already present with bulldozers, a crane and a supply of somerfeld Mats, Dump sites were selected, runways bulldozed, and late with mat, and the dump areas cleared by dark, all of which was well as made possible by the presence of and use of heavy duty bulldozers.

During both Phase IV and V, the Pioneers engaged in considerable demolition, personnel and booby trap activity, principally in conjuction with the 5th Marines and in preparation of their own beach defense lines. By the end of the period, two complete lines of entrenchments with emplacements for machine guns and 37mm guns had been constructed.

ANNEX Z (2)

#### ENGINEERS

On 21 September, the Engineer Battalion moved into a new bivous position in the beach area. It occupied and organized for defense that sector bounded on the East by ALLIGATOR CREEK and on the West by the East branch of LUNGA RIVER, a front of some 2500 yards.


A second water unit was now put into operation on the East bank of the LUNGA RIVER just below the main bridge. A mobile unit had already been installed to replace the overloaded protable unit originally installed on the West bank of the river. Throughout the entire operation, these units functioned under overloaded conditions and their efficiency was a tribute to well trained enlisted operators. Luckly, no hits were ever scored on either of these units by either bombs or shellfire, although there were frequent near misses.

The month of October was taken up with road construction and improvement in all forward areas, construction and improvement of air raid shelters, and general improvement of facilities insofar as materials available would allow. The large group of high trees on the opposite side of the LUNGA RIVER in extension of the bomber strip had already been felled by Engineers to allow a better angle of approach for incoming planes, and coconut trees in an extension of the runway to some 5500 feet, which was now being accomplished by the Sixth Naval Construction Battalion.

An anti-tank mine field was laid by "B" Company just West of LUNGA POINT, extending from the hills down to the beach; including a total of some 900 mines. Three bands were laid using a standard nongeometric pattern. A detailed chart was turned in to the Division Headquarters and to the 5th Marines showing location of mines, but in spite of normal precautions, several vehicles were demobilized in the field but no serious injury to personnel was accasioned.

A footbridge (floating) was completed across the LUNGA RIVER (#104 80401987) at a point about 1500 yards South of the main air-field on 23 October. Material used consisted of light lumber salvaged from demolished buildings and empty fuel drums. This type of footbridge (constructed by "D" Company) was found to be very satisfactory until rains caused sudden floodstream in the river, and then no floating bridge would hold:

Work of improving beach defenses was a continuous project and a great deal of maintenance of protective and tactical wire



During this period as before, the lack of Engineer materials and adequate equipment, particularly heavy earth-moving equipment, was the source of continual difficulty. By cooperation with the sixth Naval Construction Battalion, the use of all available equipmen to the best advantage was effected.

On 26 October, "B" Company was ordered up to the MATANIKAU RIVER line to reinforce the 2d Battalion, Seventh Marines, where it remained until 31 October, when it returned to the Battalion.

"B" Company suffered three casualties while on this duty.

"B" Company suffered three casualties while on this duty.

During this period from 25 to 31 October, material was salvaged and prepared for the construction of four floating footbridges to carry assault troops across the MATANIKAU RIVER in an attack scheduled for 1 November. On the afternoon of 31 October, this bridge material was hauled up and dumped at the proposed sites. Between 0100 and 0600 on 1 November, three footbridges were constructed in the dark by "A", "C" and "D" Companies. The bridges were of simple construction, consisting of a treadway 40" wide supported on a 2" x 4" stringers which were fastened to a light framework, to which fuel drums were lashed. The sections had been prefabricated so that installation consisted merely of lashing the drums to the sections, floating them, and securing them end to end with bolts so that each bay was hinged to the next. This is not to say that it was a simple operation in the dark where silence was quite an important factor; banks of the stream were rough and covered with thick undergrowth. The entire bridge was secured with light lines to a line stretched from one bank to the The security for the bridgehead during construction was furnished by a company from the Fifth Marines. Each bridge when completed carried quite satisfactorily a double column of assault troops with their equipment.

During the day (1 November) a vehicular bridge of the 10 ton Temporary Pier was constructed near the footbridges to carry supply loads for the advancing attack. Although the bridge was finished that day, it was not available for use until noon of the following day, for an access road to the main beach road had to be cut through, which involved in addition, the construction of a small 15 foot bridge across a drainage ditch. Construction of this bridge was accomplished in about three hours, which included felling and shaping of the coconut logs of which it was built,

In this operation, the Engineer Battalion furnished to the Fifth Marines one officer and twenty men as a demolition party whose mission was to destroy enemy supplies and equipment which were captured.

On 5 November, the Engineers received another rush call for a bridge to cross the ILU RIVER. A reconnaissance was made and it was decided that in order to save time, the bridge would be constructed at the mouth of the niver at practically the same point where the first temporary bridge on this river was installed on 9 August, by 1700, traffic was moving across the new bridge, a tribute to the efficiency of "D" Company. Basic material used was a "Tublelox" Dock, but the decking was an odd assortment of salvaged lumber of varying lengths, giving a vague impression of a patchwork quilt---beauty of design, however, was not a factor to be considered. The width of the crossing at this point was about 90 feet with a depth of water of about 32 feet at dow tide, and with a smooth sand bottom, the only difficult feature lay in the swiftness of the current. Plans were already being made to construct a more permanent bridge upstream on the ILU, (#104 8640993) since it was realized that this temporary bridge would last only until the first flood came down the river. This fact was proven two days later when a rise of some four feet in the river scoured away the abutments, despite the efforts of a 24hour a day maintenance crew

By 11 November, however, a timber bent bridge had been completed by "B" Company at a point about 800 yards upstream on the ILU and a second temporary "Tubelox" bridge had been installed by "D" Company at the identical site of the amphibian tractor bridge (#104 08861997--7 August) on the ILU backwash opposite Beach RED. This allowed an access route all the way East to the MALIMBIU RIVER (KOLI POINT). Floodstreams came often these days, however, and the night after the timber bridge on the ILU was completed, a sudden flood rise piled heavy drift against the bents and the swift current scoured under the upstream side of the mudsills, so that on the morning of the 12th, what had been a rather proud looking bridge, had a definite "list to starboard". The bridge was strongly constructed, however, and after a bit of bracing up in the right places, it developed that it would carry traffic satisfactorily up to 12 tons.

For several weeks, a small crew of Engineer's from "D" Company had been working on a pile driver to be used in construction of bridges that would be sufficiently strong to with tand the effects of the sudden flood rises in the rivers on the Island. On several occasions, flood rises of 6-7 feet in a few hours had occurred

and no temporary structure could stand against the pressure of water and debris that came rushing down after a heavy rain in the mountains. The finished pile driver would certainly never have won a contest for beauty, but it was capable of doing a job. and that was important. It was constructed of steel from several salvaged Japanese roof trusses, welded and braced with 3/4" cable: it was powered with a gaseline engine driven winch, dropping a 500 pound hammer, and its smoothness of operation was a source of constant amazement to all hands. This pile driver was put into operation for the first time on 14 November by "D" Company on the ILU RIVER alongside of the timber bent job which had fared so badly in the last flood, with a determination to construct a bridge that would withstand any flood. Eight inch pilings were driven eight to ten feet in to the sand and gravel bottoms, four to the bent. Using 13 foot spans, five coconut log stringers were installed in each span. The decking was an odd assortment of anything that could be salvaged that approached any similarity to two inch lumber. This bridge successfully carried 14-ton loads and was rated at 17 tons. A bit of uneasiness was always felt In the use of coconut logs in bridge construction, for nothing very definite was known about the characteristics of this material; moreover their great weight caused considerable difficulty in construction. Further, it was feared that after drying out in the hot tropical sun, a great deal of the strength of the fibers of the coconut log would be lost. This material was frequently used, however, for the lack of anything better.

About 7 November, at "Tubelox" Bridge was pushed across the mouth of the West branch of the MALIMBIU RIVER by "C" Company, to assist in the supply of troops engaged in operations on KOLI POINT. At this same time an attempt was also being made to make a crossing at the mouth of the main branch of the river, but as luck would have it, the water was rising so fast that abutements were scoured away faster than they could be built. This attempt was abandoned and a temporary "Tubelox" bridge was started at a point about 5500 yards upstream. It was known that another sudden rise in the river would taken any temporary bridge with it, but there being no other materials available. It was thought that ... possibly some use might be gotten out of it before it went the way of all temporary bridges of this type. This bridge was finished. on 15 November, but it was destined never to carry traffic. That night came another sudden rise in the river (between eight and ten feet), completely inundating the bridge, and by morning nothing was left but a pile of wreckage on either bank, a heartbreaking sight to men who had worked from daylight to dark on it's contruction. However, work was begun immediately on a light ferry to be operated on the same site. This ferry was constructed, installed and operated by "B" company of the 2d Engineers, which had

come in with the Eighth Marines. Oil drums were used for floats and parts of the Temporary pier (removed from the MATANIKAU RIVER site about 13 November) were used for abutments. Power was supplied to operate the ferry by a winch on the rear of a tractor. One-ton truck loads were contemplated.

About 18 November, it became necessary to install another temporary bridge (vehicular) on the MATANIKAU RIVER at the same site as the first one. This bridge was put in with no great difficulty (except an occasional artillery barrage), and was still being used when the battalion departed from the island. Temporary bridges on the MATANIKAU seldom gave any difficulty, due to the fact that the current was never very swift.

At this time (18 November) a part of H&S Company had started work on rebuilding and improving the road leading across the ridges just west of the bomber airfield across the LUNGA. This involved cutting through the tops of two ridges, an estimated 2000 cubic yards of earth-moving. The job was accomplished in about 10 days and the results afforded two routes passable in any weather to the southern perimeter.

By this time, two additional water purification units had been installed to relieve the load on the two units on the LUNGA. One portable unit was operated on the MATANIKAU and the other, a mobile unit was located on the ILU RIVER at the site of the permanent pile bent bridge previously discussed. In addition to these, a portable unit was set up and operated East of the MAL-IMBIU RIVERS for about a week during the latter part of November.

About 20 November, two more bridges were started; one was at a point about 900 yards (#104 07932022) from the mouth of the East branch of the LUNGA RIVER to access to the small island just to the West, and the other was at a point about 1500 yards (#104 08041987) South of the airfield on the LUNGA. There was no doubt that any bridge expected to stand for more than several days in the LUNGA, must be something of a permanent structure. By this time the Sixth Naval Construction Battalion was beginning to operate a make-shift sawmill which could turn out a limited supply of lumber suitable for bride decking. On both the bridges just mentioned, it was planned to use for stringers 33 foot spans constructed from Japanese steel roof trusses, which had been intended for use in airplane hangars; obviously, these steel members were not designed for support of bridge loads, but by welding in additional bracing, and limiting the pay loads to about 8 tons, it was calculated that the structure would be satisfactory. On the bridge South of the airfield, "D" Company operated its pile driver, driving ten pilings for each bent to support the steel trusses. to be protecting a process to the best times of the con-



On the other bidge, "C" Company, to support the trusses, constructed cribwork piers of coconut logs, weighted down with gravel-filled sand bags. The depth of the stream at this point was normally very shallow, so that this type of construction was not too difficult. After each crib was finished, sheet pilings was driven around the base of it to prevent scouring under by the swift current. Neither of these bridges were completed before the Battalion left the island on 9 December, much delay being occassioned by lack of material and equipment, but it was believed that with necessary material, they could be completed in several more days.

the file of the second of the second During the period from 19 September to departure from the island, by far the biggest jobs required of the Engineer Battalion consisted of bridging, but much routine work went on continually such as water supply, demolitions, particularly disposal of duds, shell and bombs, and the blowing of craters for burying enemy dead; road work; construction and repair of bomb shelters; and last but not least, a state of constant readiness for the defense of the beach sector, occupied by the Battalion. The sector occupied by

SUPPLY Supply activities during this phase were primarily those re-

lating to:
(a) Replenishment and allocation of supplies (see appendix "I3"). 

(b) Survey of supply with recommendations for levels to be maintained (see appendix "5").

(c) Maintenance and allocation of motor transport (see motor transport report). The last section of the se

(d) Transfer of unloading activities to naval operating base ol. (e) Initial employment of native labor. control.

(f) Construction of roads and bridges. The transfer was the

(g) Transfer of Supply Functions to Army. Replenishment of Supplies.

Rations. The ration level during this phase showed steady improvement, not only in quantity, but also in quality. Increases in the garrison required an increase in daily rations from 35 tons to 50 tons. Losses due to enemy actionwere negligible. Although a few cattle were slaughtered, the native herds were practically intact when the Division was relieved.

Tentage. Tents were never adequate for the requirements. By restricting tentage to officers of field rank, the remainder provided shelter for offices and storage of rations.

Mosquito Nets. There was an acute shortage of nets from the beginning and supply never equalled the demand. Undoubtedly this factor was largely responsible for the high incidence of malaria. Individual nets for each man is recommended as a must for future operations in similar theatres.

Equipment and Supplies for Defensive Works. As late as October 5, a message was sent to CTF 62 requesting barbed wire, on information stocks were available at Button. As additional organizations arrived with full equipment, intrenching tools and barbed wire were allocated to the several sectors. Badly needed defensive works were pushed and the troops managed to have some wire before them in the several enemy attacks. However, the perimeter was not completely wired before the Division was relieved, due to lack of wire and pickets.

Liquid Fuels.

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Motor. All Jap truck gas was eventually used plus additional supplied from Tulagi. Motor gas supplies reached a critically low level several times during November. An emergency was averted only by hurried shipments of Jap aviation gas from Tulagi which was blended with Jap motor gas. (see appendix "4" for details).

Clothing. The supply of clothing was inadequate for the demand. When the Division was relieved, it was necessary to furnish army uniforms to the troops.

Kerosene. All Jap kerosene and naptha were used to augment our meagre supply. (appendix "4").

Aviation Gas. Although problems of supply of aviation gas was a function of naval activity, D-4 kept in touch with this vital problem. Gesoline levels were usually critical - generally the supply was less than 5 days, due to increasing numbers of aircraft and constant aerial patrols - especially refuelling B-17's which landed from distant missions. During the entire period covered by this report, all gas was delivered in drums, and the vast quantity placed a strain on the supply of such containers, besides requiring an immense amount of labor and time, with enemy attacks on supply ships ever threatening. On October 15% after enemy neval bombardment during the early morning hours, 40 aircraft were reported disabled and the gas supply exhausted, except that which was being salvaged from wrecked planes. D-4 personnel immediately checked eviation gas dumps for possible drums among the empties and succeeded in locating about 400 by noon (2 day is supply for planes serviceable at thet time). Urgent dispatches 

were sent to CTF 62 stating the crisis and several DC-3's were sent in with about 10 drums each. It was the best that could be done, however inadequate, until ships enroute could land substantial supplies.

Ammunition. No ammunition was received after the initial landing until the 7th Marines arrived, Sept 18. About 10 u/f of ammunition with additional hand grenades and 81mm Mortar shell, and 28 days rations; 500 drums fuel, 2/3 of barbed wire were landed. Five u/f were allocated to this regiment, and the remainder formed the nucleus of the Division Reserve. Rations, fuel, and other supplies were similarly handled to repleniehbdivision dumps. The next important addition to supplies was landed by the 164th Infantry - 5 u/2 ammunition and equivalent rations, wire, tentage etc. - about November 5. These supplies were absorbed by the Division in a manner similar to that applying to the 7th Marines. With the arrival of the 128th Infantry, about 12 November, the US Army assumed responsibility for defense of the sector west of the Lunga River, and all ammunition landed by this regiment remained in Army control. A division dump was located in that sector and only reports of readiness were required of the two sectors from that time until the 1st Division was relieved by the Army. Following the battle of Raider's Ridge, a serious shortage of 81mm shell, 37mm cannister, and M17 signals, developed and, in response to urgent requests, CTF 62 shipped in substantial quantities of this ammunition by air, to relieve the situation. M17 signals were the only available means for illuminating the battle field at night --- a situation for which no provision had been made and for which the TBA allowances were not intended.

With the arrival of the 1stBn 11th Marines, additional artillery called for additional ammunition, and the supplies of this battalion afforded little more than its own requirements. The battle of Raider's Ridge showed clearly that the demand for artillery fire would exceed the TBA allowances. CTF 62 was requested to expedite shipment of this ammunition. No substantial amounts were forthcoming, and, following the barrage at MATANIKAU, Oct. 8, supplies were running dangerously low. Urgen dispatches were sent CTF 62 requesting a level of 15 u/f of 75mmPH and 17 u/f 105mm shell be maintained, and that additional supplies of 81mm shell be shipped by air. In reply, CTF 62 stated that ammunition was enroute and that no more 75mmPH, and 81mm heavy shell was available in S.W. Pacific. About Nov. 10, 7-155mm guns and 4-155 howitzers landed with 5 u/f. They were engaged within 3 days and fired 2 u/f and 3.5 u/f respectively in the next 3 weeks. Substantial replenishments of artillery and mortar shell, small arms ammunition and 37mm ammunition, arrived in late November, to relieve shortages: that had plagued the Division from the battle of the Tenaru.

ANNEX Z (10)

For data on ammunition expenditure, see appendix "1".

Transfer of unloading activities to Naval Operating Base Personnel.

The nucleus of a Naval Operating Base was formed under Lt. Comdr. Doxter, USCG, consisting of landing boats and their crews detached from the AP's and AK's August 9. This detachment labored under great handicaps - insufficient boats, boats in bad condition, no repair facilities and very limited personnel.

From the beginning, D-4 held to the principle that, the beach head having been secured, Supply of the Division was a Naval function and that it should be administered and manned by Naval personnel, not only to the beach, but to the Division dumps. Since it was impossible for the embryo NOB to do more that operate and service the boats, the Pioneer Battalion continued to furnish labor for handling cargo from ship's holds to trucks, administer the beach and supervise working parties details to augment pioneer personnel. Division Motor Transport carried the supplies to the Division dumps, where trucks were unloaded by working parties detailed for that purpose from troops on the line. With the advent of Cub One, discussions with the Chief of Staff were resumed relative to Naval personnel assumming responsibility for supply, but it was not possible to effect the change; because that organization was not constituted for that duty, their motor (and other) equipment was sadly inadequate, and the improvement of the airfield & urgently required their full attention. Unloading activities, therefore remained in the status quo. Early in October a Naval Construction Battalion landed with partial equipment, and, as a result of enemy shelling Kukum from shore batteries, unloading activities were transferred to the Lunga Lagoon-Tenaru"beach, and NOB assumed responsibility for unloading ships, relieving the Pioneers of that duty. NOB furnished some labor (aviation ammunition), some trucks and drivers, but working parties were furnished from Division and Army troops. Experimental employment of a native labor battalion was initiated at this time.

#### Mative Labor Battalion

Under the auspices of D-2, Mr. Witte, superintendent of Lever Bros. plantation, assembled a "labor battalion" of natives on the island. Two native police boys from the group of devoted followers of Captain Clements, British Army Intelligence Service, served as headman and interpreters. A Marine officer was placed in command. This labor was primarily employed as carriers of supplies from boats to beach dumps and to load trucks.

During intervals between ship arrivals, it was proposed to employ this labor on roads, and other general labor. The natives worked very well at first, carrying loads that our men could not equal. Their effectiveness soon waned. The troops fraternized with them, trading food, tobacco, and even clothing for souvenirs. A mistake was made in pampering them with a diet of American type instead of the habitual pound of rice, per man, per day, plus a bit of meat. They soon developed gastric disturbances. A Medical Officer was assigned the duty of caring for them, and further spoiled them by applying bandages to their sores, etc. With childish enthusiasm they vied with each other to be first on sick report and proudly displayed bigger and better bandages to their envious companions. At the end of 10 days, many claimed their wages and departed, being dissatisfied with any labor other than as carriers.

At the instance of D-3, a group of 50 was detailed to carry rations and similar supplies to the troops farthest removed from the beach road at MATANIKAU, where the supply problem was particularly difficult. It was a valuable aid to the troops there, conserving their energy, by employing natives at work for which they are peculiarly adapted. Late in November NOB took over this activity and Mr. Witte was perfecting plans to recruit about 450 natives from Malaita, whose quality he thought much higher than that of Cactus Natives.

From the first mention of importing natives within the perimeter, the Division Surgeon strongly opposed the plan from a health standpoint - particularly with regard to malaria. No doubt the medical report comments more fully on this point.

#### Reads and Bridges

In addition to the construction described in the engineer report, D-4 consulted with Cub One and Naval Construction Battalion officers regarding bridges and access roads of more substantial nature than our engineers were equipped to build.

Gub One very ingeniously built two pile drivers from salvaged Jap channels, beams, cable and motors. One was used to drive piling for a two-way bridge over the Lunga, and for another across the Tenaru, of 30 ton capacity. The other was used to drive piling for a pier at Kukum which had to be abandoned due to enemy shelling. The building of the Lunga bridge was symbolic of the Division fortunes. A bridge had to be constructed as quickly as possible to provide communication between the sectors when the rains should come. Constant interruptions plagued the crew -

#### ANNEW TOONT)

bombing, shelling, shortage of labor, flash floods, etc., paralleling those of the troops. It seemed that it would never be completed. However traffic moved over it the night preceding the heaviest enemy bombardment, preceding his first large scale landing.

Inter-sector communication was now relatively secure, a fact that measurably relieved the anxieties of the staff.

#### Transfer of Functions to the Army.

About Nov. 20, supply officers and personnel of the Army joined with corresponding sections of the Division to familarize themselves with our methods and inventories. On Nov. 30 inventories were taken of supplies on hand, receipts given, and the Army took over on Dec. 1.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE GAINED

In order to execute an unloading mission there must be present certain essential elements, namely; manpower, boats, trucks and equipment. Each of these elements may vary in quantity and amount within limits, but, generally speaking, a shortage of existing in any one requires additional quantities of the others. In order to clarify these statements, each element will be treated separately in the following paragraphs:

Boats obviously, are the first bottleneck to be reduced. The most suitable are as follows: Higgin's Type TL-it has greater capacity than the Bureau Type-TR Boats for they can be unloaded by "Chain Methods" whereas they TY requires the lifting of its cargo over a gunwale. However, all boats present can and must be used. During the administrative phase, there should be a boat pool based in the landing area of at least twelve tank lighters and twenty Tare Ramp boats and the most important considerations is that there be an ample supply of spare parts and the necessary technicians present to keep them running. Unless Diesel driven boats are absolutely unavailable, gas engined boats should not be left in this pool for the two very pertinent reasons that their fuel consumption is relatively tremendous and they require constant care, maintenance and repair. Diesel drive boats are a definite must.

An adequate supply of trucks is essential because of the direct bearing they have on the man power required. During both the landing and the administrative phases of the operation supplies must be brought across the beach and dispersed into dumps. If

those supplies have to be moved by hand no more than a hundred yards from the water's edge, manpower requirements double and if the distance is greater they become astronomical. As to the number required for a given operation, conditions are too variable to attempt a generalized estimate. With a specific operation in view, sufficient conditions should be known to make a forecast.

Regarding equipment, two types of weight lifting devices proved extremely useful, LeTourneau Cranes and the tractor mounted swivel cranes of the Northwest type. Each has its specific application and one supplements the other. Most efficient use of a Northwest requires either a float deck or finger pier on which the crane can be placed and remain stationary while trucks are brought to it to receive the cargo. For very heavy loads up to twenty tons, the LeTourneau can be pushed in the water along side the boat, make its hoist, and then carry the object up the beach into a dump. It is somewhat more flexible than the Northwest, and its ability to pick up and transport a heavy item makes it very valuable. Shear legs with winches can be employed, but the Northwest crane is a superior device. Heavy dozers are an essential for clearing dump sites, and runways to them. While corduroy runways can be constructed, the most satisfactory method of providing runways across the sand is through the use of Somerfeld mat, and a quantity of this material should be landed in the first boats carrying supplies.

As indicated before, the Red Beach unloading completely bogged down due to an inadequate supply of manpower. Our experience indicated that no more supplies and equipment should be landed initially than can be unloaded in a 10 to 12 hour period. This should embrace say five "days of supply" of ammunition, rations (Cast and Dog only), gasoline and oil, medical and some water depending on local availability. A labor party of 1500 men working without reliefs as such should be sufficient. This is in addition to the Shore Party, men manning boats, and working the ship's holds.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE PHASE

After five days, the beachhead should be secured and AK's may be brought in. As part of the deck lead, LeTourneau cranes and the cats necessary for their operation and Northwest cranes should be carried so that they may come ashore in the first loads. Each Engineer Regiment should have four LeTourneaus as part of its organic equipment in addition to the three Northwests now provided. With this equipment sufficient boats and trucks, and employing a typical beach set-up as described before, manpower requirements in

ANNEX Z (14)

addition to that furnished by Engineer's Shore Party may be estimated as follows:

NUMBER	OF AK's	j. Š		MEN	REQUIRED
1			. 2. 14		700
2	المعادرة والمعادر		Age of the second		1100
3			· N. 1	1	1300
4					1400
5	4				1500

Truck requirements will vary according to type of cargo, distance from beach to dumps, conditions of roads, and truck size, but the following may be used as guide. Let us assume general cargo, a five mile round trip and road conditions permitting 5 to 10 miles per hour speed, then:

,	NUMBER OF	AK's	TRUCKS	REQUIRED	(Mixed Cap-
	1. I			60	acities)
	2	in the start of the start of the		90	
	3			105	
	4			115	
	5			125	` .

It is believed that no more than two AK's should be brought in at a time.

RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON OPERATIONS ON GUADALCANAL

# ENGINEERS

If Engineer troops are to be expected to function properly and accomplish their fundamental missions, every effort must be made to insure the availability of supplies and mechanical equipment necessary to efficient operation.

A power shovel or a bulldozer is just as important in its own phase of modern warfare as is an artillery piece. Ground troops can go only so far without proper assistance from Engineer troops and without adequate equipment, Engineer troops cannot supply that proper assistance. Plans for combat loading of ships participating in an operation should contemplate a definite schedule of unloading such that Engineer materials and equipment will become available on the beach as needed and this schedule should be adhered to as rigidly as that involving unloading of assault troops.

In any: future operations, the supply of lumber should never be left to outside sources or captured material alone. A saw mill of a type easily broken down and transported should be carried ashore and set up as early as practicable whenever there is any timber at all available for milling.

There was practically no lumber at all landed on Guadalcanal during the phase involving this organization and the small amount of lumber left by the Japanese was soon exhausted. As a result, bridging missions which this Battalion was called upon to accomplish were greatly delayed. A saw mill of the type mentioned was requisitioned months before the start of the operation but was never received.

For temporary bridges, the use of the Army 10-20 ton Temporary Pier and the 15 ton Preumatic Pontoon Bridge were strongly recommended. This material has the advantages of facility and speed, both in original construction and in repair of damaged portions, ease of maintenance which render it far more suitable than the 3" "Tublex". Due to the numerous clamps used in its construction, the latter cannot be constructed with as much ease and rapidity. Vibration of traffic tends to lessen belts on clamps causing a greater maintenance problem. This is not to say that the "Tublex" Dock should be abandoned as Engineer Equipment but it use in temporary bridging, except under ideal conditions, or as a last resort, is not recommended. It is, however, quite useful in construction of temporary boat docks, observation towers and the like. Any temporary bridge should be used only long enough to permit construction of at least a semi-permanent bridge to replace it, unless its use tactically is definitely limited to only a short period of time. In the streams of the type found on Guadalcanal where sudden freshets occur causing 6-10 foot rises in several hours, no temporary bridge is likely to hold. In a situation of that type equipment for driving pilings deep into the stream's bottom is essential. The use of Amphibian Tractors as pontoons for temporary floating bridges should be given serious consideration. Experiments were carried out at Wellington, N.Z. by QMC, W.A. Davis which proved that with very little difficulty, Amphibian Tractors may be adapted to this use. Here, oneo of the most important advantages is that this is a temporary bridge that in itself is mobile. All material necessary in construction of a completed bridge can be carried in the tractors themselves, obviating the necessity for separate transportation to the bridge site, which in itself is frequently no small problem to be dealt with.

All Engineer troops should be carefully trained in the proper teamwork and elimination of lost motion in the construction of bridges, both of a temporary and permanent nature. Herein lies an Engineer mission than which none is more important, for the

availability of a bridge at the right place at the right time may spell success or failure of an operation.

Truck transportation should be an integral part of the equipment of each Engineer Company. That is to say, the Company should be equipped and trained to maintain completely its own transportation as well as its other equipment. Experience on Guadalcanal indicated that such a system would be much more satisfactory than that of a central pool of transportation by the Battalion. Any Engineer organization without adequate transportation, is helpless to carry out its fundamental missions.

A more plentiful supply of telephonic communication equipment should be made available for Engineer use. In a situation similiar to that on Guadalcanal where a number of construction jobs, particularly bridges were required over a widespread area, much time is to be saved where direct communication is available with Battalion Headquarters, especially in the matter of supplying, without delay, supplies and equipment that become necessary as the job progresses.

As regards training of personnel, the tendency of the parts of the individual to specialize on only one technical job should be avoided. Sickness and casualties incident to combat operations require that every man be trained to do as many different jobs as possible, within reason, of course. For instance, there is no reason why a man ordinarily employed as a mechanic should not also have his place in a team trained for rapid construction of a temporary bridge, or why a water purification operator should not also know practical demolition proceedure. An organization trained with this idea in mind will have a flexibility capable of adapting itself to any situation.

KILLED IN ACTION OR DIED AS RESULT OF WOUNDS FIRST MARINE DIVISION REINFORCED 7 AUGUST TO 10 DECEMBER, 1942. (Alphabetically by units with burial data).

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BEASLEY, Howell J.	BELET, Robert A. CROSBY, George E. EDWARDS, Ray K. NAGLER, Richard D. ROBINSON, Jack G. SKARJUNE, Edward A.		HAWLEY, John R.	DAY, Calvin C.	SHAFFNER, Orris W.		ALEXANDER, Robert W.	BRANDON, Thomas J.	BROWNSON, Harry N., Jr.	DANIELS, Raymond T.		FINAN. Francis K.	FRESE, Paul H.	LIND. Paul J.	LINT, Jean I.
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CURRY, Morris Q.	Pfc	B-1-1	349158	=	=		
DEBELE, Charles F., Jr.	Pfc	B-1-1	351596	==	=		
GARDNER, Jack H.	Pfc	<b>4</b> -1-1	340487	=	=		٠
GARRETTSON, Elmer F., Jr.	Pfc .	3-1-1	351317	=	₩::		
CARCZYSKI, Carl J.	Pfc	B-1-1	331089	=	<b>*</b>		
GRAZIER, George H.	Pot	A-1-1	368895	=	<b>±</b>	-	
GREEN, John C., Jr.	Pvt	0-1-1	354595	<b>.</b>	, =	-	
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GROVER, Oscar J., Jr.	Pfc	0-1-1	3/150/1/1	1stMarDiv Cemetery,	Guedal canal,	B.S.I., Row 1,	Grave 1.
HUNE. Dan R.	Pvt	C-1-1	334362	=======================================	=	7 11 11	<b></b>
INGERSON, Relph #	Pfc	B-1-1	347144	Overlay, Guadalcanal	1, B.S.I.		
JENSEN, Hans C.	Col	B-1-1	263323	= =	=		
KNICHEL, Thomas J.	Pvt	0-1-1	351323	Ť	で	E.S.I., Row 7,	Grave 3
KUHL, Philip S.	Pvt	B-1-1	351,600	Overlay, Guadalcanal	I, B.S.I.		
LILLY, John R.	Pvt	H-1-1	334442				
LUECKING, Bernard J.	Pvt	3-1-1	370533		= :		
MC CARTHY, Bernard J.	Pfc	B-1-1	369565	įΦ	70	B.S.I., Row 5,	Grave 5.
MC ELVAINE, Wilbur	Pvt	B-1-1	369579	Overlay, Guadalcanal	I, B.S.I.	•	
MC STINE, Leon W.	P1Sgt	3-1-1	240905	=		1	
MEREDITH, Howard R.	Pfc	0-1-1	359410	1stMarDiv Cemetery.	Guadalcanal,	B.S.I., ROW34,	Grave 2.
PERINE, Irving V. G.	2ndit.	Hq-1-1	officer		<b>:</b>	£	Grave 10
PIERCE, James F.	PhM3/c	Hq-1-1	212-63-10	Overlay, Guadalcanal	1, B.S.I.		
RICE, Leslie L.	Pfc	B-1-1	351594	f :	<b>=</b>		
SECAR, Frederick L.	Pot	B-1-1	506442		=	-	
SHOCKLEY, Riley "D"	Pvt	B-1-1	334441	=======================================	=		
SMITH, Jemes H.	Pfc	D-1-1	345102	lstMarDiv Cemetery,	Guadal canal,	B.S.I., ROW 2,	Grave 10
THOMPKINS. Robert W.	Cp1	D-1-1	300444	=	<b>=</b> :		0)
WOODWARD, Gerlton	Pfc	<b>4</b> -1-1	351284	=	<b>::</b>	= 5,	Grave 6.

# SECOND BATTALION, FIRST MARINES.

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BITHTER WROK RISSELL M.	Pot	G-2-1	329060		v Cemetery,	Guadal canal,	B.S.I.,	3	Ę.	ve.
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GIIDEA John	Pfc	F-2-1	351301.	lstMarDiv	v Cemetery,	Guadal canal,	B.S.I.	Row.	<b>~</b>	ا و
GRABARCZYK, Andrew F.	₽v₽	H-2-1	372206	=	<b>:=</b>	<b>=</b>	= .		 	10
GROVER Haven R.	Cpl	H-2-1	255972	Overlay,	Guadalcanal				,	
HALL Ralph H.	Pfc	H-2-1	351381	lstMarDi	v Cemetery,	Guadal canal,	B.S.E.	Row.		
HOLCOWBE, Richard H.	Pfc	G-2-1	293233	<b>=</b> :	<b>=</b> :	<b>÷</b> :	≐ s	= =		r-4 1
JONES Bennie C.	Pvt	F-2-1	337796	<b>:</b>	<b>=</b> :	<b>:</b> :	= =	= :	m	∞ (
	Pot	H-2-1	344329	= :	<b>:</b> :	<b>±</b> :	= :	= =	т I	N 1
KARP Charles C.	Cp1	H-2-1	281410	= :	= :	= :	= ;	: :	* \ 1	ر د -
KEARNEY, Robert J.	Pfc	H-2-1	344333	= :	= :	÷ :	= =	: :	vo c	1 0x
LYNCH, Thomas P., Jr.	Pvt	G-2-1	397030	= :	= 1	± =	: :	: =	\	<u>-</u> 1
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RICE, Ambrose I.	Pfc	파-2-1	353549	everlay,	Guadalcanal	ဟ ် က			Č	1
RIVERS, John	Pot	H-2-1	95. 15.	1stMarDi	v Cemetery,	Guadalcanal,	ω. 	HOH =	7, CF	ave .
ROBERTS, Raymond F.	Pfc	E-2-1	133	=	*	:	:			יע

	SULLIVAN, Francis P. TAYLOR, Harold K. TAYLOR, McKinley B., Jr.	Pot 2ndlt. Pot	L-3-1 M-3-1 I-3-1	348882 officer 351458	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 39, Grave 5.  " " " " " 2  " " " " 2
٠.			HEADQU ARTERS		AND SERVICE COMPANY, FIFTH MARINES.
	ADAMS, Arthur W. BAINBRIDGE, William BURAK, Walter J. CHRISTENSEN, Chester L. NARKON, Stanley	Pfc Col Col Pfc Col	H&S-5 H&S-5 H&S-5 H&S-5 H&S-5	342278 270005 302155 361444 280738	<pre>lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 5, Grave 8 Overlay, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 25, Grave 1. lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 25, Grave 1.</pre>
				WEAPONS COM	WEAPONS COMPANY, Fifth Marines.
	DONOVAN, Timothy T. HADDASZ, Robert H. VAUNDORF, Relph L.	Pfc Pvt Pvt	Wons-5 Wons-5 Wons-5	351634 357092 370506 FIRST BATTA	351634 Battlefield, Guadalcanal. 357092 IstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 8, Grave 3. 370506 Battlefield, Guadalcanal. FIRST BATTALION, FIFTH MARINES.
			•		
	AITKEN, Joseph R. ANTONOGLOU, Anthony AUSILI, Albert E.	Cpl Pvt Pvt	B-1-5 D-1-5 C-1-5	266966 337676 369655	Santo-American Mil. Cemetery, Espiritu Santo, N. H. Battlefield, Guadalcanal.
	Bielenski, John I. BONIN, Ferdinand R.	Cpl Pfc	D-1-5 D-1-5	280240 324601	<pre>lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row I, Grave ( " 50 " 9</pre>
	BUDD, Robert J.	Pvt	C-1-5 C-1-5	36844	Overlay, Guadal canal, B.S.I. Battlefield, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.
	CHOINAXI, Theodore V.	Pfc.	0-1-5	368926	Roses Cemetery, Base Roses, (Efate, W.H.) Row 1, Plot 5, Grave 14
	COOPER, Day D. CORRIGGIO, Joseph P.	ric Pfc	A-1-5 D-1-5	342841	• 1 • 0
	COX, David C. CRADDOCK, Owen W.	2ndLt. Pfc	G-1-5 G-1-5	officer 339312	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 49, Grave 10. Battlefield, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.
	CROSBY, David H., Jr.	2ndLt.	0-1-5	officer	IstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 51, Grave 1.
		P to	5-1-5 7-1-7	369118	Battlera, Guedaldena, 5.5.1.
	FETCHKO, Bernard	Pvt	B-I-5	3/5110	IstMarDiv Gemetery, Guedalcanal, E.S.I., Row 6, Grave 6.

FOXWORTHY, Fred A.	Pvt	0-1-5	337699	Battlefield, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.
GEDOMINSKI, John	Pfc	0-1-5	333308	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 50, Grave 6.
GOULET, Edward J.	Pvt	0-1-5	362755	
GROSS. Donald M.	Col	7-1-1	268767	Roses Cemetery, Base Roses, (Efate, N.H.) Row 1, Plot 5, Grave 14
	Pvt	0-1-5	361714	Battlefield, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.
	Cp.	A-1-5	368901	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadelcanel, B.S.I., Row 34, Grave 10.
	Pvt	D-1-5	339360	<b>2</b> " 50 " <b>3</b>
KEANE, Lewrence	Pvt	0-1-5	369679	Bettleffeld, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.
KIRCHNER, Metthew J.	Pot	0-1-5	369119	± ±
KOVACS, Louis P.	Sgt	0-1-5	. 942662	
KRYNAK, John	Pfc	A-1-5	331496	lstMarDiv Cometery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 35, Grave 3.
LANGOWSKI, Benedict A.	ACK	A-1-5	286472	=
LAUGHMAN, Henry B.	Pfc	0-1-5	369602	
LAWTON, Frank W.	Pvt	D-1-5	397208	Battlefield, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.
LUDWIG, Charles H.	₽v¢	A-1-5	368911	
	Pfc	<u>4.19</u>	369631	latMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 40, Grave 7
MATTIE, Sylvester	<b>C</b> b1	4-1-5	1817262	=
	Pat	0-1-5	369691	Battlefield, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.
MONACO, John	₽ <b>¢¢</b>	A-1-5	372246	
MONDAK, Joseph	Pfc	D-1-5	76866Z	IstMarthy Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 16, Grave 9.
PHILLIPS, Thomas W.	Pot	0-1-5	351264	Overlay, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.
POLLOCK, Austin W., Jr.	Pot	B-1-5	364162	Battlefield, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.
PORTER, Joseph R.	Pfc	A-1-5	354239	Is MarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row JJ, Grave 2
•	Pot	6-1-5	370547	Battlefield, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.
REYNOLDS, Terrence J., Jr.	<b>C</b> ò1	7-1-5	274278	
ROBARIS, Lewis R.	Çp1	1-1-5	300801	<b>*</b>
ROBERTS, Willard W.	Pfc	0-1-5	372263	1stMarDiv Cometery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 42, Grave 4.
ROSALIK, Raymond A.	Pfc	A-1-5	353798	
SEIFF, Murray N.	Pfc	B-1-5	355496	IstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadaleanal, B.S.I., Row 35, Grave 5.
SEIVERLING, William F.	Pvt	0-1-5	369132	
SEYMOUR, Joseph J.	Pot	1-1-5	354398	
SUPPE, Charles R.	Pfc	G-1-5	294430	Roses Cemetery, Base Roses, (Efate, N.H.) Row 1, Plot 5, Grave 13.
SWART, Harland P., Jr.	Sgt	(-1-2)	271877	Battleffeld, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.
TARANT, Alvin A.	<b>φ</b> 1	0-1-5	268945	3 to 10 to 1
N, Edge	Pfc	4-1-5	361938	1stMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 39 Worrave 5

•					
					SHEETON TEETS
VARGA, Bela	1a	Pot	0-1-5	332710	
VOSEESKI, Edmund	Edmund A.		B-1-5	350809	lstWarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 35, Grave 4.
WATERSTRA	WATERSTRAW, Christopher		را ا ا	1/0262 3710EC	Datellelle, Gracelell, Section 1.
WELKE, CR	7. H.	 		2/1/2/25 241:035	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
WELDO, LEG J.	લિંદ પારીકામ મ	<u> </u>	ָרְיוֹ רְיִּי	281099	・オープ・コー・イン・アントのプログランドのオーのオークスでは、一二二十二十二十二十二十二十二十二十二十二十二十二十二十二十二十二十二十二十二
WHITE THOMBS C.	omas G.	Pot	D-1-5	337014	
ZIEGLER, William	William F.	Pfc	B-1-5	368941	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 49, Grave 8.
•		,		SECOND BATTALION, FIFTH	LION, FIFTH MARINES.
T XIVSAA	Ingrand m.	Pot	G-2-5	304819	Field.
ARDEN. Le	Lexter C.	Pvt	13-2-5	363791	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guedalcanal, B.S.I., Row 50, Grave 2
	Benny M.	Pfc	1-2-5	283733	
BALDWIN, Carter S	Carter S.	Pfc	E-2-5	319656	lcanal, B.S.I., Row
BEES, George W.	rge W.	Pfc	B-2-5	315175	-
BERWANGER	BERWANGER, George N.J.	Sg <b>t</b>	G-2-5	250176	
BISHOP, I	BISHOP, Lawrence E.	Pot	13-2-5	350409	
BOHAC, Jo	BOHAC, John P., Jr.	Pfc ·	世 い し い い	358916	
CAENS, Marvin C.	rvin C.	Pfe:	ان در این د	20105	Thiagi, USM & USMC Cemetery #1 (white Beach) of ave #2.
CIAZINSKI, Edward	. Edward J.	Pic		794076 ·	FIGURE TO THE TOTAL TOTAL TO THE TOTAL TOT
DANEBRO, Antenie	Antenie	o id	( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )	9740TY	Dattellelu, Guadalcamel, D.S.I.
DEAN, Kenneth J.	neth J.	PHC	( ) E	1(9121(2	Grove #7
DIODATE,	James V.	Pet	<b>さい</b> (1) (1) (1)	24 / 10 <del>4</del> 251 751	
ACMUBRICANOM AND MILITARY OF THE PROPERTY OF T	DUMBROWAL, CHARLES D.	۲ م د د		7201(1)2	
DUCK WOKTE	DUCK WOKTH, WILLISH F.	PIC DMM2/C	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	266-11-47	
DOMANT. A	DORANT; Renneth W.	FIM 2/ C	TIQUE TICLE	2721FQ	
FAKIA, Jeseph	sepn E udas	7 C		2017 2017 7017 7017	
HAGAIN, FIRMICLIS		) ↓ 4 µ	ا ا آ	715507	Tottloffold Chadaleans B.C.
rok, Havara G.	ira G. Dobont G	μ φ Ε <b>ς</b>		のないたのの	lathernia Geneterv Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 21, Grave
FRASHAM,	Engones, noder v.g.	ο ς - Δ	יו ל ה ה	90,140	New Hebrides.
TASMODUSE I	FRIDANCEM, Ray Mond, 51.	υ τ. Ο τ.	2 E− 1 O f 1 C f	303740	Cemetery. Guadal canal,
A THEAT A TIME TO THE	Thort A	, φ Ω	10 10 10 11 11	352277	Overlay
TEIMBROCK	HEIMEROCK BODGET F	η τ C	9-2-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-15-	358195	1stMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 17, Grave
HODKINS Gerald P	Gerald P.	) He	9-2-5	301889	Overlay.
HUFF, Henry A.	ITY A.	Pfc	F-2-5	298759	Tulagi, USN & USMC Cemetery #7 (Chinese Bks) Grave #A.

HUFF, Robert B.	Ф Э О	#-12-15	325157	IsaMarbin Cemetery, Galdaleanl, B.S.I., Row 12, Grave S.
	) -4 ; }		77.0.70	76 11 11 11 11 11
	14 4	いして	C 25-16	
JOHANSON, Earl L.	Pfc	F-2-5	327073	= :
KASPRZYK, John J.	Pvt	3-2-5	353792	6 # 22 # 8
~	Capt.	0-2-5	officer	Battlefield, Guadalcanel, B.S.I.
KENNEDY, Roland W.	Pvt	G-2-5	332675	Overlay.
KIRSHBAUM, Martin E., Jr.	Set	1-2-5	349839	d, Guadalemal.
LARSON, Everett F.	Pfc	F-2-5	351720	£.;
LA VALLEE, Louis J.	Pvt	6-2-5	290632	enel, B.S.I.
LEWIS, Milton	C <sub>D</sub>	G-2-5	270365	οξ:
MAASEN. Raymond H.	Pvt	0-2-5	354000	
MAGUIRE, John G.	Pvt	0-2-5	355528	1, E.S.I., Row
MC KELVEY, Robert S.	Pvt	G-2-5	371.804	temetery #1 (White Beach) Grav
MITCHELL, Francis M.	Pvt	B-2-5	348533	•
NOVAK, Thomas A.	Pvt	G-2-5	353788	White Beach) Grave #7
RADCLIFFE, Robert R.	Pfc	B-2-5	698 <del>1</del> 1118	•
SASSANC, Anthony J.	Pvt	F-2-5	352.744	23
SCHANTZ, Robert E.	Pvt	B-2-5	24045	Field.
SMITH, Joseph F.	Pfc	¥-2-5	3320118	Bathlefield, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.
STEWART, Gordon B.	Pvt	G-2-5	3510.8	Dverlay.
SVIATOHO, Charles	Pfc	F-2-5	320031	Beitlefield, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.
THRESHER, Berl O.	Pfc	9-8-5	322364	Overlay.
TUKIS, Watslow W.	Pfc	- Ha-2-5	351767	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 21, Grave 4.
VIGNOVICH, Semuel	Pvt	G-2-5	95###2	Overlay.
WALDRON, Charles H.	<u></u>	4-2-5	298548	Overlay.
WALLACE, Robert B.	Col	F-2-5	298852	Battheffeld, Guadaloanal, B.S.1.
WARDLOW, John C.	Pfc	6-2-5	351718	lstMerDivCemetery, Ghadelcanal, B.S.I., Row 50, Grave 3
WEBB. Arthur T.	Pfc	F-2-5	293934	
WEBSTER, "A" "D"	Pfc	F-2-5	267006	-
WHELLAN, Kenneth J.	Pfc	五-2-5	297721	, Grave 排2.
WHRITENHOUR, Sylvester J.	Pfc	更-2-5	319656	tery, Guedelicenel, R.S.I., R
ZAGRANIS, Lawrence C.	Pvt	0-2-5	293023	## ##
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			THIRD BATTALION	ON, TIFTH MARINES.				
BARRINGTON, Robert O.	Pfc	I-3-5	327848	emetery,	Guadalcanal, B.	S.I., Row 14	. Grave 5.	_
BELTRAMI, Charles	Cp1	K-3-5	. 294339	l, Guadalc	nel, B.S.I.			
BEYER, Alfred K.	Pot	1-3-5	- 376342	netery,	canal, B.	S.I., Row	Grave	
BILBREY, Hollis E.	Pfc	M-3-5	. 29.3414			=	=	
BLACKBURN, George	Pfc	M-3-5	290329	=	<b>=</b>		<b>8</b> 0	
BRANIC, John H.	28c	1-3-5	250921	Overiey, Guadalcanal,	B.S.I.			
BURNS, Robert E.	Pvt	1-3-5	334315	lstMarDiv Cemetery, G	Guadalcanal, B.	S.I., Row	Gr.	4
CANIPE, Hildred M.	Pfc	1-3-5	306829		=	= = =	=	
CHITWOOD, Jemes H.	Pfc	平3-5	29.35.34	± .	=	=	=	
CLINTON; Lewis F., Jr.	Pfc	K-3-5	599667	<b>m</b> ~	==	27	=	
COMER, Avis 0.	Pot	K-3-5	367111	* ·	=.	†T	Ė	
DE FUSCO, Bernard J.	Pot	K-3-5	369095	=	<b>22</b>	);; :: ::	<del>z</del>	
DE LOMG, Weldon F.	Pfc	K-3-5	295947	Battlefield, Guadalcanal,	nal, B.S.I.			
DIONNE, Joseph N. R.	Pfc	1-3-5	321792	shed to	CRS of "STUDENT	, Emil S."		
EDWARDS, Robert L.	Pfc	M-3-5	•	Battleffeld, Guadalcanal	nal.			
FAHRENWALD, Frank L.	Pvt	K-3-5	367108	etery,	Guadaleanal, B.	S.I., R	Gr.	
FRANCE, David T.	Cpl	Hq-3-5	255730		=	R =	=	
GARRETT, Arthur C.	Set t	1-3-5	271587	Overlay attached to C	CRS of "STUDENT,	, Emil S."		
GASTON, James C.	Pfc	M-3-5	-291857	Battlefield, Guadalcanal,	B.S.I.			
GOODE, Fred H.	Pot	1-3-5	363742	etery,	lcanal, B.	S.I., Row	Gr	
GUERRITE, Philip	Pfc	Hq-3-5	350384		=	11 27	=	
GUNTER, James G.	Pvt	K-3-5	363740	Battlefield, Guadalcanal,	nal, B.S.I.			
HELLER, Paul	Pvt	K-3-5	349917	etery.	canal, B.	S.I., R	Grave,	
HUGHES, William E.	PhM2/c	Hq-3-5	238-73-41	=		= :::.	=	
KASEL, Calvin K.	Pvt	1-3-5	347229	ttachied to	DENT	, Emil S."		
KEPNES, Harold A.	Lt(MC)	Hq-3-5	officer	netery,	Guadalcanal, B.	S.I., Row 51	, Grave.2.	į.
KIMMEL, Charles J.	2ndLt.	I-3-5	officer	eld, Guadalc	nal, B.S.I.			
KOLACINSKI, Raymond	Pvt	· I-3-5	369626	netery,	Guadalcanal, B.	3	Gr.	
LANDRUM, William J.	Pfc	K-3-5	238612	en e	=	17 "	=	
LEMOIR, William W.	Ço]	1-3-5	272986	<b>=</b>	=	= E	=	
	$PhM3/c^{-}$	Ha-3-5	265-86-05	=		C₁ ± :	<del>zi</del> -:	
LILLY, Schley J.	Pfc	1-3-5	318/442	=	<b>-</b>	12 "	= -	
LOVETT, Benjamin H.	Pfc	Ha-3-5	318201	<b>=</b> :	= :	24	<b>m</b> ,	
LUOMA, Lauri J.	Sgt	M-3-5	270302	=======================================	<b>=</b> :	= : 572	<b>=</b> :	_
MAHONEY, William F.	Pvt	L-3-5	354946	<b>*</b>	=	# 25	<b>=</b>	
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# HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY, SEVENTH MARINES.

BERRY, Paul V. W. CROWELL, Dale D. LIWKE, Paul A., Jr.	Pfc Cpl FMCpl	H&S-7 H&S-7 H3S-7	357265 375089 280525	lstMarDiv Cemetery,	Guadalcanal, " "	E = =	Row 34,	Grave 1. " 10
			WEAPONS COMP	ANY, SEVENTH MARINES.				
MOSER, Eugene F.	ည်င	Vpns-7	311339	1stMarDiv Cemetery,	Guadal cenal,	B.S.I.,	Row 148,	Grave 2.
			FIRST BATTALION	OM, SEVENTH MARINES.				
ABLES. Clarence E.	Pet	D-1-7	429052	1stMarDiv Cemetery,	Guadalcanal,	B.S.I.	ROW 45.	Grave 5.
, U2	Pvt	0-1-7	323627	# ·	= :	<b>=</b> :	# :	<b>-</b>
ARNOLD, Janes T.	001	0-1-7	293627	=======================================	<b>=</b> :	n :	= i	- : - :
BARBAGELATA, Peter M.	Pfc	0-2-7	29,3845	# 1 # 1	= ;	= <u>,</u> =	<b>9</b> (	<b>~</b> ;
BEAMER, Donald W.	Çoj	A-1-7	343162		=	= - -	6 <u>1</u>	07
	Pot	A-1-7	347391		•			
BENNEE, Stanley G.	2ndLt.	4-1-7	officer	-	Guadalcanal,	B.S.I.,	Row 48,	Grave 5.
BERNES, Albert L.	Pot	D-17	356336	ee overla	•			
BIELAMSKI, Aloysius A.	Pfc	Hq-1-7	314792	lstMarDiv Cemetery.	Guadal canal,	.S. H	KOW ソフ。	Grave 5.
BRADY, Terrance J.	Pvt	D-1-7	351633		: =	: 2		1 o
BRUCE, Charles L.	D FG	A-1-7	293638		= =	: :	7 F	ji
BRZOZOWSKI, Alphonse J.	Col	Hq-1-7	29,3803		<b>=</b>	÷	: .	<b>‡</b>
BURGESS, Charles J., Jr.	Pfc	A-1-7	362707			•		1
BURRIS, Walter C.	Pot	B-1-7	349324	lstMarDiv Cemetery,	Guadal cenal.	B.S.I.	Row ZZ,	Grave 4.
BUILAND, Gerard M.	Pvt	A-1-7	351363	•				
CANADY, Morris E.	ာ် မြ	0-1-7	367000	<b>,</b> ∀			1	
CHAMBERS, ROY L.	Pfc	A-1-7	323950	arDiv Ceme		ν Μ	I., Row 1	4z, Grave
COCKRELL, Alvin C., Jr.	lstIt.	3-1-7	officer	HIII Y,	Grave E.			
COME, William E.	Pfc	A-1-7	348730	lstMarDiv Cemetery,	Guadalcanal,	ъ.S. I.,	20 to 48	Grave 10.
COOK Andrew F. Jr.	2ndit.	A-1-7	267891	=======================================	= :	<b>4</b> :		_ :
COOPER. George W.	Pot	B-1-7	745462		<b>=</b> :	# 1	= : [C]	<b>-</b> -(
GOOPER, Victor I.	Pfc	0-1-7	335523	=	=	<b></b>	= 表	9
	F S	A-1-7	306863	Overlay.				
DICK, Harold G.	Pot	7-1-0	360129	Overlay.				

				Grave 8.		= 2		Grave 10		10	<u>=</u> ~	-				Grave 2.	Grave 6.			Grave 6.	≓ ĮΩ				Grave 10.	<u>_</u>	<b>1</b> 00							Grave 3.
				19,	4	22	•	53,	ีเส	<del>,</del>	8	2				, 16,	51,			53.	55	٠.			5e,	5,	94.							£,
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				B.S.I.	=	=		B.S.I.	=	=	=	=				B.S.I.	E.S.E.			B.S.I.	=				BSI	=	=	New Hebr				٠.		B.S.I.
				Guadal canal,	=	=		Guadalcanal,	=	=	=	=		nal, B.S.I.	ф ф	Guadal canal,	Guadalcanal,	#3		Guadalcanal,	=		e D.	nal, E.S.I.	Guadalcanal,	=		8, Efate, N					nal, B.S.I.	Guadal canal,
	•			Cemetery, G	=	₹.		Cemetery, G		=	=	12		Guadalcanal	11 Y, Grave	Cemetery, G		11 Y, Grave		tery,			11 Y, Grave	Guad	emetery, Gu	=	=	5, Grave 8					, Guadalcanal	Cemetery, Gu
التصبيا	• 22 = 22	=	=	lstMarDiv C	<b>=</b>	***	Overlay.	lstMarDiv C	=	<u>÷</u>	=		Overlay.	Battlefield	Overlay, Hill	ΙŢ	stWarDiv	Overlay, Hi	Overlay.	ìŢ		Overlay.	Overlay, Hill	Battlefield,	rDiv C	=	±	Row 1, Plot	Overlay.	Overlay.	Overlay.	Overlay.	Battlefield,	stMarDiv C
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200877	745.243 717.713	364854	640663	3,155,11	305533	300060	300310	305703	368936	336414	officer	342572	3541.49	325034	366608	305223	31.8970	357175	300576	353580	3191:22	269817	238894	273999	305026	324.308	307502	284753	356093	354208	347392	29370)	293706	354188
7-1-0	D-1-7	D-1-7	A-17	Ha-1-7	B-1-7	D-1-7	A-1-7	A-1-7	B-1-7	0-1-7	D-1-7	3-1-7	B-1-7	A-1-7	B-1-7	B-17	D-11-7	5-1-7	A-1-7	A-1-7	Hq17	A-17	A-1-7	D-1-7	0-1-7	C-1-2	C-I-2	2-1-0	B-1-7	0-1-7	A-1-7	B-I-7	B-1-7	0-1-7
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ρfι	S. F. P. S. F. F. F. F. P. S. F.	Pvt	Cp)	Ъ	Pfc	Ço]	Pfc	Col	Pvt	Pot	2 Pr	Pfc	ΡĀ	ЪŤ	PΦ	Ъf	Pfc	Ή	Đ₽	P£	Pfc	Pvt	Pl	છું	Pfc	Ğ. Ω,	Pot	Ffc	Þ	Pfc	Pvt	Pfc	Corp	Pfc
- TDAAXT Transis E. Trans	DURR, Leland N.	EDWARDS, Randolph R.	EDWINSON, John E., Jr.	FRIEDRICHSEN, Eugene V.	GEORDI, George W.	GILES, John R., Jr.	HARLESS, Ralph	HETTERLEY, Douglas A.	HOFFMAN, Albert E.	HOGARTY, George W.	ISEMAN, Jake D., Jr.	JACKSON, Lewis E.	JOHNSON, Paul J.	JOHNSON, James P.	KARNAGHAN, Joseph P.	KESSEL, Bernard	KING, Milton J.	KING, Brwin S.	KLIME, Robert A.	KOWALEWSKI, Edward J.	KUZMA, Joseph J.	LAZAROE, Welter J.	MALANOWSKI, Anthony P., Jr.	MAROTTA, Patrick L.	MARTINCHAK, Andrew	MC ALENEY, Francis J.	MC CLANAHAN, Marvin R.	MC COY, Roy S.	MEYER, Carl H.	MIKUS, Barney S.	MILLER, Clarence C., Jr.	MORRISSEY, Harry C.	NADEAU, Brandon A.	NITCHE, James J.
•																		•										٠						

NITTINGER, Charles A.	Sgt	A-1-7	351718	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., H	Row 53, Grave 5.	
NOVAK. Leonard T.	Pfc	6-1-7	343127	=======================================	=	
•	Pfc	D-1-7	323369	= = =	" 45 " 8	
	Pvt	B-1-7	354791	=======================================	=	
PATTERSON, James M.	Pfc	4-1-7	294220	= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =	# 52 # 6	
PERKINS, Kenneth F.	Pvt	1-1-7	344299	Battlefield, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.		
PETRACO, Edgars	Pvt	0-1-7	343740	w 1, Plot 55, Espiritu Santo	Mil. Cemetery, N.H.	
	Pvt	C-1-7	319924	Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.,	Row 44, Grave 9.	
PIMENTEL, Manuel J.	<b>9</b>	A-1-7	275452	Overlay, Hill Y, Grave C.		
POTTER, John R.	Pfc	A-1-7	320957	v Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.,	Row 48, Grave 8.	
POTITS, Albert C.	Set	D-1-7	266950	=======================================	=	
QUIST, Kenneth G.	Pfc	1-1-7	337041	Overlay.		
RALEIGH, Joseph B.	Pfc	A-1-7	356021	Overlay.	•	
RICHARDS, Richard P.	2ndLt.	D-1-7	officer	v Cemetery, Guadelcanal; B.S.I:,	Row 29, Grave 3.	
ROGERS, Othe L.	Major	Hq-1-7	officer	Overlay, Hill Y, Grave A.		
ROWE, Chermning W.	Pvt	A-1-7	347368	Hill		
RCWLETT, Stanley C.	Pfc	k-1-7	2916gp	eld, Gua		
RUST, William A.	Pfc	B-1-7	278337	netery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.,	Row 26, Grave 5.	
SCHULER, Larry J.	Pfc	D-1-7	327310	Overlay.		
SHINKO, Rudelph E.	Pfc	C-1-7	326440	lstMarDiv Ceme tery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., H	Row 46, Grave 1.	
SPRAGUE, Derr I.	Pvt	Hq-1-7	301506	=	7 11 61 11	
ST. SAVIOUR, Anthony J.	Pfc	k-1-7	320762	=======================================	53 " 9	
TRAW, Lenden L.	P1Sg*	0-1-7	198224		= 元 = 4	
WALTERS, James R.	Pfc	B-1-7	354210	Overlay, Hill Y, Grave 4.	:	
WANN, Walter C., Jr.	PhM2/c	Hq-1-7		v Cemeter		
WARD, Lleyd E.	Pfc	A-1-7	327302	Cverlay.	-	
WEHR, Richard J.	Pfc	Hq-1-7	297.234	Overlay.		
WEISENBURGER, Frederick G.	Pvt	D-1-7	341398	Row 1, Plot 5, Grave 11, Efate, New Hebrides	•	
WENTZ, William T.	Pvt	0-1-7	356893	IstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., R	Row 71, Grave 9.	
WEYANDT, Jacob E.	Cpl	D-1-7	2681418	=	<u>.</u> O	
YCUNG, David J.	c <sub>p</sub> 1	B-1-7	288990	# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	. 8 . 19	
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MARINES.
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AMIDON, Everett S.			1000				2			
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-	Col	G-2-7	29,4042	=		=	=	<u> </u>	=	m
BALLEW, Robert H.	GySgt	1-2-1	962002	Field.						
BENSON, David R.	Pfc	F-2-7	290905	Overlay.	-				•	
	P C C	0-2-7	349832	lstMarDiv Cem	etery,	Guadalcenal,	B.S.I.,I	Row 56,	Grave 2	
	Pfc	G-2-7	339346	=	==	=	=	- - -	9=	
	Pfc	F-2-7	294495	=		<b>=</b>	=	[₹ #	=	
BOWERS, John	Pfc	9-2-7	370552	<b>.</b>	=	=	=	<u> 26</u>	=	
CASHMAN, Daniel R.	Pvt	H-2-7	373082	Overlay.	•					
CASSIDY, Wade M.	Pvt	9-2-7	365038	1stMarDiv Cem	Cemetery, (	Guadalcanal,	B.S.I.	Row 70,	Grave	~·
CHEATHAM, James B.	PhM3/c	Hq-2-7	262-66-04	===	=	=	**	= &	=	10
CLARK, Arthur N.	Pfc	H-2-7	356018		==	<b>=</b> .	=	= 23	=	
CUMMINGS, Boyd T.	Pfc	F-2-7	359819			<b>5</b>	5	11	=	. ~
USACK, William J.	Set	6-2-7	266646	Fiela.						
AMIANI, Louis	Pfc	G-2-7	295946	rDiv	Cemeterv, (	Guadalcanal,	ROW 57,	Grave 8	•	
DEL VECCHIO, Joseph R.	Pfc	7-2-1	305450	Plot 5, Row 1,	Gravê	19, Efate,	New Hebrides	ides.		
DRAKE, Julius T.	Pfc	五-2-7	292428	Oiv	etery,	Guadalcanal,	B.S.I.,	Row HO,	Grave	
DWYER, Garrett P.	Pfc	H-2-7	308214	overlay.						
EBERLE, Robert O.	Pfc	F-2-7	58,6699	Field.						
EDWARDS, Barclie S.	Pet	五2-7	541692	lstMarDiv Ceme	Cemetery, (	Guadalcanal,	B.S.I.	Row 42,	Grave	.01
FARRAR, James A.	chck	G-2-7	562962	=	==	æ	Ė	2=	£	വ
FRANCE, Charles N.	Pvt	I-2-7	355895	=	<b>=</b>	==	E	= 56	=	~
GAGNON, Paul E.	Pfc	五-2-7	324666	Field.			;			
GAILEY, Charles R.	Pvt	H-2-7	34510)	lstMarDiv Ceme	Cemetery, C	Guadalcanal,	B.S.I.	Row 56,	Grave	١.
GLAAB, Merle M.	· Pfc	F-2-7	325982	***	=	==	**	69		9
GNORIK, John	Pfc	7-2-4	205003	Overlay.						
GOODWIN, Paul A.	Pfc	F-2-7	305435	lstMarDiv Ceme	Cemetery, C	Guadalcanal,	B.S.I.	Row 44	Grave	×.
GRETZSCHEL, William E.	Pvt	F-2-7	366074		=	==	=	= 43	=	_
GUESMAN, Theodore		五-2-7			=	=	, ==	125	=	ผ
HANSEN, Harry E.	Pfc	6-2-7	271536	=	=	=	=	126	=	· 
HATCH, Prentis M., Jr.	2ndI.t.	F-2-7	officer	=	-	==	=	<b>%</b>	=	6
HOWLAND, Bernard J.	Pfc	6-2-7	349314	=======================================	=	=	=	£† =	=	-4

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dfre Aba	i e ga	rad	erry	aren	dawin	emes ]	Samu	les.	William "F"	₩ uuc	Andr	Frank	Wil	K, G	neth	Roland L.	ack	3011e	bert	Bai	Jos	lvin ]	Anthony J	Henry	lohn.	thur	RIDE	41 fre	H.	Isaac D.	:
• 0	JOHNSTON Eugene	KAMIA, Conrad F	KILLION, Jerry W.	KUKRAL, Clarence	LAMGLEY, Edwin N.	LAWSON, James M.,	LEIPHART, Samuel	LOCH, Charles J., J	Will	LOUDER, John W.	MAHALENA, Andrew	MANDELL, Frank	MC ARDELL, William H	MC GENTHEICK, Gerald J	MOORE, Kenneth M.	Ro]	MORRIS, Jack	MULLINS, Rollen	NAYLER, Robert E.	PANDOLPHI, Baigio	PAWLOWSKI, Joseph	PAYNE, Calvin R.	I. A	7Z, He	EL,	RHOADS, Arthur C.	RIEMENSCHNEIDER,	ROULEAU, Alfred R.	SCOTT, Sam H.	I, Ist	
HUNTER, JENKINS	JOHNS	KANIL	KILLI	KUKP.	LAMGI	LAWSC	LEIPE	LOCH,	LONG,	LOUDI	MAHAL	MANDE	MC AF	MC GE	MOORE	MOORE.	MORE:	MULL!	NAYLE	P ANDC	PAWLC	PAYME	POWELL,	RAKASZ.	REINDEL,	RHOAL	RIEME	ROULE	SCOTI	SMITH,	

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	Pvt	F-2-7	295750							•	
	Pfc	F-2-7	300169	lstMarDiv Cen	Cemetery,	Guadalcanal,	B.S.I.	Row 39	. Grave	, 10.	
	FAC T	ノーソーヨ		: ;	: :	: :	: :	: : X	<b>:</b> :	- <b>1</b> 1	
SPOHR, Thomas R.	PhM3/c	Hq-2-7	393-45-37	<b>=</b> :	=	= :	= :	57	= '	īΟ.	
STAPP, Hugh S.	Pvt	F-2-7	363156	= •		<b>:</b>	=	†† 	=		
STRICKLAND, Hugh G.	Pfc	7-2-7	316581	Field.							
STUMP, John W.	Pfc	F-2-7	283662	Overlay.		•			•		
SUGGS, John F.	<u>0</u>	E-2-7	296638	Field.						-	
SYKES, Richard S.	FM1/c	B-2-7	329585	lstwarDiv Cen	Cemetery.	Guadalcanal,	B.S.I.	How 45	Grave	. J.	
THOMPSOM, Lester O.	GySgt	15-2-7	196363	=	=	=	=	도	=	و	
TRUJILLO, Ambrosio U.	Pvt	6-2-7	329455	=		=	=	11 57	=	0	
VARDEN Leighton C.	Pfc	G-2-7	39/1/62	=	==	=	=	<b>∄</b>	=	. ~	
WALTZ, Forrest D.	Pfc	12-2-7	- CO	=			=	11 57	=	<b>-</b>	
YANUCH, Alphonse F.	Pot	正-2-7	は	=	=	=	=	-	=	<b>⊙</b> ø,	
			THIRD BETTALION	SEVENTH	MARINES.		,				
BACKUS, Lawrence E.	Pfc	Ha-3-7	45 17 45	1stWarDiv Cen	Cemetery.	Guadal canal.	B.S.I.	Row' 40	Grave	ci Ci	
_	FdCk	M-3-7	291635		1, Plo	55, Espiri	tu Santo	Mil. Co	Cemetery	E N	
CAPUTO, Samuel	Cp1	M-3-7	280822	Div	r.v.	Guadalcanel,	B.S.I.	Row 38,	Grave,		
CATES, Dantel H.	Pfc	K-3-7	318975	Overlay.		•					
	Pvt	1-3-7	353223	1stWarDiv Cemet	ery,	Guadal canal,	B.S.I.,	Row 20	, Grave	ດໍ່	
GROVES, Clayton D.	Pvt	M-3-7	348890	=	=	=	=	= -	=	cu	
HAISLIP, William T.	Ço]	M-3-7	297430	=	=	<b>#</b>	=	37	=	<u>,                                    </u>	
HILL, John R.	Pfc	1-3-7	323972	æ	<b>=</b>	=	==	= 58	• =	.~.	
JOSEPH, Jacob	Capt.	Ha-3-7	officer	=	=	=	= '	38	=	<u>,                                    </u>	
LOVELAND, Frederick, Jr.	Çoj	Ha-3-7	292248	=	=	=	=	38	=	ผ	
MATSON, Mertin M.	Pfc	1-3-7	268240	=	=	=	=	75	=	~	
RATZOW, Richard L.	Cp La	Hq-3-7	293131	=	=	=	= ,	38	=	r	-
SZEMAN, Stephen E.	Pfc	M-3-7	299841	=	=	=	=	<u>%</u>	E	ις	•
1.2	Pfc	K-3-7	351608	=	=	==	= .	27	==	∞	
TATUM, Robert O.	Pfc	1-3-7	337743	=	=	<b>=</b>	=	ର =	=	7	
WOOD, Jack S.	Pfc	Ha-3-7	346867	=	=	=	=	11 37	=	10	
		HEADQUARTE	JARTERS AND SERVICE	BATTERY,	PIFTH MA	MARINES.					
CASEY, James P.	Sgt	H&S-11	262086	lstMarDiv Cen	Cemetery,	Guadalcanal,	B.S.I.,	Row 1,	Grave	3.	

# FIRST BATTALION, BLEVENTH MARINES.

	Row 33, Grave 6.	w 30, Grave 3.	w 29, Grave 1. 38	w 10, Grave 4.  w 49, Grave 5.  6 " # 6  70 " # 4  10 " 2
	B.S.I.,	d, B.S.I., Row	d. B.S.I.; Row	1, B.S.I., Row II, B.S.I., Row III, B.S.I., Row III III III III III III III III III I
:1	r, Guadalcanal,	r, Guadalcanal	r, Guadal canal	<ul> <li>y, Guadalcanal,</li> <li>"</li> <li< td=""></li<></ul>
	Overlay. Overlay. 1stMarDiv Cemetery. Overlay.	lstMarDiv Cemetery, i " Overlay. LION, ELEVENTH MARINES	lstMarDiv Cemetery.  """"  """"  """"  """"  """  """  "	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Greve # M4534. lstMarDiv Cemetery, " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "
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	H&S-1-11 H&S-1-11 H&S-1-11 H&S-1-11	H&S-1-11 H&S-1-11 H&S-1-11 H&S-1-11	D-2-11 G-2-11 H&S-2-11 F-2-11 F-2-11	#88-3-11 9-3-11 6-3-11 #88-3-11 1-3-11 #88-3-11
	Pfc Col Pfc Pfc	S P P C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C	Pvt Pfc Pfc Col	Sgt. Sgt. Gpl 1stlt. Pvt Sgt
	HYNES, John J. KIMMEL, John L. PRICE, Hobart T. SCHNEIDER, Kenneth C.	SEIDEM, Bernard SINGLETOW, Richard V. WHITLEY, Lytle E. WISE, Horace M.	KIST, George J. MARTIN, Sheridan SAILORS, Edward H. SZAFRANSKI, Russell VARGO, Edward WEISENBARGER, George A.	ALEXANDER, Richard K. DUTTCN, William C. GALBREATH, Paul E. GUSTAFSØN, Lowell G. SWISHER, William H. TRACY, Harris P. WINDISCH, Nicholas A. WODJYLA, Edward J. ZAGURY, Mortimer S.

# FIFTH BATTALION, ELEVENTH MARINES.

Grave 7. 10 10 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110	Gub 1 Hosp. Grave 6.	0 0 0 th	Grave 9.	Grave 1.
Row 31 198 199 199 631	over to 21	8,94,83	Row 11, " 52" " 70	Row 49,
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lstMarDiv n n n	" " Died aboard. IstMarDiv Ge	BATTERY, ELE	lstMarDiv Cen " " PIONEER BATTALION	lstMarDiv Con
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P-5-11 P-5-11 P-5-11 N-5-11 P-5-11 H&S-5-11	P-5-11 H&S-5-11 P-5-11 P-5-11 P-5-11	PECI	SW-11 SW-11 SW-11	A-Pion H-Pion Pion Pion Pion
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BECKETT, Mervin E. BILLINGS, James A. BURKE, Robert D. COVERT, Richard L. EVANS, Jarey A. FALES, Alfred E.	GILLESPIE, John B. III HEIDRICH, Albert J. HENRETTA, Robert P. HOLT, Amos P. HYNES, Jesse T. KEITH, Julius C. NELSON, Edward C. NELSON, John P.	OLAFSON, Knute H., Jr. POSEY, Robert A. PRANZO, Dominick RAYMOND, Harold D. RENCSAK, William	MICHAEL, Paul R. MICHAELS, Edward W. MILLER, Ralph M.	BARRY, Edward, Jr. BROTHERSTON, John R. COMLAN, Charles F. DOLKE, Emil A.

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BATTALION
PIONEER
FIRST

	291870 lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadelcanal, B.S.I., Row 11, Grave 317920 No data. 267445 lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 10, Grave 282826 " " " " 10 " 11 " 11 "	FIRST ENGINEER BATTALION.	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalo	USN & USMC Cemetery No. 1, Tulagi, (White Beach).	269757 lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadal canal, B.S.I., Kow 19, Grave				USN Station, Efate, New Webrides.	284561 lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 17, Grave	Overlay.	286410 lstMarDiv Cemeterv. Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 36, Grave	FIRST PARACHUTE BATTALION.	S.I., ROW	USN & USMC Cemetery,#2 (Police Bks)	USM & USMC Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave	· 62# " " #35	USN & USMC Cemetery, #1 (Police Bk	USM & USMC Cemetery, Garutu, Grave #25.	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row		USN & USMC Cemetery, Garutu, Graye	= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =		286173 IstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., How 18, Grave
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Sont d	Cpl Cpl PlSgt Pfc Pfc		Pvt	Pot	Go La	Pfc	[de	Set	Pfc	Cpl	Col	Pfc		Pfc	Pfc	C <sub>D</sub> 1	Pfc	Pfc	GySgt	Pfc	Çoj	Pfc	P1Sgt	PlSgt	$C_{\mathbf{p}}$
FIRST PIONEER BATTALION - Cont'd	JARRETT, "C" "L", Jr. NORMAN, George H. RICKERT, Joseph SMITH, Robert C. TUMBER, James M., Jr.		CHMELA, Miroslay	CLARK, Fugene H.	HEATH, John W.	MARTIN, John J. B.	MC GURER, Robert L.	MC KINLEY. Robert G.	NEWBIGGING, John M.	PRATT. Milton C.	ROACH, James W.	SHUMAKER, Nathan V.		BOYD, Marion R.	BRESINGER, Joseth G.	BRUZUCHALSKI, Leo M	BURDO, Ronald A.	BURRI, Henry J.	CAMPBELL, Alan M.	CASTNER, Howard W.	CRAWFORD, Lawrence W.	CRUMPLER, Lawton, Jr.		DRISCOLL, Thomas P.	EGRI, Andrew J.

## FIRST PARACHUTE BATTALION - Cont'd

lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 15, Grave 8.  USM & USMC Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave #31  " #39. " #16. " " #20  " " " " #20	r USN & USMC Cemetery #1 (Police Bks) Tulagi, Grave #5.  lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 15, Grave 9.  USN & USMC Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave #33.  " #17.  " #52  USN & USMC Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave #14.  " #52  USN & USMC Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave #14.	<pre>istMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 17,</pre>	IstmarDly Cemetery, Gradalcanai, 5.5.1., How 19, Grave 4.  USN & USMC Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave #32.  IstMarDiv Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave #21.  USN & USMC Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave #21.  I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
254125 303802 281557 268414 252907 298300	officer 300425 266338 285653 272773 256111 261697 officer	276625 279909 259472 26924 0fficer 29194 29535 248031	284606 297374 259043 271894 259041 251026 officer
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Col Pfc Pvt Col Set	Capt Pfc Cpl Pfc Opl PlSgt Pfc ZndLt.	Pfe Cp1 Sgt Pfe Pfc Sgt PlSgt	CD1 P18gt CD1 P18gt 1stit
FARRELL, Clyde R. FONDREN, Jake D. GAGNON, Leo M. GRADY, George F. HENNESSY, James F.	HUERTH, Richard J. HURN, John P. JAMES, Stanley U. JENSEN, Clayton S. JOHNS, Harold E. KACHINSKY, Ronald F. KENNELY, Anthony L. KISER, Walter W.	KIRKWAW, Adrian L. LOCKE, Garrick MALNAR, Rudolph Y. MARTIN, Emory D. MASON, Emerson E. MAXWELL, David N. PERKINS, Keith PERRY, Charles Y. PUMROY, Howard D.	RATHBULN, Robert C. SANTIAGO, Frank G. SMITH, Charles I. STOSILAVAGE, George T. WALTON, Merritt C. WESTEROOK, Le Ecy

#### FIRST RAIDER BATTALION

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ave ve 8 Gr	12, Grave 10    12 11    625 Grave #1.	18 " 8 8 " 8 ,GRawe 18. w 14, Grave #4.	18, " 17 " 12 " Grave 21, Grave 9, 21, Grave 12, "	, Grave 11. 3, Grave 14. 11 10. 11 24. 11 16. 12 16. 16. 16.
Tulagi, Tulagi, II., Row Tulagi,	S.I., R. Tulage S.I., R. S.I., R.	" " Tulagi S.I., Ro ) Tulagi	""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""	S.I., Row Tulagi, S.I., Row " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "
9 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	Guadalcanal, B. " " " (White Beach Guadalcanal, B.	#1 (White Beach)  Chadalcanal, B.S  Chinese Bks)	eac Bks	Guadalcanal, B.S. #2 (Police Bks) r Guadalcanal, B.S. #1 (White Beach) " " " " " " " Guadalcanal, B.S.
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358161 351774 318681 officer 337135 355620	355623 282172 270601 295797 344124 officer	309109 298524 294497 275516 35 <b>4</b> 597	342546 372095 293050 293050 354965 332392	286919 officer 294607 267534 351523 354221 293337 351782
lstRdrBn             		= = = = = =	******	* = = = = = =
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Pfc Pvt Pfc Maj Pfc	•	Property Sept.	•	Sgt 1stit Cpl Sgt Pvt Pvt Prt Prt
AHRENS, Edward H. ALLAN, John W. ARNOLD, Herman F. BAILEY, Kenneth D. BARCOMB, Charles J. BARR, Woodrow W.	BENGSTRAND, Wallace W BOONE, Frank O. BOWMAN, Warren G. BRADLEY, Marion E. BROWNE, Robert S.	EUGALA, Anten A. CARNEY, William D. CARPELLOTTI, Louis J. CHAMPOUX, Neil G. CHURCH, Thomas E.	Jimmy W. Jimmy W. Martin Well C. VO, Gerar Alvin M. Julian K. S, Benjam	FLOETER, Harold C. FOX, Myles G. FRENCH, Nelton T. GIFFELS, Gorden J. GILLIGAN, John J., Jr GYATT, Edward E. HAMPTON, Arthur D. HANNA, William T. HEYLIGER, George

HINKLE, Fred L Sgt lstRarBn 268225 HUBER, Frank Pyt Byt B8914 294194 JOHNSON, George A. Pyt B70180N George A. B1241. B1241. B1242 B70180N George A. B1241. B1242 B70180N George A. B1241. Byt B70180N George A. Byt Byt Byt B70180N George A. Byt Byt Byt B70180N George A. Byt Byt Byt Byt British, George A. Byt		USN & USMC Cemetery #1 (White Beach) Tulagi, Grave		lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row	USN & USMC Cemetery #3 (Chinese Bks) Tulagi, Grave C.	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 17, Grave	2T = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =	USN & USMC Cemetery #3 (Chinese Bks) Tulagi,	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.	USM & USMC Cemetery #1 (White Beach) Tulagi, Grave				lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 14, Grave 1.	n n 17. Grave	21 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =	. USW & USWC Cemetery #3 (Chinese Bks) Tulagi, Grave	" " #1 (White Beach) " "	" " #3 (Chinese Bks) " "	" " #1 (White Be		lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 18, Grave	91 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =	USN & USMC Cemetery #1 (White Beach) Tulagi, Grave	IstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 24, Grave 7.	T ( m(d ) compto ) ZT mm tomoto visit of Notice To.	lstMarDiv Gemetery (Hadalcana) R.S.I. Row 16 Gr	TC	USN & USMC Cemetery #2 (Police Bks) Tulagi. Grave 4.	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I Row 9. Gr	# 11.2 # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	= = = .	USN & USMC Cemetery #1 (White Beach) Tulagi, Grave 17.		Overlay.	USN & USMC Cemetery #2 (Blice Bks) Tulagi, Gr	rDiv Cem	=
aniel W. Sgt byt aniel W. Sgt Joseph J. Pyt lliam A. Pyt lliam A. Pyt tford A. Pyt se A. Pyt seph T. Pyt seph T. Pyt llliam E. Pyt seph T. Pyt llliam E. Pyt seph T. Pyt llliam E. Pyt tr I. Pyt tr I. Pyt tr I. Pyt tr I. Pyt the Sgt onald B. GySgt onald B. GySgt onald B. Pyt the Sgt George W. Pyt the Sgt George W. Pyt the Sgt George W. Pyt trank R. Pyt		268225	388914	294194	368979	364329	293695	officer	291225	337123	343895	243381	351182	311942	337199	354995	officer	2,82,42,4	367233	354984	280262	330531	317625	イソインシン			193201	305240	351795	291808	297233	280233	337134	372925	372015	290531	278342	340419
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		Fred	HUBER, Frank	HUDSPETH, Daniel W.			KEBLISH, William A.	KEY, Eugene M.	KOPS, Stanley D.		LOVIM, Louis A.	LUKE, Alexander J.	MARTINO, Joseph T.	MATTHEWS, William E.	MAYNARD, Ludger A.				•					Waiter U.	Edward L., Robert I.		Gerald	Donald	9		THOMAS, Dennie F.		TROWBRIDGE, George W.	WALSH, Patrick J.		WILLIAMSON, Donald R.R.	WOLF, Donald W.	James

#### THIRD DEFENSE BATTALION

lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 29, Grave 10.  " " 29 " 8 " 1 6 " 3 USN & USMC Cemetery#3 (Chinese Bks) Tulagi, Grave 6 IstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 29, Grave 9.	USN & USMC Cemetery #1 (White Beach) Tulagi, Grave 92.  " " " 35 LION, SECOND MARINES.	<pre>lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 59, Grave l.</pre>	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 62, Grave 7. Battlefield.  Sattlefield.  Battlefield.  USN & USMC Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 61, Grave 8. Battlefield.  IstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 64, Grave 17. Battlefield.  USN & USMC Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave 5.  Battlefield.  Battlefield.
340551 274302 307269 336457 0ff1cer 381087	287962 287388 FIRST BAUTALION	336450 336450 3314050 3318343 331848 331848 331848	279855 336962 0fficer 368-65-7 335935 350004 326058 346427
3dDefBn n n n	5thDefBn "	A A A C C - L - C C - L - C C - L - C C - L - C C C - L - C C C - L - C C C - L - C C C - C -	Hq-1-2 G-1-2 A-1-2 Hq-1-2 D-1-2 A-1-2 D-1-2 A-1-2
Pfc Cpl Pfc Pfc ZndLt.	ACK Sgt	Jr. Pet Pet Set Pet Pet Pet Pet Pet Pet	Cpl Pfc Capt. Phw3/c Pfc Pfc Pfc Pfc Pvt
ALLANDE, Armand A. BELFI, John FARRIS, John P. MORRIS, George K. NALL, Russell E. ROBERIS, Myron W.	LAWS, Shafter R., Jr. SPROTT, James L.	ARMSTRONG, Docmey C., BAKER, Harold H., BEALE, Donald H. CHIVINGTON, Herbert L. CHRISTIE, Thomas J. COREY, Alton R. CRANE, Charles O., Jr. CROWDER, Rollie W. DAVIS, Paul E. DREXLER, York S. DUREM. Lee H.	FAST, Guido L. FLING, Bernard A. FUHRHOP, Paul W. GAGE, James F. GILL, Richard F. GIVENS, Warren L. GRAY, Amos H. HASTINGS, Leo D. HEITZEL, Grover A. HESSLINK, Raymond H.

HYDE. Blaine N.	Pfc	A-1-2	336013	lstMarDiv Cemetery,	IstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 52, Grave 8.	ow 52, Grave 8.
KEOHEN, James F., Jr.	Pfc	D-1-2	284438	=		58 = 5
MAJERCAK, James P.	Pvt	A-1-2	353047	Battlefield.		
MILLER, Doyle K.	Pvt	A-1-2	351888	Battlefield.		•
MILLER, Jack M.	Capt.	. A-1-2	officer	* AMarDiv Cemetery,	-tMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 59, Grave 4.	ow 59, Grave 4.
MILLER, Russell L.	Pvt	B-1-2	364062	call & USMC Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave 40	Garutu, Grave 40	
OLIPHANT. Gomer F.	Pvt	B-1-2	322933	At sea.		
PETTIT. Wade F.	Pot	6-1-2	336298	IstMarDiv Cemetery,	IstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 51, Grave 10.	ow 51, Grave 10.
PRICE, Thurman W., Jr.	$c_{p1}$	A-1-2	291982	=======================================	=	1 54 " 1
PROFFIT, Jake, Jr.	Pvt	D-1-2	364070	USN & USMC Cemetery	USN & USMC Cemetery #2 (Police Bks) Tulagi, Grave 18	Grave 18.
SANDERS, Raymond E.	Pfc	A-1-2	333486	Battlefield.		
SCHREINER, William E.	Cpl	A-1-2	296231	Battlefield.		
SCHULER, Alfred	PhM2/c	Hq-1-2	664-00-28	Battlefield.		
B.	Jr. Pvt	6-1-5	334950	Battlefield.		
STAFFORD, Richard Y.	Capt.	1-1-2	officer	USN & USMC Cemetery	USN & USMC Cemetery #2 (Police Bks) Tulagi, Grave 20	Grave 20
TOLEEN, Clayton C.	Pfc	B-1-2	339866	No data.		•
WASHER, Robert J.	Pvt	B-1-2	253947	USN & USMC Cemetery	USN & USMC Cemetery #2 (Police Bks) Tulagi, Grave 14.	, Grave 14.
WELCH, Lealand C.	Pot	0-1-2	334981	lstMarDiv Cenetery,	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 52, Grave 3.	ow 52, Grave 3.
WHITTINGTON, Dalton W.	Pvt	<b>A-1-</b> 2	331648	Battlefield.		
WILDS, Edward A.	Pfc	7-1-6	328764	Battlefield.		•
WITHEY, Thomas H.	Pfc	D-1-2	346252	lstMarDiv Cemetery,	IstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 59, Grave 2	ow 59, Grave 2
WORTHEN, Robert E.	$c_{\rm L}$	B-1-2	266916	At sea.		

### SECOND BATTALION, SECOND MARINES.

Row 51, Grave # 54 #	: :: 20 10 : ::	USM & USMC Cemetery #1 (White Beach) Tulagi, Grave 32.	LstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 58, Grave	"	Row 58, Grave	" 58 "	. 58	igi, Grave 27.	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 53, Grave
al, B.S.I.,	= =	Beach) Tule	al, B.S.I.,	". מפרויח (משום פ	al, B.S.I.,	=	=	Beach) Tula	al, B.S.I.,
lstWarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 51,	# ##	y #1 (White	. Guadalcan	" ביים בידיה "סיונים) בידיה	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I.	r	=	JSN & USMC Cemetery #1 (White Beach) Tulagi,	, Guadalcan
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345986	342180	346680	337432	349288	331279	345582	346191	328796	345675
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L. Pvt Pvt	Pot FM1/c	Pfc	Pfc	Pvt	Pfc Pfc	Pfc	Pvt	Pfc	Pfc
CHRISTIANSEN, Clarion L. Pvt DESHAZER, Larry E. Pvt	GAYDOS, John J.	HART, Donald H.	HENRY, Winston E.	KENNEDY, Clyde E.	KINGERY, ALVIN C. MANTEL, Maurice J.	MEINBERG, Floyd M.	NELSON, Victor L.	OLMSTEAD, Joseph H.	WILKERSON, Leonard C.

### THIRD BATTALION, SECOND MARINES.

	Dar.		357500	IISN & IISN Cemetery Gaviti Grave 4.
PROTE THE R.	>	1 )	00000	
DEHART, Clifford K.	ACk	M-3-2	307496	, Grave 
GRAY, Donald	Sgt	K-5-Z	245588 245588	
HALEHILL, Gorth V.	Pvt	M-3-2	345959	1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HANSON, Lloyd E.	Pvt	1-3-2	357492	Overlay.
HARPHAM, William D.	Pvt	1-3-5	345983	USM & USMC Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave 45.
HELD, William M.	Pfc	L-3-2	346311	•
HERDMAN. Matthew E.Jr.	Pvt	1-3-5	330139	1stMarDiv Cometery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 36, Grave 3.
	Pvt	1-3-5	394493	USN & USMC Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave 47
HOLDEN, Richard A.	Pfc	K-3-2	331148	<b>竹1                                    </b>
JAMES, Willis H.	Pvt	M-3-2	379240	•
KERNER. Harold P.	Cp1	I-3-5	317646	iv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.
KIEG. Robert D.	GySgt	1-3-5	198653	, Gavutu, Grave 43.
KINCAID, Roscal	Cp1	1-7-2	339028	MarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.
KNUTSON, Harold S.	Pvt	1-3-5	346654	USMC Cemetery, Garutu, Grave
KOOTLAS, Frank	Pfc	M-3-2	337288	& USMC Cemetery, Garutu, Grave
KUPER, Kenneth E.	Pfc	M-3-2	317667	SN & USMC Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave 12
LENVIK, Richard W.	Pvt	M-3-2	346179	Guadalcanal, B.S
LISTON, Robert L.	Pvt	1-3-5	348286	& USMC Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave
MACK, Gerald D.	Pfc	1-3-5	331593	C Cemetery, Gavutu, Grave 10
MACOSKI, William B.	Sgt	K-3-2	266447	stMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcan
MURHAY, Eugene L.	Pvt	1-3-5	345961	& USMC
POLLOCK, William H.	Pvt	M-3-2	394499	bomb. Body not found.
REMENARIE, George L.	Pfc	1-3-5	352424	C Cemetery, Garutu, Grave 8.
ROBINSON, Claude M.	Pfc	M-3-2	283243	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 30, Grave b.
RODGER, Paul D.	Pfc	K-3-2	335668	=======================================
THOMPSON, Merl L.	Pvt	M-3-2	328785	by own bomb. Bod
VINCENT, William L.	PhM2/c	Hq-3-2	360-14-05	4e
WAGNER, John R.	Pvt	1-3-5	346645	
WALKER, Russell	PlSgt	1-3-5	193869	
WEISBROD, Robert K.	Pot	1-3-5	337419	o = = =
WHITE, Richard C.	СĎЛ	K-3-2	335598	MarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.
WILL LAMS, William A.	Cp1	1-3-2	315441	USM & USMC Cemetery, Garutu, Grave 6.
WILSON, Carl N.	Pfc	M-3-2	347559	TG
WOODS, Donald O.	HA1/c	Hq-3-2	316-65-27	
WRIGHT, Alanson	Pvt	K-3-2	335150	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 36, Grave 4.

# HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE, SECOND MARINES

		ле 3μ	e 22		Grave		Grave	=	=	=			Grave	=	=		<b>#</b>					=	=		Grave
		i, Grave	. Grave		Row 64.	<u> </u>	Row 69,	۲7	99	202			Row 69,	# 55	172		Row 63					Row 72	בל "		Row 66,
		Tulagi	Tulagi		• I •		I. B	-	-	_			.I., R	-	-		.I., Re					.I., R	_		.I., R
		Beach)	Bks)		S E		M.	=	=	<b>=</b>			1. B.S.	=	=	•	B.S.			-		S.A.	<b>=</b>		M Ω.≖
		#1 (White	. #2 (Police		Guadalcanal		Guadalcanal	#	£	<b>=</b>			Guadalcanal	=	=		Guadalcanal					Guadalcanal	±		Gùadalcanal "
	NES.	Cemetery	Cemetery	SEN	Cemetery,		Cemetery,	#	=	=			Cemetery,	=	=		Cemetery,		• .			Cemetery,	Ė	MARINES.	Cemetery,
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Overlay	YY, SECOND	USN & L	USN & I	N. EIGHTH	1stMarDiv	Battlefield	lstMarDiv	<b>±</b>	=	=	Battlefield	Battlefield	lstMarDiv	=	=	Battleffeld	lstMarDiv	Battlefield	Battlefield	Battlefield	Battleffeld	lstMarDiv	**	ON, EIGHTH	lstMarDiv "
323429	WEAPONS COMPANY	2 2	338701	T BATTALION	362593 222746	266804	361456	313056	363614	315077	343504	350790	378323	332744	275609	310329	311791	312229	270310	266865	313893	395235	306634	ND BATTALION,	1,09573 21,01,91
•	WEAF			FIRST	-																	-		SECOND	
H&S-2		Wpns-2	3-1-2		B-1-8	B-1-8	B-1-8	6-1-8	6-1-8	A-1-8	B-1-8	B-1-8	B-1-8	6-1-8	0-1-8	B-1-8	B-1-8	B-1-8	B-1-8	B-1-8	B-1-8	6-1-8	C-1-8		B-2-8 G-2-8
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Cpl		Pvt	Pvt		Pf.	CoJ	Pvt	Pfc	Pvt	Pfc	• Pvt	Pvt	Pvt	Pvt	Pfc	Pvt	Çpl	Pfc	Pfc	Sgt	Pfc	Pvt	Pfc		Pvt 2dLt.
		О о	<u>•</u> ·		ပ် þ		Jr.		J.	'n	R., Jr.	دا ا <del>برا</del>				•		ard J.	ond J.	•					
HOWARD, Edwin A.		SHOEMAKER, Claude D.	Joseph L	. '	nthony	ANTONSEN, RUGGII ASHRB Dovle H.		BURKE, Michael R.	GAUTHIER, Arthur	HURLEY, Perry O'n	HUTCHENS, James R.,	KESSINGER, Robert	er M.	bert J	lden L	John W. G.	Claude H.	SCALESINGER, Howard	, Raymond	William A	Jack B.	Edward H.	Doyle A.		is M. len E.
RD, Ed		MAKER,	KS, Jo		ALMEIDA, Anthony	ANTONSEN, RUUD. ASHER Dovle H.	BELL James A.	E, Mic	HIER,	EY, Pe	HENS,	INGER,	KUSS, Walter M.	MADDEN. Robert	NYREHN, Nelden	N, Joh		ESINGE	SCHULTHIES,	H. Wil				•	ALLEN, Lewis M. BURNHAM, Glen E
HOWA		SHOE	SPARKS,	·	ALME	ASHR	BELL	BURK	GAUT	HURL	HUTC	KESS	KUSS	MADD	NYRE	CNNEN.	OUTLAW,	SChi	SCHO	SMITH.	SOMERS	WEEKLY	WRIGHT,		ALLE
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DATECH. Cherles W. Fro. 7-2-8 112266   1978							
Outed W. Friet Page 8 19937 Institution.  Notice 7: 18-28 19937 Institution.  Notice 7: 18-28 19937 Institution.  Notice 8 18-28 19937 Institution.  Notice 9: 22-28 19945 Institution.  Atturn J. Pat 18-28 19945 Institution.  America 7: 18-28 19945 Institution.  Notice 9: 18-28 19945 Institution.  Notice 18: 18-28 19946 Institution.  Note 18: 18-28 19949 Institution.  Note 18: 18: 18: 18: 18: 18: 18: 18: 18: 18:	DAVISON, Charles W.	Pfc	年 (1 (2 (3 (4)	312266	Cemetery,	, B.S.I., Row 69,	ave 2
The state	DICK, Jonath ESSINGER, Flood W.	PISE Pot	F-2-8	101767	Battlefield.		
Reference   Care   Selection	FORNALIK, Walter	5 2	Hq-2-8	369337	emetery.	, B.S.I., Row 70	9=
George B. 011 G-2-8 505342 Estilation and a string of the	FRANSEN, Robert	$c_{ m pl}$	E-2-8	281290	Battlefield.		
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For F-2-8 392484 Battlefield.  For F-2-8 32206 Battlefield.  J. Pro F-2-8 31218 Battlefield.  For F-2-8 31218 Battlefield.  For F-2-8 312097 Battlefield.  For F-2-8 376266 Battlefield.  For F-2-8 376266 Battlefield.  For F-2-8 376266 Battlefield.  For Hq-2-8 39996 Battlefield.  For Hq-2-8 39996 Battlefield.  For Hq-2-8 36996 Battlefield.  For Hq-2-8 36996 Battlefield.  For Hq-2-8 36996 Battlefield.  For Hq-2-8 36996 Battlefield.  For Hq-2-8 369996 Battlefield.  For Hq-2-8 36996 Battlefield.  For Hq-2-8 36996 Battlefield.  For Hq-2-8 36999 Battlefield.	KINNEY	Pfc	F-2-8	320082	Battlefield.		
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BIANCHI, Ordeo P. WONIZ, James W. C	Pfc Opl	Band-182 Band-182	31032383 20104088	lstMarDiv Gemetery,	Guadalcanal, B.S.I.	. Row 63, Grave 6
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DECECCA, Charles A. P: NUTILE, John A. P:	Pfc Pfc	Med-182 Med-182	20106717 31031655	Battlefield. Battlefield.		

#### FIRST BATTALION, 182nd INFANTRY

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Pvt Pvt Sgt Pvt Pvt Pvt Pvt	Opl Pfc Pfc Pfc Pvt Pfc 2dLt.	Pet Pre Pre Pre Pre Opl SdLf. Pre	Pfc Pvt Pvt 2dit. Sgt
AKERMAN, Lincoln H. ANSANITIS, Frencis S. BANCROFT, John D. CONNOLLY, Bartholomew CUMMINGS, Cherles H. DELVA, Harry E. DOUCETTF, Albany A. ESTELL Paul T.	FARIEY, Janes L. FOLEY, Waler M. GABC, Stanford I. GIVEN William H. HURLEY, John E. KAPLAN, Morris S. KLASS Barnet LAZAZZERO, Arthur J.	IEARY, Thomas E. IOZEAU, Arthur J. NORETSKY, Sidney S. POULIN, Marrice J. PUCHALSKI, William RUSSELL, Allan RUSSELL, Joseph G. SHEA, Howard F. STABILE, John P. TALOKOWSKI, Frank A.	BASTINELLI, Frank BEGNOCHE, Ernest H. CARAWAN, Marion D. CLARK, Richmond S. DUNN, Kenneth J. ESSIEMBRE, Adrian G.

Battlefield. lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 71, Grave 2. Battlefield. Battlefield.	TE COMMAND IstMarDi	AVIA	USA - 71  lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 30, Grave 9.  ER SQUADRON (USA)	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 30, Grave 8. USN & USMC Cemetery #1 (White Beach) Tulagi, Grave 21 ARTILLERY BATTALION	Battlefield.	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 5, Grave 9.	USN & USMC Cemetery #1 (White Beach) Tulagi, Grave 33. lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 5, Grave 9.
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LANIGAN, Thomas F. WURPHY, Lawrence J. PAIMER, William F. PARRY, Charles E. WILLIAMS, Lloyd C.	MUNRO, Douglas A.	LANIGAN, E	KEPHART, William P.	HOUSTON, Louie F. STERN, H	POPEL, George	PETERSON, Layne W.	ENDRES, Clyde D. SAHLBERG, Harold E.

The following personnel are men who were killed in action or died as a result of wounds aboard U. S. Naval vessels. They are U. S. Navy personnel and are bried in the First Marine Division area in the Solomon Islands.

#### I S. S. CALHOUN

lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 6, Grave 10.	GREGORY	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 7, Grave 10.	LAFFEY	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 60, Grave 4.	WALKE	USN & USMC Cemetery #1 (White Beach) Tulagi, Grave 82.		28	1)	ATLANTA	lstMarDiv Cemetery, Guadalcanal, B.S.I., Row 59, Grave 9.	1 1 29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	<b>=</b> :	
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ALFORD, Albert A. FIEBERT, J. T.		DECKER, Ernest E. SHEEHAN, John F.		CHASE, GL.		CLARKE, Irwin R. DOUGHERIY, Anthony W.	HERMAN, Ludwig L.	SCOTT, Reaves C.	WATSON, Elmer L. WOODS, John J.		BELAIRE, Wesley C. FUZER, Peter	MC GRATH, Thomas J. PEAKE, Frederick O.	SULLIVAN, William T.	Wilson, Ira W.

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#### S. S. PENSACOLA

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PAGE, J W.	6 6	2	Ė	300-24	0/-	Gemetery	#1;	Let	#1,	(Next	to M	ite B	each) T	ulagi,	Grave	_
PARKS, J. B.	نن	Ė	<b>*</b>	دم خن	6+ 6+	=	Ė	=	Ė,	=	<b>±</b>	=	=	==	ŧ	131
POWELL, F. A.	رب د م د ن	<b>=</b>		نے نے	ن مع	=	=	=	=	=	Ė	<u>}</u>	=	È	=	1,10
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SMYTH, F	64 64	=	¥	618-02	-75	=	Ħ	=	æ	=	<b>⊭</b>	Ė	=	=	£	23
SOUTHERLAND, W R.	دی دی	<b>E</b>	=	562-60	-68	<b>:</b>	=	<b>±</b>	=	=	=	<b>±</b>	=	=	E	25,
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THOMAS, D.	2 2 2	=	=	368-49	-93	=	=	#	<b>±</b>	=	=	=	=	E	=	36
WILSON, R A.	2 2 2	Ě	=	<u>د</u>	ر مع	=	±	÷	=	±	=	=	=	Æ	r	13

#### U. S. S. NEW ORLEANS

USS New Orleans 376-17-41 Cemetery #1, Lot #1, (Next to White Beach) Tulagi, Grave 111

ALVERSON, Francis J.



BARRON, D E.	رم در	USS	New	Orlean	8/346-81-23	Cemetery	y #1,	Lot	#1,	(Next	t	White		Beach) Th	Tulagi,	Grave	211
BIRNEY, Samuel P.	CSK(AA)	= =	= =	= :		= =	= =	= =	= =	= =	= =	= :		==	= =	= =	0 0
BLUHM, Russell K.	17.7 C	<b>:</b> :	= :		12/c-14-05	<b>=</b> ;	= :	= :	= :	= :	= ;	= :		= ;	= :	: :	ر ا ا
BRENDEN, E. M.	c- c-	=	=	-	90-20-199	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	=	= :	J C
BROOKE, H. M.	رم در در	=	=	=_	632-12-83	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	=	=	53
CARLTON, L S.	6	=	=	. <b>=</b>	~	<b>=</b>	=	=	=	=	=	=		<b>∓</b> '	=	=	115
CASTLLAS T	2 2	=	=	=	625-06-47	=	=	=	=	=	=	Ŧ		=	=	<b>=</b>	106
CAYCE W	2 2 2	=	=	=	356-65-21	=	=	<b>=</b>	=	Ξ	=	=		=	=	=	137
COWDRY, R. M.	وسن وسن وس	=	=	=	1498-50-35	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		r	=	=	147
CRAM. L	رب د. د.	=	=	=	518-58-37	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	#	=	120
CRANDALL. A J.	2 2 2	=	=	=		=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	=	=	119
CREEL, W.	د.	=	=	=	617-18-01	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	=	=	143
CREWS, R. S.	رس دست دست	=	=	=	300-04-55	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	=	=	110
CROUSE, A. R.	6-	=	=	=	381-55-59	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	<b>=</b>	=	122
DALE. D E.	رم ده	=	=	=	1	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	=	=	116
DOWNING. R. F.	ر ده د	=	=	=	-90-3	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	=	=	59
DUBOUS. D. L.	رب در	=	=	=	-85-4	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	F	÷	1,46
EDMONDSON, Cecil L.	\$2/c	=	=	=	633-94-25	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		<b>77</b>	=	=	124
EDWARDS, G H.		=	=	=	-17-3	=	=	=	=	=	<del>=</del>	=		÷.	=	=	114
EMMONS R		=	=	=		=	=	.=	==	=	=	=		=	=	=	50
ENGLISH, Claude J.	S2/c	=	=	=	670-68-52	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	<b>=</b>	=	.₫
EVANS, IL	LtComdr	=	=	=	officer	USN & U	USMC C	Cemet	ery	#J (W	White		Beach) I	Tulagi.	Grave		
FOREMAN, A	Ens.	=	=	=	officer	=	=	=	1	=	=			=	#	10¢	
GAEDECKE, F	٠	=	=	=	654-01-77	Gemetery	y #1,	Lot	#1,	(Next	40	Whit	e Bea	ch) Tul	ag1,	Grave	103
GISON, M	م د م	=	=	=	420-50-39	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	<b>=</b>	56
GRACE, F	2 2 2	=	=	=	632-21-95	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	=	61
GUSTAFSON, J.	د- د-	=	=	.: =	1382-53-011	<b>*</b>	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	<b>#</b>	66
GUSTAFSON, M H.	ر. د- د-	=	=	=	1382-53-011	=	=	=	=	=	=	=	=		=	=	107
HAINES, R. A.	it.	=	=	<b>.</b>	-1	USN & U	SMC	Cemet	ery	#1 (W	hite	Beach	ch) T	ulagi.	Grave	103	
HAMLIN, F	Lt(.jg)	=	=	=	officer	=	=	=	•	, =	=	=		· =	<b>=</b>	102	
HAYTER, H	LtComdr	#	==	= ,.	Officer	=	=	=		=	=	=		<b>≟</b> .	=	101	
HIATT, V C.	C+	=	=	<b>=</b>	342-19-00	Cemetery	у <u>М</u> ,	Lot	#1(	Next	40	Whit	te Beach)	ich) Tul	agi,	Згате	109
JESSEE, R. M.	ر د د د د	=0	=	=	382-67-63	2	,=- >	= .	=	=	=	=			· :=	=	27,
LADNIER, C W.	* * *	=	=	=	, c- , c-	USN & U	USMC C	emet	ery	#1 (w	(White	Beach	$\overline{}$	Tulagi,	Grave	93.	
MARTS, A	(r. (	= :	= :	<b>=</b> :	372-33-82	ete	y #1,	Lot	#1,	Next	to	Whit	ဆို	. ユ	lagi,	Frave	51
MC INTOSH, R M.	6 6	= .	=	<b>=</b>	اب دم دم	=	=	= 	=	=	=	=	=		=	=	<b>9</b> .



CARLTON, L L. CARRAWAY, G D. COBB, J M. ENGSTROM, Warren L. FOX, C	eman L.	WASHBURN, R. G.	H. W	Gus J.	S. G.	開設	o ⊢	<b>e</b> 4 is	S C B	IN M	PYE, William RANRY, H L.	PHILLIPS, Walter R., Jr	I, A	PASTREE R H.	`
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	n 58	102	3 121 121 ::	* 118	13h	# 62 100	136	25 to 5	801 m	132	五月	- 55°	= : 50	Grave 133	

